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Abstract.
This thesis focuses on the participation of worker representatives in the management of
health and safety at workplace level in Britain and Germany. Case studies were carried out in
both the public and private sectors, largely based on semi-structured interviews with key
personnel in the regulation of safety, but also involving the analysis of company and sectoral
information on accident prevention, the observation of meetings and information briefings at
various organisational levels, and the use of questionnaires in two cases. The main aims of
the research have been to illuminate the tensions inherent in attempts to guarantee safe
workplaces and to prevent accidents through analysis of the functions and contributions that
worker representatives, union officials and managers make within formal and informal
practices of involvement and participation. The reason behind a cross-national perspective
lay in the similarities that exist in the regulation of health and safety, and the radical
differences in the structures of trade union and workplace representation that exist in the two
countries.
I found that employment in the public and private sectors embodies different conceptions of
both the extent and quality of work pressure. Within this, capital intensive workplaces are
more likely to obscure fundamental tensions between the pursuit of profit and the provision
of safe working conditions. The role of management is of central importance in screening and
shaping the particular way in which involvement (statutory/non-statutory; formal/informal) in
safety regulation takes place. In each workplace, formal mechanisms for participation were
marginalised, albeit in different ways. Furthermore, I found that extensions to the basic floor
of rights in the regulation of health and safety were dependent on a range of factors external
to the specific nature of protective legislation itself. In particular, the control of work, and the
pace of work especially, seems to act as a critical factor in the relationship between hazard
generation/prevention on the one hand, and forms of participation and involvement in safety
regulation on the other.
I argue in the thesis that safety regulation is inherently a collective issue. The research shows
the different ways in which disaggregative factors obstruct the expression of collective
interests in health and safety management. Both management and workers are heterogeneous
groups, onto which it is difficult to apply simple notions of interest. In addition, forms of
collective regulation of workplace safety must co-exist with the highly individualised context
in which accidents, and the blame for accidents, take place. Furthermore, effective
participation in safety management depends on the degree to which safety can be made
t1visible 11 alongside more traditional industrial relations agenda items such as pay. Finally, I
argue that the mutually reinforcing relationship between the two channels of worker
representation in Germany has been overstated in the existing literature, with this research
pointing to a more clear-cut separation of functions between the two bodies, and to the
existence of an imbalance in the legitimacy of the two bodies in safety participation at
workplace level. Furthermore, cumulative-type relationships in the regulation of safety
appear to depend more on the particular working, organisational and sectoral environment in
which management takes place in each country, than on the formal legislative provisions for
participation that separate Germany from Britain.
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Chapter 1.
Worker participation in the management of health and safety; the evolution of a
framework for empirical research and analysis.
"The UK government has rightly opposed the prescriptive and
inflexible nature of many of the directive's [on working time]
proposals, for example the 48-hour limit on weekly working. But
hitherto, the UK government has conveyed the impression that any
minimum standards in the field of employment are an affront to the
voluntarism of British industrial relations. This aggressive stance has
created an equal and opposite response from the Commission and from
some other EC countries that might have been sympathetic to the UK's
stance. It has also led to the Commission's absurd introduction of the
working time directive as health and safety legislation, requiring only a
qualified majority to pass, so side-stepping the UK veto." Financial
Times editorial, 1/5/92, my emphasis.
"...almost half of the EC workforce does not have the. opportunity to
give an opinion or make suggestions about improvements to their
working environment." Hygeia, European Foundation/European
Commission bulletin, issue No. l3,pl.
2(i) Introduction
This thesis is about the participation of worker representatives in the management and
regulation of health and safety in four workplaces. The objective of this chapter is to
create a framework for an empirical and theoretical analysis of both worker
participation, and health and safety, in a cross-national perspective. This does not
only involve the analysis of "participation in health and safety" as a specific set of
practices with a well-defined institutional set-up (i.e. safety representatives and safety
committees in the UK and similar bodies in Germany). Rather, the objective of this
thesis is also to consider the relationship between systems, institutions and practices
of worker participation on the one hand, and the management and regulation of
health and safety at workplace level in both the private and public sectors in Britain
and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other. Thus, whilst both worker
participation (Poole,1986; Ramsay,1985; Brannen, 1976 and 1983; Clegg, 1977;
Feldman,1982; Batstone, et al,1983 etc.), and the regulation of health and safety
(Beaumont,1983; Drake and Wright,1983; James and Lewis, 1986; Lewis,1977;
Dawson et al.,1988; Diekershoff,1979 etc.) are well-researched issues in industrial
relations, the attempt to analyse this interface between health and safety, and
participation, in a cross national perspective involves the analysis of a new set of
factors and relationships. This chapter aims to draw out and discuss the debates and
arguments which the relationship between these two separate fields throws up.
An issue which has arisen in the course of the research, as the theoretical framework
has been revised and subjected to criticism, is the extent to which either
"participation" or "health and safety" forms the key focus; i.e. am I to use health and
safety to illuminate the way in which we think of worker participation in decision-
making, or vice versa, am I to focus on what participation tells us about the issues
surrounding health and safety? The reason for this ambivalence again is that each
field has a long separate identity in the history of social research, and each operates
3within its own body of theoretical dilemmas and established frames of reference. I
began the research with a strong interest in the issue of participation, and the
theoretical and practical problems it throws up, particularly in cross-national
comparison. The original intention was to use health and safety as a tool for
investigating these issues in a fieldwork setting. However, the issues that have arisen
have required a rethink in terms of the balance which is given to the two issues. The
research carried out for this thesis aims therefore to synthesise these two somewhat
disparate fields of analysis, seeing the issues raised by worker participation to be
closely parallelled in many ways with those of the management of health and safety.
This chapter seeks to elaborate this relationship between the two areas, and section
(iv) expands on the nature of the relationship between safety regulation and forms of
participation and involvement, pointing to the benefits that this synthesis has for
cross-national and cross-sectoral research.
The starting points for such an analysis are (i) the relative similarity of the legal and
institutional provisions for involvement of worker representatives in the management
of narrowly defined health and safety problems and issues in the two countries, and
(ii) the well-documented (eg. Clegg,1977; Maitland,1983; Fox 1977) dissimilarity in
the field of worker participation and industrial democracy, as well as in other features
of the broad industrial relations system such as the structure of trade unionism, the
degree of centralism in collective bargaining, the role of labour law etc., outlined in
more detail in chapter 2. The first starting point made it possible for me to conduct
relatively systematic and well-matched comparative research, dealing with apparatus,
institutions and legislation of health and safety with a high degree of similarity
between the two countries. The second starting point informed the study of the very
different context in which these institutions of health and safety operate in practice .
Cross-national and cross-sectoral analysis of health and safety has the advantage that
it deals with roughly comparable systems of participation of worker representatives in
management. This convergence however contrasts with the divergence in the
4relationship between health and safety management on the one hand, and the national,
sectoral and workplace-specific contexts in which it takes place on the other. In order
to achieve a synthesis of a theoretical framework involving worker participation and
health and safety, however, it is necessary to review existing research in both fields.
Only a few studies have previously attempted to study issues of participation
alongside those surrounding the management of health and safety (eg. Walters (1990),
Beaumont(1980;1982)); most focus on either participation or on health and safety
issues alone without examining the implications that each has for the other. That is
one of the central objectives of this chapter.
The next section looks at the thorny issue of worker participation, and in particular
the problems of definition and operationalisation, especially within a comparative
setting, which have made good research problematic. It is my contention that attempts
to define worker participation solely through an emphasis on formal institutions of
representation are inadequate, as indeed are those which seek to find a functional
equivalence between employee representatives operating within highly different
social, legal and cultural contexts. Instead, I argue that participation must be located
within and analysis of "relations of dominance" (Cressey et al.,1985:135); that is, that
practices of consultation, participation and involvement, whether operating on a
voluntary basis, or established through a body of protective labour law, form part of a
much broader set of relationships which exist between employers, workers and trade
unions. These relationships, in turn, centre on issues of control central to the purpose
and structure of enterprises and organisations. Further, I argue that this means that
studies of participation should not confine themselves to conflict over first-order
issues such as investment priorities, resource allocation, specific management policies
etc. Participation is also about processes and procedures, and therefore also
necessarily involves the negotiation of legitimacy regarding both participation itself
and the way in which managerial control of the organisation of work is contested.
These arguments are preceded by a brief discussion of the Marxian legacy of much of
5the debate on the nature of control and the subordination of labour at the point of
production.
This section also looks at the issue of statutory participation in the specific context of
the post-war German experience in industrial relations, worker representation and the
development of a highly codified works constitution governing participation
practices2, through a discussion of the concept of "cumulation" (eg.
Streeck,1984:407-408). By this term, I refer to a relatively brotd body of argument
which emphasises the positive value, for trade union representation at workplace
level, of legislatively based systems of participation. In particular, in the German
context, the argument for cumulation is that certain fundamental rights, eg. to
information, prior consultation etc., are mutually reinforcing in their effect, and serve
to blur the edges of legally prescribed channels of representation (whereby the works
council and not the trade union is the vehicle for interest representation at workplace
level), consequently giving trade unions in Germany de facto rather than de jure
workplace influence and power3 . Cumulation is therefore essentially an issue of
forms and practices of interest representation. It involves the analysis of different
forms and channels of representation and is therefore of importance for our
understanding of the implementation of protective legislation in the sphere of health
and safety, and not just with regard to forms of participathn themselves. Given the
existence of similar frameworks of health and safety legislation in the UK and
Germany (the floor of rights), the arguments about cumulation are important in a
comparative sense, as well as in relation to German industrial relations. By this I
mean that the operation of different channels of interest representation is a key to
understanding how participation in health and safety management takes place, and
informs our understanding of the nature of safety regulation and tells us more about
the opportunities and limitations that different structures of industrial relations and
involvement possess.
6There then follows a section containing a discussion of the issues surrounding
participation and workplace trade unionism with respect to health and safety
provision at establishment level. In some ways, the arguments used can be seen as
parallel to those outlined in the preceding section on worker participation; firstly, it is
my contention (following Moore, 1991; Nichols, 1973) that an analysis of
occupational safety and health, the distribution and incidence of fatal and non-fatal
accidents as well as other indicators of poor safety and health on the part of
employees, and the efficacy and success of institutions of involyement in health and
safety, should be set within an understanding of the broader politics of production at
workplace level. This requires that accidents and unsafe working conditions and
practices be seen within the framework of production requirements, managerial
priorities, the allocation of scarce resources and competitive product markets. Yet the
prevention of accidents and hazards is also related to broader political and economic
factors, such as the health of the economy and the relative strength of organised
labour in dealings with capital. This broader level is beyond the scope of a workplace-
based thesis, but the issues are still salient and I review key themes later in this
chapter. In each of the case studies, the wider framework of job control, the
organisation, pace and pressure of work, and managerial strategy regarding the
control and utiisation of labour emerged as of vital importance in underpinning the
operation of formal participation machinery and union responses to safety regulation
issues. In particular, the comparative experiences of the British and German public
sectors on the one hand, and the public and private sectors generally on the other,
became key axes for the analytical organisation of the material.
Secondly, a key aspect of this health and safety management within organisations of
different kinds is the extent to which consultation, negotiation and bargaining are seen
as appropriate modes of relating between representatives of management and the
workforce. These issues have played a particularly important role in the sphere of
health and safety in the British context, with the issues of negotiation and consultation
7being central to the discussions of the Robens Committee (Robens,1972). They have
also had an important effect on the framing of the Health and Safety at Work Act
(HASAWA) in 1974 and the Safety Representative and Safety Committee (SRSC)
regulations of 1977, and are discussed in greater detail in this section. In this context,
I argue that the management of health and safety is inherently an issue for the
potential expression of collective interests on the part of workers; that is, health and
safety management can be a central theme for trade unions and worker
representatives in their relations with employers and managers. The extent to which
issues surrounding safety become collective issues, as well as the precise nature of
this collective expression, in the face of much received wisdom which stresses the
role of the individual employee as responsible for his/her own safety, is a question for
the fieldwork to address, and a section of each case study is devoted to the discussion
of issues of representation and collective safety regulation.
Section (iv) of this chapter attempts to synthesise the previous discussions of both
worker participation and health and safety regulation. In particular, I highlight the
important issues that have arisen from the discussion, and discuss how they have
shaped and informed the fieldwork. Several key groups of issues emerge from
sections (ii) and (iii); it is my contention that many fundamental problems
surrounding the participation of worker representatives in decision-making, and the
range of processes and practices which seek to maintain safe working conditions,
overlap to a great extent, and the choice of comparative, cross-sectoral research was
made with these issues in mind. This section elaborates on the way in which the
fieldwork chapters serve to illuminate our understanding of these complex and diverse
issues.
The final section attempts to point the way forward towards the framing of more
focused research issues for the subsequent fieldwork. I am careful not to pose the
central research questions as simplistic hypotheses which would dictate an
8inappropriate set of research methods 4; rather, given the cross-national, and cross-
sectoral, nature of the enquiry, I attempt to move from my discussions of the literature
with respect to both worker participation and the management of health and safety to
a formulation of three sets of questions, and research issues in general, that I then take
forward into the fieldwork at establishment level, and which therefore serve as a link
to the case study chapters. In addition, I attempt in the final section of this chapter to
relate the clusters of research questions to the structure of the research design and in
particular to the relevance of a cross-national and cross-sectoral siudy.
(ii) Worker participation, industrial democracy and the fundamental problem of
management.
Worker participation and industrial democracy are broad and difficult fields. The
practices they describe can range from worker management and ownership, to
consultation committees, worker directors, share ownership and profit-sharing
schemes, through to quality circles, briefing groups, team working etc. For this
reason, what can be achieved from analysing pailicipation is inevitably dependent on
the broader framework which is adopted for such a study; ie. on what one takes as the
definition of participation and the reference point for study. This represents the
inevitable problem of definition - the need to be specific and systematic in the
inclusion of some things within 'participation" and the exclusion of others, alongside
the likelihood that an over-reliance on formal institutions of participation will render
research methods inflexible to the context in which participation operates.
I would begin by defining participation as an expression of inherent tensions in the
function of management itself, rather than as a neat set of institutions and practices:-
9The perennial interest in workers' participation in management
indicates that it concerns a fundamental problem of industrial
organisation. (Walker, 1975:434, my emphasis)
It is therefore important not to overestimate the role of somewhat reified "national
characteristics" and traditions in understanding patterns and practices of participation
(eg. Bean,1985:164). The participation of worker representatives in decision-making
is essentially an issue of power, the control of work and the ability of those
representatives to influence both decisions and decision-making processes. In this
sense, studies of worker participation concern themselves with a common ground of
paradigms and central issues, especially when the regulation of workplace health and
safety is concerned.
However, this is not sufficient as a starting point for empirical enquiry; rather, we
need to look in more detail at the way in which participation has been approached by
a variety of authors in industrial relations, in order to refine the parameters and
opportunities in this study. A major contribution to the theoretical debates concerning
worker participation and involvement, as opposed to essentially empirical, case-study
based analyses which do not systematically criticise the notion of participation itself
(eg. Marchington 1990), is made by Poole (1986). He utilises a multidimensional
typology of worker participation in an attempt to construct a framework for looking at
both the long-term development of participative machinery, and the relative weight of
factors external @olitical economy, the global strength of labour and capital etc.) and
internal (values held by agents) to the production process. This typology contains a
series of paired opposites which characterise practices and forms of participation;
voluntarist schemes as against those based on some kind of statutory employment or
company law - initiated by management, by employees, by trade unions or by
politicians (or indeed a combination of these). It can be direct or indirect
participation, worker representatives may be non-union only, union only, or a mixture
of the two. The scope of issues covered by participation and involvement
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arrangements can vary5. They can be unitarist or pluralist. Participation can be
introduced at the behest of both sides of industry, or through the greater ability of one
side to unilaterally establish new machinery. This potential for diversity in the
practice of worker participation helps to explain why it can be used to serve such
disparate ends; for example, as a vehicle for by-passing trade union representation at
workplace level, or as a way of workers seeking to enhance their ability to challenge
the managerial power of employers (eg. Ogden,1981:548), and Poole is right in
arguing that there is a great deal of flexibility and complex causality involved in
worker participation depending on the particular formation of these factors in each
case (Poole, 1986:8788)6.
The approach of Poole, whilst extremely valuable in setting the broad parameters for
the complex study of institutions of participation, represents both methodological as
well as theoretical weaknesses, reproduced in the work of other authors7. Poole,
makes several unsatisfactory assumptions about the nature of both participation and
other aspects of industrial relations; for example, that there is an inherent reluctance
on the part of managers to initiate participative schemes given their wish to defend a
kind of managerial space in the organisation (Poole,1986:41-42). Yet Poole also
argues that:-
such developments [managerial interest in involvement and
participation] are almost certain to expand in the years ahead, partly
because of the competitive advantages to be gained by introducing
experiments of this nature. (Poole, 1986:173).
It is my contention that one can assume no such thing, and that both the existence and
particular nature of forms of participation are both highly variable and related to the
very tensions inherent in the nature of management in organisations on the other. In
particular, the interaction between the issues that are addressed on the one hand (eg.
safety regulation), and the forms of legitimacy, conflict and consent attached to the
process of involvement itself is of key importance in this thesis. This does not mean
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that institutions of participation are not important, and I do seek to draw on some of
the methodological strengths of Poole's analysis in this thesis, particularly in trying to
analyse the context in which diverse forms and practices of participation takes place.
It is impossible to carry out a study of participation without focusing to some extent
on formal mechanisms (safety committees, especially) for the involvement of worker
representatives, although on the whole Poole's analysis is somewhat historicist in
seeing participation simply as part of the ebb and flow of institutionalised industrial
relations.	 -
A second approach in the study of worker participation is to focus on the functions
which a diverse set of agents and institutions fulfil in work relations (eg. Sorge,1976).
This approach allows one to compare equivalent functions across systems or
countries, such as the function of the works council in Germany with, for example,
that of the shop stewards committees in the UK. Whilst this framework would enable
one to view widely differing practices as "participative", and thereby get away from a
rigid institutional analysis, there are problems involved with such an approach. The
initial problem is with attempting to identify precisely what the functions of
participants actually are. Who can easily define accurately what the functions of a
shop steward vis a vis members, employers, union officials etc., are? Furthermore,
Sorge assumes, like Poole, that there is some kind of inevitable progress involved in
schemes of worker participation, and that it is simply a matter of cross-national
investigation as to how different cultures and nations fulfil the same functions. If the
analysis of Poole is historicist, then that of Sorge is a-historical and teleological;
worker participation becomes a function of modern production requirements, in the
solution of technical problems, in attempts to "humanise" work, or reduce alienation.
Worker participation, however, cannot be reduced to a single idiom whereby the
functions it performs become the focus of academic analysis, and where the
specificity of each set of practices and relations are subsumed in a simplistic manner
within much broader categories of functional analysis. However, the comparison of
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functional equivalents must form one central part of cross-national research of safety
involvement, and I make use of such an approach in this thesis. The reason for this is
to avoid lengthy submersion in debates about the differences and similarities between
worker participation and collective bargaining 8. The similarity between key
legislation on safety regulation in the two countries allows us to look at the role of
people who in some respects can be seen as functional equivalents (safety
offlcer/Fachkraft, safety representative/SBA etc; see later). In this thesis, however, my
research does not hinge solely on the precise comparison of functional equivalents.
The comparison of the role of safety representatives in Britain and Germany is used
as a means to an end, in illuminating the problems and opportunities that different
structures of trade unionism and workplace interest representation present for the
involvement of workers in the management of safety.
Davies (1986:74-78) categorises studies of worker participation and industrial
democracy in three ways. Firstly, there is the political approach to worker
participation, which arises out of the struggles of both the trade union movement and
the political left, and is concerned with challenging the power and prerogative of
management and employers at workplace and enterprise level. The fierce debates
within the German trade union movement during the 1950s and 1960s 9, over the
extension of parity representation on supervisory boards is an example of this, as was,
in a way, the report of the Bullock committee (Bullock,1977) and the approach of the
last Labour administration towards the extension of industrial democracy in Britain.
The second approach, according to Davies, stems from industrial psychology analysis
and is centred on programmes involving the attempt to enlarge jobs and reduce
alienation. The Hurnanisierung der Arbeit (humanisation of work) programme,
sponsored by the West German government in the 1970s was an example of this,
although such job enrichment or enlargement programmes are usually company-wide
initiatives 10. The final approach is productivity-led, and concerns the attempt to
release human resources and potential more fully so that efficiency and commitment
13
from the workforce is enhanced. The growth of direct communication, quality circles
and briefing groups (the so-called "new managerial techniques"), as well as other
usually management-led initiatives, are examples of this approach.
It is of course possible that these three broad approaches to participation will overlap,
particularly as the different groups involved (unions, politicians, employees,
managers, employers etc.) may often have competing claims for the same set of
institutions and initiatives1 1 The contribution that the categorisation of Davies offers
is introducing the concept of heterogeneity in the perceptions that key actors hold
about the nature of participation in everyday situations, although her reliance on
descriptive analysis contains similar weaknesses to Poole's arguments. It is important,
therefore, to recognise that participation is not a homogeneous category of social
research, and is heavily dependent on the rationale behind it, the interests of groups
and individuals who participate and the nature of the claims that are made for
participation as such. Such a view informs my treatment of what participation
represents in this thesis. A central issue in the analysis of participation of health and
safety management in this thesis is the different ways in which unions, safety
representatives and works councils manage the representation of heterogeneous safety
interests. As we shall see later, this heterogeneity is a complex factor in understanding
how participation takes place, with a variety of practices separating groups of workers
from each other in terms of safety interests, and an under-emphasised disjuncture
between forms of collective representation and the processes which individualise the
way in which the safety and health of workers are seen.
Ramsay (1977 :498) likewise argues that the divergent expectations and
interpretations placed on schemes of participation render it impossible to study as a
completely uniform phenomenon:-
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The key lies in understanding the differing and contradictory
interpretations, held by the two sides, of this notion of participation.
(Ramsay,1977:498, my emphasis).
This approach has been important in structuring the fieldwork in this thesis. My focus
is on first-order problems, such as disagreements between representative bodies and
management over specific safety issues, and on the function and role of the process of
participation itself, and what these processes tell us about the management of safety
and the ambiguities of interest representation 12
Ramsay also makes a further important point concerning the nature of specifically
management-led participation and involvement, as well as job enlargement schemes
and programmes etc. He claims that these management-led initiatives do not have
productivity and efficiency as their raison d'être; rather, the appeal of involvement
and participation is in the way it can help generate and sustain legitimacy and consent
for the very notion of management itself (Ramsay,1985:58-60). Thus, participation
involves a process whereby legitimacy, not just for substantive decisions, but for
positions and structures of power and representation as well, are challenged and
negotiated. He supports this with case study evidence which shows the most
important element in job enrichment schemes to be the legitimacy of the managerial
prerogative (see also, Cressey et aL1985:22-23). He uses this to then argue that cycles
of participation, or interest in participation, tend to be related to times when
managerial control is threatened in some way, requiring new forms of legitimation 13
In another work, Ramsay shows how management-led initiatives in participation,
involvement and job reform, are often couched in terms of the productive benefits that
are intended to result, but in practice involve only pseudo-democratic changes, and a
large degree of worker apathy14.
To pause and take stock for a moment, it is clear from the above discussions that it is
impossible to arrive at some sort of "universal" theory of participation. Analyses that
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focus on the institutions of involvement are likely to lack a theoretical understanding
and critique of the relationships of power and conflict, as well as the negotiation of
consent, which exist in the workplace. They can at most help us to correlate the
existence and type of participation involved, with other factors such as workplace
size, density of trade unionism and macro-economic performance, even if some
authors who have attempted such correlations have produced questionable
conclusions 15 . On the other hand, those approaches which analyse participation in
terms of the wider functions that are inherent in the employment relationship, at
whatever level, are likely to be a-historical, and allow no room for the specificities
and peculiarities which permeate such a diverse field of study.
Whilst it is impossible to establish a universally applicable theory of worker
participation and industrial democracy, I wish to argue that it is possible to view
participation and industrial democracy, whether initiated by management, employees
or trade unions, as being generated out of fundamental tensions involved in the
management of labour, as the earlier quote from Walker (1975:434) indicates.
Furthermore, as Ramsay argues, studies of participation should focus on the
negotiation of conflict and consent, and on the differing forms and degrees of
legitimacy that different actors in the organisation seek to gain from participative
practices. In this thesis, worker participation is treated as a set of formal and informal,
statutory and voluntarist, practices which confront tensions in the function of
management (more particularly, the management of health and safety, and the control
of working methods and work itself), and which are particularly concerned with the
intervention of worker representatives in decision-making processes. The complexity
and diversity of the institutional and legal framework (see chapter 2) in the two
countries forms the basis of the cross-national comparative focus I have chosen.
So far, we have looked at a variety of approaches that have been taken by authors
concerning themselves with worker participation. I would like to move now to a more
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detailed analysis of some of the central themes in the involvement of worker
representatives in decision-making, and to highlight what I see as the most important
analytical themes and paradigms which govern the research design of this thesis.
Central issues in the study of participation have been taken up by several authors,
particularly those associated with the Centre for Research into Industrial Democracy
and Participation at Glasgow University (eg. Cressey and Maclnnes,1980;
Eldridge,1982). Many such analyses focus in some way on the nature of control in
(capitalist) organisations; Thompson (1983:133-144) analyses the way in which social
scientists and industrial sociologists have conceived of a frontier of control existing at
the interface between labour and capital, and involving the negotiation of competing
interests and objectives. Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) argue that this is too simplistic
an approach, in that it falsely counterposes two relatively homogeneous groupings of
labour and capital, and tends to assume a set of zero-sum issues which are discussed,
argued and ultimately resolved through various forms of conflict and consensus.
Instead they argue that the management function involves not only the direction and
allocation of resources which are scarce (and thereby which may be bargained over),
but also the generation of acceptable patterns of relating (i.e. in securing the positive
commitment of labour for the tasks of production themselves); that is, the
management function is centrally concerned with the dual nature of labour (see
discussion below). Hence:-
The dual nature of control means that conflict about work and control
are not zero-sum. (Cressey and Maclnnes,1980:19).
The reality is, then, that interests are more diverse than the notion of a frontier of
control suggests; the extent to which the interests of management and workers
coincide or conflict changes through time, changes with relation to the issues
involved, and "coincidence" of interests at one level, or on one set of issues, can co-
exist with conflicts of interest in other arenas. Each of the case studies in this thesis
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shows the difficulties of simplistic notions of interest representation in the area of
safety and health.
Importantly, the competition and conflict over the distribution of resources
(distributive bargaining), can co-exist with a shared set of priorities such as job
security and the long-term strength of the organisation. In such instances, the frontier
of control concept again appears too simple and one-dimensional as a conceptual
device for understanding both the mechanics and politics of participation. A
conception of interests in this simple bifocal way would mean that participation
would only exist for the articulation of simple paradigms on the part of two
homogeneous groups, labour and capital, workers and managers; eg. increased wage
rises or increased dividends. For Maclnnes (1985:106):-
Beyond the warfare of bargaining lies a common interest in achieving
mutually satisfactory relationships. This is the space in which
consultation operates.
This is also the "space" which is of key importance in this thesis, particularly when, in
the case studies, we start to look at what goes on in the management of safety, above
and beyond what the statute book says about rights to information and consultation.
Furthermore:-
If there are conflicting material interests between managers and
workers, whilst at the same time they depend on each other, albeit in
the context of asymmetrical power relationships, then we can
characterise this general situation as one of antagonistic cooperation.
(Cressey et aL,1985:138)
Section (iv) of this chapter further discusses the relevance of this "antagonistic
cooperation", and other similar conceptualisations, in attempting to broaden our
understanding of participation through the issues surrounding health and safety
management. It is important here, however, to discuss in more detail the theoretical
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foundations that underlie and inform my approach to the empirical study of
participation.
For authors such as Cressey and Maclnnes, the arguments of a frontier of control are
similar to those used by Marx to deal with the problems of the formal and the real
subordination of labour. The first of these arises out of the simple ownership of the
means of production by capital, in that capital has the power to dispose of machinery,
equipment etc. at its will for the realisation of surplus value. The second, however,
represents the essential problem of management - the control of human labour power
and human resources (1980:13-16), and the need to fragment and specialise
production through the progressive division of labour 16. In other words, whilst capital
may own the means of production, the process of applying labour power to such
capital in the production of commodities is necessarily a social problem in that labour
cannot be reduced to a commodity in the same way as capital. Cressey and Maclnnes
argue that the dichotomy between the real and formal subordination of labour helps to
maintain a false distinction between participation as incorporation on the one hand,
and involving the advance of labour on the other. Broadly speaking, this involves the
difference between participation as a sell-out to the goals of management, and
participation as a pre-figurative form of workers' control, a dichotomy they claim to
have adversely dominated analyses of participation.
They claim that the dual nature of labour is the key; in other words, that whilst it is in
employers' interests to reduce the cost of labour and to increase control of the labour
process through de-skilling and the separation of functions through the division of
labour, it remains impossible to completely fulfil these intentions without the total
alienation of labour. Capital needs to develop the social productivity of labour as
much as it needs to alienate it through the division of labour (1980:13-16). To
illustrate with respect to health and safety, employers need to maintain a healthy
workforce (because of the compulsions of law, as well as the need to reduce
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absenteeism, labour turnover etc.) whilst at the same time needing to maximise labour
utilisation in competitive product rriarkets, and thereby threaten workers' health and
safety in the process. Therefore, for analyses of worker participation, the processes of
involvement and consultation of employees, directly or through representatives, are
an inherent part of the managerial function irrespective of the narrowly-defined
institutional framework for participation that exists. Maclnnes puts the point
succinctly:-
Even where there are no committees, and no stewards, maiagers
consult their employees all the time. (Maclnnes,1985:1O1)
An important element in these theories of participation is the structural imbalance in
the power held by employers and workers in organisational settiligs. Hill (1981:128)
demonstrates how unions as such represent an attempt by individual workers to join
together and to thereby establish a collective power base from where to challenge
management - a power that is still highly restricted for many reasons. Cressey et al.
(1985:135), in their study of participation in Scottish workplaces, argue that any form
or practice of participation or consultation takes place within an existing occupational
hierarchy, and within relations of dominance 17. This approach starts from the
position that the role of management in seeking to control and coordinate production
and working methods necessarily involves the negotiation of a range of potentially
competing interests, usually involving competition between employers and workers,
but also between work groups, establishments within the same firm or group, and,
importantly, levels and functions within management itself.
Therefore, the management function involves the process of ensuring and sustaining
domination as the need to resolve competing demands, and as the need to establish
mutually satisfactory relationships, assert themselves. This is the complex and highly
dynamic framework inside which participation exists and operates on a daily basis.
Participation is not to be limited to a distinct category of industrial relations enquiry,
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rather, it should be seen as a set of practices, institutions and channels of
representation involved in the negotiation of consent and legitimacy for the
prerogative of management to manage. Thus, management can be enthusiastically
supportive of participation schemes of various kinds without compromising their right
to manage - indeed, attempting as part of the process of involvement and consultation
to enhance their legitimacy and ability to manage. Such an approach allows us to
view participation in both broad terms (encompassing a wide range of possible
institutions, agents and practices involved in industrial relations), and in a more
flexible manner, as we seek to increase our understanding of how these relations of
dominance actually operate in the workplace. As Cressey and his colleagues state:-
In the context of different work situations, consultation can have its
own specific sense and meaning. (Cressey et al.,1985:118)
It is the objective of this empirical study, in the case of participation in health and
safety regulation in particularly, to narrate the sense and meaning of participation in
specific contexts. Therefore, once again, the space that exists beyond conflict and the
complex ways in which control is contested and sustained, are central to our
understanding of what goes on inside participation. It requires us to redefine, through
empirical enquiry, what we mean by conflict and contestation in particular contexts
and over particular issues. As we shall see later, this way of viewing participation as
an aspect of the politics of production in a broad sense, is further complicated by the
nature of health and safety and the problem of identifying natural sets of interest
communities in that field.
The authors construct a framework of understanding for participation and industrial
democracy, through a discussion of the notion of pluralism in an industrial setting.
They argue (Cressey et al.,1985:170-173) that pluralism has traditionally been dealt
with as a first-order concept, as an essentially organisational response to competing
demands, and involving forums for the resolution of conflict. The authors, however,
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seek to expand the conceptualisation of pluralist processes and argue that pluralism
involves a far more complicated process of the continual, and not always predictable,
shifting of organisational goals, as well as a continual construction, disintegration and
maintenance of somewhat unique policy communities, alliances and balances of
forces, than simplistic notions of pluralism permit. In other words, the way in which
interests are articulated, and the extent to which the interests of different work groups
(particularly management and workers) coincide or conflict, is a dynamic process,
closely woven into other forums and ways of relating in industrial relations -
consultation amongst them. An objective of this thesis is to illuminate the different
ways in which interests surrounding safety regulation and involvement are articulated,
particularly by worker representatives.
Participation may often be a suitable mechanism for management in rhetorical
attempts to secure legitimacy, but this is by no means always the case. I would argue
that the process of negotiation over management's right to manage is subject to an
inherent instability, and the fundamental nature of the tensions inherent in the
function of management itself, discussed above, means that this negotiation is a
constant and permanent problem, if at some times more visible and explicitly
contested than at others. In this sense, participation forms part of a dynamic pluralism,
in that it involves negotiation over and around competing interests in a highly
complex and fluid manner, within asymmetrical power relations which limit the scope
of democratic involvement initiatives. In other words, participation, because of its
role in affecting and reacting to broader power relations organised, should not be seen
as a completely stable Set of practices. As an expression of the relations of
dominance at specific moments, participation is an inherently unstable phenomenon,
making (amongst other things) precise definition extremely difficult if analytical
clarity and force are to be maintained.
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Furthermore, it is not just the process of legitimation of management, and managerial
prerogative, which is central to an understanding of the creation and maintenance of
participation and involvement. Shop stewards in particular may seek to use such
mechanisms as vehicles for the generation of legitimacy for their own role as
representatives of workers, and for the very notion of union representation itself. (eg.
Cressey et al.,1985:153-159). As we shall see in the fieldwork chapters, these issues,
of different channels of representation, and of the representative matrix in which
health and safety participation operates, were of central importance in understanding
how such participation, consultation and involvement in each of the four workplaces
actually worked in practice, as well as in understanding the meaning and importance
that participation, in health and safety as well as more generally, had for key
individuals in this representative mix.
As we have seen, our understanding of participation is highly contingent on the
motivations and interpretations given to institutions of consultation by different actors
in industrial relations 18. Cressey et al. go further in arguing that such differences in
perceptions of what participation actually means are a cause of the short life-span and
overall failure of such initiatives (Cressey et al,1985:168-169). However, this does
not simply tell us that such schemes have been mis-managed or introduced in the
wrong way or at the wrong time; rather, it tells us something of the structural
parameters within which management and unions' understanding of participation
exist. For management, it can be argued that the involvement of the workforce is to
some extent a form of extension of the raison d'être of management itself,
notwithstanding the necessity to develop further the division of labour.
There is nothing inherently contradictory in this, especially if we recognise a central
function of management to be the negotiation and maintenance of an effective
working consent over a range of issues surrounding the labour process and the
organisation of work, and over tasks and motivations which are unable to be fully
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specified and directly controlled by management (ie. issues beyond the formal details
of the employment contract). There can be a positive relationship between managers
seeking to enhance forms of worker participation, job enlargement etc., on the one
hand, and defending prerogative on the other. For workers, involvement is a more
difficult concept; the problems of incorporation, of responsibility without power, or
permanent opposition versus continued influence etc. are ones which are felt more
sharply by employees and trade unions, than by management:-
Reservations and criticisms by employee representatives ere rarely
developed into any alternative vision of what industrial democracy
ought to consist of, nor were specific changes to the systems offered
suggested. (Cressey et al.,1985:174, original emphasis).
It is therefore important in the study of participation in safety regulation to look at the
degree and scope of coherence and in the response of unions, works councils and
other representative bodies to the opportunities that participative mechanisms offer
for the expressions of collective and individual interests.
In addition, given that participation operates within relations of dominance, unions
and employee representatives do not possess the opportunity to develop a naturally
coherent ideology of participation:-
short of the ability to withdraw and oppose management's plans when
necessary, there was little prospect of unions becoming deeply
involved in schemes which only offered the opportunity to influence
management when it chose to listen. (Cressey et al,1985:169)
Thus, participation is not a symmetrical process; rather, it involves qualitatively
different thinking with respect to employers and worker representatives. The
examples quoted from above highlight the structural location that participation has
within these relations of dominance - that the intentions and aspirations of workers, or
more usually their representatives, are sifted through the willingness of management
to renegotiate or redefine how their prerogative shall operate, and how their
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possession of ultimate decision-making power is to be expressed and defended. With
regard to the construction of an effective research design for this thesis, this means
that the axiomatic role of key managers in enabling, facilitating, obstructing etc., both
the quantity and quality of involvement of worker representatives must be addressed.
Maclnnes (1985:107-109) argues that in the British context, the relative failure of
consultation machinery to satisfy the democratic demands of worker representatives,
and the consequently poor record of both success and permanence of such
mechanisms, are partially explained at least by a traditional unwillingness of British
management to negotiate away their prerogative to manage, instead framing
participation as unitarist and thereby using it as an adjunct to their decision-making
power rather than as a challenge to it. The case studies each show, in different ways,
how management strategy, and the differential pressures on management in the public
and private sectors, acts as a "gatehouse" to effective utilisation of consultation and
participation protection by worker representatives.
An important focus of the thesis is also the role of different forms of participation in
giving worker representatives the opportunity to challenge and contest managerial
approaches to safety regulation. Whilst the choice of both public and private sector
workplaces highlights the relationship between the nature of employment and the
particular approaches of management in safety regulation, the role that different
structures of worker participation play is the key of issue of Anglo-German
comparison. Above all, forms of participation reflect closely the different structures
of interest representation in the two countries. I would therefore like to discuss
briefly a central theme which arises in material, published in both English and
German, which focuses on the nature of co-determination at the level of the
workplace in Germany.
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This is the notion of cumulation (Streeck,1984:407); the idea that the range of
statutory rights to information and consultation possessed by the works council,
combined with the high degree of organisational, policy and personnel overlap
between works councils and trade unions in Germany, gives unions a higher level of
defacto influence and control in workplace relations with management than exists de
jure given the fonnal exclusion of trade unions from collective bargaining functions
within establishment level industrial relations19
It seems that cumulation can take two forms 20. On the one hand, Streeck argues that:-
West German industrial democracy - ... - is now the main mechanism
by which unions represent their members vis-ci-vis employers.
(Streeck,1991:319)
Similarly, he argues that because:-
...unions have taken over the co-determination system, de-unionisation
and the creation of a non-union sector are not viable options for
German employers. (Streeck, 1991:319)
This line of argument is also supported by other commentators on German industrial
relations, particularly with reference to the likely future development of the works
councilltrade union relationship. For example:-
The influence of trade unions on works councils consists, on the one
hand, of the right to nominate candidates; on the other, in the fact that
the union lists are as a rule elected by overwhelming majorities.
Through this "lever", the unions could expand their institutional
.bargaining and strike monopoly by adding a monopoly of
representation on the works councils. (Jacobi and MUller-
Jentsch, 1990:139)
These arguments rely to an extent on the importance of works council elections for
local trade unions, with the continuing high level of Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund
(DGB) representation amongst works councillors used as support21 . This form of
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cumulation indicates a possible overlap between the functions of the union and the
works council in establishment-level representation of workers in relations with
management22, and emphasises the role that institutions of participation play in
providing opportunities for trade unions to extend and strengthen their activities and
influence in the workplace (Briefs,1989:69). Schmidt and Trinczek (1991:182-188)
characterise the relationship between the works council and the union in three general
ways. Firstly, Verschmelzung (absorbtion) describes the use of the works council by
the trade union to extend its representative function contra capital at workplace level
(i.e. contra the agents of capital, management). The union is dominant, and uses the
works council to further its own ends at workplace level. The authors also use the
term Verschrankung (integration) where the union is supportive of the works council,
whose primary goals and objectives are derived, however, from the legitimacy given
to it by workplace elections. Thus, the representation of workers by works councils in
this situation does not extend easily to the relationship between labour and capital in
the broader sense implied in the first situation. For example:-
Allerdings mUssen die Interessen der Gewerkschaft in den Augen
dieser Betriebsräte jeweils mit den Interessen des Betriebs und der
Beschäftigten abgeglichen werden, und in diesem ProzeB haben die
von den Gewerkschaften artikuliererten Anliegen keinen "natUrlichen"
Vorrang. (Schmidt and Trinczek, 1991:185).
[in the eyes of works councillors, the interests of the union must be
adjusted to the interests of the workplace and of the workforce, and in
the course of this, the demands articulated by the union have no
"natural" precedence.]
In this scenario, the works council has to contend with competing demands on its
allegiance and on its representative capacity. The third description of this relationship
between union and works council is Entkoppelung (separation). Here, the union acts
as a service department for works councils, but by and large the two institutions
pursue separate organisational policy goals, preferring to leave each other in peace.
The German case studies in this thesis illuminate these distinctive, but related, ways
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of viewing the works council/union relationship with relation to the regulation of
safety, and to anticipate my conclusions somewhat, the second and third categories
proved more useful than the first.
There is also a second kind of cumulation; that involving the coupling of the rights to
information and consultation between supervisory board level representation and the
works council, a process which Streeck claims to have been strengthened by the
Mitbestimrnungsgesetz (MitbG) (co-determination law) of 1976 (S treeck, 1984:407).
In this thesis, I concentrate mainly on workplace co-determination, and therefore, on
the applicability of the first kind of cumulation to the analysis. The reasons for this
are partially dictated by the limits to the research design (limits of time, levels of
access etc.). Also, Mitbestimmung involves more tangible and "hard" rights at
workplace level than at supervisory-board level, where even boards with parity
representation structures (after the extensions to the MitbG in 1976) are subject to a
managerial casting vote23.
These authors do not espouse a blind faith in the process whereby unions take over
the functions of works councils to become the effective institution of workplace
representation 24. However, it is clear that the nature of this relationship, and the
specific practices involved in the interface between trade union and works council
interest representation, are both of key importance for our understanding of
participation in German workplaces, with respect to health and safety participation as
well as the operation of co-determination more generally. Indeed, whilst it is possible
to argue that works councils have become a key target for the workplace level
activities of trade unions, with the goal of establishing high concentrations of DGB
affiliated members on works councils being central to this, the degree of success of
such a goal is another matter. Indeed, a key contention of this thesis is that the precise
nature of the relationship which exists between works councils and workplace level
trade unions, and the unpacking of the constituent parts of this process of cumulation,
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are matters for detailed empirical enquiry, and form a key part of the research in the
German workplaces.
Above all, the qualitative nature of this relationship is the key issue; to what extent is
the relationship between the two channels of representation limited to the trade union
function of education, in the area of health and safety and more generally
(Schregle,1987:325)? To what extent is our understanding of this relationship
governed by competing notions of collective bargaining as opposed to consultation?;
Is it realistic to expect that institutional separation between works councils and trade
unions generates an effective distinction between regional framework collective
bargaining on the one hand, and the implementation of these agreements through
consultation by works councils on the other? This is a problem which is made more
complex by the difficulties in the theorising of health and safety as being an issue for
bargaining at the workplace, discussed in the next section. Lastly, to what extent are
moves towards an increasingly fragmented and deregulated labour market (eg.
Streeck,1991a:60), involving challenges to the traditional pattern of industrial conflict
and union strategy (Jacobi and MUller-Jentsch,1990:137-140), as well as
developments in technology which enable more sophisticated and diverse labour
utilisation policies at company rather than industry level, liable to increase the
likelihood of conflict and competition between the two channels of representation
rather than co-operation and cumulation? 25. Schregle (1987:320), in particular,
argues that the works council does participate in collective bargaining, although the
author could be criticised in that areas where the works council has jurisdiction over
the trade union in dealings with management, are generally those limited to "soft"
issues such as promotion, recruitment, transfer of employees etc. Again, this
relationship cannot be satisfactorily articulated outside of detailed work within
establishments, and inside specific workplace environments.
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In the UK context, the role of formal, statutory participation in the regulation of safety
is also of key importance, despite the lack of a broader framework of Mitbestimmung
and works councils. As with the German case studies, structures of representation
play a critical role in defining how formal participation mechanisms are used. In
particular, the fieldwork seeks to examine how the floor of rights that exist for safety
representatives, and shop stewards, in the pursuit of safe working conditions, works in
practice, and how different forms of interest representation at workplace level affect
the ability of worker representatives to build on the basic legal provisions in
establishing more dynamic and pro-active safety strategies, and in integrating the
benefits of formal participation into more general relations with managers, and into
mainstream industrial relations agendas. Moreover, and to anticipate my results a
little, the concept of cumulation should not be limited to analysis of German industrial
relations and safety regulation. Following interesting findings in the case studies, I
would argue that the ability of worker representatives to use die legislative framework
for the protection of working conditions depends on the particular organisational
context at hand, and in particular on the pressures that different kinds of managerial
strategy put on workers. As soon as this pivotal role for the letter of the law in safety
participation is questioned, then we can begin to look at cumulative-type relationships
between channels of representation and forms of participation in the context of a
British system of voluntarim that lacks the extensive framework for participation and
consultation.
This section has taken issue with a range of problems associated with the study of
worker participation in a cross-national perspective. One of the central strengths of
the research, the comparison of similar arrangements for participation in health and
safety operating within radically different frameworks of the regulation of industrial
relations, is also paradoxically a weakness. This is because each system of industrial
relations has developed a separate tradition in the analysis of worker participation and
industrial democracy. In the British context, this has led to emphasis being given to
30
the factors that are likely to lead to management-led initiatives in participation
(Poole,1986), and to case study material on particular "experiments" in industrial
democracy, whether at board level (Batstone et al.,1983; Brannen 1976) or at
shopfloor level (Marchington, 1980). With respect to Germany, the debate has centred
on both the dual channel of representation (the relationship between works councils
and trade unions), and the way in which product and labour market changes are likely
to affect the nature of this given system of participation at workplace level. I have
argued that despite this divergent legacy of analyses of participation, cross-national
research can illuminate greatly the way we think of participation. In order to give
such an analysis a sharper focus, I shall look specifically at the issues surrounding
participation in health and safety management, a theme taken up in the next section.
(iii) Health and safety management and priorities; participation in what?
This section is about how health and safety can be analysed in the context of the
involvement and participation of workers, their representatives or trade unions at
workplace level. In particular, I shall argue that two sets of issues are of importance in
generating questions and appropriate research methods to be applied in the fieldwork
in each country. The first of these is that whilst the health and safety of employees, as
well as of the general public in certain situations (eg. public services, environmental
problems etc.), is a product of many factors, such as the state and mix of technology,
levels of training, etc., we cannot look at these factors outside of an appreciation of
the fact that workers work in a system of production which is of an essentially
political nature. This involves primarily decisions over the allocation of material and
financial resources, the satisfying of competing demands within organisations, and the
construction of priorities where such resources are scarce, or where competitive
markets necessitate them. The key body of work I call upon here is that of Nichols
(eg. Nichols and Armstrong,1973; Njchols,1986 and 1991), who has continuously
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attempted to challenge popular perceptions of job safety which stress individual
responsibility for accidents, and also analysis of health and safety which chooses from
a set of possible first-order causes of accidents.
This section then leads on to a discussion of a second set of issues sulTounding health
and safety participation - involving the competing notions of bargaining and
consultation over health and safety issues, terms which have had an important history
in health and safety legislation, particularly in the UK context26. The key question
here is how unions and workers' representatives, in each of the national settings, can
effectively mobilise and campaign around safety issues, and use forums and
mechanisms of collective representation (works councils, workplace trade unions,
safety committees etc.) for the expression of health and safety issues. This question
has important consequences for the fieldwork design, and forms a key link between
our previous discussions of worker participation and managerial control in themselves
on the one hand, and the location of health and safety within the politics of
production on the other. In essence, this is one of the key "framework" questions of
the whole thesis, and informs the case study research to a great extent.
The root of the Robens report (Robens,1972:13) recommendations (the self-regulation
of health and safety in industry by those involved in creating risks and working with
them) lay in an attempt to overcome the assumed chief cause of accidents at work,
apathy27. Nichols (1973:4) argues forcibly that this is a key mistake, and that apathy
itself is no explanation at all. Instead, risks and hazards are created within the
relations of production, and, consequently, accidents do not happen to atomised
individual workers, operating in some kind of vacuum (Nichols,1975:221); if one
looks at workers in this isolated way, then one is very quickly drawn into a simplistic
attempt to identify causes of individual accidents which, whilst important in
themselves, do not tell us why so many accidents happen at work as a whole. This
inevitably leads to an over-emphasis on technical problems and the role that
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technology itself can make to improving safety and working conditions in the
workplace. Indeed, each case study of this thesis begins with an outline of the
production methods and technological mix of each workplace, including an analysis
of the importance that technologies, and the risks inherent in them, can play in
framing the priorities and agendas of health and safety in each situation.
However, safety problems can never be reduced to a list of technical issues and
solutions; rather, they occur as a part of an organisational set of relations
characterised by the dominance of management; relations of dominance, once again.
Control systems built into machinery and new technology can never be completely
safe - there is always an interface with human activity, and between labour power and
the means of production. In particular, there can be conflict over the pace of work, the
choice of payment system as well as the nature of everyday work pressure which can
generate hazards28 . Therefore, health and safety is, amongst other things, implicitly a
matter of control of the workplace and working methods. For this reason, the
regulation of health and safety at workplace level, and the way in which safety is
striven for, is implicitly an industrial relations issue, even if the precise way in which
it is treated in workplace relations is contingent on many other factors. This is not to
assume or pre-judge that health and safety should be dealt with in a particular way;
rather, that it is potentially a matter for collective representation of employees,
whether through trade unions or otherwise, and that if this collective expression of
conflict over safety and production priorities does not take place, then this is an
important matter, and we must ask why?
Moore (1991:19-20) claims that the common practice of analysing accidents through
the categorisation of their type, the part of the body injured, the degree of seriousness,
the section of the firm it occurred in etc., is something of a fallacy, in that this
reasoning helps to generate a false impression of accidents as unique, rather than as an
inherent aspect of the politics of work. Thus:-
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Compartmentalisation, separation and partial analysis together
constitute a formidable obstacle to any real understanding of how
competition, pure economic efficiency measures of performance and
cost cutting in the workplace impact on workers' health and safety.
(Moore,1989:24)
Instead, a broadened view of industrial injury and accidents should look at the factors
generating potentially dangerous situations, as well as at the relationship between the
development of these situations and the organisation and control of working methods
and processes - in particular, the desire to keep production going (Nichols,1975:221-
223). The maintenance of health and safety is therefore intimately related to the
priorities that management make in everyday situations, between competing demands
on scarce resources. The over-riding suggestion of such arguments is that priorities
geared towards production, such as keeping unit labour costs down, and increasing
productivity and output etc., are likely to displace health and safety priorities over
time, even if such a displacement is not always transparent and self-evident. The
importance of these decisions based on the allocation of resources within an
organisation, and the priorities that are established through managerial decision-
making, mean that the involvement and participation of workers or their
representatives is inherently a question of participation in health and safety
management, in some or all of the processes that lead to these decisions being taken,
and, therefore, the potential conflict between safety and profit affects worker
representatives as well as management, involved in this decision-making. This is not
to say that such participation must inevitably make managers out of workers - some of
my case study evidence points tentatively to management using the system of
participation in health and safety to exclude union influence, and to retain key
prerogatives in areas central to health and safety management. What is at stake
however, is the ability that workers (representatives) have to genuinely influence the
articulation of competing interests with respect to health and safety, and the quality of
in-put which they can make into the decision-making processes which shape and
structure these sets of priorities.
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To pause and re-cap a litfie then, if we wish to understand the nature of occupational
health and safety more fully, we need to move away from simple notions of causality,
which stress somewhat meaningless categories such as apathy, accident proneness
etc., towards a wholistic appreciation of the wide range of pressures, conflicts, and
struggles which are applied to workers in the daily course of work. These are factors
central to the function of management (payment structures, personnel policy, manning
strategies etc.); they also interact with the means of production, with stable, or not so
stable, phenomena such as the technology of production processes, the layout of the
plant, the first-order hazards involved in production materials and so on. It is this
connection, between safe working conditions and the organisation of the working
environment and the working day in other ways which makes the editorial argument
in the quote at the beginning of this chapter difficult to sustain. How can it be
"absurd" to link safety with the amount of time that workers have to work?
Under such an approach, as Nichols argues (Nichols,1973:4), it is not the existence of
apathy as such, but the reasons why apathy exists as a problem for health and safety
that are to be investigated (ie. finding out why apathy exists is more important than
merely taking it for granted). Such an argument is not limited to Nichols; I quote at
length:-
Separating what is around an organism from what an organism does is
also harmful in the study of occupational health, which is all too often
limited to identifying chemicals in the shop. But working is not just a
location; it is also an activity, the pace of work, the degree of
concentration required, the adequacy of toilet facilities, the duration of
lunch breaks, the demands of particular muscles, the type of
supervision, the monotony, the noise, the freedom to change position,
and the temperature. All are part of the occupational environment.
(Levins, R., and Lewontin, quoted in Moore, R. 1991:16-17).
Case studies of particular accidents by Nichols (Nichols,1975:227) show the
important role that pressure from foremen and supervisors plays, both in terms of the
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nature, and the extent of such supervision, in fostering dangerous working practices.
My research shows that pressure to disregard safety is often a very individually-
experienced problem, operating without the direct compulsion of supervisory
discipline.
There exists an inevitable cost-benefit analysis of health and safety by management,
which reinforces the power of managers to set the agenda on health and safety and the
priority to be given to it relative to other factors:-
The result of which is that, despite legislation, the power to decide or
determine what constitutes a risk - and how risky a procedure might
be, shifts upwards always resting finally with management, technical
experts and administrators. Therefore, this acceptable risk approach is
in truth about managers holding power and workers facing the risks.
(Moore,1991:l 1)
Littler and Salaman (1984;22-26) provide strong empirical evidence of just how
disproportionately accidents affect those furthest removed from the centres of
decision-making power in the workplace 29. The sentiments of these two quotations
are not confined to academic criticism of existing arrangements for health and safety
management; there is a tacit acceptance of their inherent logic with respect to each
piece of legislation that restricts working hours or working conditions for various
groups of employees, and categories of employment, from pregnant women, to
children, to long-distance lorry-drivers and so on (see for example,
Beaumont,1983:68). The problem, of course, is that it is impossible for companies to
completely solve the safety or profit dilemma (that at the end of the day, providing
safe working conditions is an effective cost to business), and the inclusion of the
clause "...reasonable practicability..." in legal regulation of health and safety is a
recognition of this. There is an obvious problem in that the courts find it very difficult
to take account of the varying complex pressures exerted on a worker in deciding who
is responsible for accidents (Beaumont,1983:176-l77), and in deciding objectively the
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extent to which financial considerations can be taken into account in responsibility for
accidents etc.
Such pressures towards unsafe working conditions caused by things like the pace of
work, the payment system in operation, security of earnings etc., do not simply arise
spontaneously out of particular, local, workplace relations, however. If we accept that
the relative strength of capital and labour will affect the articulation of these
competing interests between production-led and safety-led priorities, then this is
equally true of the national context of industrial relations (Nichols,1989:546-547),
necessitating an understanding of employment conditions, deregulation legislation
and so on at national level30.
Nichols argues that the balance of power between labour and capital at the workplace
is at least partially determined by developments at national level, away from the
immediate economic context of the firm. However, one of the problems of attempting
to view health and safety in this way, as a part of a broader set of economic and
political relationships inside and outside the workplace, is that a simplistic causal
analysis can be reproduced at a higher level, involving attempts to illuminate the way
in which economic buoyancy and economic depression affect the accident rate and
the conditions of employment liable to lead to greater safety problems; the arguments
alternately for the pro- and counter-cyclical relationship between business activity and
health and safety indicators. Nichols has taken up this issue, and there is insufficient
room for a detailed discussion here. However, it is important to understand the
parameters of this particular debate as it has implications for framing the kinds of
questions to be asked in the fieldwork chapters. In the private sector, the economic
environment which a firm finds itself is important in framing the production/safety
discussion. In the public sector, the issue is again one concerning the different kinds
of political pressures that impinge on the function of management and managerial
strategy.
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These arguments can be split into two groups. On the one hand, a basic contention is
that during a recession, employers find it difficult to shed labour quickly enough to
keep pace with the fall in activity, leading to a reduction in the workload, and the
likelihood that accidents will decrease in these periods (Nichols, 1989:538-540).
Similarly, output will fall and the utilisation of plant and machinery will decrease,
leaving more space for workers and consequently producing less pressure. Thus,
recession is marked by a decrease in accidents and injuries. On the other hand, it is
equally plausible to imagine that a depression in business activity weakens organised
labour at the workplace, threatens job security, can mean a lower rate of investment in
new machinery and thereby an increase in demands on old plant, and importantly, a
relegation of auxiliary functions such as health and safety specialists and routine
maintenance in an effort to maintain competitiveness. Accordingly, an upswing can
lead to greater job security, less reasons to take safety risks and more money to
develop safety management systems and to employ the staff needed to make them
stick. This argument makes several key assumptions, the most important being that an
upswing in the economy necessarily translates into a strengthened position for
organised labour at the workplace. Whilst it is true that in the long-term tighter labour
markets might well lead to greater room for manoeuvre for unions at local level, this
is not a simple relationship. One could argue that the economic upswing in the UK in
the mid-1980s was at least partially built on rigourous measures of labour market
deregulation, accompanied by more frontal challenges to trade unions through
employment legislation, which weakened labour, and which positively contributed to
the noticeable increase in occupational injury over the first half of the 1980s
(Nichols, 1990:17).
In the context of this thesis, the difference between public and private sector
employment and the different ways in which the relationship between work pressure
and accidents is manifested, are of crucial importance. Without entering a lengthy
38
debate about the nature of ownership, the separation of ownership from management
etc., it is important to consider the extent to which public sector managers can model
their strategies of labour utilisation on their private-sector equivalents, in the absence
of external competitive product markets, a real profit motive etc. The two public
sector case studies address this issue directly, particularly with regard to the political
context in which managers operate in publicly owned workplaces, and the degree of
success that government attempts to radically change the employment relation have
had (applying in particular to the UK context).
Ignoring this public sector/private Sector comparison, however, the complexities of
the pro- and counter-cyclical arguments are clear for all workplaces: to pre-figure my
research results somewhat, the impact of bonus payment systems in Department B
(chapter 6), illustrates the difficulties in establishing a clear relationship between
economic activity, payment systems and the generation of accidents. Furthermore,
whilst the research methods used in this thesis do not allow a systematic analysis of
the various claims outlined above, the case study evidence from the private sector in
both countries appears to suggest that depression of economic activity engenders a de-
prioritisation of safety, at least in terms of the visibility and vibrance of committees
and functions, and in the interpretations of key actors in workplace health and safety
in each case, even if strong, positive correlations with the incidence of accidents is
impossible to discern 31 . Given the degree of complexity involved in determining
which economic and social factors contribute to poor safety and accidents etc., what
must really be at issue when discussing the institutional and legal framework of
regulation of health and safety, within changing political and economic
circumstances, is the extent to which self-regulation, the over-riding philosophy of
both Britain and Germany with respect to health and safety legislation and practice,
can
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provide the logic for a universal local system of safety provision
(Dawson et al,1988:265),
rather than what it tell us about the specific statistical effect on accidents themselves.
However, the issues central to the pro- and counter-cyclical debate are important, in
that they point to the importance of economic factors in framing both the real, and
rhetorical, discourses of health and safety participants in specific workplace
situations. If it is the case that safety is governed by decision-making over resource
allocation, amongst other things, then local (ie. plant-based and company-based)
economic conditions become important in giving a context to the participation that
takes place. The key task is to determine the extent to which management have the
prerogative to de-prioritise safety issues, and the resources and opportunities that
trade unions or worker representatives have to challenge this. In a cross-national study
such as this one, the impact of statutory rights to consultation becomes significant, as
we attempt to understand the functioning of the floor of rights in health and safety
participation.
Similarly, if one accepts that unsafe and unhealthy working conditions are the product
of the fact that the organisation of the workplace, and working methods etc., are
dominated and sustained by production rather than human (social) criteria, then one
might assume that bargaining over health, coupled with protective legislation
compelling managements to comply with minimum standards and practices, is an
appropriate mechanism for the improvement of working conditions and safety. In
other words, if profit-led managerial decision making is responsible for creating an
environment in which accidents are more likely to happen, then unions and other
representative bodies (works council mainly) have health and safety (potentially, at
least) issues on their bargaining agendas 32, and protective legislation becomes
important as a vehicle for improving safety through the power it gives to worker
representatives to challenge management in this area. The logic of this argument is
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that at times when safety and profit are perceived to be irreconcilable aims,
bargaining and conflict over safety are more likely than effective consultation, an
issue which the fieldwork chapters address, particularly with regard to the difference
between public and private sector workplaces, but also when looking at the
differences between the two chemicals factories. My private sector fieldwork in
particular seems to support the argument that perceived irreconcilable differences
between the protection of working conditions and profit (or, more accurately, cost
saving strategies) are more likely to lead to conflict over safety regulation and
unsatisfactory descriptions of the functioning of participation.
This forms a further important question of the fieldwork; how can workplace trade
unions, as well as other employee representatives, develop strategies which challenge
the profit-led deprioritisation of safety concerns. What opportunities are there for
them to do so, and what obstacles? 33 . This brings us on to the second set of issues
that commentators on health and safety have addressed with respect to participation,
and industrial relations more generally; the importance of bargaining and
consultation, as competing terms, for the way in which health and safety issues are
regulated by management and employee representatives.
The starting point here is the philosophy of self-regulation (Dawson,1988) built into
the health and safety system of both Britain and West Germany, and the legislative
background to each system. In Germany, management is directly responsible for
health and safety in much the same way as in the UK. Safety cornnittees were made
compulsory in 1973, having similarly advisory roles to their British counterparts. A
similar piece of legislation to the HASAWA, the Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz (AsiG) of
1973 made safety specialists compulsory in large companies, again with an advisory
role, but having regard for safety as a primary concern rather than other managerial
tasks. The two main differences in health and safety legislation between the two
countries are a) that Sicherheitsbeauftragte (safety representatives) are selected by
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management in Germany and by recognised trade unions in the UK and b) that
employee participation in health and safety in Germany is entrenched within a system
of workplace co-determination whereby the works council has certain rights and
powers with respect to health and safety 34. The system of inspection through bipartite
Berufsgenossenschafren (BGs) ensures that self-regulation is also a central feature of
German health and safety, with inspections, and prosecutions being lower there than
in the UK.
In Britain, the Robens report attempted to improve safety standards through a move
away from external enforcement to self-regulation. Part of this process was the
initiation of relatively extensive provisions for worker participation in safety
regulation at workplace level. The committee also argued that consultation was the
most appropriate form for the resolution of problems concerned with health and
safety35. Indeed, the whole tone of the report, and of those large parts of it that were
made into the HASAWA, was an attempt to take health and safety out of bargaining,
and to establish a system of self-regulation at workplace level with clear opportunities
for workforce involvement, thereby breaking with a tradition of legal regulation of
health and safety which had minimised the importance of participation 36. For the
Robens committee of enquiry, health and safety was too important an area to be
bargained over, and their fear was that such a process of collective bargaining would
inevitably dilute standards of health and safety, as it became just another item on the
bargaining agenda, to be settled in comparison with a wide range of other factors,
despite a lack of evidence of extensive health and safety bargaining in British
industry37.
Such an approach was understandable given that unions in the UK have always
played a greater role in both seeking compensation for injured employees after the
event38, and in seeking to have particular dangers recognised through additional
payment and danger money etc., than they have in the effective workplace prevention
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of accidents39. A similar move was to recommend that the new safety representatives
would be selected from the entire workforce and not necessarily through union
channels, an issue which was to be the most fiercely debated in the passage of both
the HASAWA and the SRSC regulations, ending with the repeal of the HASAWA by
the Employment Protection Act (EPA) of 1975, which ensured single-channel
nomination of safety representatives40. The approach of the Robens committee was
based on the central assumption that there was more to unite the interests of managers
and employees in the area of health and safety than there were conflicts of interest
(Dawson et al.,1988:14-16). Thus, common problems, according to the committee,
required solutions framed in a cooperative and consultative setting, with the main
target being an increase in the level of input from all levels of employee, from senior
management down to shop floor representatives. This is not an uncontested notion.
For example, Moore (1991,11) argues that safety problems are disproportionately a
part of manual employees' working environment, given the distance between
conception, selection, investment choices (and other managerial functions) etc., and
execution in the industrial division of labour:-
In the workplace there clearly exists an asymmetry between the risks
and burdens of responsibility carried by workers relative to
management power,... (Moore, 1991:11)
Haraszti (1984;294-301), and Littler and Salaman (1984;22-26), as we have seen,
make similar points.
Thus, whilst the Robens committee feared a dilution of importance for safety under
collective bargaining, the view of some unions is that the opposite is the case; i.e. that
the consultative nature of safety committees introduced under the new legislation
meant that safety representatives could have their power and responsibility
compromised by the existence of an advisory safety committee (Dawson et
al.,1988:54-56). This partially explains why safety representatives have tended to be
43
seen as more important than safety committees by trade unions (Beaumont,1983:122),
and why many unions (eg. TGWU) try to insist that safety representatives are also
shop stewards.
The difficulty with a discussion of collective bargaining procedures which include
health and safety issues on the broad agenda, is that there has historically been little
research in the UK as to the extent to which health and safety issues become the
subject of collective bargaining and collective agreements at workplace level. Instead,
much of the available evidence comes from United States experience
(Bacow,1980:61-65), where health and safety agreements are more common, despite
the similar legislative framework of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OS HA)
of 1970. What evidence there is appears to suggest that unions are reluctant to expend
bargaining capital on health and safety agreements which still leave poor working
conditions and which cost firms extra money, indicating the difficulty of conceiving
of health and safety as a simple zero-sum game between employers and workers at
plant level (Bacow,1980:65). Bacow goes further in arguing that legislation such as
the OSHA (and therefore the HASAWA/SRSC regulations) contain inherent
dysfunctions in that they are built at one and the same time upon the existing
industrial relations machinery and also on the treatment of safety as an issue for
consultation over an agreed set of priorities rather than conflict over resources.
Indeed, the Robens philosophy, passed on to the legislation of the 1970s in the UK,
was highly dependent on the willingness of management to take safety seriously and
to stimulate the participation of employees, given that the positive rights of such
employees, and their representatives, are relatively weak, and the levels of
enforcement are low (Dawson et al.,1988:174-176, and also Hendry,1989:9). As my
research will show, managers in different workplaces have varying degrees of
commitment to health and safety participation.
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Beaumont says that consultation has traditionally been seen as a weaker mode of
relating with management on health and safety, and other issues, than negotiation,
which allows for coercion and the use of force and sanctions in the pursuit of certain
goals. He argues, however, that the separation of negotiation and participation in
analyses of health and safety and industrial relations represents a false dichotomy
(Beaumont,1983:97-99), and argues that there is never a situation where a complete
unity of interests, or a perfect zero-sum bargaining agenda exists. The idea that
participation (involving an ideal type of consultation) and negotiation are mutually
exclusive alternatives ignores the flexibility and informality that is built into
collective bargaining and everyday relations between management, workers and trade
unions, and reproduces the false dichotomy between worker advance/incorporation
mentioned in the previous section. The survey evidence Beaumont produces appears
to show that consultation was viewed in stronger terms by employee representatives
in health and safety management, as a bargaining situation only really arose when
management were determined to defend certain prerogatives eaumoM,93'iO-
107).
Indeed, the finding that defence of managerial prerogative did not mean an emphasis
on consultation is indicative of the fact that not only do different groups within an
organisation (mainly management and workers, but not solely) have competing
notions of safety priorities, but that there are competing perceptions of the nature of
relationships which exist in the regulation of safety itself (Beauniont,1983:117); this
relates strongly to the arguments of the previous section which stressed the different
role that institutions of participation could play in the rhetorical and ideological
discourse of different actors, above and beyond the substantive issues which are
resolved and challenged with systems of participation. This is important in a
comparative context, as it would be wrong to suppose that different institutional and
legal frameworks of participation in health and safety regulation necessarily change
the nature of the regulation involved. The lack of statutory workplace co-
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determination in the UK does not necessarily mean a stronger bargaining role for
employee representatives as the incorporationist argument would imply - rather, the
extent to which safety issues get bargained over, and the nature of consultation and
bargaining in this arena in specific situations, are both issues for the research to
address.
The problem here is that whilst in a global sense, unions can be seen as agents for
improvements in health and safety, through the defence of working conditions
broadly conceived, this is by no means a uniform process. Flanders, in the "Fawley
Productivity" study, argued that risk analysis and the assessment of hazards, were
inherently imperfect as tools of an operational safety system, because:-
...neither side can be impartial,.. .for management is biased in favour of
production and workers in favour of protection. (Flanders, quoted in
Lewis,1977:21)
But are these biases consistent, and are they good heuristic devices for a deeper and
wider understanding of participation in health and safety? This is the key to a central
issue; that, in a tangible sense, health and safety is rarely an issue which clearly and
simply separates employees from managers. One of the key problems of establishing
effective worker participation and involvement in health and safety is that the
interests of employers and workers conflict to a variable extent over time, and
occasionally a unity of interests may exist, such as the need for new investment that
meets both production needs and safety improvement criteria at the same time. This
situation (the . importance of investment for both safety and production reasons)
certainly seemed to be important to participants in my own case studies, and is also an
issue at the heart of the dynamics of health and safety regulation at workplace level;
i.e. it is not true that unions and managers continuously stand opposite each other in
policy terms on health and safety as on any other matters. The dynamic pluralism of
Cressey et al.(1985:170-173), discussed above, applies as much to health and safety
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as to other issues, with the added problem that the potential stakes are much higher,
and the urgency to make progress towards safe working conditions more apparent.
Similarly, health and safety provides us with a good example of an area in which both
the conflicts of interest inherent in the provision of safety within production systems,
and also the needs of both management and the workforce to act co-operatively in
some respects co-exist under what Cressey et al. called "antagonistic cooperation"
(Cressey et al.,1985:138). The heterogeneity of interests with respect to general
agenda items for industrial relations is therefore reproduced in the arena of health and
safety.
All of this has further implications for empirical research in this area; if unions are,
potentially at least, key agents in the struggle to maintain safe working conditions,
then it is not just the issue of bargaining versus consultation which is at stake, but the
nature and content of any bargaining and consultation which takes place. Moore
(1991:29) has argued that the single-channel protections afforded by the Safety
Representative and Safety Committee (SRSC) regulations has meant that, in the
British context, safety representatives have taken advantage of such measures and
extended bargaining and negotiation over safety issues.
This leads to another problem in identifying how health and safety is negotiated,
bargained and discussed; namely, that any bargaining that happens is likely to be
informal and rarely subject to official machinery of industrial relations and official
agreements, particularly in a workplace without formal/statutory participation
mechanisms. This informal bargaining and involvement is infused with considerations
of overtime, payment systems, supervision, training, manning levels, investment and
task discretion and job autonomy in the control of the labour process and the
organisation of work41 . Regarding tile latter, Moore (1991:9-11) has argued that
"low-level intelligence" relating to experience on the job, and the discretion and
knowledge that workers exercise on a continual basis, are important factors in
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promoting an effective regulation of health and safety, and that this has been slow to
emerge despite the SRSC provisions for participation, and the emphasis on
involvement in the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (CoSHH) regulations
of 1988, an important piece of legislation for the UK private sector case study in
particular.
The issue of job control generally, points to important considerations once again in
the empirical study of health and safety participation, and leads to interesting findings
in some of the case studies. The control of the labour process, the degree of discretion
and autonomy for employees, and the control that workers or their representatives
have over manning levels and the ffort bargain are all important in understanding
how dangers are generated in the workplace, and how unions and employees respond
to them. This is particularly important given that the case studies span the public and
private sectors, giving us the opportunity to see how the control of the labour process,
and the criteria which are used to set staffing levels, differ between the public sector
in the two countries and the public and private sectors in each country42.
Finally, the study of health and safety participation is one of a highly variable and
dynamic set of actors and relationships which serve to confuse simple notions of
interests and policies, within a system of production that systematically creates
dangerous working conditions. Therefore, it is I1QI just the approach of workplace
trade unions to health and safety which must be addressed in the case studies.
Management must also be seen as a central force in their own right, given the power
that they are taken to have in shaping the parameters of the regulation of safety issues.
Moore (199 1:9) argues that systems devised by management for the regulation of safe
working conditions at an operational level tend to ignore the asymmetrical power
relations mentioned earlier. Therefore, models of safety regulation based on
managerial self-interest ("it is in all our interests to keep the place safe") 43, are
flawed according to this author, and whilst such systems may be only partially related
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to the participation of workers in the management of health and safety, the way in
which safety is viewed by both senior and line management themselves has an
important bearing on our understanding of health and safety regulation and
management at workplace level. After all, the way in which a particular mechanism
of worker participation operates is intimately linked to the approach that management
takes to the issue of the defence of its prerogative. An institution such as a safety
committee does not operate in an organisational vacuum.
This section has attempted to locate the issues surrounding the regulation and
management of health and safety at workplace level, within broader industrial
relations in general, and within the sphere of involvement and worker participation in
particular. The two major themes discussed were firstly the nature of hazards and
accidents within what I have chosen to call relations of dominance, and how safety
must be seen as an integral part of the politics of production in terms of power,
decision-making and managerial prerogative. Secondly, this necessitated a discussion
of the nature of consultation and bargaining over health and safety issues, and the
importance that this has for our understanding of channels of interest representation,
the location of trade unions in the workplace and worker participation. I recognise
that both this, and the previous, section have been expansive in throwing up issues
that arise from the literature, in a somewhat hap-hazard kind of way. This is inevitable
given the potential scope of a thesis dealing with central issues as broad as
participation, health and safety regulation, and representation. The aim of the next
section, therefore, is to bring the arguments of both this and the previous section
together, to re-cap the main theoretical frameworks and concepts that the thesis
addresses, and to attempt to synthesise the disparate strands of argument into a more
coherent approach to the analysis of participation in health and safety.
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(iv) A synthesised terrain? Heterogeneity and ambiguity in safety participation.
We have so far considered an extremely wide and disparate literature, ranging from
empirical and theoretical studies of participation in different contexts to those more
concerned with health and safety regulation and the inherent problems of accident
distribution and prevention. I have claimed earlier that this thesis seeks to analyse
participation in health and safety management through a synthesis of these two
separate traditions of industrial relations analysis, and the purpose of this section is to
articulate what I see as the common agenda covering issues of participation and
safety.
The fundamental arguments I have put forward can be summarised thus: the
participation of worker representatives in decision-making processes is inherently an
issue of control, of work and working methods in particular. Secondly, institutions
and practices of participation operate within hierarchical structures of authority, or
relations of dominance. Thirdly, participation holds a mirror to the fundamentally
unstable nature of management, and therefore cannot be considered merely in terms
of the performance and effectiveness of committees/consultative forums etc. Fourthly,
participation is a part of the process whereby legitimacy and consent for the right of
management to manage is negotiated and maintained. Finally participation is about
processes as well as issues, and it is about the establishment of mutually satisfactory
relationships which allow work in an organisation to go on, on a day-to-day basis,
with the result that it cannot be seen as a forum for the straightforward expression of
homogenous interests on the part of capital and labour.
Accidents, explosions, dangerous occurrences, spillages, slips and trips etc. are all
many and various (some happening to individuals and some to groups of workers and
even affecting people outside the working environment, but they occur within an
environment of decision-making and resource allocation, introducing the problem of
50
control. Therefore, health and safety is about management, and about the
fundamental nature of resource allocation and the construction of priorities between
production goals and safety costs. Making workplaces safe costs money - an inherent
problem underpinning analysis of health and safety participation. However, the
conflict between safety and profit is a complex one, with the nature of investment,
and the economic environment within which the organisation operates seemingly
important in determining how this conflict is expressed or suppressed. Because safety
is tied closely to the function of management decision-making in other areas
(particularly investment and resource allocation, and staffing policies), safety
regulation is inherently a matter for trade unions and other organs of worker
representation. To put it another way, when safety is so closely tied to the core
decisions that management make in the pursuit of organisational goals, the effective
prevention of accidents and control of hazards etc., must involve the representation of
interests that might conflict with dominant managerial strategy. Again, this is not a
simple matter, with a variety of forces acting to obstruct the generation of unified sets
of collective interests in safety regulation. Finally, to counterpose consultation and
negotiation as mutually exclusive modes of participation in safety regulation is to
over-simplify the process whereby consent for work and for working conditions is
generated and sustained.
The overlap between what I take to be the central theoretical reference points of study
for participation and health and safety is striking. The fact that health and safety
regulation involves the articulation of collective interests immediately raises a whole
range of questions about the efficacy of collective bargaining, consultation and
participation mechanisms in how these interests are followed through and resolved in
some sense. This is one of the central reasons for choosing a cross-national study.
When Maclnnes talks of the need to establish "mutually satisfactory relationships"
(1985:106), this applies to the physical environment and to working conditions as
well as to the politics of production and to the rules of governance in the workplace.
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The cluster of terms that have been used to describe this instability in the relationship
between capital and labour, "antagonistic co-operation", 'mutually satisfactory
relationships", "practical co-operation" (Littler and Salaman,1984:65, see also Wright
Bakke,1946:1-19) all point to an important feature of safety regulation at workplace
level; i.e. that conflict and consensus over policies towards the working environment
are dynamic intricate processes. More importantly, the fact that safety regulation is
not just about written safety policies and a set of rules about how to operate particular
machines - the fact that safety is related to money, staffing policies, investment levels
and strategies etc. - means that the participation of worker representatives in
consultative forums non-specific to health and safety matters is also of key
importance. In the context of the German works constitution, participation in health
and safety must address the role of the works council as well as that the safety
committee. Similarly, in the UK safety committees must be looked at in association
with the general industrial relations machinery at the workplace.
The difficulties of interest representation are also an axiomatic part of this thesis.
Rueschemeyer (1986:75) states clearly this difficulty:-
Collective organisations are indispensable for identifying and
articulating common interests which would otherwise remain inchoate,
interpretable in different ways.
Unions therefore, in a general sense, are highly ambiguous bodies, seeking to make
coherent a wide variety of competing and contradictory interests, on the part of their
members as well as the union organisation itself. The lessons for the regulation of
safety are clear:-
The simple fact that a collective organisation exists is no guarantee
that collective interests will be pursued. (1986:76)
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Furthermore, these ambiguities in the roles and functions of representative bodies are
reproduced in a different way for management. The conflict between safety and profit
in a particular situation may well be a conflict between different functions of
management, and different levels of management, as evidence from the case studies
will show.
The problems that unions have as representative bodies, both in opposition to
management and in mediating between workers and managers,are compounded by
the difficulties in articulating simple interests with regard to health and safety. One of
the roles of health and safety analysis in this thesis is to extend and elaborate on the
degree of heterogeneity obstructing the expression of collective interests. It is not
simply that the factors separating groups of workers from each other (geographically,
socially, economically) in the workplace complicate attempts by worker
representatives to construct united strategies. There is also a disjuncture between
forms and practices of the collective regulation of safety (SRSC Regulations, safety
committees etc.) on the one hand, and the individualisation/atomisation of accidents
(discussed in the previous section) on the other. Workers, for a variety of reasons,
often experience accidents or unsafe working conditions in an individual way, which
does not necessarily sit easily with the maintenance of effective strategies by bodies
concerning themselves broadly with collective representation. This tension between
the individualisation of blame and responsibility for accidents, and suuctures of
participation which emphasise forms of collective regulation, runs throughout the
fieldwork, and I return to this issue in the final chapter, particularly with regard to the
visibility of health and safety, and the problems of collectivisation for unions and
other bodies. Above all, the heterogeneous nature of interest representation in health
and safety is dynamic in nature, involving an instability that can only be addressed
through empirical research. The next section points the way forward to the case
studies, by discussing more specifically the way in which the theoretical framework
of the thesis can be applied to workplace situations.
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(v) Participation in health and safety; the framing of empirical research questions.
The previous sections in this chapter have looked at the theoretical background to
participation in health and safety which has informed my research. In this section, I
want to move towards a framework in which the fieldwork can be organised and
structured so as to make an analytical contribution to this field. In this chapter, I have
made several claims about the nature of employee relations, about the parameters
inside which the regulation of health and safety takes place, and about the nature of
worker representation in safety issues as well as other matters. I have also argued that
in a sense, these issues are universal, in that they concern fundamental aspects of the
employment relation, and constant and unavoidable decisions about the priorities
given to safety regulation as against other business and/or organisational objectives.
Notwithstanding the fact that each of the four case studies represents a highly
particular and specific constellation of factors governing participation in health and
safety, it is important to be able to structure and present the case studies in a way
which enable these universal issues to be analysed in both a systematic and
comparative fashion. The final chapter of the thesis returns to the issues emanating
from the two-way comparative structure of the research, drawing in turn on the
outcomes of the intervening chapters on the fieldwork. However, it is necessary to
structure the case study chapters in a way which makes comparison easier and also
benefits analytical discussion. I would emphasise here that such a structure is not a
perfect- solution to methodological imperfections discussed elsewhere. Because of
limitations to the depth and breadth of access, and the differential weight given to key
actors in the four studies etc., a completely even distribution of the fieldwork in this
framework of analysis is impossible. However, each case study, at the least, must deal
with some of the core theoretical arguments presented earlier in this chapter. For this
to happen, the four fieldwork chapters involve, in addition to an introductory section
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presenting background information on employment, working methods, participative
structures, accident statistics etc., three umbrella sections in which the research is
presented.
The first set of issues addressed in each study cluster around the relationship between
the generation and prevention of accidents in the workplace on the one hand, and
styles of management and the variety of pressures which management and workers
operate under in the private and public sectors respectively. I have argued earlier in
this chapter that there is always a potential conflict between safety and production
priorities, complex as this relationship is as experienced in everyday work relations,
and notwithstanding competing arguments about the precise direction of causality in
the relationship between financial pressures and accidents (see Nichols,1989). The
way in which this conflict is expressed, suppressed, articulated etc., is therefore
central not only to each workplace in isolation but to all four workplaces, and must
therefore be dealt with in a systematic manner here. The difference in the nature of
the employment relations between the public and private sectors is critical here, in an
attempt to understand the differential impact of public and private ownership on
management, the pursuit of production/profit-oriented goals and the ability of worker
representatives to influence decision-making processes in each context.
In addition, in the context of a cross-national comparative study such as this, the focus
must rest not only on the different experiences found in the private and public Sector
workplaces, but on the complex tensions and pressures felt at different levels of the
organisational hierarchy in the negotiation of safety regulation in both sectors,
particularly those which appear to disunite areas of management charged with
different responsibilities with regard to safety and production. To anticipate my
conclusions a little, the sectoral differences are expressed primarily through
discussion of the issue of work pressure Leistungsdruck in the German context) and
at how managerial strategy impacts upon the pace of work and the ability of workers
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to retain job control and autonomy, and thereby to restrict the generation of accidents
through resistance to increases in the pace and pressure of work. In the public sector,
the degree to which management can maintain an autonomy in the delivery and
organisation of work which serves to restrain the "niarketisation" of employee
relations, in the UK acting almost as a cipher in the implementation of legislation, is
an important issue. Particularly interesting in this respect are the divergent
experiences of the two public sector studies. The British study is set against a
background of successive pieces of legislation, passed since 1980, which are united
by a desire to inject private-sector style competition into employment in the public
sector44. Most relevant to this study has been the introduction of compulsory
competitive tendering (CCT) for a range of services carried out by local authorities
(Hartley,1990). In Germany, no such comprehensive and deliberate attack on received
practice in the public sector has taken place, and the lack of financial pressure on the
pace of work in Department G forms as much of a focal point in the Department G
case study, as CCT does for Department B.
The second section in each case study looks at the way in which the statutory
framework for the participation of employee representatives operates in practice in
highly specific organisational settings. Britain and Germany have similar, though far
from identical, provisions both for the regulation of workplace health and safety, and
for the participation of employees representatives in this process of regulation. The
key difference in this statutoly framework is that participation in health and safety in
Germany dovetails with a comprehensive system of involvement and consultation
(Mitbestimmung and Mitwirkung) in a range of employment issues. In Britain,
participation in health and safety management remains one of the only major pieces
of legislation relatively untouched by Conservative changes in employment law45,
and exists somewhat in isolation given the lack of a legal framework of guarantied
rights to information and consultation in the UK. This particular picture of
convergence and divergence in the institutional and legal framework of Britain and
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Germany forms the other central comparative pillar of the thesis, and in this sense the
British and German studies treat the issue of legislation and participation slightly
differently, particularly where precise comparison of, say, the role of the union, is
difficult to maintain. In Britain, a key question is the extent to which legislation
regulating health and safety, including as it does provision for participation of
employee representative, and some legal redress against employers, acts as a floor of
rights which can neither be eroded by bad management, nor bargained away in a
voluntarist manner in conjunction with trade unions46. In Germany the focus is still
on the existence and operation of this floor of rights, but the emphasis shifts slightly
to the relationship between safety participation and the well-established system of
participation at workplace-level via the works council in utilising and expanding these
rights. Once again, the way in which legislative protection, in health and safety as
well as other issues, acts as a floor of rights on which worker representatives can
build in relations with managers is analysed. A further aspect of the role of
employment legislation in the regulation of health and safety is the differential way in
which legal standards, and particular sets of legislation, are implemented at workplace
level. In particular, the ability of management to utilise minimum legal standards as
both a ceiling (as opposed to floor) of rights for worker representatives, and as a way
of sanitising safety regulation as involving merely compliance with quantified and
easily measured standards for working conditions (whilst obstructing more dynamic
and participative safety regulation) is a key issue.
The third of the three analytical categories employed in the fieldwork chapters is
something of a logical extension to the other two. The issues surrounding the
legislative framework in which participation in safety takes place are largely issues of
comparison between British and German employment practice. Equally, the nature of
the employment relation, and the particular way in which the negotiation of safety as
against production priorities takes place, raises fundamental questions about the
differential nature of public and private sector employment, and of the possibilities
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and constraints that exist for management in each sector 47 . The third section in each
case study will look at the role of the trade union, with respect both to its role in the
management of safety, and its function as a representative agency in a complex
environment. My approach in this chapter has been to emphasise that safety is
intrinsically an issue for the potential expression of collective interests 48. Each study
must therefore address the extent to which this collective representation over safety
issues takes place, as well as the factors which obstruct unions from mobilising
around health and safety. In the UK, unions have a degree of privilege in the
representation of workers' safety interests via the SRSC regulations (see chapter 2). In
Germany unions have far less direct formal influence at workplace level; rather, direct
influence is limited to parity representatiort in the industry-specific safety regulation
and inspection bodies. This dichotomy between industry-level and workplace-level
union influence points to an important problematic relationship in Germany - that
between the union and the works council. I attempt to unpack the concept of
cumulation further, and to examine the implications that the union/works council
relationship has for our understanding of interest representation in health and safety,
involving also a re-examination of the particular nature of health and safety
representation in comparison with other issues like pay and job security. This takes us
back to the main theme of the thesis itself, the nature of participation in health and
safety management as a specific sphere of industrial relations in different national and
sectoral settings.
The complexity of these issues, their degree of overlap and the extent to which they
reinforce each other are clear. Similarly, such a diverse set of paradigms within which
to undertake a study of worker participation necessitates a particular kind of research
design, methodology and tools for empirical analysis. These are dealt with in chapter
3. The next chapter reviews at length the historical and legislative background to
participation in health and safety in both countries.
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Notes.
1. The methodological issues raised by the nature of this enquiry, and the methods
used in the carrying out of the fieldwork, are dealt with in detail in a different chapter.
In particular, the problems involved in framing comparative fieldwork in an area with
a great deal of divergence in terms of 'key institutions" are left to the third chapter,
and are consciously omitted here.
2. See chapter 2 for more details.
3. There is a somewhat anglo-centric bias in this chapter, given the greater availability
and access of material which deals with participation in a British context. Thus, my
discussions of participation debates in a German context, whilst important in showing
how our understanding of the field is related to other important factors, are more
practical in nature, referring to the arguments about "parity" representation in the
1950s and 1960s, rather than at a more sophisticated theoretical level.
4. A somewhat arbitrary example would be "Statutoiy workplace participation in
Germany makes it harder for management to ignore the wishes of worker
representatives relating to safety issues?".
5. Cressey, P., and Williams, R. (1990), use a graded approach to participation in their
analysis of the survey work of the European Foundation, starting with mere
information-giving and progressing through involvement, consultation and joint
decision-making.
6. Poole suggests (1986:15-24) that a key factor in the historical initiation, success
and failure of schemes of participation is the latent and manifest power held by labour
and capital at a broad social level through time, power generated in turn from macro-
economic developments such as full employment, skill shortage etc.
7. For example, Fröhlich et al. (1989) use similar analytical tools in their survey of
worker participation in the introduction of new technology in several European
countries. The location of participation in this almost "free-floating" matrix of
causality is often the result of an a priori assumption about what participation is for,
and the values that it should embody. In the case of the study by Fröhlich et al., there
is an assumption that participation is a positive force for change in working lives,
supplemented by further assumptions about the determining way in which new
technology opens up further opportunities for involvement. This also accounts for the
confusion of description and prescription in the work of Frdhlich et al. whereby the
existence of participation machinery is often confused with an implicit set of
arguments about the value and worth inherent in participation itself.
8. Flanders (1975;42-3) argues that collective bargaining is the best form of worker
participation, in extending democracy and influence over a wide range of issues. Lane
(1989:224-226) argues that participation is an extension of collective bargaining
which is seen as ". . . merely a process of interest representation in certain limited
areas." This is an interesting set of arguments. I am interested here in the relationship
between legislative rights to information and participation, the framework of safety
regulation and different forms and structures of interest representation in public and
private sector workplaces, necessitating a distinction between general bargaining, and
formal institutions and mechanisms of involvement.
9. See, for example, Markovits (1986:289-290).
10. For details, see Streeck (1984:394).
11. Case study evidence appears to show that initiatives in participation, particularly
involving union representatives on behalf of employees, are usually seen by
management in terms of increasing efficiency and motivation, and by worker
representatives as involving some degree of power sharing and democracy; eg.
Cressey et al,(1985). Furthermore, in the German context, the introduction of new
managerial techniques such as quality circles and team working, was clearly related to
the development of the Hunianisierung der Arbeit programme developed at a
corporatist level (Jacobi and Müller-Jentsch,1990:133), although the difference here
is that these new approaches to involvement and direct communication were not
59
introduced as a challenge to existing union channels of representation (Jacobi and
MUller-Jentsch,1990: 148), nor as a challenge to the role of the works councils in
participation at workplace level. Similarly, job enrichment is often allied, in a
rhetorical sense at least, to the benefits that should result for productivity and
efficiency. Again, for a discussion of the Humanisierung der Arbeit programme in
this context, see Beisheim et al.,(1991;123-125).
12. Flanders (1975;41-42) describes the crucial importance of distinguishing between
procedural and substantive issues in industrial relations, arguing that establishing
systems of rules to govern the carrying out of everyday relations is at least as
important as first-order issues such as pay claims, holiday entitlements etc.
13. Whilst it is important to note that Ramsay is restricting himself here to
management-led participation schemes involving job redesign, it is also the case that
this type of participation is central to the experience of workers in the post-war British
context.
14. This allows Rarnsay to categorise the success of such initiatives as "incorporation"
(Ramsay, 19 80:48-50).
15. For example, Brannen (1983:147) argues that:- "when the market situation of
labour strengthens, and the balance of power changes in its favour, participation
becomes important as an attempt to comes to terms with it". Such an attempt to
correlate participation with some notion of labour 'strength" is weak; whilst it is true
that crucial periods in the growth of consultation forums in British manufacturing
were those where labour appeared to be more powerful (i.e. the second world war),
this is by no means universally the case. An opposite position could be taken with
regard to the preference of "strong" trade unions in the 1970s for "free collective
bargaining" rather than formal participation (and incomes policies).
16. Littler and Salaman (1984;49-54) discuss in detail the development of the division
of labour, and its effects on the nature of managerial attempts to control jobs and
workers. See, also, Rueschemeyer (1986:4-11).
17. I make extensive use of the research carried out by Cressey et al. on participation
in large Scottish enterprises. The reasons for this include the similarity with my own
research design, fieldwork research methods.
18. Cressey et a!., argue that the dichotomy between managerial perceptions of
unitarism, as against employee representative perceptions of power sharing and
genuine involvement, featured to some extent in all of the workplaces studied.
19. The formal exclusion of trade unions in the post-war works constitution is
discussed in chapter 2. Markovits (1986:289-290) shows how parity co-determination
became a central campaigning issue for leading trade unions in the 1950s and 1960s,
and Schregle (1987:322-323) shows how a system of dual representation by, on the
one hand, unions at regional and national level for bargaining purposes and. on the
other, by works councils at workplace level for more general employment regulation
issues was part of a deliberate strategy developed by the DGB in the post-war period,
and not imposed unilaterally by legislators.
20. The set of arguments I have characterised as "cumulation" is strongly related to
other developments in workplace level industrial relations, such as the stimulus in
recent times towards the growth of internal labour markets, and firm-specific labour
regulation policies (eg. Streeck,1984:408-411 and Hoff,1984), and the way in which
co-determination has made personnel issues more central to strategic management
through the costs associated with the possibility of works council opposition to
unilateral managerial decision-making over labour issues (Streeck,1991a:70;
Streeck,1984:41 1-414), although there is insufficient room to fully elaborate these
issues here.
21. 76.3% of works councillors were DGB affiliated members in 1990, compared to
76.6% in 1987; (Die Mitbestimniung, 3/91:221-222).
22. See also, Jacobi and Müller-Jentsch (1990:134).
23. Streeck (1984:409-411).
24. For example, Streeck (1991a:81-82) shows how progress towards decentralised
collective bargaining, and the shift in the balance of power towards works councils in
the regulation of employment issues, creates tension in the relationships between the
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two channels of representation which threatens simplistic notions of cumulation of
rights and powers between them.
25. Chapter 2 deals with the details of changes in employment legislation in Germany
in the 1980s in more detail. Jacobi and Müller-Jentsch (1990:139) say that at the time
of writing, the German government were considering amendments to the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG), which would strengthen the structural and
organisational influence of minority groups in the works councils, thereby diluting the
domination of the DGB.
26. Again, this debate in based on the British experience, given the problems of
access to German material early in the research.
27. This aim is repeated in the HASAWA. See, for example, Hepple (1983:407).
28. Nichols (1980:265) shows how the choice of payment system has been a historical
source of problems for workers' safety.
29. Such a situation is not limited to capitalist economies. Haraszti (1984;294-301)
shows graphically how piecework systems in factories in communist Hungary
produced intense physical and economic pressures on workers to cut corners and to
ignore the formal safety policy of the factory.
30. Part of this includes a recognition that the legislation on health and safety is
framed to the benefit of employers in making safety at work contingent on the
"reasonable practicability" of measures to ensure it. See chapter 2.
31. Nichols (1989:546-547) shows how accident and injury statistics are imperfect
tools for solving issues of the cyclical nature of economic influence. In particular,
business upswings and labour confidence might increase the ability of workers to take
time off for an injury that tight economic circumstances and aggressive managerial
style would not permit.
32. The assumption that safety issues are inherently a matter for collective bargaining
is made by several authors in industrial relations; eg. (Flanders,1975:41;
Clegg,1979:25) It is ironical then, that the failure of (British, in this context) unions to
take safety onto the bargaining agenda (or, rather, the absence of preventive strategies
at the expense of reactive compensation agreements) is cited as one of the main
reasons for successive attempts to legally regulate health and safety.
33. Unions	 campaign around health and safety issues in a way which directly
challenges both managerial prerogative and the dominance of production criteria; for
example, the waves of strikes in the UK oil industry in 1989 were centrally concerned
with discontent over safety standards in the light of the Piper Alpha disaster of July
1988. Beaumont (1983:181) cites other similar examples.
34. Full details of the legal framework of regulation are given in chapter 2. The
discussion here is focused on the issue of safety priorities and the importance of
power and decision-making control in the workplace for the construction of the safety
agenda; for this reason, the high degree of similarity between the two countries is
stressed at the expense of dissimilarities.
35. Dawson et al. (1988:24).
36. Beaumont (1983:71).
37. For example, Beaumont (1983:49).
38. See Hepple (1983:407-408).
39. See, for example, Beaumont (1983:6 1); see also, Moore (1991:26-27) on the
historical failure of UK unions to negotiate the introduction of participative
mechanisms for health and safety prior to the HASAWA and the SRSC regulations
40. Beaumont (1983:186).
41. Case study evidence from the US has shown how manning levels has been a key
factor in workplace negotiations over health and safety.
42. The issue of the nature of public sector employment resurfaces in the case study
chapters. For a fuller discussion, see for example Batstone et al. (1984).
43. Or those based on the coercion of insurance premiums and penalties for
companies with poor safety records etc.
44. Accompanied by privatisation of whole segments of the public sector.
45. Notwithstanding recent suggestions of the future privatisation of all or some of the
services now undertaken by the HSE.
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46. To re-emphasise - the Robens report, and the whole edifice of safety legislation
springing from it, was predicated on the fact that "health and safety" should be taken
beyond bargaining and industrial relations and managed as a separate sphere of
operation, with guarantees of involvement for worker representatives.
47. Notwithstanding the fact that public sector experience in each country is as
different in some ways as between the sectors in each country.
48. Legislation in both countries have recognised this through the role given to trade
unions in the national systems of safety regulation.
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Chapter 2.
Health and safety, co-determination and worker participation in the UK and Germany: a
history of legislation and practice.
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(i) Introduction
This chapter attempts to give a comprehensive overview of the practices of worker
participation, with respect to the management of health and safety in particular, and
outlines the development and impact of the central pieces of legislation governing these
practices in each country. In this chapter, emphasis is given to the legal, statutory and
institutional forms of worker participation, in order to contextually locate the empirical
research of later chapters with reference to what may be called the official world of
involvement in safety management. Given the scope, breadth and extent of the material
covering labour law in the two countries, this paper takes on the task of collecting and
organising the information important for the thesis. It does not enter into a critique of the
relationship between legislation and health and safety in abstract ternis - nor does it
develop an argument concerning the qualitatively different histories of worker
involvement in the two countries. This requires that the chapter follows a fairly
regimented pattern, outlining the situation in each country separately, and in a somewhat
disjointed fashion, rather than attempting to compare practices theme-by-theme.
Similarly, each section follows the developments in legislation and practice in each
country, with no direct comparative analysis, for example between the Health and Safety
at Work Act (HASAWA) of 1974 in the UK, and the similar Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz
AsiG) of 1973 in Germany.
Section (ii) looks at the complex history of worker participation in the UK, particularly in
the post-war period. Particular use is made here of the research by authors such as
Ramsay (1977) and Maclnnes (1985), who have studied the patterns of consultation and
involvement in British industry (particularly manufacturing) over this period. It also
looks briefly at the employment law legislation of the 1970s, the Bullock report, and the
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key impact that labour law changes, introduced in the last 12 years, have had on the
sphere of worker participation, and industrial relations in general. Section (ii) then goes
on to look more closely at the development of health and safety legislation in the UK,
particularly from the Robens report, through to the HASAWA of 1974, the Safety
Representative and Safety Committee (SRSC) Regulations of 1978, and major
developments since then. Further, use is made of a variety of statistical sources which
outline the distribution of accidents and occupational injury, in particular with reference
to the chemical industry1
Section (iii) looks at the post-war history of worker participation in the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG); in particular, I focus on the importance and impact of major pieces of
legislation. Emphasis here is given to the growth and development of workplace co-
determination, and the importance of the relationship between the two channels of
worker representation, the works council and the trade union. This section then moves on
to the management of health and safety in the German context, particularly through the
provisions of the general Mitbestimmung (co-determination) laws, as well as specific
safety legislation such as the Reichsvei-sicherungsordnung (RVO) (Imperial Insurance
Order) of 1963 (Amendment), and the AsiG (Health and Safety at Work Act) of 1973. A
statistical outline of accident distribution is given, again particularly in the context of the
German chemical industiy.
A final section looks at a different arena in which the legal regulation of both worker
participation and health and safety is played out; the European Community (EC).
Legislation on health and safety participation has taken on more of a European dimension
in recent years, and many of the comparative themes which inform this thesis are better
dealt with in terms of pan-European developments than in individual national contexts.
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Therefore, this section will involve a reappraisal of some of the themes raised in the
sections dealing with national arrangements and practices.
(ii) UK labour law, industrial relations and safety regulation
Industrial democracy and worker participation are difficult fields to disentangle in studies
of British industrial relations. The central reason for this is the overwhelming lack of
statutory participation rights for workers and/or unions. Processes which in other
countries are identified as worker participation, and are covered by distinctive
representative mechanisms, are in the UK more integrated into collective bargaining.
Therefore, analyses of involvement and participation must locate themselves in a diverse
network of relationships which can be informal as well as taking place in formal
participative forums. This helps to explain the difficulties authors have had in specifying
what participation is in the UK context (Poole,1986:l-12, Marchington,1980:9-14,
Ogden,198 1 :544546)2.
Britain has often been characterised as having a laissez-ftiire tradition of labour
regulation and collective bargaining (Clegg,1979:289-306). In essence, this refers to the
relative abstention of the state from extensive regulation of industrial relations, with
voluntary self-regulation, in the form of free collective bargaining between capital and
unions,- providing the essential basis of industrial relations. Historically, the relationship
between the 19th Century trade union movement and the emerging Labour party is a
good starting point. Wedderburn (1986:22) points to the fact that in the late 19th Century,
the absence of political representation for workers and trade unions in Parliament,
(combined with other factors such as the lack of a written constitution) ensured that very
little positive protection was ever afforded organised labour by the legislature3.
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Wedderburn argues that this was a central factor in the formation of workers' protection
in law as immunities, rather than the positive rights (eg. to association and to strike)
which began to emerge in the labour codes of other European nations
Wedderburn,l986: 16-17). Similarly,
The immunities were in essence the British legal form of basic democratic
liberties, the equivalent of what in other countries took the- form of
positive rights... (Lewis,1983:363)
These immunities have had a checkered twentieth-century history, with periodical
attempts (1901, 1971,the 1980s legislation etc.) to limit and control the pursuance of
collective interests by trade unions. However, the immunities remained largely intact
(until the 1980s at least), given a "deliberate ahstentionisrn" on the part of UK
governments in the regulation of industrial relations law. The gist of state policy tovards
employment law has been reluctance to legislate, coupled with rulings designed to
stimulate free collective bargaining and locally agreed practice (see, for example,
Wedderburn,1986:30-35; McCarthy,1988:12). This has had important effects on the role
of unions in safety regulation. Protective legislation, certainly up until the 1970s, had
always been seen as an addition to collective bargaining, rather than as a replacement for
it Hepple,l983:408). It also helps to explain the importance that unions placed on
single-channel nominations of safety representatives in the framing of 1970s legislation,
given that non-union representation in the new regulations might be seen to threaten the
place of unions in negotiating over working conditions.
The second world war formed an important staging post in the development of
consultation and participation in British industry, characterised by the growth in Joint
Production Committees (JPCs). The ILO reported around 2.5m workers to be covered by
over 400 JPCs in the engineering industry alone in 1943 (Maclnnes,1985:94). However,
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in the fifteen years following the end of the war, economic growth, the nationalisation of
key industries, near-full employment and the development of the shop stewards
movement, conspired to weaken the spread of formal consultative machinery with the
extensive development and spread of collective bargaining (Marsh, 1982:121).
The 1960s saw an increase in strike activities, and both major political parties engaged in
attempts to regulate and re-order the increasingly unofficial nature of trade union activity,
as part of a debate over the apparently inherent problems of British industry and
productivity (for details, see Nichols,1986). This period also saw the publication of the
Donovan report which recommended the recognition and integration of the shop stewards
movement into mainstream industrial relations and union activity, and also coincided
with an increase in interest in the concept of industrial democracy in the reform of
industrial relations and economic regulation.
During this immediate post-war period, safety legislation was expanded through the
Factories Acts4, which limited themselves to very specific and technical matters, and
were not part of a comprehensive framework of safety regulation. Dawson et al.,(1988)
argue that legislation of this kind:-
...was characterised by its fragmentation and by the absence of workforce
involvement. Fragmentation was rooted in the gradual extension of
regulatory coverage through a struggle between employers and proponents
of laissez-faire on the one hand and trade unions and reform groups on the
other. (Dawson et al.,1988:9)
The 1970s was a period of intense activity in the employment law arena in the UK, with
successive attempts to intervene in the process of collective bargaining, primarily through
incomes policies introduced by both political parties whilst in power. The Industrial
Relations Act (IRA) of 1971 attempted to directly regulate the activities of trade unions,
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through a registration scheme giving positive rights to registered unions on the one hand,
and through the creation of the National Industrial Relations Court (NTRC) on the other.
According to Wedderburn, the IRA represented a qualitatively new approach to the
regulation of industrial relations, through primary intervention, rather than through the
indirect abstentionist approach to the law described earlier (Wedderburn,1986:51-56),
although the fall of the Conservative government led to a further change in direction in
industrial relations regulation.
Legislation introduced by the subsequent Labour government must be seen as part of the
broader policy of accommodation with the demands of trade unions, and the unwritten
accord between them both; the Social Contract. The repeal of the 1971 Act, and a return
to the immunities of the 1906 Act was achieved through the Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act (TULRA) of 1974. The Employment Protection Act (EPA) of 1975,
provided more direct protection of both trade unions (through an extension of support for
collective bargaining, the setting tip of ACAS etc.) and to individual workers (for
example, through new unfair dismissal legislation). These two Acts forrri the background
to the developing debate on industrial democracy and participation during the late 1970s.
Indeed, industrial democracy was not limited to the work of the Bullock Committee
(Bullock,1977)5; the EPA, and other pieces of legislation, dealing with the National
Enterprise Board for example, also included elements of consultation and involvement
for employee representatives (Ramsay, 1977:493). The Bullock majority
recommendations included mandatory employee representation on unitary boards of
companies employing over 2000 people 6, and single channel representation through
trade unions. The subsequent White Paper of 1978, watered down several of the main
recommendations from Bullock, including limiting the participation to the supervisory
board of a two-tier systeim The White Paper never became law, and the in-coming
Conservative government did not take it any further.
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Despite the eventual lack of legislation on participation, the 1970s did see an increase in
forms of involvement. The Warwick survey of establishments iii 1978 charted the
growth of consultative committees over the period 1973-8. It must be noted also, that
experiments with industrial democracy, particularly involving worker directors, were
largely limited to the public sector (Ramsay,1977:495), with British Steel (Brannen et
al.,1976) and the Post Office (Batstone et al.,1983) being the major examples8.
Turning to health and safety, the 1970s was also a period of expansion in legislation. The
report of the Robens committee in 1972, implemented through the HASAWA (1974),
represented a break with tradition in the legal organisation of health and safety in Britain.
Robens and the 1974 Act sought to inject genuine self-regulation and accountability
(through easier access to enforcement and prosecution) into the provision of safe working
conditions, and to make it a central issue for employee involvement at the workplace -
rather than relying on highly specific Factories Acts-type legislation on single industries.
One of the main changes in legal emphasis introduced by the HASAWA was a
conditional responsibility on employers to provide safe vovking conditions, replacing the
more narrowly-defined yet absolute standards of the Factories Acts. In particular,
employers after the 1974 Act had to take all "reasonably practical" measures to ensure
workers' safety, a term which has remained at the heart of enforcement and the
prosecution of employers in the courts. It made employers responsible, in a
comprehensive way, for the safety of employees, rather than specifying definite practices
that were illegal etc. This was further reinforced by the SRSC regulations of 1977, which
specified rights to information, consultation, time-off and inspection of the workplace for
union appointed safety representatives, and also stipulated that a consultative safety
committee must be established if requested by at least two safety representatives.
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Whilst the legislation of the 1970s sought to make the system of regulation of health and
safety more coherent and universal in its application, it also embodied central difficulfies
with regard to worker participation in health and safety. Although the whole tone of the
Robens report sought to take safety out of the arena of collective bargaining, the
HASAWA gave trade unions a central role in the management of enforcement agencies,
and the subsequent provisions of the SRSC regulations ensured a privileged role for
recognised trade unions in the representation of workers in safety matters, principally
through single channel nomination of representatives 9. This tension between negotiation
and consultation over safe working conditions was discussed in the last chapter, and re-
emerges in the fieldwork chapters. Codes of practice produced by the Health and Safety
Commission (HSC) also established the function of safety representative training as a
mainly union function (Walters,1990:l0) 10 . It is important to note also, that the SRSC
regulations gave very little to safety representatives by way of "strong" rights to
participation, such as joint-decision making over safety-related managerial decisions, and
the law in general says very little about the functions of safety representatives, or the
functioning in practice of safety committees.
Enforcement is shared between the HSE and local authority inspectors in the UK,
through improvement and prohibition notices designed to stimulate self-improvement in
the safety practices of firms, rather than to invoke punitive sanctions. In 1988/9, 11546
notices of this kind were served by inspectors, compared with only 2342 informations,
the first step towards prosecution 12. The insurance of employees in Britain comes under
the compulsory auspices of the Employers' Liability (Compulsory) Insurance Act of
1969, and is only administered by the HSE because of an agreement under part of the
HASAWA which transfers enforcement to the HSE from the Secretary of State (Drake et
al. ,1983:136). Therefore, a separation between insurance prerni urns and
inspection/enforcement, as coercive forces for good health and safety practices in UK
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workplaces, exists in a way which tile combined functions of German insurance agencies
do not allow (see later in this chapter).
The theory of self-regulation enshrined in tile legislation of the 1970s is essentially one
which sees safe working practices as being in the interests of both workers and
employers, seeing enforcement agencies as necessary for the few who do not accept the
responsibility for safety. Walters (1990:9) refers to the code of practice accompanying
the SRSC regulations, which stresses that as much use as possible should be made of
exisüng industrial relations machinery in achieving the degree of consultation and mutual
trust necessary for the implementation of tile regulations themselves. Similarly:-
If health and safety is, as some would maintain, a matter for collective
bargaining, it could have been brought within the ambit of tilis general
statutory disclosure [tile pro-collective bargaining tenris of tile EPA].
However,., health and safety at work is treated, not as a matter for conflict
to be resolved by collective bargaining, but as involving a community of
interests for which joint consultation is the appropriate mechanism. (Drake
et al.,1983:186)
This form of legislation. and enforcement, built on the tri-partism of tile HSC and the
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 13 , has remained virtually intact despite the
significant changes in labour law, and trade union power that have taken place
subsequently.
The last 14 years of Conservative government have seen resurgent attempts to use the
law, and legal sanction, coupled with more far-reaching changes in tile structure of
industry and changes in tile occupational make-up of the workforce, to control and
weaken the activities of trade unions in tile workplace. Tile eariiest moves to weaken
organised labour concentrated on tile individual rights of workers, in extending the
qualification period for unfair dismissal and maternity leave (Wedderburn,1986:69).
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Subsequently, the main legislative attempts to curb both the bargaining and
organisational power of trade unions were the Employment Acts, (EAs), of 1980 and
1982, and the Trade Union Act (TUA) of 1984. The first of these limited severely the
picketing and secondary action rights of unions in dispute. It also outlawed the closed
shop. The 1982 EA banned the use of industrial action to pursue rights of recognition and
consultation, or to pressurize employers into Union Membership Agreements (UMAs), as
in the case of the Messenger newspapers dispute 14 (Wedderburn, 1986:72). The 1984
TUA dealt more specifically with the internal organisation of trade unions, under the
rhetoric of democratising allegedly unrepresentative bodies15.
Wedderburn summarizes the combined effects of the various changes:-
The new statutes of the 1980s have invited the common law to resume its
dominion over industrial conflict, union security and the power
relationships inherent in employment. They have cleared the ground of
laws that had propped up minimum standards as a base for bargaining
machinery, much of which is now deplored as an obstacle to lower wages
and competitive efficiency. (Wedderburn, 1986:94)
Moreover, these changes have also been accompanied with a Positive role for the courts
in enforcing harsh sanctions on offending unions. The important changes of the 80s are
not easy to categorise, and some authors have pointed to the continued resilience of
structures of collective bargaining and trade union activity in the face of this concerted
attack on the vestiges of immunity1 6•
The 1980s have also seen a growth in so-called a-typical or peripheral forms of
employment such as part-time work, temporaly work and sub-contracting. Combined
with continued high levels of unemployment, it would not be surprising to find that these
recent developments in labour law have weakened the bargaining strength of unions in
the workplace, and enabled management to re-establish their decision-making
prerogative without recourse to extensive forms of participation (especially participation
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involving unions). In addition, this extension in the scope and range of non-typical
employment has implications for health and safety and foims of collective regulation of
working conditions. As the previous chapter argued, the fragmentation of employment is
a central way by which managerial decisions affect working conditions (sub-contract
labour being associated with less safety training, more cost-cutting etc.) and also the
ability of workers or their representatives to maintain a collective approach to safety
regulation. It is also a way by which the individualisation of blame is reinforced and
protected, as individuals fall out of the various collective mechanisms (unions, access to
safety representatives etc.) designed to protect them.
Recent survey evidence seems to differ as to the strength of foniis of worker participation
in the last decade. Daniel (1987:112-115), in the DE/ESR/PSI/ACAS survey of 1984
(covering change since 1980), argues that participation in the implementation of new
technology has been, on the whole, weak:-
Our findings show that,. ..,there was little or no involvement of workers
and their representatives in the introduction of the major changes we
studied...managers generally operated in a minimally pragmatic fashion. If
they could introduce the changes they wanted to without having to take
account of the views of any other group or individual, they did so.
(Daniel,1987:1 13)
In particular, Daniel found that the extent of participation and consultation, particularly
through union channels, was strongly positively correlated to both the degree of
resistance and uncertainty surrounding the change involved, and the extent to which the
changes were organisational as opposed to solely technical.
The original survey material, however, showed a more complex development of general
consultation and participation mechanisms, rather than those limited to the introduction
of technical change (Millward et al.,1986). Whilst the proportion of establishments with
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joint consultative committees remained constant at 34% across all sectors, there was
relative decline in consultation in manufacturing, and relative growth in the public sector.
The 1990 survey (Miliward et al.,1992:153) found that this figure had fallen to 29%. The
authors conclude that, in the early part of the 1980s at least, participation and
involvement have been more affected by shifts in the structure of employment, than by
disuse of committees, or managerial de-recognition of them (Mil-Iward et al.,1986:140).
These conclusions would tend to confirm the arguments of Maclnnes (1985:98-99), who
claims that incidence of consultation, in private manufacturing at least, has remained
stable in the post-war period, with constant failure and renaissance being a typical cycle.
Health and safety committees were cited as frequently in 1990 as in 1984 (1992:162),
although the authors report a big decrease in the number of workplaces where safety
representatives existed without safety committees. This was accompanied by an increase
in the proportion of workplaces where no consultation over safety takes place (from 22%
in 1984 to 37% in 1990), with this trend being strongest in firms without union
representation.
There is also disagreement in the survey results over the growth or decline in the role of
dade unions in participation machinery. Whereas Miliward (Millward et al.,1986:144)
point to a slight decline of the union channel in nominating the employee representatives
on consultative committees, other authors (eg. Batstone et al.,1986;1 17-120), argue that
not only does trade union-channel representation still pre-dominate in most sectors of the
economy, but that it has not suffered even a relative decline compared to individualistic
participation techniques such as briefing groups, quality circles etc.
The 1980s have seen no major repeal or extension of the HASAWA and the SRSC
regulations, save for new arrangements in reporting of accidents with the Notification of
Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (NADOR) in 1980, replaced by the
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Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) in
1986. The HASAWA remains the centre-piece of UK safety legislation, with the HSE,
through advisory industiy committees (IACs), producing new regulations, guide-lines
and codes of practice accordingly, usually in response to new EC Directives 17. Other
minor changes to legislation have been made, such as the transfer of a greater proportion
of enforcement and inspection to Local Authorities and away from the HSE inspectorate.
Drake et al., (1983:119-122) have argued, however, that the post-HASAWA experience
has involved something of a return to a concern with specific hazards and standards in
the legal regulation of safety, within the framework of self-regulation and legal
accountability. This development includes the Control of Substances Hazardous to
Health (CoSHH) Regulations of 1989, which demand conformity with highly technical
exposure and monitoring specifications in the control of chemical.s and other materials. In
addition, the CoSHH regulations require management to update and continuously
monitor the passage of all substances through the workplace, and through each stage of
the production process, with particular attention paid the potential hazards that might
result from storage and handling procedures, and the consequences of breakdowns in
safety systems. As will be seen, CoSHH has had an important effect on the British
chemicals factory, reported in chapter 4; it represents a combination of an extension of
the 1974 HASAWA, in placing overall responsibility for safety with management, with
an extension of the requirement that management devise more long-term and analytical
safety control systems in the workplace, particularly associated with the monitoring of
chemicals and other substances as they pass through the plant and the production
processes.
There has been no shortage of research into the way in which safety committees have
operated since the introduction of the SRSC regulations, at least in terms of the numbers
of workers covered by committees and representatives. There is strong evidence to
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suggest that the regulations led to a sudden explosion in coverage, as (usually organised)
employees took advantage of the new possibilities' 8 . Attendance on TUC-approved
stage 1 and 2 safety courses reached a peak between 1979-1980 and fell away somewhat
thereafter. Recent figures show that there are now approximately 90000 trade union
safety representatives in the UK, with 10000 consultative safety committees in operation
and over 100 union representatives on health and safety advisory, technical and standards
committees 19 . Walters (1990:10-11) says that since this initial expansion in incidence of
safety representatives and committees, coverage had stabilised and decreased in many
areas. The proportion of employees covered by each institution is strongly positively
related to workplace size; between 1979 and 1987, only iii workplaces with more than
250 employees did the proportion of workers with a safety representative increase. Over
the same period, it was only in firms with over 500 employees that the proportion of
workers covered by a safety committee increased.
The Conservative government has not attempted to dilute the system of union-nominated
safety representatives in any direct way; however, the Offshore Installations (SRSC)
Regulations of 1989, seeking to tighten the operation of health and safety in oil fields
following the Piper Alpha disaster of 1988, include systems for electing safety
representatives that do not depend on the single channel 20. There exist trade union fears
that this, combined with the menu system of implementation for European company law
(see later), may in the long run threaten the single channel election of safety
representatives in the UK.
This thesis is not about the relationship between the frequency of accidents and the
practices of worker participation in safety regulation. However, it is worthwhile to make
selective use of available data, in order to enrich the background to the study, and to give
a clearer idea of shifts in accident frequency over the last 20 years or so. The main source
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of statistical material on safety and accidents in the UK is the HSE, depending naturally
on imperfect reporting procedures. The two questions which have preoccupied
commentators in this area have been - how have the HASAWA and the SRSC regulations
affected safely and health?, and has safety been affected in any way by the fluctuating
fortunes of the economy in the last decade? (in particular given general political moves
towards the deregulation of industry).	 -
Nichols (1990), in particular, poses the question as to whether the self-regulatory nature
of the Robens report and the HASAWA has proved adequate in facing up to the shifts in
the balance of power between labour and capital in the 80s; i.e. has the Act been
succesful in providing the framework for effective safety regulation at a time when
unions have seen their negotiating power challenged and weakened? Despite the
reduction in absolute numbers of fatal injuries since 197421, he finds that there was a
definite increase in non-fatal injury rates, calculated per 1000 employees and using other
standardising criteria, across virtually every industrial group, between 1981 and 198522.
He also argues from the statistical evidence, that a strong up-turn in labour intensity in
the early 80s was positively correlated to an increase in the relative incidence of
accidents over the same period (1990:30-31). The chemical industry has traditionally a
higher incidence of fatal and non-fatal accidents than for manufacturing as a whole; in
1988/9, there were 2.5 fatalities per 100000 employees for the chemical industry
compared with a figure of 1.8 per 100000 for manufacturing as a whole. A similar
relationship exists for non-fatal major injuries 23, although the evidence suggests that
whereas accidents per 100000 employees for manufacturing industry rose slightly for the
period 1986/7 to 198 8/9, the accident rate for the chemical industiy improved somewhat.
This history of participation in health and safety, and the legislation underpinning it,
illustrates the close relationship between safety regulation and collective bargaining in
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the UK. This does not mean that unions prioritise safety considerations in general
dealings with management. Indeed, Hepple (1983:407) argues that much of the impulse
for new safety legislation in the 1970s came from a historical failure of unions to do so.
The 1974 Act, and subsequent legislation, therefore are seen as a floor of rights
protecting employees in workplaces without unions or with weak unions. The attacks on
trade unions in the last decade only serve to highlight the importance of this floor in
providing minimum protection. However, safety legislation still affords a privileged role
for union representatives, despite the fact that the guiding principle from Robens onwards
has been that safety is an issue to be consulted over rather than bargained over. As I
argued in the previous chapter, consultation and bargaining are not mutually exclusive
patterns of industrial relations. However, the emphasis on union-channel representation
in the UK legislation indicates the acceptance on the part of legislators that consultation
is not enough with some employers, and that the floor of rights is weakened unless some
kind of statutory input on the part of worker representatives exists to counter the fact that
management willingness to consult is not always guaranteed. This complexity and
ambivalence in the varying roles that exist for consultation, negotiation and participation
in UK safety legislation give an indication of the likely pressures that shop stewards and
safety representatives might feel, particularly where both jobs are done by the same
person, and this issue is raised again in each of the UK case studies. As mentioned in the
last section of chapter 1, the tensions of union representation in safety are an important
part of this thesis, particularly in the way that they affect the expression of collective
safety interests.
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(ili) Co-determination and safety regulation in Germany
The later development of German capitalism and the particular nature of state power in
the late 19th Century are often reasons given for the differences in the development of
industrial relations in Germany24. However, for the sake of space and for ease of
comparison, the starting point here is the reconstruction of forms of legal regulation of
industrial relations after the second world war, with trade unions arguably devastated b
the experience of war and Nazi oppression 25. More discrete and institutionally separate
legislation has existed over the last century in Germany. For that reason, I shall discuss
first the workplace constitution, the body of law governing the rights and obligations of
worker representatives, going on to look at health and safety regulations. I will look at
the major pieces of legislation dealing with co-determination in Germany, as well as
going into some detail as to what co-determination actually means in the context of day-
to-day relations between management, unions and worker representatives. Although
material will be discussed relating to enterprise co-determination at supervisory board
level, emphasis will be given to those aspects of labour law and practice which regulate
workplace relations and the activities of Betriebsrätc' (works councils) in particular.
The original attempt to reconstruct a legislative system of industrial relations was
targeted at the coal, iron and steel industries, strongly influenced by the interests of allied
occupation administrations in seeking to dilute the potential collective strength of this
industry- for the German economy and for German re-armament. The
Mitbestininiungsgesetz (MirbG) of 1951, usually referred to as the Montan regulations,
provided for extensive forms of industrial democracy, including parity involvement at
supervisory board level, the placing of a labour-director on the management board, and
union involvement in the nomination of some of these representatives, for those
companies in this sector with more than 1000 employees. The provisions were partially
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extended to the rest of the private sector in the Berriebsverfrissungsgesetz (BetrVG), or
works constitution act, of 1952, which also applied to the coal, iron and steel industries
already covered by the previous legislation. Under the 1952 Act, one-third representation
at supervisory level was granted for all public limited companies with a minimum of 500
employees. These representatives were to be elected by, and from, all employees, and
not through single channel nomination, in the case of the first two board places.
Subsequent places were open to external representation, in practice full-time officials.
The BetrVG (1952) also provided for "compulsory" works councils in all private sector
firms employing six or more people, to be elected by all employees. The creation of a
works council had, however, to be triggered by the workforce, and a central aim of the
legislators was to exclude trade unions as the focus of workplace relations between
employees and management. For Hyman, these legislative decisions can be seen:-
...as deliberate initiatives to displace potentially insurrectionary organs by
the "safe" machinery of employee representation: formally detached from
the trade unions, and denied the right to mobilise opposition to the
employer. (Hyman,1989:203).
Thus, one of the key aspects of German labour law throughout the post-war period has
been the separation of functions between unions (collective bargaining over pay, regional
and national terms and conditions, strikes and their regulation) and the Betriebsrat (rights
to information, consultation etc., no right to strike) - an issue which resurfaces as a
central aspect of the two German case studies. Neal (1987:232-233) argues that the
centralising policies of leading unions such as IG Metal!, making the region and
municipality the centre of organisation rather than the workplace, were a critical early
reason why subsequent legislation sought to exclude unions from the workplace in this
way. Indeed, the same argument could be used to explain why the DGB approach to
industrial democracy during this period was more concerned with representation on
supervisory boards than at the level of the workplace. Indeed, Markovits (1986:289-290)
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shows how, for the union movement in Germany, the issue of industrial democracy was
largely one based on campaigns for an extension to the provisions of the 1951 and 1952
Acts - particularly through the extension of patty co-determination for workers in sectors
other than coal, iron and steel. The policy of seeking extensions to supervisory level co-
determination was also the key campaigning theme for DGB unions in the 1950s and
1960s26, somewhat at the expense of developments in workplace-level participation.
The 1960s in Germany also saw an increase in the number and length of sikes,
comparable in some ways to the growth of unofficial action in the UK over the same
period. In 1966, the coalition government ordered an enquiry into the system of co-
determination then in place, under the chairmanship of Biedenkopf. Streeck (1984:398-
399) details the broad findings of the committee, which found that participation was
overwhelmingly successful in generating consent in industrial relations at the workplace,
and this forms an important historical reference point for the understanding of the tension
between integrative and confrontational rationales behind participation law in Germany
(see case studies). Fears voiced by management over reduced efficiency and slower
decision-making were rejected. Importantly, the laws had helped to place manpower and
employment issues at the heart of managerial decision-making, through making unilateral
action, and the refusal to consult with workers representatives, costly in terms of
opposition and delay in implementation enforced by the works council.
The BetrVG was subsequently revised in 1972, involving an extension and deepening of
involvement on the part of the works council 27. This law increased the numbers of works
councillors permitted, established stronger links between unions and works councils,
gave the power of Mitbestimmung to the works council over a greater range of issues,
gave legal backing for the Gesanirhetriebsrat (joint works council) for multi-
establishment firms and removed obstacles to works councillors carrying out union
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duties. In other words, it strengthened the formal ability of works councils to influence
management, and it diluted somewhat the exclusion of trade unions from the workplace,
whilst leaving the strict separation of powers between the two bodies intact.
The Mitbestiinniungsgesetz (1976) amended the same law of 1952, and involved an
extension of industrial democracy and co-determination. However, this law was strongly
opposed by employers associations, both before and after it came on to the statute book,
and many of its terms fell short of DGB demands for effective parity co-determination28.
Parity representation at supervisory board level now applied to all companies with over
2000 employees, although one employee representative had to be chosen from middle
management. The Biedenkopf commission had highlighted the unnecessary nature of an
independent element in the structure of supervisory board, and it was omitted from the
final version of the MitbG (1976). The illusory nature of the "parity" enshrined in this
law, was further ensured by the casting vote of a chairman who always had to be elected
from shareholder representatives.
The threshold of 2000 employees meant that by the late 1970s, 19.6% of German
employees worked in firms covered by both the MitbG (1976) and the BetrVG (1972).
This proportion has remained relatively stable in recent times, with the number of firms
employing more than 2000 people having increased from 472 in 1978 to 522 in 198929.
In comparison, in the late 1970s, 43.9% of workers (working in firms with less than 500
employees) were only covered by the provisions of the BetrVG (1972) governing works
council co-determination 30. Moreover, there appears to be a consistency over time with
respect to the proportion of elected works councillors being trade union members. In a
survey of over 33000 companies in 1990, 76.3% of elected councillors were DGB union
members (compared to 76.6% in 1987). Only 20.6% of works councillors were not
members of any union federation31.
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Legislation on worker participation and involvement in the German public sector is very
similar to that in the private sector at the level of the workplace (there is no direct
equivalent of supervisory level co-determination iii the public sector). The bulk of the
BetrVG (1972) is reproduced in similar form in the Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz
(BPersVG) or Staff Representation Act, of 1974. The differences that do exist are usually
concerned with the distinction between Miti'ii*ung (a right to consultation weaker than
co-determination) and Mitbestinunung, and are complicated further by the distinctions in
German labour law between Arbeiter (blue collar employees), Angestelite (white collar
employees) and Beamte (state officials) 32. The differences between public and private
sector workplaces in the management of health and safety are discnssed in the next
section. With regard to the composition of Persona/rate (public sector works councils),
there appears to be highly variable incidence of union members on the councils,
depending on the nature of the industry and the urban/rural divide. A survey of local
authority works councils in 1977, in the region of Baden-WLirttemberg, showed that only
43% were union members, and only 37% members of the DGB union for the public
sector, OTv33.
It is necessary to go beyond a formal description of the major laws concerning co-
determination and statutory forms of consultation and involvement. The rights to
information and participation for German workers and their representatives are positive
in nature. By this I mean they are written in law, and are not the subject of voluntary
agreement, custom or practice. They form part of a written, complex and highly
developed labour law code, and are designed specifically to create a system of workplace
industrial relations based on cooperation and industrial peace34.
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...Comparatively speaking, legalism seems to be the essential feature...in
the industrial relations system of the FRG. (Conrad,1981:210)
This is a long way from the historically unwritten immunities protecting British dade
unions. Furthermore, the positive nature of these rights makes it necessary to identify in
more detail the key legal elements which make up the system of workplace participation.
What ultimate sanction do employee representatives have in order to guarantee these
rights with obstructive employers? These central issues then become a focus for the
empirical research, particularly in the way in which they relate to indusflial relations in
general, and the informal world of workplace relations.
The ultimate recourse for a works council in either the public or the private sector, when
it considers that management has failed in fundamental temis to fulfil its obligations
under the law, is to go to the federal labour court, the Bunclesarheirsgericht BArbG), or
its equivalent at regional or lower levels (BeIrVG,para23(3); BPersVG,para7l(1)).
Companies in the private sector can be fined a maximum of DM20000 under
BetrVG,para23(3) for breaches of basic obligations with regard to the rights of works
councils. It is veiy uncommon for disputes to reach this level; when they do it usually
involves test cases where anti-works council employers have attempted to obstruct some
or all of the provisions, or have tried to intervene in the process of works council
elections 35 . Evidence suggests that the labour courts are on the whole sympathetic to the
side of employee representatives in these cases 36. The law makes it illegal for employers
to interfere with the process of election of works councils in any way BetrVG,para20(1-
2); BPersVG,para24(l)), and have even ruled against the separation of business
departments designed purely to reduce constituent employment levels and thereby reduce
the numbers of works councillors permitted etc. This contrasts with the relative freedom
of employers in the UK to manipulate employment in this way (Messenger newspapers,
Wapping etc.).
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The most important legislative prop to participation below recourse to labour courts is the
Einigungsstelle (agreement position or arbitration). This exists in both the private
BetrVG,para76) and the public sectors BPersVG,para71), and is the procedure followed
in the case of continuous disagreements between the works council and management. It
involves the establishment of a separate body, involving representatives from either side
and a mutually agreed neutral chair. The decision of this body is final and binding, and
refusal of either side to recognise and act upon the decision can invoke further recourse
to the labour courts.
The laws describe fairly clearly which matters are subject to Mitbestimmung
BetrVG,para87(l-l2): BPei-sVG,para75(l-3)) and, in the case of the public sector, which
come under the weaker kind of joint decision-making Mitwirkung (BPersVG,para7 8(1))
as well as those which apply specially to Beamie (BPersVG,para76(l-2)). Included in the
list of matters to involve co-determination in the strong sense are the organisation of
work, working time and the length of the working day, methods of payment, the
distribution of holidays, accident prevention etc. This general list of subjects which
qualify for Mitbestimniung is supplemented in other areas (i.e. Beti-VG,para9l on changes
to working methods) and in other laws. This means that Mitbestimniung applies to health
and safety narrowly defined, and to the range of issues broadly termed working
conditions which, as I argued in the previous chapter, are central to the creation and
regulation of hazards. The law in the public sector further grants works councils a period
of time to respond to a management proposal which has been submitted to them; ten
days, although this can be reduced to three days by management in exceptional
circumstances (BPersVG,para69(2)). Similarly, the same paragraph states that the
Einigungsstelle must reach its decision over a dispute within two months of being
notified of the problem37 . A similar protocol covering the process of Mithestimmung in
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the case of private sector works councils is contained in the individual provisions of the
BetrVG.
A further important positive right associated with participation is the protection from
victimisation for those who carry out the work of the works council (BetrVG,para78;
BPersVG,para8). In both laws the victimisation of works councillors, as well as
preferential treatment for them is clearly outlawed. Victimisation in this sense also
includes obstruction of berujiiche Entwicklun (professional development). In addition to
these "positive" rights detailed above, the legislation also provides for extensive
secondary and administrative support for works councils in calTying out their duties. In
both the private and public sectors, the costs of elections (BerrVG,para2O(3);
BPersVG,para24(2)), the costs of the general running expenses of the council (where
appropriate, BetrVG,para4O; BPersVG,para44) and the administrative costs incurred by
recourse to the Einigungsstelle (BetrVG,para76a; BPeisVG,para71) are all borne by the
employers.
The trade union has no legal rights in the workplace in Germany, by way of the strict
separation of functions between regional wage negotiations between union and employer
federations on the one hand, and the negotiation of workplace issues in a structured
atmosphere of industrial peace between management and employee representatives on
the other38 . This, as we have seen, does not prevent the majority of works councillors
being trade unionists, or representation on works councils being a primary goal of many
trade unions as a way of gaining some influence at workplace level39
To pause for a moment, the object of the discussion here has been to outline the broad
legislative framework within which worker participation operates in the FRG, to examine
in more detail some of the key positive rights which distinguish legalistic forms of
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industrial democracy, particularly at workplace level, from those which operate under
voluntary agreements and ad hoc initiatives (i.e. in the UK) and to present elementary
statistics which illustrate the extent of coverage that works councils possess in both the
private and public sectors. To re-iterate, this thesis seeks to use cross national and cross
sectoral research to inform an understanding of the various ambiguities and tensions in
health and safety participation. To this end, the differing structures of participation, and
the different kinds of legal framework in the countries forms a key comparative axis in
this thesis, the other being the control of work, differential experiences of work pressure
and managerial strategy in the public and private sectors.
The law on participation in Germany has implications for workplace management of
health and safety. Like Britain, legislation to regulate working conditions in Germany
was introduced as a response to the deprivation and poverty of the late 19th Century.
Again, the focus was on specific problems, and specific groups of workers, leading to
legislation for miners and seamen (both 1887) and for the protection of children (1903)
and women (1908). However, analysis of German legal regulation of health and safety
must focus on the dualism of staailiches Recht (state law) and auronornes Recht
(autonomous or civil law). The first is legislation produced by the government
periodically, which applies to all workers, and which is broadly concerned with absolute
minimum standards or particular hazards and dangers, like asbestos for instance. Laws
which have been produced in this way recently include the Chemikaliengesetz (chemicals
law) of 1980, and the Gefahrsroffi'erorcinung (hazardous substances regulations) of 1986.
However, a large body of law is also produced through a system of self-regulation; the
autononies Recht. The root of this law, for health and safety at tile workplace is the
Reichsversicheruiigsorc1nuiig (RVO), or Imperial Insurance Order of 1911, revised with
important amendments in 1963. This law provides for two important features of health
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and safety. Firstly, the Unfallversicherungsträger, or accident insurance bodies, which
are organised by industry in the private sector (Berufsgenossenschafren (BGs)) and
regionally in the public sector (Gemeincleunfallversicherungsverbãncle (G U1/)). Cities
with population of more than 500,000 have the right to form an independent inspection
agency of their own. All employers must be a member of one of these three bodies,
which are managed and run by a strictly bipartite assembly and parliament of trade union
and employer representatives. This is the principal way by which employers insure their
employees against accidents at work, and employers in both sectors must be a fee-paying
member of one of these organisations 40. These subscriptions are, in a small number of
BGs, partially refundable oi.
 surchargeable depending on the accident and general safety
record of a member company over a period of time41.
The BGs and GUI/Vs also perform two further central functions in health and safety.
Firstly, they issue binding Unfallverhütiingsvorschriften (UVVs), or accident prevention
regulations, which have the status of law, and which address particular hazards and
technologies, although there are also sets of general U1VVs which set minimum standards
of safety for the workplace as a whole, and place responsibility for safety with employers
in much the same way as the HAS AWA does in Britain. These UVVs are generated from
within the umbrella bodies for the BGs and GUVVs, and are ratified individually.
Membership of a BG or GUI/V automatically brings an employer under the legal
requirements of these regulations. Secondly, both the BGs and GUI/Vs take on a high
proportion of inspection and enforcement functions of member firms and establishments.
They work hand in hand with the Gewerbe Auftichtsarnt (GA), or state inspectorate, and
have similar powers of enforcement, through the rec/in ische A ufsichtsheamren (TABs), or
technical inspectors. Although all employers must be a member of an insurance body,
UVVs do not apply to Bearnre, who are regulated by separate insurance arrangements.
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However, in practice, the U1/%s do get implemented as non-binding internal regulations
and guidelines42. The period 1969-1979 saw a 60% increase in the number of TABs43.
The second main provision of the RVO (1963), is that each employer should appoint an
appropriate number of Sicherhe its beauftragten (SBAs), or safety representathes
RVO,para719(2)), who then take on a watch-dog function with. respect to workplace
health and safety problems 44. The law provides little guidance on the selection and
responsibilities of the safety representatives, other than the need for experience on the
part of these SBAs and a general requirement to support employers in the carrying out of
accident prevention duties. The Betriebsrat has no rights to Mitbestimniung in the
appointment of the SBAs. They are supposed to be a link between management and the
workforce45 . In addition, the SBAs take on the functions of representing workers on
health and safety matters, in workplaces where there is no Betriebsrat or Persona/rat
(Diekershoff,1979:2). In the public sector, each GUI/V produces separate laws on how
the requirements of the RVO are to be implemented. For example, the GU1/Vs of Baden
and Württemberg jointly produce UI/Vs which stipulate the numbers of SBAs required,
the thresholds of numbers of employees requiring the employment of workplace doctors,
as well as the number of hours to be worked by safety specialists for a given number of
employees46.
The law does make clear however, that the SBAs have no legal responsibility for
accidents or poor safety practices; they are merely in an advisory position with regard to
the observance of protective legislation. Indeed, the law stipulates that the delegation of
general managerial responsibility for safety be done in a highly formalised manner with
written contracts along a line of Vorgesetzreii (superiors), usually line management,
specifying the exact responsibilities involved in each position. Comparison between the
role of German SBAs and safety representatives in the UK emerges in the fieldwork
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chapters. A major empirical study of Sicherheitsbeaiiftragten was carried out by
Diekershoff (1979), drawing on survey evidence from eight companies in both the
private sector, and pseudo-public sector utilities. The study appeared to confirm a highly
unorganised system of selection of SBAs with " ..no criteria.. " being most reported at over
50%, followed by "..length of service.." at 16% (Diekershoff,1979:35). Another
important finding was that in the utilities, operating as autonomous firms funded by
public money, there was a far higher incidence of SBAs also taking on the functions of
Vorgesetzten as well (1979:19). This tends to support the research I carried out in the
German public sector, and is further discussed in chapter 7.
In the field of statutory legislation, the main pillar of health and safety provision is the
Arbeitssicherheitsgeserz (AsiG), or Health and Safety at Work Act of 1973. This applies
directly to the private sector only, as it is up to regional Lander parliaments to pass public
sector legislation, although the law does stipulate that employers in the public sector must
make health and safety provisions of equal value (AriG,para6)47
The three main provisions of this law are for Fac/ikrâfre (safety specialists),
Betriebsärtze (company doctors) and for an Arbeitsschut:ausschuJi (ASA) or health and
safety committee. The Fachkrafte, previously optional, became a compulsory part of
health and safety with this law. Their minimum working hours per year vary greatly
between industries, as they are fixed by the respective BGs and GUI/Vs who use variable
criteria such as workplace size, hazards involved in production etc. The tasks of the
Fachkraft are specifically laid down in the AsiG, and centre on the function of
compliance with UVVs, liaising with management on safety matters, and on relationships
with bodies such as the ASA and the Betriebsrat. The Fachkraft should carry out his/her
function solely according to safety criteria, and not with regard to the financial position
of the company; thus, as with the SBAs, there is no direct legal responsibility on the
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Fachkraft for accidents and poor safety, so long as he/she has discharged their advisory
duties to the employers, who remain legally responsible. The law also stipulates that
management can reject the advice of Fachkr4fte, so long as written reasons are given for
such refusal (AsiG,para8(3)). Betriebsärtze are employed in very similar ways, with
required hours stipulated by the appropriate BG or GUVV. Like FachkrOfte, they can be
employed full-time, but more usually are contracted in from local medical practices, or
shared with other firms, in order to meet the necessary number of hours required to be
worked in a year. FachkrOfte are often employed full-time by a company, with only a
portion of time taken up by specifically safety functioiis48.
The ASA is not a decision-making body; it is made up of representatives of management,
the Betriebsraf and SBAs, includes the company doctor and safety specialist, and must be
formed by the employer if the company also employs either a Fachkraft or a doctor
(AsiG,paral 1). Additionally, specialists should be invited as and when appropriate
AsiG,para1 1). Failure to establish such a committee can lead to prosecution under AsiG
(paral2). The committee is given a number of duties such as the administration of
training for SBAs, the investigation of accidents, the preparation of collective agreements
over health and safety (where appropriate) and collection and distribution of accident
statistics49.
The law provides for only minor Mitbestinimung rights for the works council in the work
of the ASA; in the number of representatives on the committee, and the processes for
selecting them. The works council also jointly draws up the agenda for the sittings of the
committee50. In this sense, the functioning of the ASA is very similar to that of the safety
committees in Britain; however, although the committee has no decision-making
powers: -
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Der Betriebsrat kann die Initiative ergreifen und sein
Mitbestirnmungsrecht geltend machen, wenn der Arbeitgeber die
Beschlllsse des Arbeitsschutzausschui3es fiber zu treffende
Arbeitsschutzmassnahmen nicht d urchfiihrt. (Nitschki, 1990:88)
[The Betriebsrar can grasp the initiative and invoke its co-determination
rights, if the employer does not carry out the appropriate health and safety
decisions of the health and safety committee]
This is a key aspect of the system of legal regulation of health and safety in Germany.'
Institutions such as the safety committee, or safety representatives, whilst in isolation
possessing very similar powers to their UK counterparts, form part of a system of
participation and positive rights, centred on the more encompassing rights of a works
council, which has no precise equivalent within the voluntarist British system 51. The
analysis of such systemic effects is a central part of the two German case studies.
Mitbestiinrnung rights exist for the management of health and safety in both the private
and public sectors (BetrVG,para87(7); BPersVG,para75(3)). In both of these cases, the
law specifies that this Mitbestinimwig applies to nmtters involving the prevention of
accidents (Uiifallverhütung), a term which narrows the field of health and safety, and one
which has been the subject of dispute in labour court cases. Recent court decisions have
favoured a strong reading of this Mitbestinimung right, extending it to include the right to
jointly determine the selection of SBAs, for example 52. The BPersVG (para8l(1-5)), and
the BetrVG (para89(1-5), both stipulate the range of measures, such as inspections and
new regulations; which the employer must involve and inform the works council about.
As is the case with British health and safety legislation, there have been relatively few
changes to the basic framework of protection since the acts of the 1970s, although the
legislature has similarly passed new laws dealing with specific hazards 53. This is not
surprising given the European Community origin to much of recent health and safety
initiatives.
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The previous paragraphs have attempted to give an overview of the central laws which
govern participation in health and safety in Germany. In such a highly developed legal
system, it is obviously impossible to detail every aspect of the system. By way of
conclusion to this section, I would like to present a synopsis of secondary material,
dealing with the statistical background to accidents and occupational health, for German
industry as a whole as well as the sub-groups of chemicals manufacturing and the public
sector. It must be said here, that direct comparison of fatal and non-fatal accidents is very
difficult between the two countries, given that, amongst other things, road traffic
accidents occurring on the way to work are also included in the German figures.
ILO figures (1988:1017,1023) show that occupational fatalities in Germany fell from
3089 to 2302 between 1983 and 1986. Taking a longer time period, there has also been a
strong decline in reportable (3-day) accidents in private sector industry in Germany, from
102.5 per 1000 full-time workers in 1970 to 51.6 per 1000 in l989. Interestingly, the
same figure for the chemical industry fell from 99.0 in 1970 to 36.0 in 1989, indicating
that over this period the level of accidents in the chemical industry fell from roughly the
national average to well below it. Occupational illness has been the major growth area for
health and safety problems in the chemical industry. Whilst absolute numbers of new
cases of occupational illness fell from 5613 to 3941 between 1980 and 1989, the figure
for the chemical industry rose from 226 to 342 over the same period, the highest
percentage increase for any industrial grouping 56. Over the same period accident
fatalities (excluding road traffic accidents) fell from 1807 to 1098 for industry as a
whole, against a fall from 61 to 29 for the chemical industry 57 . The BG Cheniie annual
report shows how employment in the chemical industry is highly polarized between small
and large firms. Whilst 4655 (47% of the total) companies employing less than 10 people
account for only 1.6% of employees, the largest three companies (Hoechst, BASF and
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Bayer) employ approximately 12% of employees 58. Further, whilst accident rates per
1000 employees stood at 15 for the "big three" companies, it peaked at 59 per 1000
employees for firms employing between 50 and 99 people 59. Figures collected by the
umbrella organisation for public sector GU1/Vs do not break down figures between
regions, although accidents (excluding road traffic) have consistently fallen in recent
years, by a slight amount, in the public sector as a whole from 178467 in 1986 to 167905
in 198960. In Baden-Wurtternberg, the GUVV produces accident statistics, showing an
increase from 14595 to 15597 between 1986 and 199061. Further statistics, particularly
those related to the departments and workplaces where the research was calTied out, are
presented in each case study chapter when appropriate.
(iv) European legislation and the internal market.
This last section is included primarily as a context in which the legal position of the two
countries can be located. The period from the mid-1980s onwards has seen a renaissance
in the discussion of issues of European integration, particularly at the economic and
financial levels. This has been accompanied by real, substantive changes in the structure
and practice of the EC, inspired fundamentally by the Single European Act of 1987,
which changed voting rules in some areas of policy in order to achieve more efficient and
quick decision making throughout the business of the community.
These developments are centrally important to the future of industrial relations in
member countries: the process of European integration is business-led and is essentially
one concerned with economies of scale required in order to compete effectively with
Japanese and US producers62 . With the ever-increasing interdependence of nation-states
upon multinational producers and employers, this process of expanding the economic
95
space under which European employers are to operate has come to require major re-
sucturing at the level of the political economy. The agenda for analysts of industrial
relations is principally one set by the divergent processes of economic deregulation and
liberalisation on the one hand, as against attempts by governments and democratic
movements (including trade unions) to re-establish and construct a degree of regulation
and social protection at the European level, as a replacernenL for existing national
practices63.
At the same time, the issue of the social dimension has attracted considerable attention,
as trade unions at national and European level have attempted to develop a strategy on
collective bargaining across national boundaries, and have attempted to develop stronger
links with employers' bodies in order to achieve this (the social dialogue, Val Duchesse
etc.). This process of establishing a social dialogue is also promoted by the Single
European Act (Article 118b). There is insufficient space to develop these issues here;
rather, I will look at recent developments in European legislation which are important in
our considerations of industrial relations, worker participation and the regulation of
health and safety. Indeed, European legislation is likely to become the key arena in which
unions can hope to influence the management and regulation of health and safety in
Europe in the future, as Brussels, despite difficulties over political union in the broad
sense, comes to influence and initiate national protective legislation to a greater extent64.
The EC has been active in the field of health and safety regulation for many years now.
Both CoSHH in the UK, and its equivalent, the GefahrstoJfverordnung in Germany, have
their roots in European initiatives in this sphere. The amendments made to the Treaty of
Rome (1957) by the Single European Act specify that whereas decisions affecting "the
rights and interests of employed persons" (Article lOOa) still require unanimity in the
Council of Ministers 65 , those dealing with health and safety matters, as well as with the
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working environment, require only a qualified majority (Article I 18a). This has led to a
series of new Directives which have health and safety as their central theme, including
the "Framework Directive" (Directive 89/391/EEC - adopted 12/06 89) which involves
general health and safety measures, and which requires very little legislative amendment
in the UK. This Directive has also been instrumental in the production of several other
"daughter" Directives: some of these have already been adopted, such as that on
Personal protective equi)ment (Directive 89/656/EEC - adopted 30/11/89), on the use
of work equipment (Directive 89/655/EEC - adopted 30/1 1/89), on minimum
workplace requirements (Directive 89/654/EEC - adopted 30/1 1/89) and on VDU use
(Directive 90/270/EEC - adopted 29/5/90)66.
Several of the Directives produced in recent years include provisions for worker
participation and involvement in the management of health and safety, particularly
regarding the circulation of information, formal involvement of workers (eg. Article 7 of
the Protective equipment Directive), rights to consultation (eg. Article 8(2) of the
Minimum workplace requirements Directive) or the right to request a visit by the
appropriate enforcement agency if employee representatives are not happy with safety
measures in existence (eg. Article 6(2) of the Use of work equipment Directive). Many
of these new laws are general rather than specific in nature, establishing responsibilities
on the part of employers rather than prescribing definite practices.
A common theme linking this new body of European legislation on health and safety
with proposed legislation on the harmonisation of company law and employee rights is
that of "mutual recognition", which Streeck (1991:335-337) defines as a process of
"negative integration" whereby the process of gradual harmonisation is achieved through
the mutual recognition of standards, practices etc. of each member country in other states.
Therefore, the EC does not, in many circumstances, regulate what practices must exist in
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each country, but seeks to make sure that each country recognises the laws and standards
of others, as far as this is possible. It is a process very similar to that of subsidiarity,
whereby decisions are made at the lowest possible level of decision-making within the
Community. The principle of subsidiarity, an important issue for the UK government in
recent years, was included in the final wording of the Social Charter, signed at the
Strasbourg summit in December 198967.
Streeck argues that the process of mutual recognition is critical to the wishes of
international business in establishing an economic space where the advantages of broader
production possibilities are not offset by the renegotiation of excessive labour regulation
and protection. He argues that the success of mutual recognition in the shaping of
European labour law, to be seen in the menu-type draft Directives on worker
participation leaving a maximum amount of discretion in the hands of national
parliaments in the implementation of the new laws, is partially responsible for the failure
of positive integration-type legislation such as the Fifth Directive and Vredeling to pass
through the Commission (Streeck,1991:342-343). This is a key reason why it is therefore
most unlikely that the development of labour legislation at a European level will involve
the integration of a comprehensive system of worker participation in health and safety,
involving positive rights, at a level beyond that of established national practice. Thus,
whilst Euro-led initiatives in health and safety can reasonably be expected to increase in
importance, they will be grafted on to existing national arrangements for the general
regulation of employment rather than generate a specifically new arena of legislative
support for participation.
Schmitthoff (1977:6) charts the development of positive legislative proposals on worker
participation through the EC in the 1970s. The European Company Statute (ECS)
(from 1970 onwards), the Fifth Directive (from 1972) and the revised version of the ECS
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(1975) all looked for the best formula for ensuring compulsory employee participation at
supervisory board-level. Both of these draft proposals, in addition to those concerned
with the availability of information to employees (Vredeling,1980)), have been
resurrected at points in the last ten years, as the issue of European integration has
reappeared at the centre of national and supra-national politics. Partially, however,
because of the difficulty of such positive legislation, discussed above, and partly because
of the problems of unanimity required in the area of the rights of employees, all of this
legislation has either been temporarily shelved, or disappeared from the agenda
altogether.
A new initiative proposed by the EC is a draft Directive on the European Works
Council (amended in September 1991), which, like some health and safety legislation,
originates in the 47-point Action Programme drawn up by the Commission in
conjunction with the Social Charter in the autumn of 1989 (Hall,1990a:34). It is designed
to n-iake consultation and involvement in European multi-nationals compulsory, through
the establishment of works councils in such companies. Gold et al,(1991) have analysed
the possible implications of such a Directive, through a study of existing voluntary
arrangements for European-wide consultation in 15 multi-nationals. They come to the
conclusion, in line with the predominance of national practice in safety regulation, that
existing national practice within the parent company is critical in shaping the nature and
content of such experiments, and show how two models, broadly speaking French and
German, appear to dominate the agenda iii this area. Whilst consultation in French
companies tended to involve joint committees combining management and worker
representatives, the initiatives originating in Gemmn companies (including Volkswagen,
Mercedes-Benz and Allianz) tended to involve the existing works councils (and unions),
with only modest and informal support from employers. These findings would appear to
suggest that European-wide experiments in participation do not necessarily involve an
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organic growth in the power resources of employee representatives; rather, it could be
argued that voluntarist forms of participation such as these must accommodate
themselves with existing practice, and must often acquire their legitimacy by the very
fact that they do not challenge existing arrangements for collective bargaining, dispute
resolution etc. The authors of this study confirm such experiences in several of the
companies mentioned. It is also important to recognise this- distinction between
legislative and voluntarist forms of participation in comparing involvement in Britain and
Germany.
Further, the study appears to confirm the hypothesis of Streeck (1991:343-344), that
European integration and deregulation are likely to help stimulate company-specific
systems of industrial relations, as multinational firms tend to take on an importance
greater than that of employers' federations in the European economy. With this in mind,
experiments with participation can be seen as part of a process of internal company
restructuring with the changes of the internal market uppermost. Iii this context, Hall et
al., (1991:30) show how manager respondents saw the process of extension of the sphere
of consultation as a positive channel for restructuring at a European level.
This chapter has extensively referenced the key aspects of legislation and established
practice in both worker participation and health and safety in Britain and Germany in the
last 45 years. It has also looked very briefly at official statistics on health and safety,
accident rates nationally and by industry and on some trends in occupational illness, as
well as empirical studies which have looked at worker participation. It has also discussed
the relevance of a sphere of European influence over labour law, and health and safety
legislation, and raised some of the broader issues surrowiding European integration and
labour regulation and deregulation.
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Clearly, there is a good deal of divergence and convergence in the relevant history and
experience of the UK and Germany. My research will attempt to analyse workplace
practices in the light of these national and sectoral differences, whilst at the same time
seeing problems of participation in the management of safety regulation as fundamentally
cennal to industrial organisation. The next chapter discusses in more detail the research
methods used in carrying out the fieldwork, and talks further about the methodology of
cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison.
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Notes.
1. See chapter 3 for details of the choice of the chemical industry for the purpose of
carrying out the private sector case studies.
2. For an excellent overview of the history of forms and practices of participation in the
UK and Germany see Lane (1989:226-239 and 241-243).
3. The lack of general "positive" legislation, for example on the length of the working
day, on minimum standards, holidays etc. has obvious implications for working
conditions and safety regulation. See, especially, Hendry, 1989:9 and Hepple, 1983:405-
407. Protection was usually extended to the employment of women and children,
indicating a faith in the role of local negotiation, for (unionised) men, in regulating
working conditions.
4. These laws are commonly called the four "codes", and are the Mines and Quarries Act
of 1954, the Agriculture Act of 1956, the Factories Act of 1961 and the Offices, Shops
and Railway Premises Act of 1963.
5. The Bullock report was the culmination of an intensive debate within the labour
movement concerning the pros and cons of statutory worker participation. Whilst the
TUC, in its submissions to the Bullock committee, were enthusiastic about the need for
legislation in this area, the policies of member unions were more diverse and sceptical. A
composite motion at the 1974 TUC conference rejected the need for enforced worker
participation in favour of an enhanced status for collective bargaining. The TUC, it is
claimed, misjudged the mood of the trade union movement in promoting statutory
participation (Edmonds, 1977:4).
6. The Bullock Committee were confined in their remit to the discussion of industrial
democracy at board level only. Mc'arthy (1988:6) argues that the importance of the
European Comm tinily (EC) Draft Fifth Directive on employee in volvemeiit is important
in this respect, and the Bullock C'ornmiuee itself uses the Gennan iW/Ihesthiirniitçsgesetz
of 1976 as a benchmark for the (arbirraiy) choice of 2000 as the employment threshold
(Bullock,1977: 128-129).
7. Brown,1981, reported in Maclnnes,1985:97-98.
8. The industrial democracy experiment at the Post Office was established along the lines
of the Bullock majority recommendations.
9. Dawson et al.,(1988:12-13) suggest that the fall of the Conservative government in
1974, and the enactment of the Robens report by a Labour administration, help to explain
the much stronger role for trade unions in the subsequent legislation. See also Nichols
(1990:27).
10. The HSE has, it is argued, sought not to be involved in the enforcement of the SRSC
regulation (Walters,1990:22). See also, IRRR(HS1B),No.184 (5 April 1991:8) on the
wishes of trade unions to see the SRSC regulations more strictly enforced by the
inspection agencies.
11. Drake et al.,(1983:199-201) argue that the safety representative is a function which
partly exists to allow others (i.e. managers) to discharge their legal obligation (eg. under
the HASAWA) to inform, consult and involve employees or their representatives.
12. IRRRHS1B),No.184 (5 April 1991:2). Prosecutions are far more common in the UK
than in Germany; with 2812 cases against only 177 in 1987.
13, Although the HSC includes parity representation for union nominees, the executive
enforcement agency, the HSE, has a chair appointed by the Secretary of State, with
consultation with unions on further appointments. This contrasts with the strict bipartite
parity of the Berufsgenossenschaften (BGS) and Gemeincleunfalh'ersicherungsverbände
(GLJVV) in Germany.
14. The Messenger Newspapers dispute centred on the de-recognition of the National
Graphical Association (NGA) by a group of newspapers, each of which became a
separate employer in the eyes of the 1982 EA, thus making concerted industrial action
illegal. The 1982 Employment Act also included a far more rigid definition of a trade
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dispute, now limited to workers' own employer, and directly concerning employment
matters, thus outlawing political strikes and all forms of secondary and sympathy action.
15. The three main clauses of the Act ruled firstly on the compulsory carrying out of
secret ballots for strike calls, including strict terms under which the call could be phrased
and a compulsory warning to employees that striking is in possible breach of
employment contract. Secondly, compulsory secret ballots were introduced for the
election of union officials, and funds were made available from central government to
finance the carrying out of these ballots; TUC policy has been opposed to taking
advantage of such opportunities, although several unions have utilised the funds
Wedderburn,1986:8l-82). Finally, ballots had also to be held for the payment of a
political levy by a trade union, a move arguably designed to weaken the Labour Party
through striking at a key source of its funding (Coates et al.,1986:100-106) The
cumulative effect of the new legislation was seen clearly in the miners' strike of 1984-5;
particularly regarding secondary action and the liability of the union in common law for
damages resulting in an illegal dispute (Coates et al.,1986:90-95, Beynon,1985).
16. See for example, Batstone et al. (l986:pp45-47,ppôO-64,pp69-78).
17. There is also strong union representation on these IACs.
18. Drake et al.,(1983:197) report that by Januaiy 1981, the AEU organised workers in
2436 establishments, with a total of 12080 safety representatives.
19. IRRR(HSJB),No. 190 (4 October,l 991:2)
20. IRRR(HSIB),No.184 (5 April 199 1:8).
21. IRRR(HSIB),No.190 (4 October 199 1:2).
22. Nichols (1990: 17).
23. IRRR(HSIB),No.190 (4 October 1 99 :5).
24. Fox (1978:26-29).
25. The extent to which trade unionism survived the third Reich in Germany is the
subject of some historical debate. Compare, for example, the differing comments of
official DGB publications on the degree of damage done to German unions
DGR,1973:72, and DGB,1981:10). For Mandel (1980:104), the effects of Nazi
oppression were deep and lasting:-"It is not difficult to locate the social and political
secret behind this "success". The smashing of trade unions and all other workers'
organisations, and the resultant atomization, intimidation and demorilization, condemned
a whole generation of workers to loss of their capacity of self-defence."(original
emphasis).
26. Markovits (1986:299) also shows how the importance of parity co-determination at
supervisory board level for DGB unions was strongly related to the increasing
centralisation of lending member unions such as IG Metal! and IG Chemie and the
importance of macro-political rationalisations of industrial democracy as a potentially
genuine opportunity to challenge the power of capital.
27. In addition, there is regional variation in the implementation of the BetrVG. Each of
the 11 (now 16) Lander, or regions, has its own equivalent of the federal BPersVG, a
LandesPersVG, with only fairly minor variations in the extent of Mitbestininiung
afforded to employee representatives across a range of issues.
28. See, for example, Spieker (1989:244-257) on employer opposition to the
implementation of Mitbestimnwng legislation.
29. See WSI Mitteilungen,7/1 99O,pp468-476.
30. Streeck (1984:404).
31. Die Mitbestimmung,3/91,pp221-222. In 1990, 23.5% of works councillors were
women, and 4.6% foreign workers. This compares to figures of 20.5% and 4.5%
respectively for the year 1987.
32. Seglow P. et al.,(1982:21-23) discuss the important differences between Bearnte and
the other employment categories, especially with regard to collective bargaining and the
right to take industrial action, as well as showing how the difference has been eroded in
practice in recent years.
103
33. Kübler, (198 1:59). Personalrat elections alsotake place, as a rule, every four years
(BPersVG ,para27 (1)).
34. Matters which are classified as part of the Arbeirskampf (labour struggle) are not
allowed as part of the general process of joint decision-making. See, BetrVG,para74(2).
35. Nakielski (1987:712-721). A DGB survey suggested that at least 10% of firms had
tried to interfere with the process of Betriebsrat elections.
36. Nakielski (1987:7 15). The labour courts generally have three members; a
professional magistrate/judge, plus a representative of employers and of the trade unions.
See also Gold et al.,(1990:39) on how labour court decisions in Germany have tended to
reinforce the Mitbestinirnung rights of employee representative bodies.
37. cf. the arguments of Streeck (1984:398-399), on how the potential for works councils
to legally delay unfavourable decisions has led to a reorientation of management policy
with regard to long-term planning and the development of an internal labour market).
38. The law also governs the rights of trade union officials and representatives, to time-
off for example. For recent labour court decisions in favour of paid time-off for union
business, see International Labour Review, Vol.130,1991,No.l, p108.
39. "West German industrial democracy - its so-called 'works constitution' - is now the
main mechanism by which unions represent their members i'is-à-vis employers."
(Streeck,1991:319,my emphasis). This issue is very important to the research and
resurfaces in the fieldwork chapters. German unions have been involved centrally in
some recent developments in the creation of multinational works councils; for example at
Volkswagen (Gold et al.,1991:30).
40. Membership rules for fiGs in particular lead to interesting anomalies. If one shifts
production methods fundamentally, one does not necessarily have to switch BC
membership, meaning that some firms originally involved in wood-working in the last
century still belong to the appropriate BGs even though working methods bear no further
resemblance to wood-based technology.
41. BG Cheniie operates this system of rebates; see chapter 6.
42. Grassl M. et al.,(1982:40-44).
43. ILO,1984:43.
44. I use the translation safely representative, despite strong differences between the
position of SBAs and safety representatives in the UK context, In Germany, SBAs are
selected by management, and do not have any mandate over the representation of
specifically workers' interests in health and safety, although to cast them as management
agents or representatives would also, I feel, be misleading.
45. Amtliche Mitteilungen der Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz, January 1990,pp 10-12.
46. "Allgemeine Verwalutngsvorsch riften' des Landes Badeii- Würrternherg , 15 Dezember
1983 ,para 33.
47. This has been a confusing legal issue for employers in the public sector over the last
15 years or so. See Nitschki,1990:96.
48. For a full discussion of the ways in which work-hours of safety specialists and
company doctors are calculated, see Nitschki,1990:pp32-33, ppl6-l7 respectively).
49. Nitschki,1990:87.
50. Nitschki,1990:88.
51. Gill (1990:4) emphasises how in the British context, so much of the agenda and pace
of worker participation and involvement is set by management, with strong implications
for how we view the processes involved.
52. Der Personal rat 3/89,pp65-67.
53. The main new piece of legislation in general employment matters is the
Bescháftigungsftirdei'ungsgesetz (employment promotion act) of 1985, which sought to
promote temporary employment through extensions to periods of justifiable temporary
contracts etc. For a fuller discussion of comparable developments in temporary working,
see Casey et al.,(1989:449-466).
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54. "Arbeitsuiifallstatistik für die Praxis",Hauptvorstand der gewerblichen
Berufsgenossenschaften,1990: 17.
55. "ibid",1990:19.
56 "ibid',199ft32
57. "ibid",1990:34.
58. Jahresbericht, BG Cheniie, 1989:16.
59. ibid. 1989:16.
60. Jahresbericht, Bundesverband der UnfallversicherungstrLiger der Offentlichen Hand,
1989:50.
61. Verwaltun gsbericht, Wurtternberg Gemeiiideunfallversicherungsverband, 1990:43.
62. Labour Research Department,(1 989:13).
63. Deakin et al.,1989:1-3. 	 -
64. I shall assume a good degree of knowledge on the part of the reader with respect to
the functions and institutions of the European Community in decision-making.
65. Effectively meaning a lack of progress in many areas given the power of the (largely
British) veto.
66. IRRR(HSIB),No.192 (6 December 1991:9-10). Many more Directives have been
proposed and are likely to become European law in the next two or three years, including
an eighth 'claughter" Directive, concerning temporary worksites (inciuding building
sites), which seeks to increase supervision on construction sites employing more than 20
people or existing for over 30 days, a Directive which may require extensive amendment
to UK health and safety legislation; see IRRR(HSIB),No.192 (6 December 1991:12).
67. Hall M (1990:6).
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Chapter 3.
Research methods.
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(i) Defining the research problem
This thesis began with an interest both in forms and practices of worker participation
on the one hand, and the development of the Single European Market (SEM) in the
second half of the 1980s on the other. As has already been discussed in the previous
chapter, a central dispute over the evolution and direction of the SEM, has been,
broadly speaking, that concerning employment law harmonisation, the construction of
a social Europe etc. This led me to an interest in statutory versus voluntarist
participation schemes, and to the progress of European legislation such as the Fifth
Directive, Vredeling and the European Company Statute. Lately, the proposed
European Works Council Directive has taken up many of the themes included in the
earlier attempts at legislation.
I was therefore determined, from the outset, to carry out cross-national research of
some kind. Germany seemed to have four advantages as a choice for comparative
research. Firstly, I had already carried out preliminary research into worker
participation and the SEM as part of my Masters dissertation. Secondly, this had
allowed me to establish some contacts in Germany, to develop a basic grasp of
German etc., making access, and subsequent success at doctoral level more likely.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Germany offered the opportunity to study the
relationship between worker participation and other issues (trade unionism, interest
representation etc.) in the context of a statutory framework of works constitution law,
which stood in contrast to the tradition of voluntarism in the UK. Finally, existing
studies of an Anglo-German nature (for example, Maitland,1983), as well as ones
focusing on particular aspects of German industrial relations (eg. Koch,1978 in the
case of shop steward organisation), provided the starting point in the construction of
an effective research design at workplace level in the two countries.
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The methodological problems of carrying out cross-national research in two very
different legal and regulatory environments were great. Krieger raises the same
issues:
...it is impossible to avoid certain difficulties with the precise
comparison of contracts of employment and collective agreements, and
also with the exact interpretation of the prevailing individual forms of
participation. (K.rieger, 1991:6).
The next task therefore was to define a more manageable research project than merely
looking at worker participation in broad terms. This led me to an extended interest in
the diversity of spheres of participation, and to the commonalities between the legal
regulation of health and safety in the two countries. I became interested in the way in
which similar forms of safety regulation at workplace level in the two countries
interacted with the divergent traditions of workplace labour regulation and industrial
relations, and this led to the theoretical and practical development of participation in
health and safety management as more of a discrete research area than either
participation or health and safety 1 . Within this, I tried to specify the research
objectives I would take into the fieldwork stage. Above all, I was keenly aware that
health and safety is an emotive issue as well as being of more academic interest. At
various stages of the research, questions concerning the efficacy of forms of
participation in reducing accidents have been raised by myself and others. However,
I have purposely avoided such questions, and those seeking to analyse the relationship
between participation and demographic factors such as workplace size, union density
etc; my interest is in the complex relationships that exist between worker
representatives, managers, individuals and safety officers within differing
participative frameworks, and in what they can tell us about the processes of safety
management, as well as the bearing that they have on the collective expression of
interests regarding safety and working conditions. Within this, the utility of concepts
like cumulation and the floor of rights came to be of central consideration as the
108
research took shape. In addition, I felt that in-depth case study research would be the
best method of achieving these research aims.
The choice of paired case studies in both the private and public sectors resulted from
a desire to broaden the base of the research, and to maximise the benefits of the thesis
in focusing more clearly on the general research issues outline in chapter 1. In
particular, much of the literature dealing with health and safety regulation, the
implications of production priorities for safety and hazards etc., was centred on the
private sector, whilst classic studies of worker participation (in the UK context)
focused on large state enterprises like the Post Office and British Steel (Batstone et
al.,1983; and Brannen,1976 respectively). I argued in the opening chapter that the
regulation of safety is inherently linked to the nature and policies of management in
pursuing organisational goals. This raises the interesting question about how public
ownership affects the way in which management strategy is devised and followed
through, and how it also restructures the relationship between managers, workers and
worker representatives with regard to the generation and prevention of hazards.
Therefore, I thought it essential to look at the regulation of safety in public as well as
private sector workplaces, in order to broaden our understanding of the differences
and similarities in safety regulation.
However, one of the key problems that this thesis set out to address is the relationship
between statutory forms of participation at workplace level, and the representation of
workers' interests in health and safety regulation. In other words, how does a legally
defined structure of involvement and rights to information consultation etc., affect the
way in which worker representatives, trade unions and individuals seek to regulate
safety. This forms the main Anglo-German focus of the study. Whilst safety
participation institutions are similar between the two countries, they co-exist with
very different systems of industrial relations, collective bargaining and union
organisation. Given my central argument that safety management is inherently related
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to these broader issues of the control, organisation and regulation of work, it became
essential to see how these different regulatory frameworks served to structure the
regulation of safety in different ways. Therefore, the two-by-two matrix of British and
German/public and private sector workplaces was devised.
I chose the chemicals industry for the private sector studies for two reasons. Firstly,
there was the likelihood that a relatively vibrant safety agenda would exist; recent
legislation in both countries (CoSHH, GefStoJjV, Chemika/iengesetz), and proposed
legislation from the European Community (Major Industrial Hazards programme, for
example), had pointed to an increased interest and activity in the problems of
environmental and safety regulation in the growing European chemicals industry.
Secondly, the inherent instability that characterises much of chemicals production
made it more likely that participation structures in health and safety would therefore
be well developed at workplace level. As with all research, a starting point has to be
made somewhere, and for the above reasons the chemicals industry was chosen for
the first case study.
The consideration of the sets of issues discussed in chapter 1 required that in-depth
case studies be carried out, where intensive semi-structured interviews with key
personnel involved in safety regulation would form the central focus. In other words,
the structure of the research design, and the methods used, are closely interwoven
with the nature of the considerations and issues that this thesis seeks to address. The
key to understanding participation in health and safety is to analyse and un-pack the
relationship between worker representatives and managers, within differing
organisational, national and sectoral contexts. I would argue that this is true, no matter
what workplace is being studies, and therefore, the systematic comparative analysis of
workplace practices is the logical form that the research design of this thesis should
take.
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(ii) Searching for the workplaces; access, and the chronology of the research.
Access to Textchern resulted from a search for companies using a computer
database2. Access was granted via a senior manager at the larger plant, and then
following a short meeting with the plant manager at the smaller site. My research was
spread over a period of 12 months, with several visits to the factory to conduct
interviews. I spoke with all members of management concerned with health and
safety functions, some of them more than once. I also spoke to the senior shop
steward, and the local branch secretary of the TGWU, as well as other shop stewards
and safety representatives from both the general und craft unions. I also interviewed
supervisors and an operations manager in one of the businesses. I attended a meeting
of the safety committee in the flake business and a CoS HI-I briefing given in the tow
business. Finally, I attended a meeting of the technical safety committee (TSC), and
interviewed the senior site engineer, and chair of the TSC.
With the German case studies, the search for access began with initial letters to trade
union officials at the headquarters of IG Chenile and OTV in Hannover and Stuttgart
respectively. The organisation of the research in Germany was constrained by the
need to spend one intensive period of study there, although initial contacts were
formed during a fact-finding (and language-learning) tour, a few months prior to the
extended stay, and a week-long follow-up visit was also made possible. With OTV, I
was granted a meeting with a Persona/rat member for Department G 3, who then
became my key informant. During the course of the research, I spoke with several
members of the Persona/rat of Department G, one member of the Gesamtpersonalrat
(not an employee of Department G), two senior managers, two representatives of the
regional safety enforcement body, three shop stewards, five safety representatives and
a national union officer at union headquarters. Most contact, however, was with my
key informant, in his position as senior safety representative, member of the safety
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committee at council-level and as the member of the Persona/rat in charge of safety
issues within Department G.
In the case of the chemicals study in Germany, initial contact with a multinational
corporation was established, with permission given to proceed with the research. This
workplace was moderately well-matched with Textchem in terms of size and
technology used, but management withdrew from the project on the eve of my period
of study. I had to arrive without warning at the local branch of /G Chernie in the same
region, and fortunately a local official was able to arrange a meeting for me at
Prochem, where he had close contacts in the Betriebsrat. This late access meant that
the research period was shorter, although I was able to carry out further interviews on
the subsequent trip to Germany. It also meant that I had to settle for a workplace
where technology, hazards, levels of automation etc., were all very different from
Textchem, making systematic comparison more difficult - although the structure of
health and safety participation was similar at both plants. During my visits, I spoke on
several occasions to the vice-president of the works council (in charge of health and
safety matters on behalf of the Betriebsrat) who was the most useful point for my
information gathering. In addition, I interviewed a further member of the works
council involved in health and safety issues, and the full-time Fachk,-aft (safety
officer), who left the company shortly after the completion of my fieldwork.
Management did not co-operate in the project beyond granting me formal access,
even to the point of refusing to grant me a tour of the factory by a junior manager, on
the grounds of shortage of time. My approval for the distribution of a questionnaire
was also revoked at the last minute.
On return to England, I was able to select a public sector workplace quite closely
matched to Department G. Here, initial access to the council came through a personal
contact with a NALGO representative, who arranged meetings with managers in
Department B. In the course of the research, I spoke to several managers in
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Department B, some of them more than once, as well as representatives of the central
safety unit of the council. I also spoke at length with one of the new Council
Accredited Representatives (CARs) working in the education department and also in
charge of health and safety for NUPE employees throughout the council. In addition I
interviewed safety representatives in the department and attended safety committee
meetings at three levels. I also had access to the minutes of previous meetings and to
accident statistics for the council and for Department B. I was given initial permission
for the circulation of a questionnaire, but time ran out waiting for various committees
to approve the project.
As this resume indicates, the detailed study of perfectly matched workplaces was
never the intention of this thesis. Sufficient similarities were achieved through
workplace size, minimum levels of union organisation, and conformity with national
practice in health and safety regulation, to allow for systematic analysis, with context-
specific factors emerging as the fieldwork evolved.
The methods used in each workplace were the same. Semi-structured interviews with
all of the people centrally involved in safety participation were followed up by repeat-
interviews with key personnel, and informal contact (especially with union
representatives at Textchem and Department G) maintained outside of working hours.
The interview schedule was drawn up in each case with the central issues of the thesis
in mind. Usually, interviews would start with questions concerning the various forms
of participation in safety regulation (as well as other issues, if appropriate), and the
problems they came up against. I would also focus specifically on safety problems,
what respondents thought the key dangers were, changes to the management of safety
over recent years, and recommendations that respondents might have with regard to
the system of safely regulation. This would generally lead on to a more un-structured
discussion about why accidents occur, what can he done about them, what the role of
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management, unions, committees, individuals and representatives were in these
process etc.
Access was granted to safety committee meetings, and to works council meetings, as
well as to minutes of previous meetings, and records of accident frequency and
distribution (see each case study for details). I also took advantage of auxiliary
material relating to safety regulation at supra-workplace level, particularly involving
the Berufsgenosseiischaften and public sector equivalents in Germany. The guiding
principle throughout the research caii be summed up:-
The key to successful research lies in combining a flexibility of
response to changing circumstances with the maintenance of a
coherent overall strategy. (Clark and Causer, in Allen and
Skinner,1991 :163).
During the course of the research at Textchem, I became aware that all of the people I
was interviewing formed part of a community of representatives which marked
them out from other workers and other managers, an issue discussed in more detail in
chapter 4. This is where the idea for the distribution of the questionnaire came from,
with the idea being to get an impression of shopfioor opinion on a range of safety-
related themes4. Again, pennission was readily given, and the questionnaire was
distributed to all 564 hourly-paid employees on company records at the time. The
poor return of 63 was partially the result of the fact that the period of distribution
coincided with my stay in Germany, making it impossible for me to publicise the
questionnaire independently of the personnel office, who merely left a ballot box in
the doorway of the office. In Germany, my proposal for a questionnaire at each
workplace was raised early in the period of study. Progress was unhindered at
Department 0, with 523 being distributed to Arbeiter (luring a later trip 5 . This was
done through the Persona/rat, with a much better return (108). Both German
questionnaires were translated into Turkish on the advice of works councillors in the
two workplaces, and the few of these that were returned are incorporated into the
114
general body of data for Department 0. In addition, my contacts in Germany were
able to review and correct the grammar, syntax and idioms of the German
questionnaires, ensuring that the information gathered would not be distorted by
inappropriate expressions and incorrect/clumsy formulation of questions and options
etc.
At Prochern, as mentioned in chapter 5, permission for the questionnaire was granted,
and they are still in the cupboard of the works council office, following a (familiar).
dispute over their distribution. At Department B, a provisional questionnaire was
circulated to union officials and managers, but the project ran out of time before
successive committees could rubber stamp approval. I would emphasise here that the
questionnaires were devised as an adjunct to the information gathered through the
interviews in each case study, and are not intended as the central aspect of the
fieldwork. I have used the information from the questionnaires as and when
appropriate, as supporting information for the case study material.
In the first three case studies, a key informant was vital in making the research more
focused and efficient. I did not have to waste time (and therefore good will)
establishing from scratch who would be important to talk to, approaching them
individually etc. At the fourth workplace, I had managed to refine the questions I
wanted to ask with the benefit of the hindsight of three previous case studies, and felt
able to approach managers and worker representatives semi-independently and
without the need for a key informant.
(iii) Analysis and presentation
The case studies are presented in discrete chapters, rather than as issues-based
chapters each considering information relating to each of the four workplaces, for two
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reasons. Firstly, as has already been mentioned, the research design was not based on
a precise match between the workplaces in the two countries 6. This means that each
case study is unique in the particular mix of technology, hazards etc. it possesses,
making it easier to transmit information in a case by case fashion. The case studies
have been presented in pairs; that is, rather than introduce them chronologically, I
have written the two private sector studies together, followed by the two local
authority studies. The reason for this is to maintain analytical clarity and consistency
as the case study chapters develop, allowing the reader to move steadily through the.
comparative issues raised. However, the benefits of this thesis lie not only in what
they tell us about four isolated and individual workplaces. Some degree of systematic
presentation of the analysis is necessary if the comparative and sectoral themes are to
be brought out. The discussion at the end of chapter 1 raised the key theoretical and
practical issues which guide the fieldwork in this thesis, and these three clusters of
research questions have been used in the case study chapters to structure the
presentation of the research. I was keen to avoid constructing boxes in the case study
chapters that would be too rigid to accommodate all relevant research findings in the
different workplace environments. Therefore, the three subsections of each chapter
are concerned with the broad questions of work pressure, the floor of rights and
participation, and issues of representation, categories flexible enough to structure all
relevant material.
Secondly, the research process in a study like this is an iterative process. In other
words, improvements in the fieldwork were made as and when problems and
imperfections became apparent, requiring a re-think over, say, a particular issue, or an
occurrence in the factories and workplaces concerned. An example of this is the
somewhat post-hoc decision during the course of the research to circulate
questionnaires, when the opinions of employees seemed to be needed in order to
balance the views of a somewhat incestuous community of safety officer, shop
stewards and safety representatives. Similarly, some issues which have become
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central to the thesis have grown in importance, meaning that they could be dealt with
more directly in the later studies, An example here is that of work pressure which did
not feature directly in the initial series of questions with which I began semi-
structured questionnaires at Textchem, but which were included in the questionnaire
as part of questions concerning the efficacy of safety committees in solving problems
requiring a financial commitment from the company. At Department G,
Leistungsdruck become the central motif of interviews with workers, representatives
and managers alike, necessitating a re-analysis of the Textchem material and the,
firmer integration of these issues into the research programmes of the subsequent two
case studies.
Whilst the individual case study chapters are structured so as to systematically
address the central themes of chapter 1, the concluding chapter attempts to take a
broader approach. Also, some of the initial comparative themes which emerge in the
case studies, and which are not straightforward representations of the public/private or
British/German comparisons (i.e. the different experiences of the UK and German
public sector over the last ten years, or the different ways in which investment and
working conditions are related at the two private sector studies) are brought out in the
final chapter. There, I return to the issue of cross-national comparison in the light of
the results of research in the individual workplaces, and to the contribution that the
research makes to our understanding of how public and private ownership affects
processes and practices in the management of health and salety.
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Notes.
1. See chapter 1.
2. I specified a minimum number of employees, SIC codes etc., and then sent letters
to around 14 companies in the Midlands and north of England.
3. G and B stand for Germany and Britain respectively in the public sector case
studies; simply an unimaginative way of protecting identities. Textchem originates
from the textiles-dominated use of chemical processes, and Prochem is short for
"protective chemicals".
4. Copies of the cluestionnaire are re-printed in the appendix.
5. The decision to distribute questionnaires to blue-collar workers only was a
functional one, in that 800 questionnaires would have too unwieldy to deliver and
collect. Given that the number of Arbeiter in Department G were roughly similar to
the number of hourly-paid employees at Textchem, it seemed logical to circulate the
questionnaire to each of them, also avoiding methodological problems of selection
and random sampling, which would have unnecessarily held up the interviews in
Germany.
6. Although at the two workplaces where the questionnaire was not followed through,
questions were included which sought to increase the possible measures of
standardisation between the case studies, such as age profiles, union density
indicators etc.
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Chapter 4.
Textchem; UK private sector chemicals.
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(i) Introduction
Textchem is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a large British multinational (engaged in a
wide range of productive activity, from the production of chemicals, chemical by-
products and pharmaceuticals, to food processing and the manufacture of synthetic
fibres), although it is a completely autonomous business in terms of financial control
and managerial structure. This has followed successive moves within the parent
company to devolve power and business responsibility from the centre to the
subsidiary companies. In this thesis, all references to the "company", or "the firm"
will therefore indicate Textchem as opposed to the parent multinational corporation.
Textchem has five plants in operation, employing a total of around 3300 people, the
vast majority in two factories. The research carried out for this case study focuses on
the arrangements for participation in the management of health and safety at a
medium-sized production plant situated on the outskirts of a large English city. In
addition to this, I also carried out some interviews at the largest of the four plants, at
which Textchem has its headquarters, central administration, marketing and sales
functions, and although this research was independent of my thesis and thus not
centred on health and safety arrangements in particular, I draw upon the information
gathered as and when appropriate 1 . In order not to confuse the two sites, I often refer
to them simply as "smaller" or "larger". However, for reasons of access, and because
of the fact that the institutions of involvement in health and safety are for the most
part plant-based, the majority of the information gathered has been specific to the
smaller of the two sites.
The problem of defining a unitary and honiogenous workplace on which to focus the
research is multiplied by the process of devolution taking place at Textchem. The
smaller factory is split into four separate departments corresponding to four distinct
production processes carried out in different sections of the site. As we shall discuss
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in the next section, the progressive devolution of business authority and
responsibility, and the increasingly autonomous status of each of the four businesses,
are at the centre of major changes taking place at Textchem, changes with important
implications for the organisation of health and safety. These changes are very much
incomplete at the moment, and it is therefore important for the next section to sketch a
picture of the organisation of production and employment at the plant prior to them
taking place, so that a clearer understanding of the nature of work organisation and
business structure at Textchem is possible. Section (ii) also includes detailed.
information about production processes, the relative market position of the separate
businesses, the structure of participation in health and safety and a brief look at the
breakdown of accident and injury statistics for the company.
Section (iii) looks in more detail at the business plan, and the deep changes taking
place at Textchem with this attempt to streamline decision-making, to restructure the
company vertically, and to devolve the function of management from a site-wide to a
business-specific basis. In particular, I look at the implications that these changes
have for the management of health and safety at Textchem, as a retained site-wide
safety system pulls against the drive for managerial autonomy in the separate
businesses. The changes of the business plan allow us an opportunity to look at the
way in which management constructs sets of priorities around production and safety
goals. Furthermore, this process of change is acting as a catalyst for a re-examination
within the company of a whole range of issues and established practices, including the
functions and scope of worker representation, the future of centralised collective
bargaining and the regulatory role of formal participation mechanisms. Importantly,
the collective regulation of health and safety has been hampered by the secondary
effects of the business plan, with clear consequences for the scope that workers have
to complain about safety problems.
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The issue of safety regulation is returned to in section (iv), which deals with two
distinct but related sets of issues, linked by their roots in legislation, and which enable
us to see how the floor of rights operates in a private sector workplace where formal
participation in areas other than health and safety is non-existent. Firstly, I look at the
impact of the CoSHH (Control of Substances Hazardous to Health) Regulations of
1989, and at how management have sought to implement them in a sterile
environment of number-crunching over exposure limits in various parts of the factory.
Secondly, I look at the (changing) role of the formal framework of safety.
participation, and in particular the various safety committees, in regulating health and
safety. The on-going changes inherent in the business plan, discussed in section (ii),
form an important backdrop to the problems that employee representatives have in
utilising their statutory rights to participation in joint safety committees. The
importance of a management-only committee in the process of decision-making in the
safety arena is also discussed.
Section (v) looks at worker representation in health and safety. The business plan,
again, has been central in the progressive erosion of union influence at shopfloor level
during, and prior to, the period of research. In this section, I will look more directly at
the problems facing union and safety representatives at Textchem. In seeking to
isolate safety regulation from formal participation mechanisms, combined with moves
towards more direct channels of communication between managers and workers,
employers are de-collectivising the process of safety regulation at Textchem. Section
(v) looks at the response of trade union representatives to this process, and at the
obstacles to a more dynamic mobilisation around safety issues that exist. I also point
to the ways in which the presence of contract workers/firms affects our understanding
of policy communities in safety regulation, and to illustrate the particular problems
that the fragmented nature of these communities present for safety representation at
Textchem. Whilst contract workers are seen as the main victims of poor safety
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regulation by employees of the company, they also present representational problems
as they cut across the mainstream forms of representation at the workplace.
The concluding section aims to draw together some of the disparate strands of
analysis running through the chapter, and to further contextualise the research
outcomes. I will argue that the business plan represents a key expression of change at
Textchem, which draws in other organisational and structural practices in a re-
evaluation of the nature of participation in health and safety management.
(ii) Background information
The root of all operations at Textchem is the production of cellulose flake, through
the conversion of wood pulp and acetic anhydride, through complex chemical
processes involving acetic acid, acetone, methylene chloride, sulphuric acid and
solvents. The plant is therefore unusual for the chemical industry, in that its main
production processes are not derived from oil refining, despite the use of petroleum-
based substances such as acetone. In addition, the site is somewhere in the middle of
the productive stream of the chemical industry, between the treatment of raw
materials on the one hand and the manufacture of finished products on the other. At
Textchem, five distinct operations take place on the one site, made up of the four
separate businesses and an engineering/site services section, involving electricians,
painters etc., which, for the most part, is still centrally organised.
The flake business is the largest of the four businesses in terms of capital expenditure,
and takes the raw materials to produce cellulose flake, which is then distributed to the
other three businesses. In the tow business, the flake goes through further chemical
treatment processes, and is turned into filter tow, and then sold to other companies, at
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home and abroad, for the manufacture of cigarette filters. This is a large and
expanding export market, particularly in Europe and the Middle East2.
The yarns business employs very similar technology to that used by tow, in
producing filament yarns for the fashion industry. This business operates in a more
stagnant market, as other synthetic materials come on to the market, and in the face of
increased competition from producers in the USA and Italy, and cheaper synthetic
yarn imports from Asia3. The tow and yarns businesses share a large central building.
on the site and have historically shared equipment and machinery, as well as
employees, in a co-ordinated personnel policy, although these practices have become
something of a casualty of the changes over the last few years. The smallest business
on site is the plastics business which converts the flake into a range of speciality
plastics for use in tool handles, spectacle rims, etc. In addition to these four semi-
autonomous businesses, there is a central engineering section which carries out large
scale changes to machines, and other jobs either too large for the maintenance
engineers working within each business, or requiring particular expertise or
equipment.
Each of the businesses has its own managerial structure, and is responsible for its own
budgeting, sales and purchasing, as well as other functions such as marketing. This
process of devolution has been introduced as part of a business plan, introduced some
two years prior to the period of research, which has sought to organise the four
businesses vertically across the different sites, and to remove as many functions as
possible from horizontal, site-wide management. Central to this case study is the fact
that these changes are only in the process of taking place, creating a tension between
existing patterns of representation and managerial authority, and the new targets of
business autonomy. This creates an interesting interface between new and old ways of
developing policy, and making key managerial decisions, an interface which I will
claim in section (v) has also brought problems for union representatives as they seek
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to find a role for themselves in this changing environment. Those functions retained
on a site-wide basis are at present limited to the recruitment and training of staff
(although business managers now have greater freedom to determine staffing levels
within their domain), site fire and safety (although the implications of the business
pian changes for the management of health and safety are important and are discussed
later) and most collective bargaining issues. The site manager conceded that both his
role, and those of the safety adviser, were largely becoming one of an advisory
service to the (increasingly) separate businesses, as the vertical structure of decision-.
making came to by-pass site management. These different impulses, on the one hand
towards an higher profile for health and safety issues at the site (discussed later), and
the increased interest in the institutions of participation and involvement, against the
progressive decentralisation of business autonomy and the relative subordination of
these forms of joint regulation to local managerial control within the separate
businesses on the other, form the key framework in which this case study is located.
The factory was built between the wars and occupies a crowded site bordered by a
canal, a main road and a residential area. The plant employs relatively outdated
machinery; the processes involved in the production and treatment of cellulose flake
are extremely corrosive to machinery, and the company is involved in a large-scale
investment programme in a new production line for the flake business. This reflects
an increased business optimism, expressed by many of the people interviewed during
the research at the site, after a period of uncertainty during the recession of the early
to mid 1980s. A programme of redundancies some years ago, coupled with the
closure of a similar factory in Wales, has ensured, temporarily at least, the survival of
the factory as a whole4.
Not everyone shares an undiluted optimism regarding future investment and the long
term prospects for the factory. The break-down of machinery at the site was an issue
in the interviews I carried out, and investment in new machinery seen as essential for
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the solution of both production (and therefore job security) problems, and health and
safety problems. The company announced that the flake section at this site is likely to
close in two and a half years, with employees being relocated into other businesses;
similarly, union representatives were also sceptical about the prospects for some of
the other businesses as well, and the safety officer acknowledged that the current
programme of LiOm of investment was around a third of what was needed to put
production problems completely right at the site.
The safety agenda at Textchem is extremely diverse; not surprising, given the
diversity of the tasks performed, and the diversity and range of chemicals processed
and production processes utilised. The fire prevention officer at the site was keen to
play down the potential for large-scale accidents at the plant, claiming that:-
..the mix of chemicals at this plant does not allow for a major
bang,.. .the worst that could happen here would be that the local
residents have their throats tickled by an explosion, toxic exposure and
so on.
The safety adviser also emphasised the relatively innocuous nature of the chemistry
employed at the factory, in comparison with mainstream chemical refining industries.
Notwithstanding this confidence, however, there was an explosion in the flake
department at the larger sister plant, shortly after the end of my period of research,
which injured ten people, injuries which subsequent research showed to be almost
solely to the ears, involving no burns5.
The experience of this blast, and the attitudes towards danger that I encountered
during interviews with safety officers, points us in different directions; whilst
management at the larger plant claimed that the explosion had shown that both the
safety procedures followed, and the machinery and materials used in that part of the
factory, had prevented serious injury, it also highlights the inherently unstable nature
of chemical-based production processes, even in this relatively innocuous
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environment. For example, the factory has had several problems with compliance
with CoSHH exposure limits, with respect to dust in the flake business; interviews
with a safety representative showed how important this issue was, because this dust is
not only a potential problem to health in itself, but compounded the dangers of
explosion in that part of the plant6. Such a complicated background agenda is
important in our considerations of the management of health and safety at the site7.
Whilst there is the extreme outside chance of a major incident such as the one at the
larger site, the dominant problems faced by employees on a- day-to-day basis are.
traditional manufacturing problems involving slips, trips, load carrying etc. on the one
hand, and exposure to varying degrees of toxicity, splashes from pressure valves,
unknown mixtures of substances in the air etc. on the other. We shall see in following
sections that this tension between big dangers such as explosion, and everyday
dangers, informs the way in which health and safety is managed, and the way in
which management set the agenda for these issues.
This site of Textchem employs a total of 680 people, of whom 217 are non-manual in
some respect, and 588 are men8. The only place where women are employed as
operatives is in the spinning shops of the yarns business, with the rest being largely
employed as cleaners and caterers. There is a brief discussion of the gendered division
of labour with respect to the representation of workers interests in health and safety in
the section (v)9.
The payment structure in operation at the plant is fairly simple, with five managerial
grades, supplemented with individually negotiated supplements in the case of four of
them. For manual workers, there is a basic hourly-paid rate, with five skill
differentials; in addition, there is a small departmental bonus system, a service
increment, and a profit-related bonus measured by criteria of wastage and efficiency
within the separate businesses. A key factor in the changes taking place at Textchem,
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is the increase in importance of this bonus in the make-up of employees pay, as the
criteria used vary between each business, and this will also be discussed later.
There is a virtual defacto closed shop at the site, supported by management through
the encouragement of new employees to join the recognised union. There is a written
recognition agreement embracing all unions on the site, including unions for lower
and middle management, an agreement which also specifies grievance and
disciplinary procedures. The operatives are organised by the TGWU, with the AEU.
acting as an umbrella union for craft workers and engineers organised also in the
EETPU and TASS 10. Collective bargaining over a wide range of issues used to be
carried out at national level between employers and the recognised unions, but
virtually all bargaining over pay and conditions now takes place at site level.
Agreement is reached first with the TGWU on behalf of process workers, with the
deal generally being knocked-on to the craft unions1 . Once again, this system is now
seen as an obstacle, by some managers, to the full implementation of the business
plan, and was perceived to be under threat by union and management representatives
alike, during interviews at both sites of Textchem. There are 13 TGWU shop
stewards, and 5 AEIJ stewards at the smaller plant, and there is a general consensus
amongst people I spoke to that industrial relations at the site were very good, with the
last proper strike taking place in 1968, and with only a brief overtime ban taking place
in recent years12.
Very few changes to working practices have taken place in the last few years, despite
moves towards greater functional flexibility and a weakening of demarcation implicit
in the business plan initiative (discussed in the next section). The last two years or so
have seen the financial recovery of the company flatten out as the recession has
deepened, although no compulsory redundancies have taken place, and the size of the
workforce has remained stable since the mid 1980s. The company has begun to make
increasing use of sub-contractors, particularly in construction and large-scale
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maintenance work around the site, an issue which is returned to in a later section,
when the issues of representation and heterogeneous interest communities with regard
to health and safety are discussed.
Both the structure of health and safety participation at the site, and its emphasis in the
regulation of safety, have changed somewhat in the last two or three years, in line
with changes to the structure of business organisation brought in with the business
plan, and with the relative buoyancy of the firm compared to the recessionary period.
of the early 1980s. The two major changes have been (i) the employment of a new
full-time safety adviser to the plant in September 1989, with the previous safety
manager left in sole charge of fire prevention and (ii) the resurrection of business
safety committees (BSCs) following the decline in importance of the former site-wide
safety committee in previous years.
The new safety officer was given most commonly as the reason for the improvement
in health and safety, and for the increased profile of safety throughout the
organisation 13. Each business, as well as the central engineering section, now has a
joint safety committee 14. Either the safety adviser or the fire prevention officer
always sits on these separate committees, the agendas for which are drawn up by
managers in the separate businesses. Usually, employees are represented by two or
three safety representatives, and sometimes a few shop stewards. The committees are
non-decision making bodies and act as a talking shop for specific problems as and
when they arise. Each meeting generally involves a report back on business raised at
the previous meeting, with the nature of the discussion relatively low-key with much
emphasis on particular problems such as hand-rails, loose stairs and the detailed
discussion of certain incidents etc., rather than general discussions about management
policy on health and safety, investment etc. The safety committees are supposed to
meet every six to eight weeks, but the safety adviser said that in practice they met
whenever there was a feeling that it was worthwhile. This has led to the emergence of
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different patterns in the different businesses as they have each evolved and grown
somewhat separate from each other, as well as a variable degree of interest and
attendance by committee members.
A further committee is the technical safety committee (TSC), which consists of
representatives of management only, including advisors from other plants of
Textchem, and retired personnel. This committee exists primarily to discuss the safety
implications of new investment, changes to the layout of the factory and production.
processes etc. To the extent that such issues are central to the way in which the
priorities of safety as against production and efficiency targets are produced and
carried out, then it is right to consider this an important safety committee, although it
is not a part of formal participative machinery. The role that the TSC plays in keeping
important safety decisions outside of the framework for the participation of union and
employee representatives will be discussed later. The site also employs a part-time
occupational nurse, and shares a company doctor with other local employers. The
training of employees, whether new recruits or existing workers, is organised by the
centrally organised training department, including information on health and safety
law, first aid facilities and emergency procedures.
The company has only relatively recently computerised the collection of data on
accidents and injuries, and so comparable figures are only available for the last few
years. There have been no fatal accidents at the site in the living memory of those
interviewed, and the number of accidents involving serious injury has fluctuated
between 1 and 2 per year since 1986. Over the period from 1986 to 1989, the number
of accidents involving lost time of over three working days has increased from 14 per
year to 29 per year. This makes the number of total reportable accidents (under the
RIDDOR regulations) 43.92 per thousand employees, for 1989. Almost half (48.9%)
of these injuries were to hands, with eye injuries, principally from releases of various
liquids, gases, etc. from vessels at sampling points also being a problem. In addition, a
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proportion of injuries are to the back, torso and feet as the result of slips, trips, falls
etc. This increase, however, are offset by a general decline in the total number of
accidents (i.e. not just those involving three or more days off work) over the last two
years that I have figures for, from 514 in 1988 to 476 in 1989. This is accompanied by
a fall in the total hours lost over the same period from 5184 to 3904, an apparently
genuine decline in real terms, given that employment levels have stayed broadly the
same, although such statistics should be treated with caution, as the reporting of
accidents is subject to a high degree of variability, depending on whether workers feel.
able to take time off from work for minor injuries.
Perhaps the most important development in the sphere of health and safety at
Textchem has been the implementation of the CoSHH regulations. This legislation
has had important implications for the factory, as the number of chemicals used, the
dangers of exposure caused by the corrosive nature of the production processes, and
the age of the plant combine to make the monitoring and control of chemicals usage
difficult. A further problem is the relatively poor recording and monitoring
procedures used prior to the new legislation, leaving the plant relatively unprepared
according to one manager. The main problems in this respect relate to exposure levels
of certain chemicals in parts of the plant, particularly acetone in the dope department,
where the cellulose flake is prepared for spinning in the tow and yarns departments.
Part of the attempt to comply with CoSHH has involved special CoSHH briefings
which are two hour sessions, with overtime paid, held either directly before or after a
shift. Attendance is voluntary, and the safety adviser said that interest varied greatly
between the separate businesses. There are also general briefings, held approximately
every two weeks in the separate businesses, where a range of issues, including
production targets, the state of the market and health and safety can be discussed.
The right to three-monthly inspection by safety representatives is incorporated into a
monthly inspection of a third of the plant, organised by the safety adviser, in order to
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spread the load of work put onto the engineering section as faults are remedied. In
addition to this framework of employee participation in health and safety regulation,
the factory has a suggestion scheme, with financial rewards allocated on the basis of
the usefulness and cost-savings of individual suggestions by a committee which has
union representatives on it. The company also experimented with quality circles in the
early 1980s, although they were short-lived. There are no formal consultation
committees, or other forms of participation via worker representatives and trade union
officials, in areas outside of health and safety.
	 -
Indeed, the business plan, and the increase in the financial autonomy of the
businesses, has tended to reinforce a more individual notion of employee
participation, by diluting the extent of consultation with unions and restricting the
range and scope of issues where site-wide trade union involvement was the norm.
Discussions with both managers and union convenors at the larger plant showed how
there were long-term intentions to move to staff status for all employees, the removal
of clocking-on, and the devolution of wage bargaining to the separate businesses,
within the logic of the business plan. A key further aspect of the business devolution,
and of the progressive individualisation of the employment relation, is the move
towards business-specific collective bargaining arrangements, mentioned as a strong
possibility in the future by management at the larger plant. Whilst the recent shift
from national to plant-level bargaining was welcomed by all union representatives I
spoke to, this issue seemed to be the one that brought out the strongest sentiment in
union officials at both plants, one senior steward at the larger plant claiming that
decentralisation of bargaining to individual business-level would never be tolerated.
The senior steward at the smaller plant claimed that these changes had meant an
extension of bureaucracy as decisions often now had to go through the larger sister
plant, and that they would probably rob him of his job as a union representative, if
collective bargaining was further decentralised and his position down-graded. There is
very little by way of formal and informal involvement of union representatives at
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Textchem, save for the minimum required in the area of health and safety by the
SRSC regulations and for the annual round of wage bargaining carried out by senior
stewards.
(iii) Management, pressure and the control of work
The business plan is the key to many changes taking place at Textchem, with respect
to health and safety, and other issues. It was devised and introduced at the larger plant
the spring of March 1988, although slightly earlier than this at the smaller site 15. The
two core elements of this plan are (i) the devolution of centres of power,
responsibility and decision-making autonomy from the site to the separate businesses,
and (ii) the introduction of QEP (quality, efficiency, production) bonuses for
shopfloor workers. However, these key areas of change have had a series of knock-cm.
effects in other areas of managerial strategy, with attempts to increase flexibility at
many levels of the workforce, and the attempt to introduce new, and to devise more
direct, methods of communication between management and employees (eg. the
emphasis given to the new briefings which transmit information directly to employees
rather than through representatives) being two of the more important. In addition, this
very specific change to business structure and to decision-making is coupled with
more long-term ideas about a move to staff status for all employees, the removal of
clocking-on and designated parking areas for managers, individual job assessment
including performance-related pay etc. However, it is the two core areas which are of
most importance with regard to health and safety regulation.
The key driving force behind the changes is the devolution of decision-making, in an
effort to allow management within each business to pursue policies more in line with
their own needs, than those of the site as a whole. The most obvious outcome of this
has been a change in the operating relationships between the businesses, with yarns
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and tow now buying cellulose flake from the flake business (almost) as if they were
distinct operators on the open market 16. This decentralisation is mirrored, to some
extent, in the possession of plant and machinery on the site, with the business plan
emphasising the need for separate businesses to be responsible for purchasing repair
etc. An example concerns the trucks that used to be shared by the tow and yarns
departments, and which are now very much more seen as the property of one or the
other, and thereby less easily borrowed. A similar result of the business plan is that
there is also now a smaller central engineering section at the smaller site of Textchem,
with many engineers now attached to individual businesses as part of this devolution.
The implications of this decentralisation for the regulation of health and safety are
clear, and examples of problems that had arisen were mentioned by union
representatives in the course of the research. Some of the flat-back trucks used to
move large drums of cellulose solutions etc., in the tow department are old and
unreliable, with one safety representative arguing that this was the most important
safety problem in that part of the factory - the dangers to feet and backs being
heightened by the need to push them around 17. A worker had gone to use a truck
from the yarns department, when there was a shortage in his own department, only to
be told by a manager that that particular truck belonged to the yarns department,
proceeding to lock it away to prevent it going to another area of the factory. These
changes, and this new approach in general, have further implications for the
management of health and safety at Textchem. One safety representative at the
smaller site complained that the separation of the businesses had already led to
problems in the expression of safety grievances by individual workers. He cited the
example of when a blockage on one side of a large spinning apparatus made it
difficult for him to operate his side, thereby necessitating hazardous alterations to his
machine. The other side of the machine was part of the tow department and he was
employed by yams, and when he complained to a supervisor on the opposite side, he
was told that it was nothing to do with him.
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The QEP bonuses are also a central part of the business plan; they are an attempt to
reflect changes in managerial decision-making patterns, by building in a business-
specific element in pay determination at all of Textchem's manufacturing plants. This,
the logic goes, will give a critical stimulus to progress in convincing business-level
managers of both the desire and the necessity of devising business specific personnel
and employment policies, remuneration and bonus payment strategies etc18.
The bonuses are calculated using complex criteria, rising to a maximum of 15% of
basic pay. Importantly, the criteria used for determining QEP rates are also different
in each business; in yarns, the central indicator is yarn utilisation, the proportion of
yarn made turned into yarn sold. Other indicators such as market share and market
penetration also help make up the QEP bonus in yarns. In the flake business, QEP
bonuses are calculated more on the basis of output and production targets, than on
quality or sales. Thus, whilst workers in the yarns business have a potentially
significant part of their wages determined by criteria of quality, they are provided
with cellulose flake by workers whose bonus is calculated by criteria other than
quality, leading to recrimination between businesses regarding quality of raw
materials. A further confusing and dividing factor is that engineers still employed
centrally have retained a bonus averaged over the other four businesses, even though
some of them may spend several months within a single business on a particular
project.
At the larger sister plant, bonuses for workers in the tow business have been running
at the ceiling of 15% for some time, whilst the yarns bonus has been non-existent for
several months, reflecting the relative market position of the two businesses, and
intensifying fears over the future of yarns production. This has led to a perception of
the QEP system as unfair by workers at the other factory, and to concern on the part
of union representatives, that the bonuses will lead to further decentralisation,
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snowball fashion, and a reduction in the scope for joint regulation on a site-wide
basis19.
The relationship between the generation of hazards and the pressure of work is
particularly complex at Textchem. Managerial policy has been to deregulate payment
systems, as part of a policy of devolution which seeks to make management decision-
making more responsive to the market situations of the four distinct production
operations, and the problems involved are clear. However, whilst the changes
themselves have threatened the previous mode of collective bonus payment (thereby
mirroring the safety impact of some of the business plan changes), there has been no
direct attempt to increase productivity through amendments to the payment system.
The links between the pressure of work on the one hand, and the payment system on
the other, are provided by the profit of that business and various other indicators such
as waste. There has been no attempt to introduce piece-work, or to reduce staffing
levels in a productivity drive that would effectively increase work pressure.
The feeling from shop stewards was that the business plan involves organisational
restructuring which, despite making radical changes to the system of representation
and safety regulation at Textchem, do not intensify work pressure in any direct sense.
Indeed, the opposite was the case - that the business plan, whilst partially de-
regulating and de-collectivising safety regulation, was also part of the new managerial
approach of making safety a high profile issue, and being seen to devote more time
and energy to it. The relative buoyancy of the company, coupled with managerial
optimism over the business plan, led to several claims by the safety adviser
concerning the benefits that the recent changes had had, directly or indirectly, for
safety at the smaller site. He claimed that his job involved working "...for neither
management nor unions, but for safety." He pointed to the fact that in such a capital
intensive industry, investment in new machinery and in maintenance services would
always be major factors in establishing safe working conditions, in that new
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technology and updated machinery and working practices went hand in hand with
improved working conditions, and in that these changes usually took workers away
from hazards in the workplace20. This common idea, that improved safety was
dependent on new investment in machinery and production equipment, rather than
safety-specific changes, was reinforced by safety representatives and shop stewards.
Indeed, a senior manager recognised that the changes of the business plan were not
driven primarily by productivity requirements and the need for increased efficiency.
This perhaps helps to explain why the business plan is broadly welcomed by most
union representatives, despite the inherent dangers of the decentralisation of
collective bargaining etc.
Indeed, the new system of QEP bonuses is designed to stimulate business-specific
calculations of profit and wastage etc., rather than to stimulate efficiency itself, and is
therefore directed at managers as much as workers. The safety officer went further:-
..the division of the businesses now means that they are not competing
for resources in a central services pooi,.. .they are more responsible for
their own safety management, particularly through having to organise
their own engineering functions to a greater extent.
This, it was claimed by the safety adviser, meant that safety policy and investment
decisions had to be tied more closely to the management of the separate businesses,
thus bringing such decisions closer to the hazards themselves, and allowing swifter
action, independent of the bureaucracy formally associated with central engineering
services.
Of course, the decentralisation of safety regulation does not mean that fundamental
decisions about where to spend money, and about what priority is to be given to those
aspects of safety regulation which represent a cost to the company and which cannot
be incorporated into production-centred technological investment, can be avoided.
Indeed, at Textchem, safety regulation appears in practice (i.e. in terms of everyday
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issues and their regulation) to have followed the contours of the business plan in
being decentralised despite formal retention of site-wide safety functions. Similarly, I
am not suggesting that competitive pressures do not affect how workers work at
Textchem, and how they control hazards.
Rather, it appears that the capital intensive nature of production at Textchem
(notwithstanding differences between the businesses) allows management and worker
representatives to see safety as more tied in with the business success of the company
than might be the case in other working environments. In other words, investment in
new machinery has a double function. Primarily, it is a managerial strategy designed
at maximising profits as the company pulls out of a difficult financial period. But it is
also of central importance in addressing some of the main safety problems,
particularly those where the company has problems complying with CoSHH exposure
limits.
At Textchem in particular, the tension between safety and profit has a different
quality to it in the different businesses, with investment being a most critical element
in safe working conditions in the flake department. As a corollary of this, some
managers stressed that safety in a chemicals processing environment is more a
question of the proper functioning of systems and safeguards than about the daily
pressure on workers, a somewhat controversial issue dealt with more directly in the
next section.
Notwithstanding the common perception that investment was the way to a safer and
healthier working environment, individual workers still felt the pressure of having to
"make do" in imperfect circumstances, with associated health hazards to work around.
A shop steward gave the example of a worker who had been disciplined for not
implementing a standard operating procedure (SOP). The union looked into the case
and found that the job had been made more dangerous by the introduction of new
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production processes downstream, and that the SOP was now redundant in that the
safety problems of his job had now changed. The senior shop steward for the TGWU
said:-
• ..workers in this place are doing their best to keep production going
with old machinery in some parts of the factory,...Sometimes this
means they have to be a bit clever and ignore the SOP in order to keep
things ticking over.
The quote above illustrates a particular importance that job control has in safety
regulation21 . At Textchem, especially in the flake department, job control is
relatively high, and a production manager claimed that despite the complexities of
chemistry involved, and the small margin of error in chemicals production systems,
individual workers had their own way of preparing production batches, as if they were
secret recipes with varying amounts of various substances added or taken away by
personal preference. Therefore, beyond the world of formal safety systems, and
official safety policies, workers have to operate machinery that is imperfect and often
outdated. This presents problems, both in terms of the dangers that might arise and in
terms of the disciplinary procedures that may be invoked when workers try to address
the problems. Clearly, the unity of interests between workers arid employers over the
need for investment is an incomplete representation of the relationship between
workers and their safety within productive systems. But it also shows how control
over work is an important element in the struggle of workers to stay safe, to be "a bit
clever". An individual worker is confronted with a range of possible options when
manipulating machinery or production processes within a more complex system that
might present safety problems outside of his/her direct control. The ability to shift and
change and adjust working methods is a necessary part of the job of attempting to
control for hazards that might be "imported" from other parts of the production
process, and this gives us a clue as to how convenient it is for managers and worker
representatives alike to push blame for accidents onto workers who have neglected
official (and therefore somewhat inflexibly defined) safety policies and procedures.
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Similar issues exist concerning the issue of quality control and customer satisfaction.
The site manager claimed that many of the problems of the business in the early 80s
sprang from an output-centred philosophy which paid little attention to quality and the
needs of the customer, although other managers were more sceptical about the extent
to which recent changes involved this shift to quality-centred production, claiming
that it often involved more rhetoric than reality. The works manager at the smaller site
gave three examples of where production-led investment decisions had had important
beneficial effects with respect to both quality control, and health and safety,
reinforcing arguments that in capital intensive industry, investment for production can
be more easily perceived as also investment for safety at one and the same time.
Firstly, a new production line in the flake business, built to increase capacity and
reliability, will bring the company into line on exposure limits under CoSHH.
Secondly, a large-scale ergonomic re-organisation of the process of charge-feeding
will remove workers from proximity to the vessels as they will eventually be fed
automatically. Thirdly, investment is planned for a new closed-system filter in the
spinning departments of the tow and yams businesses, which will end the need for
process workers to enter the vessels for cleaning purposes, exposing themselves to
high concentrations of acetone. The level of expenditure on these projects, as well as
on measures required for compliance with the CoSHH regulations, inform a widely-
held opinion that the company now takes safety more seriously. It appears also that
the company has found it possible to attach improvements in safety to investment
decisions made under entirely different criteria. This is not to suggest that investment
on its own absolves management from political decisions over resources and safety
costs more generally. In particular, the experience at Textchem raises the question as
to how likely it is that this ability to make safety an "ally" of production goals (i.e. to
unite union representatives interests in establishing safe working conditions with
managements desire to invest in new production lines and equipment), is dependent
on the financial upturn the company has experienced.
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The changes of the business plan are all-pervasive at Textchem. The next section
addresses the impact that the increased autonomy for the businesses has begun to have
in undermining the central policing function of the TSC, as individual managers
choose not to seek approval for modifications to production processes and/or
machinery, with implications for the regulation of safety. The changes discussed in
this section represent a decentralisation of business and managerial control as well as
of employment status and systems of representation, although it must be stressed that
whilst business autonomy in some areas (eg. purchasing of flake by other businesses)
is well established, more far-reaching changes, such as the decentralisation of
collective bargaining, are yet to be realised, and indeed may never actually take place.
One of the problems of the business plan is the environment of change and the
disruption to existing patterns of representation, which has an impact on the
previously "stable" function of union representation, (discussed further in section (v)).
For example, the senior shop steward said that recently, an operative and supervisor
had both been shut in a lift for over five hours. He, however, had only heard this
indirectly through a conversation when in that particular business, emphasising, he
argued, the difficulties inherent in his attempts to use his representative position to
	 (
influence a collective approach to health and safety, as well as the implications that
full business devolution will come to have for this collective regulation.
These may be somewhat anecdotal examples, but they do illustrate the potential
problems that may develop as businesses become increasingly responsible for their
own affairs, and as the current framework for participation of employee
representatives becomes redundant and ineffective in articulating collective and site-
wide safety issues. Another example of the relationship between production goals and
safety, within a changing atmosphere of business autonomy, is the explosion at the
larger plant mentioned earlier. The blast caused the entire factory to be closed for
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three days in order to make the place "safe", and to shut-down operating systems etc.
Management was then left with the decision of which parts of the plant to priorities
for re-opening; in the end, the tow business was chosen, leaving the other departments
closed for a further few days, the decision being based on the contribution that tow
makes to the general profitability of the company. This caused further resentment
amongst yams employees, ensuring that the QEP bonus remained low for that
business, and further fuelling calls for a return to the "collectivised" payment of
bonuses. It also points to the problems of the business plan itself, in attempting to
create separate businesses, on sites where geographical location, and a large degree of
interdependence of equipment, site services, safety etc. worked towards horizontal
organisation. It further demonstrates the way that decisions about safety are
intrinsically related to those concerning production priorities.
Evidence also exists that this process of de-collectivisation involves not just the
formal changes of the business plan. The safety adviser at the smaller site said that he
increasingly by-passes union representatives in dealing with problems relating to
health and safety on the shopfloor. The union representatives at the same plant
claimed that there had been an actual decrease in consultation between themselves
and management over safety, an example being where the men had organised for
workers to go on a ten-day safety course organised by the local TUC, only for
management to say that they had already organised a five-day course in conjunction
with the larger plant, and the TGWU nationally. There is insufficient room here to
discuss the further implications of the business plan for industrial relations and the
ability/desire of union officials to obstruct the force of the management changes.
However, those changes that have already taken place under the auspices of the
business plan indicate something of the importance of managerial control, corporate
strategy and prerogative for the structure and practice of participation in health and
safety. They show the strong role that business structure and strategy play in framing
the processes and content of decision-making, in the management and regulation of
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safety. They also show how fragmentation of decision-making over production-
centred goals has a knock-on effect in de-collectivising safety regulation. The next
section looks at the relevance of the formal floor of rights at Textchem. The
development of the business plan at Textchem shows how the particular form that
safety regulation takes (in this case, particularly the extent of centralisation of joint
regulatory functions) is important in determining the level influence that worker
representatives have.
In essence, the business plan is not an attempt to improve efficiency, cut costs or de-
recognise union representation. It is certainly not driven by a desire to break up plant-
wide safety representation and the influence of shop stewards, although these are
clearly some of the by-products of the process. Rather, it is an attempt to re-focus the
policy goals of management at business- rather than site-level, although the
secondary effects on safety regulation and representation are clear. The examples of
change to safety regulation given in this section further show that the process of
negotiation and decision-making concerning safety as against other production
priorities is a complex one.
At Textchem, a period where management have attempted to de-collectivise health
and safety participation, alongside other matters, and where the relative strength of
influence of trade union representatives has decreased as this collective space has
been squeezed, has also been one where investment has increased, where management
have given a higher profile to safety as such, and where this is reflected in an almost
universal feeling that things "...are getting better. The next section goes on to look at
the formal structure of participation in safety management, and at how, within the
context of the business plan changes, legislation over safety issues is implemented at
Textchem.
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(iv) Statutory participation, safety regulation and the floor of rights
There is an overwhelming feeling amongst almost all of the people I interviewed that
health and safety issues are taken more seriously now, and given greater priority by
management, than in previous years, with an improvement in the financial position of
the firm often given as the main reason for this. Many of those who have been
employed at Textchem for a number of years mentioned a general apathy to health
and safety matters on the part of management and employers alike in the past.
These feelings are expressed in a similar fashion in the questionnaire returns,
regarding the question of improvements in health and safety at Textchem in recent
years.
Changes to safety in recent years?
Response:
Much Improved
Improved
The same
Worse
Much Worse
No response
No.	 %
	
20	 31.7
	
34	 54.0
	
7	 11.1
	
1	 1.6
	
0	 0.0
	
1	 1.6
cum. %
31.7
85.7
96.8
98.4
98.4
100.0
As we can see, over 85% of respondents claim to have seen some degree of
improvement in health and safety. I have already mentioned that the employment of a
new full-time, high profile, safety adviser, as well as the subsequent resurrection of
moribund safety committees are important in this respect. Union representatives also
claimed that there was a direct relationship between the degree to which management
are now taking safety matters more seriously, and the financial situation of the
company; i.e. there is simply more money around to spend on health and safety
measures. However, many people, particularly but not exclusively on the employee
representative "sid&', also claimed that legislation, and especially the new CoSFIH
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regulations, have also been instrumental in this change of attitude by the company.
Indeed, an operations manager candidly agreed:-
although the company are gcnerally good on safety here,.. .in reality
nothing would be done about health and safety, without the
compulsion of legislation.
Similarly, the TGWU senior steward saw health and safety legislation as a key way in
which unions could gain influence in the company, in the face of an environment
hostile to trade unionism per Se. Whilst new regulations concerning noise control,
dust levels and hard hat protection were all cited as important, it was CoSHH which
appeared to be uppermost in safety considerations22.
The relatively recent introduction of CoSHH means that the company are still in the
process of making the great number of assessments necessary at the very start of the
procedures of compliance23. However, various measures to deal with high exposure
levels have been introduced in key parts of the factory, and the issues of exposure,
exclusion and the personal protection of workers are very much on the safety agenda.
The safety adviser admitted that the company has been slow to comply with CoSHH,
and that its impact has been deep in challenging the existing safety management
system. Although the regulations require management to consult with employees at
each stage of the substance monitoring process, the input of trade unions at this site of
Textchem has been negligible, according to both safety representatives and the
production manager of the flake business. The reason given by the safety adviser was
the complex, technical nature of compliance with CoSHH, and the lack of such
knowledge on the part of shopfloor employees.
It would be misleading to claim that the impact of the CoSHH regulations on health
and safety serves only the interests of workers in a simple sense, despite the
importance attached to legislation by union representatives at Textchem. It became
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clear in my discussions with managers, that CoSHH was very much welcomed at the
factory, not only in helping to professionalise the health and safety system in
operation, but also in helping to standardise and objectify the management of health
and safety; for example, the tow business operations manager claimed:-
since CoSHH it has been much more difficult for workers to dress-up
grievances of various kinds as involving health and safety,.. .i.e. by
refusing to do certain tasks on spurious safety grounds, as had
happened previously.
The safety adviser made a similar claim, that the last year or so had seen a fall-away
in these "artificial" safety grievances being used as a mask for other issues, although
he did cite a dispute with a group of men working at the gate-house over regrading of
reception duties24. This had led to a dispute over payments for holiday shifts, and two
of the men leaving the factory at the end of the shift, even though replacements were
late, causing potential safety hazards in the intervening time. The safety adviser also
said that this disagreement had led to two employees refusing tasks on spurious safety
grounds, although this was the exception rather than the rule.
Worker representatives also pointed to the law as a problem as well as an area where
workers enjoyed a good degree of protection. The senior steward said:-
..mind you, the worst people for us are the environmental people [i.e.
environmental health officers from the local authority, HSE inspectors
etc.]. If we had to put everything right that they say, then we would
soon be out of business. They have no idea that we have to try and
keep this place going, and the jobs with it.
The general impact of CoSHH, however, has been to tighten the measurement of
hazards, and remove uncertainty and the scope for bargaining and disputes over safety
from everyday employee relations. This was reinforced through further interviews.
Almost all of those interviewed also said that health and safety matters were kept
entirely separate from bargaining over pay and conditions, with almost all of them
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claiming that this was a good thing. Questionnaire responses suggested that the
picture was more mixed, raising the question of whether shop stewards and managers
centrally involved in safety regulation maintained a different definition of what
bargaining constitutes25.
To what extent do safety issues get wrapped up in other issues such as pay and
conditions?
Response
V Much
To some extent
Rarely
Never
Unknown
No response
No.	 %
	
3	 4.8
	
16	 25.4
	
17	 27.0
	
8	 12.7
	
17	 27.0
	
2	 3.2
cum. %
4.8
30.2
57.2
69.9
96.9
100.0
The above discussion would suggest that, in part at least, compliance with the CoSHH
regulations at Textchem has become an end in itself which allows managers to deal
with this aspect of safety in a unilateral and routine way, without consultation with
trade union officials or safety representatives, and reinforced by a concentration on
safety issues as essentially a range of technical solutions to unproblematically
identified technical problems. The legislation itself does not have a causal role in this;
managers still choose to implement CoSHH within the framework of existing safety
regulation. However, the concentration on exposure limits in the regulations seems to
offer management the possibility of isolating compliance from the dynamics of
participation. Who needs to participate when safety is just about getting the exposure
readings below, a certain level? Health and safety has almost come to be equated with
compliance with the law, and with the achievement of exposure targets, maybe in an
attempt to remove any form, or expression, of conflict over the safety priorities that
are set, and the decision-making process involved.
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The clearest example of this is the minimal role that the joint safety committees play
in driving CoSHH as opposed to being informed about it. Management enthusiasm for
the CoSHH regulations enables a diversion from any challenge from safety or union
representatives, in that the achievement of specific measurable targets is taken as a
common objective and not subject to dispute. In other words, the safety agenda has
become dominated by measurement and exposure levels at the site, at least partially
through the way in which management have approached compliance with the CoSHH
regulations. There is every possibility that once assessments are complete, a similar
process will take place with the use of personal protective equipment, with little scope
for a critique by employee representatives, of the very decisions which generate the
dangers in the first place.
Such feelings emerge in comments on a number of questionnaires. An electrician
working for central services says:
The company's image is one that values safety! But in reality does very
little outside of complying with the law.
This sentiment conforms to the comments of both managers and union
representatives, mentioned above, on the fact that much of the improvement in health
and safety was down to the compulsion of legislation and statutory requirements.
These feelings, however, exist within a framework of opinion, commonly held view
amongst union and safety representatives, as well as operatives, that the company is
now taking safety more seriously than in the past, as mentioned earlier.
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How seriously does the firm take safety?
Response	 No.	 cum. %
Extreme Seriously	 10	 16.4	 16.4
Very Seriously	 17	 27.9	 44.3
Quite Seriously	 23	 37.6	 81.9
Not Very Seriously 	 7	 11.5	 93.4
Not At All Seriously 	 2	 3.3	 96.7
Not Known	 2	 3.3	 100.0
The fact that CoSHH is used in such a way as to exclude rather than engender more
effective participation is only partially a result of the nature of the legislation itself,
which admittedly concentrates on number-crunching compliance with exposure
limits, as well as on the professionalisation of the whole operational safety system and
the importance of responsibility for safety within line management. The legislation is
also clear in demanding full consultation and involvement of employee
representatives, as a springboard to more effective participation. In practice,
legislation is utilised in a more complex way in everyday safety regulation. Union
representatives complained that in some cases the company was hiding behind the
safety legislation, in over-using temporary workers, as a kind of numerical flexibility,
on the grounds that extended probationary periods were necessary for safety reasons.
The second half of this section looks further at what management at Textchem does to
both reinforce a technical discourse in the resolution of safety problems, and to
neutralise the potential that exists for effective participation of employee
representatives.
The discussions so far have attempted to show how management are attempting to use
the CoSHH regulations to insulate this important aspect of the health and safety
agenda from the potential expression of conflict by employee representatives via the
institutions of participation - i.e. business safety committees. In other words, through
claiming that the legislation is a universal, and externally legitimate, set of targets for
safety policy to be geared towards, and therefore something that should unite the
efforts and interests of management and employees alike, management are attempting
149
to isolate health and safety from broader issues around the distribution of power and
decision-making, from the relations of dominance, as it were. This is an important
issue, as I have already argued in previous chapters that this link between relations of
dominance on the one hand, and choices over safety and production considerations on
the other, are a crucial element in the management of health and safety. Later in this
chapter, I will discuss the difficulties that union representatives have in shaping a
coherent response to this problem. However, I want first to discuss in more detail the
way in which management at this site choose to isolate and control the regulation and
monitoring of health and safety in this way.
One of the key bodies in the regulation of health and safety is the management-only
technical safety committee (TSC). The main role of this site-wide body is to meet
once a month, and to review the safety implications of new investment, amendments
to working and production processes, alterations to machinery and equipment etc. The
function of the TSC is to look at detailed modification (mod) proposals, and to take a
broader view of the safety problems that might be involved, although the senior site
engineer has the power to veto the need for matters to be taken to the TSC where he
feels that this would be inappropriate, usually where a duplication of the original
detailed proposals might occur. Many of the mods are produced within the separate
businesses, and are usually "production-led" according to the senior engineer, thereby
giving the TSC something of a policing and advisory role in relation to the changes
that the individual businesses would like to see. The TSC, however, must give
approval for mods before they take place, thus giving it more power and influence
than the separate business safety committees, although the changes to the business
structure on the site, and the shift to greater autonomy for the businesses (mentioned
earlier), has confused this relationship somewhat. The senior engineer said that whilst
most managers recognised that mods must have TSC approval before work could go
ahead, not all managers observed this process.
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The senior engineer, who also chairs and co-ordinates the work of the TSC, said that
although it had always existed, it had been revamped just prior to the appointment of
the safety adviser and the resurrection of the safety committees, and now had a very
important role in safety matters. The justification for this body not involving
employee representatives was given by the senior engineer as one of technical
competence, saying that:-
The committee would simply go over the heads of workers...
Similarly, the senior engineer argued that the capital-intensive nature of the industry
means that safety problems are defined more by the nature of complex operating
systems, often involving built-in automatic safety procedures, with human, ergonomic
issues being less important. This relates to my comments on the general safety agenda
at Textchem mentioned earlier, and represents a somewhat false separation between
technical safety problems, and those more generally associated with the labour
process, and with the control of work, such as fatigue, double shifts etc. The false
nature of this dichotomy was further recognised by managers who contributed to the
TSC meeting that I attended, where the importance of the skills and competences of
shopfloor workers was constantly raised as being a critical part of ensuring the safe
technical operation of production processes. This represents the reverse of the logic
of the argument above; that technical safety systems can limit the impact of
individuals of the prevention of hazards. Furthermore, one senior adviser from the
larger plant said that one of the main problems with safety at this site was the lack of
know-how on the part of employees, and a lack of experience amongst middle
managers. He said:-
..at the end of the day, you need to employ competent people who
know the bloody plant and can work safely.
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A similar view was expressed by the senior engineer:-
Sometimes, too much technology is a problem,..
In other words, technological solutions to safety problems can cause further problems
in their own right if the operatives lack the necessary expertise to work within the new
advanced system, or if understaffing is a problem. The operations manager of the tow
business made it clear that safety problems in his business were related to production
targets and the need to reduce unit labour costs, in particularly concerning workers
doing double shifts when manpower is short.
Furthermore, it was argued in the opening chapter that a management-centred
approach to safety problems, involving a use of risk analysis driven solely by
managers, ignores critically the fact that it is workers who shoulder a
disproportionately high degree of burden with workplace hazards26. This problem is
reproduced at Textchem with respect to management approaches to CoSHH, and the
fetishism of measurement mentioned above. An operative in the yarns business
exemplifies the feeling that concentration on CoSHH measurements ignores the more
basic reality of workplace problems:-
I believe that if Textchem should sort out a more effective cooling
system in the spinning mills, it would make life a lot easier and
healthier, creating a lot more alertness;.. .for heat causes drowsiness
and drowsiness causes accidents. What a pleasure it will be if you
come into work on a hot blistery summers day to a nice cool
environment of work...
This quote illustrates just how simple" a matter safe working conditions can be for
individual workers, even in a capital-intensive plant such as Textchem. Safety
representatives also expressed concern that whilst the concentration of technical
know-how within the TSC, and management more generally, was fine for the solution
of some problems, there was an overall lack of joint regulation in the co-ordination in
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health and safety across the site, made worse by the winding up of the old central
safety committee in favour of those in the individual businesses, discussed in the
previous section. The site nurse also felt that the end of the central safety committee
meant that her job of health promotion was weakened as businesses looked after more
of their own affairs, and ran training courses she was unaware of, using first-aid
equipment, for example, she was unaware even existed. Importantly, the senior union
representatives I spoke to at Textchem were unaware even of the existence of the
TSC.	 -
The TSC meeting I attended also included a difficult and detailed discussion about
safety valves that could be built into the new charge-feeding 27
 system in the
preparation of a cellulose solution, and the implications that any number of failures
could have for containing exposure and gas emissions. At several points in the
discussion, the need for the operative to be aware of safety procedure, and
importantly, not to leave the new apparatus for extended periods was raised,
indicating again this separation of technical solutions from health and safety more
broadly conceived to be false and misleading. Similarly, at one point, members of the
TSC argued that it was always difficult for decisions regarding modifications to
machinery to be taken, because there was little guarantee that money would be spent,
at other levels of management, in implementing their recommendations. This not only
points to the importance of managerial decision-making in safety regulation, even if
managers at Textchem see this arena in purely technical terms; it also reinforces the
contention that management cannot be seen as a homogenous body in the regulation
of safety and health. The business plan has already shifted the emphasis in the
relationship between management in the separate departments, as they have to
compete over price and quality with other producers, and negotiate over the internal
supply of the three other businesses by the flake department.
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As we have seen, management at Textchem have introduced the new CoSHH
regulations in a way which attempts to insulate the health and safety agenda from
conflict over the allocation of resources and priorities, concentrating instead on
compliance with exposure limits, This enables a privileged role for management
specialists, through the separate discussions of the TSC and through the "ownership"
of CoSHH as a management-driven initiative, in regulating health and safety at the
site. This is reflected in the institutional arrangements for the regulation of health and
safety, with the relatively powerful TSC making decisions over safety (albeit
imperfectly given the considerations above) at the expense of the relatively toothless
business safety committees. This separation of functions between the two forums of
safety regulation, however, does not appear to be an important issue for union and
safety representatives I spoke to. Responses varied from complete ignorance of the
existence of the TSC, to a positive recognition, similar to the views of the site
engineer himself, of it as typical of a new importance given to safety by management,
but never a query over the necessity of employee participation, in some form, on this
higher, and more important (in decision-making terms) safety regulation committee.
Again, this raises questions about the response of worker representatives to the de-
collectivisation of safety regulation, which will be discussed in section (v).
This separation of functions between the TSC and the joint safety committees was
partially disputed by the senior engineer. He argued that there existed a continuum of
safety problems, ranging from a one-off major accident with disastrous potential
effects (a kind of accident that other managers described as beyond the potential for a
plant such as this), to routine safety problems involving a large number of minor
injuries. He said that there is an overlap between the functions of the two committees,
although because of the nature of technical knowledge possessed by specialists on the
TSC, there is bound to be some separation.
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This tension, between the discussion of minor (but regular) problems at BSC level,
and major investment-related and CoSHH-related problems at TSC levels runs
through the framework of participation in health and safety at Textchem. It is
reflected in a clear way by the following table, which analyses the questionnaire
responses:-
How effective are BSCs in solving these problems?28
those caused
by individuals
or the company
Resp. No. % cum%
V/Good 3 4.9	 4.9
Good	 28 45.9 50.8
Bad	 13 21.3 72.1
V/Bad	 2 3.3 75.4
D/Know 15 24.6 100.0
Miss.	 2
those needing
changes to
working methods
or layout but
costing little
No. % cum%
4 6.6 6.6
29 47.5 54.1
10 16.4 70.5
3 4.9 75.4
15 24.6 100.0
2
those exp-
ensive to
put right
No. % cum%
1 1.6	 1.6
15 25.4 27.1
16 27.1 54.2
13 22.0 76.2
14 23.8 100.0
4
Clearly, whereas over half of respondents say the safety committees as at least "good"
at solving problems other than those involving large scale cost and investment by the
company, this figure drops to just over a quarter when expense is required (i.e. the
figures underlined).
It is my argument that the institutions of participation in health and safety (primarily
the business safety committees, and the rights of safety representatives to inspection
etc.) are separated from the location where management concentrate attention to
safety matters, where a meeting is convened more often (the business safety
committees meeting only every six weeks or so29), and where the decisions made are
much more likely to carry more weight. The business safety committees are left with
relatively minor details (handrails, machine guards etc.) as well as with issues specific
155
to individual businesses. The necessary choices of priority over spending on safety
and production are at the heart of the way in which relations of dominance are
expressed in safety regulation. At Textchem, the TSC is the central body where these
decisions are regulated; conversely, the limitation of participation to the BSCs means
that these fundamental decisions cannot be challenged in a participative forum. This
situation is reinforced both by two other procedures. Firstly, the fact that the changes
required under the CoSHH regulations are generally incorporated into the work of the
TSC (in discussions of the best way to use the range of protective measures available
etc.), rather than the business safety committees; and secondly, through a certain
manipulation, by management, of the participation of employees or their
representatives, at least in those situations where I was present.
The degree to which this manipulation constitutes a specific strategy on the part of
management is questionable; it is probable that the structural limitations imposed by
the nature of the CoSHH regulations, and the indirect influence of the business plan in
diluting the potential impact of participation mechanisms, are likely factors. However,
the problem can be illustrated with examples from a CoSHH briefing in the tow
business, attended by a relatively small number of shopfloor employees. Several clear
grievances were expressed by these workers concerning the state of repair in some
roofing sections with old asbestos pipe insulation. Similar complaints about asbestos
as a safety hazard neglected by management were made in questionnaire responses,
although management representatives at the briefing attempted to defuse the issue
through claiming that "it was not the dangerous type of asbestos", and through
promising further investigation before getting back to delivering information about
CoSHH assessments. Privately, another member of management admitted that it was
impossible to be clear about the hazards of certain kinds of asbestos.
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Similarly, part of this briefing included a short video on the need for employees to
respect labelling and classification of packaging, particularly those labelled as toxic
and dangerous. Later in the session, one employee said:-
delivery drivers regularly bounce their drums, containing substances
labelled as harmful, from the back of their lorries.
The safety adviser once again said that he would investigate, but also said that many
manufacturers put these labels on drums containing harmless substances, just to be
"...on the safe side...", thereby contradicting the message of the video, and seemingly
undermining the value of trying to get employees to adhere strictly to the regulations
of safety in handling and transporting products.
These accounts reinforce the argument that management are not simply shunted
along a path of safety regulation determined by other strategies (eg. the business
plan), by the details of CoSHH or by the nature of the hazards involved. At a basic
level at least, they seem to choose to isolate representative participation in health and
safety from the location at which genuine decision-making over safety matters goes
on. Management enjoy a certain hegemony through the possession of technical
knowledge and through management specialists sitting on the TSC30. They also show
that within such participation, managers tend to deflect rather than address criticism
from shopfloor workers. Thus, whilst much is made of the new-found importance
attached to health and safety by the firm, and the enhanced profile of the business
safety committees, the content of that participation (i.e. the potential for the
expression of problems, grievances and opposition to management priorities over
safety) is manipulated by management, in defence of participation more as a form. In
other words, whilst participation is important, genuine complaints are less so, either
because operatives lack technical knowledge on the one hand, or are "bad personnel
choices" (as one operative who I witnessed complaining about a spillage in the flake
business was described later by the safety adviser) on the other31.
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The next section looks at the response of union officials to the changes inherent in the
business plan, and the difficulties that union and safety representatives have in
challenging these tendencies towards de-collectivisation, the colonisation of technical
solutions to safety by management, and the relative toothlessness of the business
safety committees.
(v) Representation; the role of trade union and the collectivisation of health and safety
It was argued in the opening chapter, that it is problematic to think of the health and
safety interests of workers as being simply opposed to those of management, even if
the generic contradiction between the pursuit of profit and the creation of safe
working conditions is accepted. I argued further that unions, and other employee
representatives, play a necessarily difficult role in pursuing safety issues on behalf of
members whose interest are potentially diverse and contradictory in nature
themselves, and that management too must be viewed in a heterogeneous way with
respect to its handling of health and safety issues. I have already cited several
examples of the difficulties that union representatives in particular have at Textchem
with respect to participation in decision-making and information regarding safety and
other matters, particularly during the period of business plan changes. In addition, I
have pointed to proactive ways in which management control both the regulation of
technical safety problems, and the manipulation (intentional or otherwise) of forms of
worker participation. This section looks more closely at the union response, and at the
role of worker representatives, in the management of health and safety at Textchem.
The union representatives I spoke to at Textchem found themselves in a difficult
situation with respect to health and safety issues, as well as their general dealings with
management on other matters. A starting point for these men was complaints about
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the general apathy that workers exhibit, and the low priority that employees generally
gave to safety above other issues such as pay and conditions. This meant that they
were very often unsure of the support they had from their members when taking
complaints about safety and accidents to various levels of management; the senior
steward was angry that he received such little support from his shopfloor members for
his campaigning work in this area, whereas he was severely criticised by workers
sometimes for not taking a harder line with management. He said that he had often
felt stupid when he had fought for certain improvements regarding safety only for
workers to either ignore the new arrangements, or to refuse to wear new clothing etc.
He also described many employees as selfish in this respect, claiming that there was a
simple lack of solidarity at shopfloor level in the factory.
The senior steward cited several examples where direct intervention on his part had
won concessions from management with regard to health and safety matters,
generally through advocacy on behalf of injured employees, as well as on issues other
than health and safety related. A man who had broken his glasses on a wire left by
some contractors requested that the company paid for replacements. Apparently, this
was normal practice "in the olden days", but this time the company would only pay
half. The senior steward took further action and won full compensation, despite being
told by the union that it was too small a claim to waste money on should the company
have wished to fight it. Sometimes, however, the union representatives would fight
for a group of workers on a particular issue, only to find that the workers would either
abuse or ignore protective measures won. As an example, a worker tore his trousers
which belonged to him after contractors had not returned clean overalls on time. The
company wanted again to reimburse half the cost, but the senior steward stood firm
and managed to get a full payment. He was then angry when the man claimed for £45,
even though the trousers cost less than half this, claiming that this selfishness had
compromised the stand that he had taken on behalf of the worker. In addition, it then
came to light that the accident had been caused by another worker who had twisted a
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bit of wire through a machine guard that had come loose, instead of contacting his
supervisor to get the fault repaired. To the union representatives, their members
expect them to just stick up for them on every matter, whether they are right or
wrong, simply because they pay their union dues; they fail to see their own
responsibility for things like safety, and the above examples support them in this. In
this respect, the union representatives seem to have to manufacture a collective
agenda on safety and health from the disparate experiences of individuals and
sectional interests of small groups confronting particular problems. The stewards
embody many of the complexities and contradictions in trying to pressurise managers
to maintain safe working conditions in the face of market competition, the general
need to keep production going, and in the face of non-solidaristic responses from
individual workers.
Furthermore, the union representatives were far from universally critical of
management, particularly in the area of health and safety. They said that the
ignorance and apathy of the workforce were also important. The senior steward said:-
..with hand on heart, the workforce are more to blame than
management...
This represents an important assertion; a central aim of this thesis is to understand
how safety can be utilised in a collective manner by unions, in challenging managerial
hegemony of decision-making and production control. If the steward is correct in
saying that workers are more to blame than management (i.e. that it is the actions of
management in promoting safety that workers ignore), then the scope for trade unions
in mobilising around safety is intrinsically limited. However, he also said that the
competing pressures of production and safety, also had an effect on the behaviour of
shopfloor workers, claiming that often workers took short cuts in order to keep the
line going, or to avoid a stoppage of some sort. The example, mentioned earlier, of
the man disciplined on safety grounds for ignoring a certain SOP, when in fact he was
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trying to solve some of the problems that the SOP created for actually carrying out his
job, is illustrative of this. Clearly then, individual worker negligence is complicated
term, and must be seen within the context of production pressures and managerial
domination of the safety agenda. The union representatives were in agreement with
the safety adviser that shopfloor workers ought to go to their supervisors and line
managers about safety matters, rather than leave things till they get worse, and then
bring in the safety officer or union officials, illustrating the fact that management per
se can be seen as an ally, or as a resource, for union representatives trying to improve
working conditions, rather than just as the "enemy".
In my discussions with the union representatives, a complex set of paradoxes between
trying to pursue safety issues on behalf of workers, trying to police workers who were
often less than interested in safety, and performing a balancing act between trying to
protect employees' interests whilst trying to ensure the survival of the plant emerged.
As mentioned earlier, the senior steward argued that the "environmental people" (the
environmental health department of the local council), and the health and safety
inspectorate were sometimes "our" worst enemy, in that they had little idea of the fact
that the factory needed to stay open and jobs needed to be protected. He said further:-
..if the letter of the law [regarding environmental and safety controls]
was applied, the place would simply be shut down.
This is clearly the truth; worker representatives therefore have an ambiguous position
with respect to legal regulations and improved legislation, saying on the one hand that
this was crucially important in the improvements of recent years, and on the other
hoping that the regulations did not threaten jobs.
All of this suggests that it is difficult to draw out simple representative interest
constituencies with respect to health and safety at Textchem. By this I mean that the
work of union and safety representatives routinely involves a balancing act between
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sets of competing pressures. If safety and profit are fundamentally at odds in a broad
sense, as I have argued that they are, then the articulation of this conflict is anything
but straightforward and linear at the point of production. Drawing out the processes
which filter this fundamental relationship is to also expand our understanding of the
relationship between safety management, and the politics of production in general.
At Textchem, the comments of both managers and union representatives centrally
involved in safety management, suggest that these people form a separate community,
in some sense, with health and safety as a key theme separating them from colleagues.
Both of these groups acknowledged the role that each other play in promoting good
health and safety, and looked outside of this group, to individual workers who ignored
safety procedures, and to other managers (and management functions) who didn't take
safety seriously enough etc., for people to blame for poor safety. This community cuts
across the divide that exists between unions and management with regard to many of
the changes that have taken place (especially the business plan) in recent years. On
several occasions, the union referred to themselves and management as "us" (the
environmental people, after all, were described as our worst enemy) to the exclusion
of other groups, and of individual workers, reinforcing their perception of their role
more as one of policing workers (or helping to police them) rather than of the
representation of their interests contra management32.
An example is the issue of contract workers. Throughout many of my interviews,
contract workers were identified as a key cause of safety problems at Textchem,
covering a number of different jobs and potential hazards 33. The problems arose from
the fact that these workers did not know the safety and emergency procedures at the
plant, and were not aware of the totality of hazards involved (i.e. a comprehensive
hands-on knowledge about the dynamics of the plant and how problems in some areas
might lead to dangers in other areas etc.), to the extent that full-time employees were.
Interestingly, contract workers were also recognised to be one of the main victims of
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poorer safety conditions, given the more precarious (and non-unionised) nature of
their employment, and by the fact that they were generally called in to do work that
was more hazardous anyway. The safety adviser and the senior engineer had recently
introduced a new system of contract monitoring, involving detailed discussions not
only of price and job specification, but also the safety implications that the work
would involve and written descriptions by the coniract firms of how they would
overcome them.
This problem of interest disaggregation and representation is also illustrated through
consideration of the gendered division of labour at Textchem. There is no room for a
full discussion here34, but one example shows how the male union representatives
seemed to view the health issues of female workers in a different light from more
general issues35 . A group of women in a different department were refusing to move
the fran bars holding the fmished yarn, on the grounds that they were too heavy to
move when a woman was pregnant. He was very sympathetic, and demanded that
management allow pregnant women not to move them, although the stewards claimed
that when men and women, pregnant or not, at other sites and in other parts of the
factory, were able to move them, it was difficult to make out a special case for these
women. Management conceded that women could ask for help from work colleagues
if the bars were too heavy, and the steward then took up the issue of whether the same
output of work could be expected in these situations. The steward then gave an
account of how he had been in the relevant department towards the end of a shift and
had seen the women, including the pregnant ones, shifting the bars " ...in no time...".
He came to the conclusion that the issue of safety during pregnancy had become a
front for idleness, and made for a special example in reinforcing his negative view of
his members in terms of their selfishness, and their approach to his job.
These examples are diverse and problematical in themselves, as they raise many
questions about male domination of representative functions in the workplace.
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However, they are illustrative in that they represent a key difficulty in our
understanding of the articulation of collective health and safety interests by union
representatives such as shop stewards. They point to the various disaggregative
factors working against a collective articulation of safety interests. They indicate the
fine line between representation and mobilisation of workers on the one hand, and the
joint regulation of labour, with the help of management, on the other. When the
specific issues governing these relationships are filtered through the prejudices and
personal outlooks of the representatives (both management and employee) involved,
then we can very quickly lose sight of the real issues involved. In other words, the
exact nature of original grievances is lost as it passes through the distorting filters of
those holding representative positions.
This difficulties of representation mentioned in this section are coupled with a general
weakness in the power of the senior stewards, engendered by the changes of the
business plan, the devolution of decision-making and the progress towards less
centralised collective bargaining. The effects of these are cumulative and act as a
gradual erosion of the function of collective representation, making life more difficult
for the union representatives I spoke to 36. The degree of this distortion and
representative filtering, is difficult to pin-down in research of this kind; however, the
representative problems which the stewards at Textchem experience are clearly
important. At Textchem, management are forging ahead with a programme of change
that has mixed benefits for traditional modes of representation. It is not unreasonable
to conclude that when management are pushing forward changes which are likely to
threaten collective regulation of employment conditions, and when stewards clearly
lack a groundswell of support for their work from shopfloor workers, then the
importance that participation in health and safety has for the legitimacy of union
representatives (as well as the notion of union representation itself) must be
considered in itself in addition to the importance that such participation has for
management37.
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(vi) Conclusions.
This is a short concluding section to the discussions of this chapter. I do not intend to
regurgitate previous comments and analyses; rather, I want to extend the discussion
and make some broader remarks concerning the structure and content of participation
in health and safety at Textchem.
Change is more significant in itself at Textchem, than at each of the other three case
studies. A period of radical internally-driven change marks out this case study; the
depth of the changes involved are important above and beyond the component parts of
the business plan. This business plan has been at the centre of a reorganisation with
widespread effects in the structure of management and in opening up new channels of
communication between management and employees. The important thing to note
here, is the determining influence that these changes have had with respect to the
whole direction in which collective regulation of health and safety is heading. Whilst
management are praised by stewards and employees alike for their new positive
attitude to health and safety issues, management are pursuing a policy which directly
and indirectly threatens the place of union representatives within a framework of
participation, and the influence that unions at the plant can expect to have in the
future. It further de-collectivises safety regulation as the move towards vertical
business organisation develops.
This is reinforced by a relative incoherence in the approach of the trade unions in the
plant towards both health and safety and other matters; they are caught between
attempting to mobilise workers against the most excessive implications of the
business plan (for decentralised collective bargaining, individualised employment
contracts, performance related pay, business specific QEP bonuses, as well as the
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segmented and compartmentalised treatment of health and safety through CoSHH and
the TSC etc.), and an alliance with certain managerial initiatives which potentially
enhances the status of union representatives, and perceptions of the influence that
they have. This situation is repeated at many different levels, and with respect to
different issues. At the larger plant, the move to direct communication between
managers and workers has been welcomed by shop stewards, who say that this is what
they have wanted for many years.
This takes us back to the arguments of Cressey et al (1985:169) concerning the nature
of managerial hegemony over the framework in which participation operates.
Management at Textchem, as we have seen, are far from hostile to trade unionism in
the factory. However, they have been able to squeeze the influence that trade unions
have, through their retention of managerial initiative in the guise of the business plan,
and, in the case of health and safety, through the "ownership" of the introduction of
CoSHH and the colonisation of decision-making through the TSC. It is important in
this respect that the business plan has nothing specific to address to safety regulation,
leaving it as a site-wide (managerial) function, whilst indirectly forcing business
managers to resurrect BSCs as site-wide issues concentrate in the TSC. This particular
constellation of developments has the greatest potential importance for future
developments. Managerial prerogative is the key to the business plan; not in
confrontation with strong plant-based trade unionism, but in conflict with horizontal
business organisation which supposedly does not allow for good decision-making
within the separate departments. However, what we have seen is that this prerogative
has a momentum which could herald qualitatively new relationships between health
and safety management and the participation of employee representatives.
The key for trade unions at Textchem must lie in finding some new role as
representatives of employees in health and safety matters, rather than as enforcers of a
health and safety agenda which is seen as solely management-led. I mentioned earlier
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that union absence from TSC-level participation was not questioned by the
representatives I spoke to. In the light of the discussions in the rest of the chapter, this
is not surprising. It is understandable that union representatives should see
management in a positive light, when their own bargaining power, and status-levels in
the workplace, are so low. A strong management is better in the provision of good
health and safety than nothing at all. The division of labour, the persistent prejudices
of union representatives concerning sections of the workforce (eg. women), and the
continual atmosphere of pessimism over the long-term future of the smaller site are
unfortunately all factors which will serve to limit the realisation of a new form of
collective representation, with respect to health and safety and other issues.
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Notes.
1. I refer here to research I carried out with Paul Marginson and Stephanie Tailby for
IRES Lombardia.
2. Where awareness of the use of cigarette filters is growing, according to the
personnel manager.
3. The senior steward of the TGWU said that the future of the yarns business is the
least secure, and said that it is quite conceivable that the tow business, with its
increasii-ig market share and profitability, would come to replace yarns entirely at the
plant in the future. He also commented that it is becoming increasingly untenable for
his members to be part of the textile group of the union given this situation.
4. Whilst I was given open access to meetings and to key people in the health and
safety framework, senior managers were reluctant to give away what they considered
to be sensitive, and thereby more precise, company financial details.
5. Derby Evening Telegraph, Monday 14 January 1991, p1. I carried out interviews
with managers and union representatives at the larger plant after my main research
period at the smaller site was complete.
6. The CoSHH regulations came into effect in January 1989; see chapter 2 for fuller
discussion of their importance.
7. It is also more diverse and dynamic than at the other three workplaces studies. The
role that the technological means of production, and the inherent properties of raw
materials and production processes plays in defining the scope and nature of
involvement in the management of safety is not the direct focus of this study. I have
argued that the management of health and safety involves essentially political issues
and that the technological properties cannot determine in any direct sense the way in
which actors in the workplace choose to regulate working conditions. Rather, the role
that material factors play is discussed in each case study chapter as background
infonnation to the actual politics of health and safety participation.
8. The larger sister plant employs a total of around 2200 people, including those
working in the sales, administration, marketing, research and development sections
etc. which are largely centralised there.
9. 1 am aware that issues of the gendered division of labour, of the differential impact
that work can have on the health needs of men and women, as well as analytical
problems of analysing worker representation in safety matters (whether through
formal participation mechanisms or through the union channel) of women by men, are
not tackled head-on by this research. These issues do arise when I discuss problems of
representation in some of the case studies, and are discussed in this highly specific
context.
10. The research took place prior to the merger of the AEU and EETPU to form the
AEEU.
11. The company is, according to the site manager, a "non-conforming" member of
the Chemical Industries Association, which does negotiate minimum national wages.
12. The works manager at the smaller site said:- "industrial relations within [the
parent multinational] company are generally regarded as good. Within that, Textchem
is seen as having a particularly good reputation, and again within that, this plant has a
good reputation for industrial relations."
13. He was also my key informant for the course of the research, organising
interviews and coordinating my time at Textchem.
14. These committees are constituted broadly in line with the recommendations of the
SRSC Regulations of 1977.
15. Much of the material on the changes involved in the business plan came from
interviews with senior shop stewards and management at the larger plant, where
general employee relations, and not health and safety, were the basis on which access
was negotiated.
16. By "almost", I mean that company subsidies for flake produced on-site have been
largely removed, thereby creating competition between the flake business and the
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small number of other producers (theoretically including flake departments at other
sites of Textchem), and putting the three other businesses in negotiation with the flake
business over cost, quality, delivery specifications etc. Towards the end of the
research, the company announced an intention to close the flake department at the
smaller site, claiming that the new market for flake had made it impossible to carry
the hidden costs that used to be associated with the internal market between the
businesses.
17. One of the serious accidents in the time prior to the research, involved a man
breaking his thigh after being crushed up against a wall by one of these trucks.
18. According to some managers, they are also an attempt to buy increases in
functional flexibility amongst the workforce. The yarns operations manager at the
larger site paraphrased the response of senior shop stewards to the business plan at
that site: "...well, if we are giving up our right to be obstructive, then we want to get
paid for doing it."
19. Operatives at the larger site had voted in 1989 for acceptance of the business plan
(no such vote was ever taken at the smaller site of Textchem), but discrepancies
between bonus rates now paid to employees working equally hard in different
businesses, have led to calls for a return to an averaged bonus system across the site.
20. In other words, it is argued by some managers that new technology generally
relies on a greater degree of automation, on computer-driven production processes
etc. thereby enhancing working conditions by default, by separating workers from the
central physical production processes. Importantly, the place where this supposed
"unification" of business and safety interests takes shape is the management-only
technical safety committee (TSC); the role the TSC plays in the management of safety
is discussed in the next section.
21. An importance reflected in different ways in each of the case studies.
22. Despite attendance at CoSHH briefings being voluntary (with pay), the safety
manager said that there had been a good response generally. Almost two-thirds of
questionnaire respondents reported that they had attended CoSHH sessions.
23. The regulations force employers to make comprehensive assessments of hazards,
of the properties of chemicals and substances brought into the factory, the precise
dangers of the production process etc. For Textchem, this whole process of
assessment is a major task given the lack of a systematic control mechanism
beforehand, and given the sheer number of substances used.
24. They had held a ballot over Christmas bonuses, one of the few bargaining issues
still determined at national level between the TOWU and chemicals employers.
25. cf. Beaumont,1980.
26. See Moore,1991:11.
27. Originally mentioned in section (iii).
28. Percentages are "valid", calculated from the total of definite responses for each
question and disallowing missing values. This is why 13 responses represents 22.0%
in the third question, and only 2 1.3% in the first. Some rounding of figures has taken
place in the questionnaire tables, in order for totals to reach 100%.
29. Although the frequency of meetings does vary between businesses.
30. See Grant et al,1988.
31. This tends to support the view put forward by Ramsay (1985:58-60) that, in the
UK context at least, management are usually more interested in generating legitimacy
out of participation, than in allowing such a forum to challenge their prerogative over
decision-making, and also by Cressey et al,(1985:169) and discussed in the first
chapter.
32. This central problematical position for worker representatives, in having to
represent workers on the one hand and police them on the other emerged to a degree
in each of the four case studies.
33. Although contractors were rarely cited as being to blame for individual accidents
in the questionnaire responses.
34. I recognise that the issues raised by considering the gendered division of both
labour and interest representation are large and controversial areas, which this thesis
does not pretend to give justice to. The example used is indicative of the problems
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that safety representatives and stewards have in constructing a collective approach to
safety regulation.
35. Both managers and union representatives made comments regarding the natural
physical suitability of women to the work carried out at Textchem. Reasons given
included the extra manual dexterity of women, and the fact that their smoother hands
did not cut the fine yarn.
36. This is reproduced in spheres other than health and safety. The company has been
operating a successful share option scheme for 5 years or so, enabling workers to
invest up to £35 per week in company shares. The senior steward claimed that this
had further weakened his position in bargaining with management, because wage
claims could be countered with the fact that so many workers were ploughing so
much back into this scheme.
37. Indeed, I felt, somewhat subjectively, that at times the union representatives tried
to use me to justify their interest and activism in health and safety, blowing their
trumpet and citing me as an expert from the local university. In addition, senior
stewards candidly said that the non-financial support given to the union by Textchem
was invaluable, and that without it (free photocopying, office space, unofficially
accepted use of phones for union business etc.) the local branch probably would not
exist.
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Chapter 5
Prochem; German private sector chemicals.
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(i) Introduction.
Prochem is a Swiss-owned multinational company, with three production centres in
the Federal Republic of Germany, the largest of which is the central focus of this case
study. In addition, Prochem has a number of subsidiary companies, operating both in
Germany and abroad, which do not engage in production, but act as retail and
distribution outlets for the finished goods made elsewhere. The company
manufactures and prepares a number of chemical compounds, largely for the
construction industry. These include a range of rust protections, anti-corrosion
treatments, industrial floor coverings and chemical applications designed to extend
the life-span of steel, zinc, concrete etc., principally in bridges and large scale
industrial installations. Some Prochem products are available for the domestic market,
but the vast majority of sales are to the professional building and construction trades.
This chapter attempts to analyse the participation of employee representatives in the
regulation and management of health and safety issues at Prochem. For a variety of
reasons, including the kind of access I was granted and given the minimal role that
supra-workplace level institutions of participation (such as the Gesamtbetriebsraz1)
play in the formal management of health and safety, the unit of study for this chapter
is just one of Prochem's production sites on the outskirts of a large German city, and
hereafter, all references to the ' tcompany", "firm", "management" etc. concern this site
rather than the company as a whole. I was given access to Prochem via a local
representative of IG Chemie, the German chemical workers' union. This access was
agreed• very much at the last minute, after another German firm withdrew
participation from my project. I was therefore able to speak in depth to only a few
people at Prochem, mainly members of the works council, during my short stay there.
This means that the information gathered is something of a snapshot of the existing
safety regulation and participation practices at Prochem, and it does not deal with
172
long-running issues or trends in safety management, industrial relations etc., although
I have remained in touch with my key informant subsequently.
In common with the other case studies, I shall attempt to structure this chapter in
order to deal with the questions raised at the end of chapter 1. The next section begins
by giving a brief description of production and working methods, followed by
detailed background information to the case study, such as the structure of
employment and participation. The section ends with a brief analysis of accidents
statistics over the last few years at Prochem, gathered from available material.
Thereafter, this chapter contains three sections.
Section (iii) deals with the issue of managerial strategy at Prochem and its impact on
safety regulation, and aspects of job control. As in the other case studies, these issues
are central to our understanding of participation mechanisms and formal relations
between management and worker representatives, and form the framework of this
chapter in a similar way. At Prochem, financial considerations and attempts by
management to cut unit labour costs in a period of more intense competition and a
squeeze on profits are very much to the fore, unlike at Textchem 2. This role that
financial margins appear to play in dictating managerial policy is a key to
understanding how participation in health and safety is carried on on a day-to-day
basis, or at least to understanding the context in which employee representatives
operate.
Section (iv), goes on to look at the way in which Mitbestimmung and the broader
system of participation operate in practice. At Prochem, statutory participation does
not co-exist with "good" industrial relations, or the high degree of informalism that
we saw at Textchem. Notwithstanding the relative lack of material available for
Prochem, and the shorter research-time spent there, this allows us to make a direct
contrast between a workplace where Mitbestimmung is apparently unimportant
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(Department G, see chapter 7) and, here, where it is highly relevant in the contested
relationship that exists between management and the Betriebsrat. Indeed, the impact
of a floor of rights in safety participation, and our understanding of the notion of
cumulation in the mutually reinforcing role that the dual channel of representation
plays, are ideally examined in a workplace where industrial relations are poor and
where rights are contested. This contestation applies as much to the role of the works
council in general work regulation matters that could be said to affect workplace
hazards indirectly, as to direct health and safety issues themselves, and again
illuminates our appreciation of the meaning and nature of the floor of rights. This
section then goes on to look further at the role of key individuals in health and safety
at Prochem3, seeing the specificity of participation in safety management as
depending to a large extent on the nature and make-up of this personnel matrix.
Section (v) considers again the relationship between the works council and the trade
union in interest representation at workplace level. Despite the lack of additional
questionnaire information, as well as of management contribution to the project, it is
instructive to re-examine the issue of cumulation in the context of private sector
manufacturing in Germany. We will see in chapter 7 how the dual channel of works
council and trade union representation operates within a broader context of statutory
participation on the one hand and highly specific workplace conditions (public sector
managerial policies being decisive) on the other. At Prochem, many such contextual
factors could not be more different from those in existence in Department G. The
general recalcitrance of management in all matters, including health and safety
management (discussed in section (iii)) throws the onus on to these institutions of
worker representation to co-operate to mount a more effective challenge to
management in other words, I would argue that the formal provisions of
Mitbestimmung and Mitwirkung legislation take on a greater significance, when
mutually recognised goodwill between managers and the works council does not
exist.
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Once again, the chapter ends with a brief concluding section, which attempts to draw
together the specific and interdependent contextual factors structuring and informing
participation in health and safety regulation at this site of Prochem.
(ii) Background information
As mentioned previously, the company mixes and prepares other ready-made
substances and chemicals4, and is, for the most part, not in the business of chemicals
manufacture itself. This has obvious implications for the specific set of hazards and
health problems that are likely to make their way to safety regulation agendas. The
Fachkraft at Prochem said that there were no very dangerous chemicals on site, some
having been removed from the products and working methods with the onset of new
legislation concerning environmental control of products. At the time of the research,
the only serious danger to workers' health, according to the Fachkraft, arising from
hazardous substances was the use of solvent-based cleaning agents in parts of the
production area, although as I shall argue later, this does not mean that safety issues
are not seen in a more critical way, and as more important in general, by worker
representatives5.
The company has made an operating profit continuously for the last few years,
although Prochem is suffering from a similarly recessionary environment to that at
Textchem, and according to respondents, profits have been hit somewhat in the two
years prior to the research. At the time of my visits to the plant, the site employed a
total of 610 people, including all levels of managerial employees. There are 160
Arbeiter (blue-collar workers), of which only 19 are women 6, and there are 337
Angestelite (white-collar employees), of which 113 are women 7. In addition, there are
21 Auszubildende (apprentices) working on the site, and 7 temporary workers.
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Furthermore, some 17 employees are registered as handicapped and 65 are foreign
workers, almost all of them blue-collar workers. The figure of 610 total employees is
slightly down on employment levels in the months before the research, although they
have remained broadly the same over recent years.
However, this picture hides the progressive reduction in numbers employed in
production areas in an attempt to reduce labour costs. One member of the Betriebsrat
claimed that whilst staffing levels in these areas had fallen by around 10% in the last
year or so, output had increased by a similar amount. These changes form the
background to the conflict that exists between the Betriebsrat and management over
staffing levels and their effect on safety standards, discussed in later sections, and
contrasts with the stability in employment in each of the other case studies, allowing
us to focus on the role and effects of cost cutting managerial drives on various aspects
of the safety regulation system.
The increase in employment in other areas, countering cut-backs in staffing levels in
key production areas, has taken place via the purchase of another company by
Prochem, and the subsequent reorganisation of managerial and administrative
functions, resulting in further concentration of these higher managerial positions at
this site of the company. Indeed, this reorganisation originally pushed total
employment above 600 and thereby gave the Betriebsraz' a second full-time official, a
benefit the members of the works t council, as we shall see, were afraid of losing if
further rationalisation in production areas took place. So far, the firm has avoided
compulsory redundancies and have reduced employment by natural wastage and
scaling down recruitment.
The majority of working procedures at Prochem involve the mixing and preparation
of a range of products from a wide variety of chemicals and other products brought
into the factory ready made. The main production units on the site are two large two-
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tiered warehouses, with extensive pipework and feeder tubes connecting vessels on
the ground floor with storage vats on the floor above. The system operates to a large
extent through gravity, with workers employed mainly on the ground floor, mixing
particular compounds through manipulation of this system of pipes and feeders. The
job of many of the Arbeiter in this part of the factory is to follow a set of instructions
for a particular mix of raw materials, and to supervise the filling of the vessels,
checking for texture, temperature, colour etc. against prepared charts and "recipes".
Here the main safety problems, as mentioned above, are not the explosive or toxic
nature of the mixtures and raw materials used, but those of contact with eyes or skin
through splashes and spillages in the filling of the vessels, as well as dangers to feet,
back fingers and hands in the lifting and general manipulation of heavy vessels.
The other main area of employment is the packing department where tins and drums
are sealed, stored and moved to labelling and distribution departments. Here, the main
safety hazard is the danger of injury to fingers (in the operation of intricate machinery
which must seal the lids of an assortment of can sizes in various batch sizes) as well
as injuries to the back and feet resulting from lifting and manoeuvering of cans and
trays in this area. In total, there were 21 reportable accidents in 1990, compared with
15 in the previous twelve months. None of the accidents were serious or fatal. The
vice-president of the Betriebsrat claimed that the main reason for this was the fact
that production did not involve pressurised systems, and a low degree of automation8,
and that a feature of this arrangement was the likelihood that the safety problems are
similar to those one would find in a light engineering factory.
The factory operates a two-shift system, with no continuous production and no night-
shift. Part of the reason for this is a recently introduced management strategy to
increase flexibility in production and to enhance customer satisfaction by expanding
the range of products prepared, and in targeting an increasingly specialised market for
its products. This has led to increasingly small batch-sizes (thereby making night-shift
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working prohibitively expensive in a time when labour costs are being squeezed), and
more rapid turn-round in production runs and "recipes" 9. As part of this attempt to cut
staffing costs in a relatively labour-intensive environment, management at Prochem
have made much more use of contract firms in recent years. This has taken place at an
even greater rate than at Textchem, and has involved the closure of the in-house
painting department, as well as the loss of other services such as cleaning and
catering. Engineering and maintenance staffing levels have also been reduced.
The factory is organised by IG Chemie (German chemical workers' union), although
DAG (Deutsche Angestelite Gewerkschaft) do have a small number of members in the
white-collar areas. Union density figures were given verbally, and were said to be
quite low, especially in the areas employing Angestelite (as low as 10-15% maximum
according to one member of the Betriebsrat). An estimate for the density of union
membership amongst blue-collar workers was given as around 40-50%. All of the 11
members of the works council are also union members. Bargaining takes place largely
at national and (in the case of pay determination) at regional level. Prochem is a
member of the chemical industry employers' federation, and is thereby bound to the
outcome of the bargaining commission for this region of Germany. The wage round
had just begun at the time of the research, and IG Chemie began by calling for more
negotiations to take place at national rather than regional level There has been no
strike at this plant in recent memory. This high degree of centralisation in collective
bargaining, as well as the formal rights given to works councils, is mentioned as
important in the other German case study1 1, and I return to it in the final chapter.
The involvement of worker representatives in decision-making at Prochem is
governed to a great extent by the BetrVG. There is an elected Betriebsrat with 11
members, two of which are full-time. A fall in total employment below 600 would
also mean a reduction in size of the Betriebsrat to 9. In addition, there is worker
representation on the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) 12, although I was told by
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members of the Betriebsrat that health and safety issues were virtually irrelevant to
the work of the supervisory board. There is also a Gesamtbetriebsrat (joint works
council) which has powers to regulate employment, and relations with management,
on issues affecting the company as a whole, and the three production sites in
particular13 . Again, this Gesamtbetriebsrat was said to have no role in safety issues;
whilst the absence of health and safety issues from these higher forums of worker
participation is interesting in itself, it makes for a further concentration in this study
on workplace health and safety regulation, as the research did not allow for a
penetration of supra-plant level representative bodies 14•
The Betriebsrat at this plant meets about every three weeks (in company time), and
apart from full sittings, it is split into around 7 sub-committees, which deal with
distinct areas such as manpower policy, training and recruitment etc. These sub-
committees then report back to the whole Betriebsrat-5, although I was told by the
vice-president of the Betriebsrat that the sub-committees have a good deal of
autonomy in determining works council policy, with the full meeting existing usually
to rubber stamp various sub-committee proposals, as and when they exist. There is
also a sub-committee dealing specifically with health and safety regulation (the
internal-ASA) 16, which devises Betriebsrat policy on health and safety, carries out
routine surveys and collates accident frequency and distribution statistics 17• I was
unable to sit in on one of these meetings during my brief time at the factory, but
minutes were made available which I utilise when necessary in this chapter.
There is one full-time Fachkraft employed by management to oversee the provision
of safe and healthy working conditions throughout the factory 18. He coordinates
health monitoring and particular programmes of health promotion, as well as the input
of safety considerations into the training of new workers. This training is carried out
mainly by experienced employees, usually SBAs, who include safety information in
the description of the job involved. There are 14 or so such SBAs at Prochem, and the
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Fachkraft also acts as the leitende (leading) SBA, as well as the elected safety
representative for handicapped workers1 9.
Insurance legislation also compels private sector firms to subscribe to the relevant
industry regulation body, which shares inspection and legislative functions with the
state inspectorate. In the chemical industry the Berufsgenossenschaft Chemie (BG
Chemie), operates a system of rebates for good accident performance (i.e. low
accident rates, or improvements in overall safety records). Prochem obtained almost
the maximum possible rebates within this system for several years, but recent rises in
accidents in production areas have led to a reduction in the size of this rebate. In the
year prior to the research, BG Chemie carried out a routine inspection of the factory,
and were also involved in the dispute between the Betriebsrat and management over
the construction and design of a new laboratory area, discussed later in this chapter.
The assessments required by law under the GefStoffV20, are also carried out under the
auspices of the Fachkraft's department, with no input at all from the Betriebsrat or
employee representatives; the vice-president of the works council had virtually no
knowledge of these regulations. However, the firm has also employed someone to
deal with GejStoffV compliance in labelling and packaging. As already mentioned, the
only part of the factory where exposure to chemicals, or the reaction of chemicals
with each other leads to serious on-going safety concerns, according to the Fachkraft
at least, is in the use of solvents in the vessel-cleaning area.
There is also an ArbeitssicherheitsausschuJ3 (ASA), or safety committee for the site as
a whole. Again, this is a non-decision-making body which brings together managers,
the Fachkraft, SBAs, Betriebsrat members and the company doctor 21 etc. to discuss
safety problems - this committee meets around every six weeks, or when necessary. It
operates in a similar way to the Business safety committees at Textchem, in that it
chases safety issues raised outside of the meeting (i.e. in day-to-day contact between
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employees, supervisors, the Betriebsrat and management), and then proceeds on a
report-back basis as issues are pursued. In this chapter, this ASA is not to be confused
with the internal-ASA of the works council.
Finally, the Fachkraft also leads a quarterly meeting with the Betriebsrat, to look at
much broader health and safety issues, and longer-term developments such as the
implications of new investment or production layout, or any imminent legislative
changes affecting the site. The function of these meetings overlaps, to an extent, with
the information-exchange nature of the ASA, and both were cited as the central forums
where the works council had formal contact with the Fachkraft.
Accident statistics are collected in a curious and seemingly non-systematic manner at
Prochem. The figures I have for the years 1987-1990 inclusive are gathered for the
period 1st January to whenever analysis took place, and this varied from year to year.
I have therefore broken down accident frequency on a monthly basis. Reportable
accidents (excluding accidents in transit to and from work) fell from an average of 2
per month for 1987, to 1.88 per month for the first seven months of 1989. In 1990,
accidents were back up to 2 per month for the first 8 months. Over the same period,
lost time fell from an average of 243.2 hours per month in 1987, to 140.6 per month
in 1989, rising to 154.6 per month in 1990.
I argue later in this chapter, using primary evidence, that the pace of work has
increased in production areas (i.e. affecting Arbeiter more than other groups), and that
this is significant in assessing participation in safety regulation. In the light of these
changes to the pace of work, I suspect that other factors, such as the pressure not to
report minor accidents in an effort not to fall behind with individual work-loads,
rather than improved safety regulation in itself help to explain this fall in lost time per
month22. Further, no statistics were given to sittings of the ASA23 concerning either
lost-time per 1000 employees, or accidents per 1000 employees. The fluctuations in
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accidents must be set against a steadily declining proportion of Arbeiter as against
white-collar employees at Prochem. In view of the expansion of administrative
employment as against production workers, one would expect a marked decline in
accidents, instead of such a fluctuation and (recently) increase. Written comments in
the minutes of ASA meetings also indicated that occupational illness was on the
increase at Prochem (in line with national trends24), although specific figures and
records of cases were not given. The next section returns to the issue of managerial
strategy, the pressures of work and job control and autonomy at Prochem. Whilst later
sections deal with the formal mechanisms of participation and co-determination, it is
necessary to set these considerations against a background of conflict over staffing
levels and the pace of work, which has developed over recent years at the factory.
(iii) Management, pressure and the control of work
At Prochem, as in each of the other case studies, the particular constellation of forces
affecting the pace of work and the ability of workers or their representatives to
challenge managerial strategy 25
 is of central importance as a framework issue when
looking more closely at participation and representation. The dominant discourse
surrounding health and safety at Prochem, amongst all those I spoke to including the
Fachkraft himself, was that reductions in staffing levels (in production areas relative
to other parts of the firm) in a quest for a reduction in labour costs and improvements
in productivity, were combining to put a greater stress on the workforce. Put simply,
employees were having to work harder for the same amount of return; this can have
been the only outcome of a situation where output is up, employment levels in blue-
collar areas are down, and no extensive investment in changes to production
techniques (i.e. automation) has taken place.
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This issue of staffing levels has become the key problem-area between the Betriebsrat
and management, with successive claims for increased recruitment having been made
by the works council. According to my key informant, the Betriebsrat had found itself
in a difficult situation with regard to staffing levels and safety regulation. The vice-
president said:-
...I put a question mark over whether the safety of employees here is
possible under this policy of cutting costs.
In other words, the conflict of interest between safety and profit had become very real
and concrete in the last two years or so - more so than in any of the other three case
studies. Other members of the Betriebsrat, however, said that both investment and
increased competitiveness were essential, in securing the future of the plant as well as
in improving safety standards. Instead, the company have reduced plans for new
investment in the last year or so, and new investment that is taking place is generally
directed at reducing staffing levels further, or at general increases in productivity such
as in the case of faster loading machinery for the packaging departments26.
Furthermore, the Fachkraft also supported strongly the views of the works council
vice-president, regarding the safety implications of staffing reductions and increased
worldoads. He saw a direct link between this increase in the pace of work on the one
hand, and in accident frequencies in Arbeiter-dominated areas on the other27.
This situation has a qualitative effect on the management of safety, and on the forms
and nature of interest representation taking place at the firm. The difficulty for the
works council can be illustrated by two distinct sentiments, which were expressed by
works council members. On the one hand, good working conditions depended on
market stability and the long-term profitability of the company, thus suggesting
(grudging) support for the policy of reductions in unit labour costs. On the other hand,
it was evident that such policies had had a direct influence on the pace of work, on the
ability of workers to enforce safety regulations and to take safety seriously 28, and in
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the generation of stress-related hazards and accidents, reflected in the recent
proportional increase in accidents involving production workers. In this sense, the
interests of workers regarding safety were seemingly in conflict with those of profit-
centred managerial strategy, yet it was not immediately clear what the alternative
was.
One safety problem actually made worse by technological change designed to
increase production speed was mentioned in section (ii). Here, cans of prepared
chemical compounds would be sent along a small conveyor belt and automatically
capped (this had previously been done by hand). Now, the Arbeiter who supervises
the machine has to keep it supplied with lids of the right size, and must act as trouble-
shooter when jams or blockages occur. In particular, when the lids do not drop
straight (and one-by-one) down a "gully"29, the operative has to insert his/her hand
and force the lid down manually, an action which has led to more injuries to fingers
and hands, as the machine has a pre-set speed. The Betriebsrat, again, have called for
the machine to be better adjusted so that jamming does not occur, and also for its
speed setting to be lowered, but the vice-president reported to me that management
has failed to act on its demands, although an emergency stop button close to that part
of the machine has been fitted. This example shows that the issues of investment and
re-organisation of working methods, bear a complex relationship to safety regulation
and the prevention of hazards. Whilst works council members acknowledged the
central importance of investment for improving safety standards, principally through
reducing work pressure, the case above highlights that this relationship is not a simple
one. The particular quality and purpose of investment, and the workplace
environment it is introduced to, are important in understanding the impact that it may
have on workplace hazards. The last chapter discusses these issues further, focusing
in particular on the way in which degrees of labour intensiveness play in determining
how conflict between safe working conditions and production/profit targets is
expressed.
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In general, however, this pattern of automation, leading to a relative loss of job
control and autonomy in work tasks, is the exception rather than the rule at Prochem.
As mentioned above, the company now prioritises small-batch production runs aimed
at increasingly specialist markets for its products, thereby, if anything, enhancing the
ability of Arbeiter in the production departments to maintain a degree of control over
job tasks30, within the limits set by chemical properties and the pre-set recipes 31, and
notwithstanding the increased pressures they find themselves working under. The
challenge to health and safety by changes in the labour process is made by a fairly
simple increase in the pace of work caused by productivity drives, and a progressive
under-staffing of the production departments. Working processes are becoming more
dangerous not because of old machinery, or of a lack of training, but because
individual workers are finding it harder to escape from ever-tighter production runs,
and longer hours32.
At Prochem, job autonomy remains fairly high in most areas (because of a
combination of factors: the small batch-size, the high variance and turnover of orders,
the low-levels of automation), yet the Betriebsrat appears not to be able to challenge
managerial strategy, despite making several coherent appeals to management in terms
of the need for increased investment which would take pressure off workers 33. As
will be seen in chapter 7, works councils in the public sector seem, on occasion, to be
able to challenge managerial policy more effectively. The extent to which this
difference in the power of the works councils in the public and private sector is a
result of any qualitative difference in the nature of the employment relation is beyond
the scope of this thesis. It does appear to be a real factor for those engaged in the
representation of employees in health and safety; works council members at Prochem
had a clear impression of private sector employers as being more crudely profit-
driven than their public sector counterparts. At Prochem, the works council, whilst
enjoying similar privileges and legal rights to its public sector counterpart, was less
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able to challenge managerial drives for cost cutting, which would suggest that sectoral
factors (for example, the existence of a tangible product market, the nature of the
political context in which managers in the public sector operate) might play a key role
as catalysts in the operation of formal participation, and in limiting the possibilities
for worker representatives.
The following section looks at how formal participation in the management of health
and safety (as well as more generally) is contested by management and the works
council at Prochem. In the context of a generally poorer record on health, safety and
accidents, and increasing pressures on individual workers through reductions in
staffing levels in recent years, it is instructive to examine how such a framework of
conflict between management and the Betriebsrat over the provisions of participation
legislation force us to question the extent to which statutory protection can exist to
support the power of employee representatives in employment regulation and safety
issues independent of other factors, such as cooperative management, good
economic circumstances and non-conflictual industrial relations generally.
(iv) Statutory participation, safety regulation and the floor of rights
The previous section introduced the issue of work pressure at Prochem, and looked at
how cost cutting and increased work load has led to a different conceptualisation of
the management of safety on the part of worker representatives. This section looks at
the way in which Mitbestimmung operates in practice, and at the problems that exist
for the Betriebsrat in particular in utilising legal provisions compelling management
to inform and consult with them, on safety as well as more general matters.
Industrial relations in general (i.e. the relations between the Betriebsrat and
management) were said to be poor by all respondents, but especially by my key
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informant who took the lead in dealing with management. The conflict between the
works council and management over staffing levels has had a knock-on effect in the
area of safety regulation, introducing an element of conflict into previously
consensual aspects of safety management, with the Betriebsrat now beginning to use
part of the range of statutory rights it possesses to challenge what it sees as
managerial obstruction. The Betriebsrat, via the internal-ASA invoked paragraph 88
of the BetrVG, in order to force management (according to a works council member)
into making the monitoring of accidents part of the job of supervisors. Despite
managerial opposition to the idea, mainly on the grounds of cost, in increasing the job
tasks of supervisors, the Betriebsrat had, just prior to the research, concluded a
Vereinbarung (agreement) with management over this accident monitoring function.
We saw in the last section that members of the works council consider the safety
interests of workers as not being served by the dominant strategy of cost cutting at
Prochem. However, it is not just issues directly relating to staffing levels that are the
subject of contestation and conflict over Mitbestimmung and co-determination rights
and practices. The company built a new two-storey laboratory block without showing
the plans first to the Betriebsrat, in contravention of information-giving provisions of
the BetrVG. In the end, one of the work-rooms internal to the building had no natural
source of light (thereby brealdng BG Chemie accident prevention regulations), and the
building had to be partially demolished, and rebuilt in accordance with these
regulations.
In this instance, the Betriebsrat made an appeal to the TAB (inspectorate arm of all
Berufsgenossenschaften) of BG Chemie, and won the support of the inspectorate over
the way that management had handled the new building work, in much the same way
as the Personairat in the refuse department in the next chapter used a combination of
Mitbestimmung rights in health and safety, and UVVs, to force management to back
down on rationalisation of refuse collections. For one member of the Betriebsrat, this
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lack of willingness on the part of management to engage in the genuine participation
of employee representatives was "...normal practice." Indeed, it appears from this that
contesting the formal rights of worker representatives under Mitbestimmung goes on
at Prochem outside of the necessity for management to defend efficiency and cost-
cutting drives, as the case above illustrates. Rather, Mitbestimmung provisions seem
to be there to be tested and fought over across the board, which is the opposite of
what one would expect to happen if cumulation is a valid concept, where the costs
associated with obstructive managerial behaviour are meant to stimulate consensual
workplace industrial relations (eg. Streeck,1984:408-41 1).
Most Betriebsrat complaints regarding management contravention of the rules
concerning involvement, information and prior consultation, focused on the refusal of
management to take the works council into account, and to involve it in the early
stages of planning for changes to working methods etc. These, of course, also
included occasions where general employment issues were at stake as opposed to
those specifically relating to health and safety. One such example featured a new
piece of machinery that was introduced to the production areas. The law gives the
works council the right to prior consultation, in so far as new machinery makes
qualitative changes to the working environment, although the company simply went
ahead with installation, and even by-passed the Betriebsrat in recruiting a new
employee to supervise this particular piece of machinery. Examples such as these
were commonplace in my interviews with employee representatives. In a sense, their
content is less important than the quality of the day-to-day relationship between
management and works council that they depict. My key informant summed up such a
relationship thus:
With management, you always have to push for what you want.[...],
over every issue, we have to go to the border [Grenze] in order to get
our rights.
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This seems to be an entrenched pattern of behaviour by management, as a subsequent
letter from the vice-president of the works council showed; I was informed in this
later correspondence of cases where management had also refused to inform the
works council of increases in overtime, a central issue in the attempt by management
to reduce staffing levels and to increase production. Whilst the Betriebsrat has had
some successes in getting more information from management, and in forcing
agreements over accident monitoring (see earlier), it is also clearly the case that the
works council at Prochem does not get everything it wants 	 -
The most common reason given by management for assorted refusals of information
or consultation is that of economic secrecy. A secondary response commonly found,
regarding safety matters raised by the Betriebsrat, was that changes could not be
made because of a lack of financial resources. In these instances, where the
Betriebsrat were coming up against a management determined to challenge statutory
rights to information etc., the works council had often threatened to take matters to
the labour courts although this had not actually occurred. Similarly, the bottom line of
Mitbestimmung legislation, the Einigungsstelle (in effect, compulsory binding
arbitration) had never been invoked, raising questions of the efficacy of some of the
harder elements of participation in Germany, questions I return to in the concluding
section.
Another essential point about this process of competition over Mitbestimmung and
Mitwirkung rights for employee representatives is the high degree of formalism it
implies. With all of these so-called "hard" elements of participation legislation (i.e.
the Einigungsstelle, disputes over whether management has discharged its
responsibilities over information and consultation etc.) there exists clearly defined
procedures which participants can follow to seek redress. In the main, this involves
written questions, and formal responses within a limited time period by management.
In other words, if "good" industrial relations do not exist, then there are still formal
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channels through which worker representatives can go in order to maximise
utilisation of legal provisions. At Prochem, these procedures are followed relatively
frequently (and threatened even more often), as points of contact between the
Betriebsrat and management are few in number and, as we have seen, carried out in
an atmosphere of conflict. The internal-ASA, via the full Betriebsrat34, plays a key
role in pursuing management for information and consultation.
An illuminating example of this high degree of formalism is one I learned of from
minuted meetings a year prior to my time at Prochem concerned fire regulations. The
internal-ASA carried out an inspection which came to the conclusion that the factory
fire safety unit existed "only on paper", pointing to poor attendance at fire safety
training, emergency evacuation practices. The report of the inspection, sent to
management, included criticisms of the fact that fire/smoke alarms were being
deactivated by workers in an area of the factory where diesel fumes were in the air
and where many false alarms had occurred. The statement included the following
passage:
The responsibility for this situation, in our opinion, lies not with the
fire unit, but with those responsible for putting production above the
support of employees for the fire unit.
This report was also backed up by the Fachkraft who claimed in a letter to
management that:-
...the deactivation of fire alarms in this way could cost lives given the
- delayed response time for local fire services,
pointing out also that routinely de-activating or re-routing fire alarms would also
incur a higher premium on company insurance. The Fachkraft also spelt out changes
that needed to be made, but by the end of the research, the Betriebsrat were still
awaiting a response to this enquiry.
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This example is a clear illustration of the difficult situation that employee
representatives find themselves in regarding the desire for safer working conditions in
relations with management, and in having to police workers at the sharp end, in the
knowledge that when production priorities over-ride agreed systems of safety
regulation (whether laid down in legislation or through local agreement), they do so in
a way which allows management (and others) to see individual workers as negligent.
It is clear from this example that at Prochem, the works council is keenly aware of
this problem, and is doing much, in the form of a young newly elected works
councillor (see later in this section), to challenge and pressurise a somewhat
recalcitrant management. The modest success with which this is met once again raises
questions of the efficacy of Mitbestimmung legislation for intervention in safety
regulation by worker representatives in specific contexts; this will be returned to in
the concluding section.
It is perhaps a little simplistic to characterise this relationship between management
and the Betriebsrat at Prochem as conflictual; it is clearly in the interests of
management to restrict the obstruction of works council demands for consultation, so
as not to provoke it into more pro-active challenges, as recourse to the state
inspectorate or the labour courts on a regular basis might no doubt engender.
The Fachkraft claimed that works council/management relations were:
..not without conflict, but in the end, a consensus is generally reached.
However, it is also the case that the structures of participation at Prochem, have failed
to take the nature of the relationship between the Betriebsrat and management beyond
a conflict of interests at what might be called a "frontier of control", as supporters of
participation and of German Mitbestimmung in particular have claimed that they
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do35. Management clearly devotes only as much energy to the rights of the works
council as it must under law, and seems to see participation in itself as more of a
threat to their prerogative than an opportunity in conflict resolution, and in enhancing
their legitimacy, although this is a somewhat speculative assertion given lack of direct
contact with key managers during my time at Prochem.
There was a clear feeling that there was only so far that the Betriebsrat could go in
forcing management's hand on safety issues when the viability of the company was at
stake in the medium if not the short-term, a sentiment also found amongst worker
representatives at Textchem. This further helps to explain the limit to the scope of
possible Betriebsrat action in the case of breaches of safety legislation, for example in
the case of the fire alarms mentioned above. Of course, this problem is neither new,
nor confined to a works council operating under statutory participation legislation. It
may reasonably be called a "standard" problem for employee representatives of all
kinds, although the economic pressures may be more explicit in the private sector,
where the service offered by the organisation is deemed essential, and where the
paymaster is unlikely to go bankrupt. It is important here, however, because it throws
light on the nature of Mitbestimmung itself, and on the limits that can be placed on its
scope by a management determined to defend prerogative and essentially to compete
over the scope and quality of participation. At Prochem, such competition involves
the narrow extent to which management are prepared to allow the formal rules of
participation to generate a more meaningful, dynamic and "organic" consultative
space36 for the articulation of employee interests, in health and safety and more
generally, beyond the letter of the law. Some of these issues resurface in the
concluding section to this chapter, and in the final chapter of the thesis. The important
thing here is that management are able to pursue relatively unhindered cost cutting
strategies, with implications for the safety of work, despite the formal protection
enjoyed by the works council.
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A key issue for our study of participation in health and safety at Prochem is the
particular role that individuals play, as well as the impact that a particular matrix of
representation through central individuals has on the framework for safety
participation. The power of individuals to dominate, or at least influence, the way that
formal (i.e. collective) participation takes place, is a theme running through the
fieldwork in all of the case studies. In chapter 1, I argued that the function of
representation is critically more difficult for "labour" to sustain, compared with the
internal "pseudo-unity" with which the pursuit of profit, and broader production-
centred goals, is transformed into managerial strategy. Given management refusal to
cooperate with my project, and also given that the works manager, personnel
manager, and managing director are all posts which have seen changes of personnel
within the year prior to my research, I shall concentrate on the individual
contributions to safety management made by non-management functionaries. Whilst
the problem of representation at a collective level, particularly in safety matters, is
discussed in the next section, here I focus on two people at Prochem; the Fachkr aft37
and the vice-president of the works council.
The Fachkraft coordinates the work of the 14 other SBAs, and provides technical
information to management about safety issues, in an advisory capacity, both in
consideration of changes to working methods/changes in work organisation and the
implications of new investment and machinery, and of training to new and existing
workers. He is an employee of the company, and the Betriebsrat has Mitbestimmung
rights over his appointment; management have the right to ignore his advice, as they
are legally responsible for safety provisions.
The vice-president of the Betriebsrat38 is the newly-elected full-time member of the
works council. Many of the initiatives of the Betriebsrat originate with him, and he
claims a special importance for health and safety in his work, partly because of the
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delegation of functions to him, and partly because of a higher degree of personal
motivation. He summed up his position within the works council:
• .. age is an important factor affecting how good the Betriebsrat
is. ..other members of the council are uninterested in putting a lot of
work into the running it, including the president...
He said that attendance at meetings by other members of the Betriebsrat was
sometimes poor, especially if issues close to them were not being discussed, and
claimed that many only stand for election in order to benefit from the time-off from
work that membership of the works council sometimes brings.
There is a general lack of coherence in the responses of those I spoke to regarding the
work of the Fachkraft, for example, I was referred to his office from the works
council when I asked questions concerning the GeJStoffV regulations and their impact.
However, I was then told by the Fachkraft that "...I had come to the wrong place...",
and that I should go to the packaging and labelling department. Similarly, it was
interesting to note how these key actors perceived the role and functions of each other
in the framework of participation in health and safety. The Betriebsrat members I
spoke to had a fairly low opinion of the Fachkraft, saying that he was remote from the
shopfloor, was not highly motivated and did not provide the kind of technical back-up
they required to make their job more effective. On the other hand, the Fachkraft said
that technical support to the Betriebsrat was the main function of his job, and he said
that he identified more closely with the works council than with management, as he
was an employee of the firm.
Furthermore, the Fachkraft said that the working relationship, both between the
Betriebsrat and himself, and between the Betriebsrat and management, were "good",
notwithstanding his earlier comments about conflict and consensus. He said that the
Betriebsrat was effective in that it was the only body which could actually force
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management to take account of safety. At each of the other case studies, in different
ways, trust between worker representatives and managers was moderately high,
resulting in a certain degree of consensus as to how participation could be organised
and maintained on a day-to-day basis. At Prochem, the conflict that exists between
management and the Betriebsrat makes a great difference to this coherence in the
views of different parties.
At the same time, the Fachkraft argued that his own position as safety officer lacked
teeth in this respect, given its advisory status. The vice-president, however, said that it
was himself and not the council as a whole, which had begun to make progress, and
to be seen to make progress, on health and safety concerns in the previous year. He
said that the contact and relations between the Fachkraft and the Betriebsrat on a
formal level were both modest, given the lack of commitment of both the safety
officer and the president of the works council to the jobs they were supposed to do.
Similarly, there were substantive differences of opinion over specific issues, such as
the wearing of protective clothing. The Fachkraft said that there were no problems in
this area, with little or no abuse of regulations. The vice-president said that refusal to
wear equipment provided was one of the key problems in the production areas, a
problem made worse by the increased work pressure in recent months, as workers cut
corners to save on time39.
As mentioned before, there are difficulties in assessing the roles and contributions of
individuals in an organisational setting, and over health and safety issues, where
inherently collective matters are also played out in participative (and therefore
collective) forums. Such analysis at the level of individuals and their perceptions of
each other could carry on indefinitely, and it is particularly difficult to establish any
kind of causality with respect to the power of individuals, not least given
imperfections in research methodology that has to take at face value what people say
about each other. It is instructive, however, to look at the way this level of discourse
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operates at a tangent to formal mechanisms of participation and employment
regulation. I argued in the opening to this chapter that at Prochem, the participation of
employee representatives in decision-making was characterised by a lack of
informalism that is present in each of the other case studies. This does not mean that a
personal, informal layer of communication does not exist between works council
members, management and the Fachkraft. Rather, there appears to be a singular lack
of cement linking the work of the people charged with managing health and safety.
They are sceptical about the commitment of each other, and, in the case of the vice-
president, find themselves working in isolation in an attempt to raise safety
awareness. Such a situation can have benefits, in by-passing clumsy and moribund
participative organs. However, at Prochem, such individual commitment seems to
operate in a vacuum, with no strong role for a Betriebsrat which constantly runs up
against a brick wall of management uninterest.
At Prochem, the lack of coherence between the work of key individuals is clear and
tends to reinforce the "negativity" of participation discussed in other parts of this
section. There is a lack of extensive contact at a personal level, and the lack of
overlap between employers and employees reinforces a marked horizontal
segmentation (in contrast to the long employment "ladder" seen in Department 0; see
chapter 7)40. The dual aspect of Mitbestimmung is important here; on the one hand,
co-determination represents a floor of rights for organised labour, and I have at times
called these hard elements of the works constitution. On the other hand,
Mitbestimmung is wrapped in obligations to industrial peace, workplace harmony, and
a common interest in non-conflictual problem-resolution. After all, the translation for
Betriebsrat is works council and not workers' council, emphasising the common
ground of workplace-level interest in the success of the firm. At Prochem, relatively
clear horizontal interest communities exist (compared to the other case studies at
least), in health and safety and other areas. The central pillar of this horizontal
differentiation is the managerial policy of cutting unit labour costs, and the perceived
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negative effects on health, safety and work pressure that it involves. This allows us to
test the impact of participation on industrial relations; my research at the site would
suggest that co-determination does not facilitate smoother industrial relations, and
that disputes over issues such as staffing levels, new investments etc. become
transformed into secondary disputes over the extent and scope of Mitbestimmung
itself. There is very little agreement over labour regulation and safety involvement
practices. A key argument of the cumulation thesis is that formal, statutory rights to
information, involvement, consultation etc., establish a framework for the procedural
resolution of conflict that is too costly for employers to obstruct. Therefore,
workplace disagreement over particular issues (manpower strategies and their impact
on safety, for example) can take place without threatening the procedural and
structural matrix of participation. This case study suggests that this is not necessarily
the case, and that conflict over substantive issues can lead to a dysfunctioning of the
system of participation itself.
This focus on the particular function that individuals fulfil is not unique to this case
study, but it does have a greater emphasis than elsewhere. The responsibility for this
must lie partially in the limited access I was able to negotiate, and my subsequent
reliance on key informants to a greater extent than at any of the other three studies.
However, the relationship between formal and informal channels of communication
between management and employee representatives is important, particularly in this
context where formal channels are subject to conflict and obstruction on an everyday
basis.
The next section follows from this analysis of individual contributions to safety
regulation and industrial relations, by looking at problems of representation, and
health and safety regulation, at a collective level, mainly through a focus on the
relationship between the works council and the main trade union, IG Chemie.
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(v) Representation; the role of trade unions and the collectivisation of health and
safety
The nature of the dual channel of worker representation in Germany has been well-
documented, particularly in terms of the degree to which works councils can be seen
as the workplace arm of the trade union movement. The implications of arguments for
cumulation, as introduced in other chapters, are that this relationship is necessarily
cooperative, and that each channel thrives on the representative legitimacy of the
other, in a symbiotic way. I have argued elsewhere that this is a highly simplistic
approach to the relationship between channels of representation, and that each case
must be unpacked within a broader organisational context.
At Prochem, as we have already seen, union density is around 40-50% for manual
workers, slightly above what is considered to be the national average. However, this
must be set against low white-collar union density, which reportedly falls to as low as
10%. However, all of those sitting on the Betriebsrat are IG Chemie members, and
the works council, chiefly through the activities of the vice-president, is used to
promote union membership through the dissemination of information and recruitment
papers. The union, it must be recalled, is the main body responsible for the training of
workers, and works council members in particular, in the legal dimension to
participation and safety issues, although the formal role of the union in workplace
health and safety is negligible 41 . However, in terms of the composition of the
Betriebsrat, in terms of the good contacts that exist between it and the local branch of
the union42, and in terms of the high profile that recruitment and union business has
for key members of the works council, then Prochem may be considered a strong case
of "back-door" trade unionism whereby the union, formally excluded from power and
influence on the shopfloor, is actually active through its "possession" of the
Betriebsrat and its powerful role in controlling nominations for works council
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elections. If these were the only considerations, the union and the Betriebsrat might
well be seen as essentially one and the same thing43.
However, this tells us very little. To read off union influence from domination of the
works council is mis-leading, as we need to enquire about the concrete ways in which
real influence might be exercised by the union, whether or not directly involving
safety issues. In this respect, the union appears to be virtually without influence at
Prochem, although an assessment of the degree to which management took the
potential strength of the union seriously is impossible given non-cooperation with the
project. Low union density (when Arbeiter and Angesteilte are both considered) is to
be contrasted to an extremely high participation in works council elections (between
80-95% according to different respondents) and a feeling from works council
members that the works council is seen as an important body by employees. Of
course, popular support for the works council at shopfloor level does not necessarily
mean that the union is weakened into the bargain. However, this apparently high level
of support for the works council from shopfloor workers, reflected in high levels of
participation in elections by employees, seems to suggest that the exclusion of the
union from the workplace, a cornerstone of the original post-war legislation, has been
successful at this plant. To put it another way, the formal exclusion of the union from
workplace safety regulation means that one has to look for evidence of the union
utilising the Mitbestimmung regulations to establish a more dynamic relationship with
the works council. At Prochem, no such evidence exists, and the relationship between
the two bodies resembles Entkoppelung rather than Verschmelzung (Schmidt and
Trinczek (1991:182-188); see discussion of these terms in chapter 1). This is
reinforced by the high degree of centralisation in collective bargaining, and the ultra-
centralist role that IG Chemie, according to some authors45 has carved out for itself
in the last twenty years.
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Much hinges here on how we perceive union influence, and what exactly a "union-
friendly" works council might behave like. Is it simply the case that organised labour
at Prochem is weak, and that it does not really matter whether we look at the works
council as a separate body or as the de facto workplace trade union, because this
weakness in ability to deal with management is the paramount factor involved? I have
some sympathy with this line of argument, especially given that the Betriebsrat has
been vocal in articulating to management the safety problems that have arisen in the
period of staff reductions that has taken place. In other words, they have pursued
safety as an issue of collective representation, and have linked such issues to
managerial staffing policy in a very direct and coherent manner.
Every member of the Betriebsrat is automatically a Vertrauensmann and the
automatic nature of this relationship suggests that it is the works council that tries to
inject legitimacy into the role of the shop steward through the credibility that the
works council has as a representative institution. It is hard to imagine a major role for
Vertrauensleute operating totally independent of the works council in monitoring
wage agreements and working conditions, given low union density and activism.
Indeed, one member of the works council said that the power and influence of
Vertrauensleute had fallen away in recent years. The relevance of these issues is the
way that they reflect on the relationship between the union and the works council, and
on the legitimacy of each body in the representation of interests. Cumulation implies a
transference of influence and legitimacy which the research from Prochem would
suggest to be over-stated in the extreme. The legitimacy of the works council still
derives from its focus on workplace representational issues and on its elected status.
The union derives its legitimacy at a higher level (of collective bargaining in
particular), and the overlap between the two appears minimal.
Given the further difficulties that shop stewards have in mobilising a specific union
response to safety management, even in workplaces with stronger organisation, then
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the potential for this campaigning role for the workplace-level union at Prochem can
be expressed as modest in the extreme. A leading role for the union in the
representation of safety interests, may only be possible in cases where the union is
seen as an alternative to the Betriebsrat, rather than as one and the same thing; for
instance, where the works council is seen as neglecting safety issues, or where
Vertrauensleute have a strong and independent voice. If this is the case, then
arguments of cumulation are centrally flawed in underestimating the conflict and
competition that can exist between both channels of representation46.
In the light of experiences at Prochem, it appears that the main initiative in the
union/works council relationship lies squarely with the latter, and its ability to
mobilise for the union, on the back of the legal provisions it enjoys. The union at
Prochem is almost entirely dependent on the recruiting and informing activities of the
vice-president of the works council, and we have already seen in the previous section
the obstacles that prevent the growth of effective representation from such an isolated
position.
(vi) Conclusions
The health and safety agenda at Prochem is relatively dormant, given the peripheral
use of major chemicals in production, and the generally routine operations of filling,
mixing etc. The production departments make up a minority of the total employed at
the site, and the rest of the employees are split into maintenance, research and
development, packaging, storage, administration etc. Above all, this makes direct
comparison with arrangements at Textchem difficult, as too many differences exist in
the fundamental nature of production and work organisation.
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As with the other studies, the nature of managerial policy with regard to work
pressure, cost cutting etc., is of central importance in the regulation of working
conditions. At Prochem, more than in the other studies, safety and profit are seen
fairly clearly as disparate goals by worker representatives, although the actual
relationship between financial investment and improved working conditions is more
complex than would at first appear, as the impact of some programmes of investment
on hazards at Prochem illustrates. Moreover, the atmosphere of industrial relations is
poor, and the Mitbestimmung rights afforded the Betriebsrat by law, are subject to
intense and continual pressure and resistance from management. Furthermore, the key
individuals responsible for the regulation of safety, work somewhat in isolation with a
modest degree of cooperation and mutual trust, within the works council as well as
between the works council and managers. The union plays a peripheral role in
industrial relations at workplace level, and is even less important in health and safety
matters.
An explanation for this last point has already been suggested - that the Betriebsrat has
taken on a campaigning role with regard to the safety implications of reduced staffing
levels, and is seen, according to works council members, as an important and
legitimate body by most employees. Indeed, the poor industrial relations environment,
and especially severe disagreements between workers and managers over staffing
levels and the pace of work, seem to have crystalised the issues regarding interest
articulation and safety regulation. In other words, workers' interests, save for a vague
notion of long term investment and viability, seem to be diametrically opposed to
those of management, generating a form of horizontal segmentation not easily
reconciled with the vertical, and integrative logic of some aspects of Mitbestimmung
legislation. The dual nature of Mitbestimmung, and its relationship to varying
workplace environments, are discussed in the final chapter. The rubric of safety
participation - in particular the company ASA - appears to lack credibility in the eyes
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of worker representatives, a feeling evident to some degree in the other case studies
too.
Yet it is not all gloom; the Betriebsrat has already had successes with respect to
forcing management into providing more information and consultation, and has won
safety concessions from management via the industry accident prevention agency. In
a situation where management reluctance to play by the spirit of the law is unlikely to
diminish, these successes cannot be underestimated. In addition, out of the four
workplaces, Prochem exhibited least problems in the fragmentation and
disaggregation of interests on the part of workers - despite the existence of the
fundamental problem of balancing pursuing management for safety protection against
the need to maintain competitiveness - leaving the works council relatively free to
articulate the central issue of staffing levels as the cornerstone of a "big" campaign
against management policy. Notwithstanding this, a prominent picture to be drawn
from participation at Prochem is one of an inability of the works council to break out
of the inertia generated by a defence of managerial prerogative. The role of
management in being able to restrict what seem like straightforward legal rights is
striking. The problem for supporters of statutory participation here, is that the hard
elements of Mitbestimmung (the Einigungsstelle etc.) appear to be not so easy to use,
even in a workplace environment where they are most needed, and where most
members of the Betriebsrat are fully aware of the rights that exist. In this workplace
as much as elsewhere, there is an interest in maintaining acceptable working
relationships between management and employee representatives, and going to the
labour courts is not the first option that works council members consider. At
Prochem, the sanction of calling in health and safety inspectors is part of the constant
rhetorical battle with management to inform and consult, yet it is a sanction that has
been used once in the recent past. The only irony is that, from the evidence of the two
German case studies, the effective working of Mitbestimmung seems to "depend" on
managerial good will, at least as much as it caters for managerial intransigence,
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although this can be overplayed, as the prospect of employee representation without
the BetrVG at Prochem would illustrate. Certainly, everyday practices of worker
involvement at Department G (see chapter 7) are very different from at Prochem, with
the attitude and policy of management towards the rights of works councillors
seemingly of the highest importance in distinguishing the workplaces.
Finally, this case study was carried out in a very limited time span, leading, amongst
other things, to a relative lack of depth with regard to substantive issues, and an
inability to look at the development of relationships and safety issues over a longer
period. I have learned since the end of the research, that more younger workers have
been elected to the works council, and that there is a renewed optimism in the role
and influence that the Betriebsrat might be able to play. The vice-president writes:
..through the election of more young people, the work of the
Betriebsrat has taken on an altogether different quality. It stands up for
its rights, and is now prepared, if necessary, to defend these rights
through labour courts procedures.
The acid test will be in whether the works council can build upon successes, and
continue to articulate specific employee interests with respect to hazards and safety
regulation, and to build and strengthen a mobilising role in this respect.
This concluding section has attempted to draw together some of the more disparate
themes emerging from this complex case study. Such a context-specific analysis is
crucial in expanding our understanding of what participation and Mitbestimmung
actually mean in the regulation of safety and other matters on the shopfloor. The final
chapter looks more globally at the threads running through the case studies, and at the
various axes of differentiation with which we can organise and analyse the fieldwork.
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Notes.
1. See chapter 2 for details of the framework of statutory participation as a whole.
2. At Textchem, the changes of the business plan were intended primarily to make the
whole process of management more responsive.
3. See, for example, Dawson (1988) on the importance of key individuals in safety
regulation
4. There are well over a hundred different preparations mixed and marketed by
Prochem.
5. The main law affecting these changes at Prochem arise from the
Bundeimmissionsschutzgesetz (BImSchG) of 1990. This legislation was also
responsible for the construction of a new waste disposal unit on the site at the time of
the research.
6. As with other chapters, the gendered breakdown of employment figures is included
to give a fuller picture of the nature of the workplace studies. Direct analysis of the
sexual division of labour, male-doniiiiated representative structures etc. are beyond
the scope of the thesis.
7. See chapter 2 for an explanation of German employment categories.
8. The assumption made by the Betriebsrat member here is that highly automated
systems can reduce contact between workers and hazardous substances, breakdowns
in the functioning of the system as a whole can have more catastrophic consequences
in terms of injury and the numbers of workers it affects. Low automation, he argued,
means low risk of serious injury, but increased risk of back strain, feet injuries etc., in
the labour-intensive work.
9. And in this sense the plant resembles the "multi-purpose" chemicals plant studied
by Batstone et. al. (1987:39-45).
10. See Markovits (1986); IC Chemie has built a reputation in the post-war period for
centralism, and as a moderate union - popular with conservative administrations, and
lagging behind unions such as IG Metall in developing strong shop floor
representation. There has also been conflict between these two unions over
membership and recruitment in recent years (Der Spiegel,21/8/89,pp76-77).
11. In the same way as progressive moves away from centralised bargaining in the
two British case studies is important for workplace-level developments (see chapters
4 and 6).
12. See chapter 2 for details on supervisory board-level representation laid down
under the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976.
13. The Gesamtbetriebsrat meets alternately at the three factories, but is administered
from this site of Prochem. Several of the Betriebsrat members at this site are also
members of the Gesamtbetriebsrat for Prochem as a whole.
14. In addition to safety playing a minimal role in these higher levels of participation,
I was also informed by members of the Betriebsrat at Prochem that the
Gesamtbetriebsrat was also weak in co-ordinating the work of the three separate
works councils on general employment issues.
15. In this sense, practice is different to the organisation of the Personairat in
Department G, where individuals take responsibility for separate areas of works
council involvement.
16. At the time of the research, efforts were being made to merge the health and
safety sub-committee with the environmental sub-committee - further evidence that at
Prochem, safety considerations and changes to working methods are heavily wrapped
up in new Federal environment laws governing emissions and waste products,
particularly affecting the chemical industry.
17. A further sub-committee deals with the office environment in which the large
administration, sales, marketing etc. sections work. I was told that office safety issues
(YDUs, stress, ergonomics etc.) also informed the work of this sub-committee.
18. Again, see chapter 2 for the legal antecedents to the employment of safety
specialists, particularly AsiG.
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19. The selection of SBAs is a managerial prerogative, although they have no legal
responsibility for safety at the workplace. They are required under the RVO (1963);
see chapter 2 for details. Brief comparisons between the selection and the role of
SBAs and their safety representative counterparts in the UK are also made in chapter
2.
20. Regulations comparable to the CoSHH regulations in the UK; see chapter 2.
21. The company employs a part-time doctor (with hours prescribed by law in
consideration of numbers employed and hazards involved), with a special surgery on
Thursday mornings. In addition, a surgery is held by a part-time nurse every morning,
and there are four named first-aiders amongst the workforce.
22. I would further suspect that insecurity over redundancy (although no compulsory
redundancies have been made at Prochem), and the increased workload falling on
individual workers, has meant that the time off taken following accidents has been
squeezed.
23. I obtained accident distribution statistics via the minutes of ASA meetings.
24. See health and safety material available on a nationwide, industry-specific basis in
chapter 2.
25. Or government driven strategy in the case of Department B (see chapter 6).
26. The other major area of investment in recent years has been the new Entsorgung
(waste disposal) department, necessary under Federal environmental regulations.
27. This situation is accentuated by the problems both of recruitment articu1arly for
skilled positions) and of labour turnover, which was also said to have increased
sharply. An example of such a problem just prior to the research was the employment
of a number of people from the former DDR, many of whom left after a short time,
"...because of the demands of the job and the pace of work compared with
experiences in the old communist system...", according to the safety officer.
28. cf. my earlier comments about the case of the fire alarms being deactivated in a
part of the plant.
29. An analogy would be when a chocolate bar gets stuck in an automatic vending
machine and fails to fall to the tray at the bottom.
30. This is not the same as a definite increase in job discretion and autonomy itself,
which does not appear to form the basis of any of the company's employment and
personnel policies.
31. The recipes often involve comparisons with colour charts, leading, according to a
Betriebsrat member, to a high degree of personal variation in the methods used to
arrive at the end products. This is similar to the comments of the safety officer at
Textchem, who emphasised the extent to which individuals took control of a
particular batch and had their own slight variations on what, on the surface, appeared
to be fully standardised operating procedures (Textchem, of course, being a more
highly integrated, and automated, production unit, certainly within the flake
department).
32. c.f. the moves by management to introduce more compulsory overtime without
the consent of the works council, mentioned later in this chapter.
33. This state of affairs means that the burden of financial difficulty, in terms of a
more hazardous working environment, has fallen on employees in a very direct way,
reinforcing the comments of Moore (1991:11), discussed in chapter 1. This would
also support the argument that there is a counter-cyclical relationship between
financial success of a firm and the generation of hazards and accidents. For a fuller
discussion, see Nichols (1989: 538-540).
34. The internal safety committee has no Mitbestimmung rights as a sub-committee of
the works council, so formally everything has to be approved by a full sitting of the
Betriebsrat.
35. See for example, Poole,1986 and Streeck,1984.
36. A term used by Maclnnes (1985).
37. This Fachkraft left Prochem shortly after the completion of the research.
38. My key informant.
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39. On a tour of the factory, my key informant had to pull several workers up on
regulations over clothing and protective equipment. My presence on the tour could
obviously have had an effect on his decision to do this.
40. And in marked contrast also to the arguments of Fox (1978) who characterised
German social stratification as essentially vertical in nature.
41. The works council had recently organised a seminar run by a member of IG
Chemie's national executive in Hannover, although from my research, this appeared
to be the only input from the union in health and safety affairs outside of participation
on training courses for Betriebsrat members.
42. Through which access to the company was negotiated.
43. A section of the (redundant) questionnaire was directed at finding out just how
Arbeiter distinguished between the two bodies.
44. There was even a high turnout in the pre-works council election to determine
whether all sections of the workforce would participate in the same election, or
whether separate elections would be held for the two employment groups (Arbeiter
and Angestelite). This ended in a "yes" vote for everyone participating in the same
election, reinforcing the perception of the works council as a unitary representative
body, perhaps supplanting the need to strengthen "horizontal" trade union
representation (again, see Fox,1978) at Prochem.
45. Markovits: 1975, for example.
46. An interesting and recent incidence of conflict between the workplace-level union
organisation and the national union in the German chemical industry is recounted in
Der Spiegel (8/8/l988,p80). The union expelled 11 members of a shop stewards
committee after it put forward its own list of nominations for supervisory board
election, in contravention of union rules. The disagreement between the two levels of
union organisation focused on the perceived leniency with which the national union
had treated negotiations over workplace safety and the 35-hour week. In subsequent
elections the split resulted in DAG nominations winning out over IG Chemie favoured
candidates. This example, whilst not directly affecting the works council, does
indicate the caution with which we must approach the assumption that
Mitbestimmung leads to a coherence in the strategy of unions at different levels. It
also lends support to the argument of Markovits (see above) concerning the reputation
of IG Chemie for centralisation.
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Chapter 6
Department B; a British local authority.
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(i) Introduction
This chapter looks at participation in health and safety in the local authority of a
medium-sized industrial city in England. It is unusual in comparison with the other
case studies in that interviews with management rather than trade union
representatives have been at the centre of the research. The main reason for this has
been the refusal of the TGWU trade union official in Department B to speak with
me 1 , leaving it to management to arrange ad hoc meetings with safety representatives
at departmental level. I did, however, speak at length with the senior NUPE official in
the council, with whom I was able to discuss participation and health and safety from
a council-wide perspective.
Department B is a City Engineers Department, similar in many ways to the
department studied in the German public sector study. It is responsible for roads
(construction and repair), sewers, street lighting etc., and up until a year before the
research had also carried out refuse collection, now transferred to a different
department. The similarities with Department G do not end there. As with the German
study, there is no simple unitary workplace to focus on, and therefore participation in
health and safety regulation takes place at distinct locales, separated both horizonta11i
and vertically from other departments and the different levels at which a large local
authority operates. Therefore, this chapter addresses key issues in health and safety
involvement at both departmental and council-wide level as appropriate, and as will
emerge, the character of participation varies greatly between the levels involved2.
However, there are also important differences between the two public sector
workplaces. The background of changes to public sector employment in the last
decade is more evident than in the case of Department G, and the German local
authority as a whole. As in that study, a comprehensive analysis of public sector
politics is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the introduction of measures by
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the government designed to stimulate private-sector type competition into public
sector employment (externally through privatisation, and internally through
compulsory competitive tendering, or CCT, legislation 3) overshadows the research in
this authority. The degree to which CCT4 has been introduced with enthusiasm or
opposition from management, as well as the changes both in work pressure-related
safety problems, and in the relationship between management and workers itself,
form cornerstones of the subsequent analysis. Of course, the following sections of the
chapter will deal with these issues more directly, but it is important to place the whole
case study in this context of a re-negotiation of public sector employment.
Section (iii) looks at CCT and the changes that have occurred directly and indirectly
because of it. In particular, I look at the way in which perceptions of the relationship
between safety hazards and CCT have evolved in recent years. This involves the
particular position that unions and various levels of management have found
themselves in regarding the process of competition for tenders, and the changes to
everyday employment relations between the two parties. This section then goes on to
look at how job control has been affected by the introduction of CCT, and at the
extent to which the logic of increased accidents resulting from the new-found
competition can be challenged through the retention of job autonomy by workers in
public sector jobs. In other words, how have workers and their representatives sought
to obstruct the rationality behind CCT, and with what success.
Section (iv) goes on to look at the structure of representative participation in health
and safety, primarily at departmental level, but also across the council. This involves
a focus on the role of the two departmental-level safety committees, and at the joint
safety committee at council-level, as well as at the role of safety representatives in the
day-to-day regulation of safety. This follows very much from the previous section; if
managers and unions have found a renewed impetus for cooperation given the need to
work closely on the winning and everyday maintenance of in-house tenders, then how
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has this affected mutual expectations and perspectives regarding safety? What
emerges is a complex and ambiguous network of perceptions of (and between)
managers, the labour-controlled council, union officials, safety representatives,
workers and the government. What also emerges is that formal participation
mechanisms operate in less of a zero-sum way at departmental level. The reasons for
this are grouped into two; on the one hand, CCT has acted to unify the perceived
interests of managers and workers in utilising safety regulation as a way of keeping
contracts in-house. On the other hand, the stronger source of union influence is at
council rather than departmental-level, resting on long-standing industrial relations
machinery and grievance resolution procedures.
This issue of union influence in both health and safety issues, and more generally,
forms the central focus of section (v). Union influence in the authority seems to be
quite high, far higher than in the private sector case studies and also higher than in
Department 0. This influence is most visible in the control of health and safety at
council-level, and this, in turn, affects our understanding of participation as a distinct
sphere of employee relations. In this local authority, the role of elected members, and
of political-level sub-committees, are important in the support that they give to unions
in defending jobs, and opposing CCT. This section also re-examines the obstacles to
the collective representation of workers in safety issues, chiefly through the
comments of safety representatives and trade union officials.
The final section seeks to bring together the different strands of the case study, and to
re-emphasise the specific context in which the management of safety takes place - i.e.
under the changes introduced by CCT, the organisational restructuring, the indirect
strategy of management to filter CCT in particular ways, and the determination of the
council to resist the worst excesses, as they see it, of government legislation.
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(ii) Background information
Department B carries out road building programmes, repairs to existing road surfaces,
maintains street lighting, traffic control systems etc., as well as numerous ancillary
transport co-ordination and planning functions. It has the largest capital expenditure
programme of all the council departments, because of the cost of road construction
and maintenance, although employs less people than education and building services.
A total of 778 people were employed in Department B at the time of the research,
with an average of 767 for 1990 as a whole 5. Apart from management and
administration, plus a small staff for the local airport, employment is distributed about
evenly between commercial services and technical services. The first of these are
those which by law must be subject to competitive tender, and a recent restructuring
placed them all under the same executive umbrella, whether contracts were
subsequently won by external firms or kept in-house.
There is a high degree of devolution of managerial autonomy in matters such as
recruitment and training etc. with support from the centralised personnel and
administration (P+A) department, and within the constraints of council policy on
equal opportunities 6, and ethnic monitoring. Middle management (section heads, as
they were referred to) were responsible for these issues, including overall staffing
levels and annual expenditure. This autonomy extends to the drawing up of tenders,
and the submission of an annual business plan, including labour needs, capital
expenditure, intended profit margin etc., which is submitted to the council, after
consultation with senior management, for rubber stamping at the political level. From
April 1993 onwards, new legislation7 will force the council to radically restructure
manual work departments further, extending the process of organisational change
carried out in recent years. Therefore, Department B is dissimilar to its German
counterpart in that it has no large fixed-site workplaces equivalent to the water
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treatment centres at Department G (see next chapter). Most workers are based at two
depots in the city, but spend the greater part of the working day spread over hundreds
of sites around the city.
Manual workers in the department are organised solely by the TGWU, with
membership of virtually 100%, according to a senior manager, who said that section
heads in practice encouraged new workers to join the union. White-collar sections are
organised by NALGO, with a more uneven spread of membership. Indeed, some shop
steward and safety representative positions remain unfilled in administration sections
with TGWU representatives taking over the job. The structure and procedures of
representation have never been the subject of a written agreement at departmental
level, although a senior manager described industrial relations as being governed by a
well-established grievance resolution procedure, discussed again in section (v). At the
time of the research, however, the structure of representation was being re-negotiated,
in an attempt to prevent issues going too quickly to the highest level, according to a
manager. These changes involve the injection of a layer of CARs (council-accredited
representatives) and DARs (departmental-accredited representatives) between shop
stewards and the full-time official of each union. These changes to the structure of
representation are not uncontested, however, an issue taken up in the last section 8. In
practice the (disputed) role of the DAR within Department B has been taken on by the
senior TGWU steward, and the election of these union representatives remains by
show of hands, with a management veto available in theory, but not in practice
according to a senior manager. Managers also said that the system of grievance
resolution worked well:-
...you have to go a long way to get a bad decision.
This process of specifying the system of representation was not finalised at the time
of the research. A more recent interview with a manager revealed that the system was
now "up and running" despite some opposition from individual union officials. On the
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whole, industrial relations were described as good; the assistant city engineer said he
could never remember an official strike in Department B, and that the "very
occasional walk out, was as bad as it ever got,...".
Responsibility for safety is delegated through line management, via written
specifications, from chief executive down to individual workers, of the safety
elements of particular jobs, and the responsibilities for safety that come with positions
of supervision. The assistant city engineer is the departmental manager in charge of
safety. The most commonly perceived hazards of working in Department B are those
associated with road-working on the one hand, and canal and sewer maintenance on
the other, depending on who the interview was with. Therefore, working at heights,
trench working, road safety, uses of electric equipment etc. were common responses.
The hazards involved in the various tasks carried out are, in the main, very similar to
those found in Department G. CoSHH has been introduced relatively smoothly over
the last couple of years, grafted onto a substance monitoring system in existence since
the 1970s. Problems have been met in the sheer number of substances used
throughout the council 9, and in the decentralised purchasing systems, and the growth
in small work units, and contract firms, increasing the extent of independent product
use at the disparate sites. There was a comprehensive safety inspection carried out by
the HSE just after the main period of research which managers claimed had met with
a completely clean bill of health, including in areas of safety management systems as
well as on technical and ergonomic grounds.
Also at the level of the council, there is a central safety unit (CSU), formed in
response to the HASAWA in the 1970s'°, and this has expanded ever since. It now
has eight full-time safety officers, split into two teams which each take on both
departmental and functional (i.e. asbestos, CoSHH, noise etc.) tasks1 . The CSU also
provides advice to individual departments and acts as a consultancy for particular
problems. Approved codes of practice 12 (COPs), mainly in implementing new safety
214
regulations, also originate with the CSU, and are passed after consultation with
section heads and union representatives. The CSU also discharges its safety function
through the recommendation of safety committee constitutions for individual
departments, who can then choose whether to use them13.
There are three levels at which safety committees are convened. At departmental level
there is a management safety committee (MSC), which is made up of section heads
and senior managers only. It is essentially a pre-meeting at which managers try to pre-
empt the issues likely to be raised at the meeting of the operational safety committee
(OSC) which is a joint body 14, and which meets a week or so after the MSC. Both
meetings take place at roughly six-weekly intervals 15• The assistant city engineer said
that safety representatives had also asked for a pre-meeting, but that this had been
refused on the grounds that they already had time-off for monthly meetings, at which
issues and positions could be clarified (see later discussion about the function of pre-
meetings in section (iv)). Such time-off arrangements are subject to a written
agreement, signed originally in 1978 between the council, NUPE and the EETPU, and
subsequently by all of the unions throughout the council. This agreement has been
partially revised through the re-negotiation of representation (DARs and CARs etc.)
but remains essentially intact. The joint safety committee (JSC) takes place at
council-level with delegates from each of the OSCs, and with an additional co-opted
member for each trade union. This makes the committee union-dominated16.
Managers from individual departments are only co-opted on the committee when
particular issues relating to individual departments were on the agenda. Neither the
OSC nor the JSC are decision-making bodies 17, with a manager always as chair (with
a union representative always the vice-chair, following the 1978 agreement) and the
committee tries to find consensus and unanimity on issues. In practice, the safety
committees merely act as an expression of union/safety representative opinion,
without impinging on managerial prerogative directly. The emphasis on management
devolution running through strategic decision-making in the council applies also to
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the working of the safety committees. The efficacy of formal participation
mechanisms is returned to in section (iv) as well.
In Department B there are around 12 safety representatives, giving a ratio to
employees of 1:65. I was told that generally there was a low turnover in safety
representatives, with very little competition for the position 18. The continual
restructuring going on in and between council departments makes for a constant shift
in the numbers of safety representatives, and the departments they work in. The
TGWU in Department B applied the policy that shop stewards should automatically
become safety representatives, although the reverse does not have to apply. One or
two safety representatives are not shop stewards. This has caused problems for
management, partly given the numbers of safety representatives taking advantage of
time-off for training, inspection duties etc., and partly because of confusion over the
different jobs involved.
Accident frequency rates have decreased modestly at both departmental and council-
level in recent years, although this trend has been reversed for 1991, at council-level
at least. The absolute total of accidents fell from 2185 in 1987 to 1624 in 1990, for the
council as a whole. This figure increased to 1952 in 1991. In the same three
individual years, major accidents fell from 21 to 18 and then rose to 25, plus the first
fatality for a number of years. In 1991, 55000 hours were lost through accidents. The
progressive fall in the lost-time accident rate (number of total hours lost by accidents
divided by the average number of employees), from 2.96 to 2.42 between 1987 and
1990 has halted with an increase to 2.55 in 1991.19 In Department B, accident rates
have fallen in a similar fashion. In the last two five-month periods for which figures
from Department B are available, the absolute number of accidents fell from 45 to 38,
lost-time accidents from 16 to 11 and lost days from 169 to 87, with a fairly high
degree of monthly variation to be allowed for. Senior managers and safety
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representatives alike were keen to emphasise this fall in accident rates 20, as part of a
general perception that safety is "tight" and improving.
The reporting of accidents is always a complex and ambiguous process; it is also
potentially sensitive in certain situations. A year or so before the research, the bonus
system in Department B was changed. Previously, the department did not pay bonuses
to workers on sick leave, unless self-certification was accompanied by an official
accident report, Now, an averaged bonus is paid to workers on sick leave irrespective
of whether an accident is registered. This led a senior manager to claim that at least
part of the recent fall in absolute numbers of accidents was attributable to this "take
up of slack" in the reporting patterns. This makes us cautious about taking the
improvements in safety performance at face value. Similarly, the figure of 2.42 given
as the lost-time accident rate in 1990 was based on a figure of 19218 employed in the
council as a whole. The minutes of a management safety committee meeting showed
that some managers are concerned that this was an over-estimate since the prevailing
trend between 1987 and 1989 was downwards (19456 to 17330). If such concerns are
justified, then the figure of 2.42 may be a considerable under-estimate.
Towards the end of the research, union representatives on safety committees were
calling for the breakdown of accident statistics by whether the job areas had been
subject to tendering or not, and more accurately by the nature of injuries incurred in
accidents. This follows both union and management comments that CCT has caused
an increase in hazards in some areas, especially involving injuries based on a
repetitive work burden, stress-related illness, back pain etc. 21 The next section looks
more particularly at the impact that CCT has had on work organisation, safety
problems and the changing relationships that exist between managers, employees and
unions.
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(iii) Management, pressure and the control of work
As described in the opening section, the key framework issue for industrial relations,
participation and health and safety in Department B is the introduction of competitive
tendering for services carried out. This is an extremely complex field. For the
purposes of this chapter, the main focus is on the extent to which the ideological
impulse behind CCT has translated into substantive changes in aspects of
employment, and in organisational relationships22. Again, a precise exegesis of the
ideology and practice of government legislation in the public sector is beyond the
scope of this thesis. I characterise such an ideology in simple terms, as an attempt to
inject competition, modelled on an ideal-type borrowed from the private sector, into
public sector employment23, a competition between service delivery units in both
sectors in the tendering of contracts, stimulating price competition etc. For us, this
broad statement divides into two areas, which are treated separately in this chapter.
Firstly, I look at how the processes of competitive tendering have changed
perceptions of employee-management relationships, as well as at the role that
managers have played in obscuring/filtering the implementation of CCT. Following
from this, I look at how CCT, and the intervention of managers in its application, has
changed perceptions of hazards and working practices, both in Department B and in
other departments of the council. The section ends by drawing together the disparate
effects that CCT implementation has had. In the conclusion, an attempt to understand
the processes involved in an organisational response to CCT is made, in the context of
issues discussed in other sections.
The assistant city engineer put CCT implementation in the following terms:-
It is the job of local authorities to defend working conditions,...there
are plenty of firms in the private sector who will force conditions
down, simply in an attempt to compete on price.
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He was keen to stress that this defence of working conditions in this local authority
was done strictly in accordance with the letter of the law 24, and that no collusion took
place between employers charged with the tendering of contracts. Rather, he
emphasised that the council is merely seeking to implement a policy, which was to:-
use its own employees wherever possible,.. .much in the same way that
a University seeks to employ its own lecturers.
He claimed that in Department B, no contract had been lost to the private sector:-
..apart from those which the department wanted to lose anyway,...
and no money has been wasted, at a managerial level, on trying unsuccessfully to win
contracts in-house. The ways in which the policy of employing in-house labour is
carried out is indicative of the particular power that middle and senior management
have in filtering the impact of CCT to suit organisational needs. The council has
drawn up a register of approved contract firms, many of whom win contracts on a
regular basis, and exclude others from consideration. I asked on what criteria such
exclusion was made. The assistant city engineer said that the scale of work involved
was used to filter out some (smaller) firms, and economic viability is used as a
criterion, particularly when long-term contracts are involved, and where a department
cannot risk a firm pulling out through bankruptcy. Of course, the obverse of this is
that in-house tenders have the built-in advantage of economic permanence. Further
screening takes place over ethnic monitoring and the monitoring of equal opportunity
practices of firms seeking to win contracts.
A council safety officer said that another key area where CCT is subject to managerial
discretion is approved codes of practice (COPs). Highly detailed COPs exist for most
areas of manual work in the council, with many existing primarily with regard to
safety, where existing job training is insufficient to maintain safety standards or
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eliminate risks. An example he gave was the numerous jobs in maintaining roofs in
the building services department, jobs subject to CCT legislation. A COP in this area
made full scaffolding, including horizontal platform rigging etc., compulsory.
Thereafter, compliance with approved COPs is made a condition of acceptance for
tenders, this time using safety as an indirect way of advantaging in-house contract
bids. This process necessarily cuts across the ability of small firms to compete on
cost, whilst having a positive effect on safety regulation. Similarly, contractors were
monitored at the tendering stage for other indices of good safety provision, such as a
written safety policy (which had to correspond to the safety policy of the council in
certain respects); at the time of the research, the CSU was striving to raise the profile
of this safety monitoring of contract firms further.
It was also clear in several interviews that the process of negotiation in the
implementation of CCT had a distinctly political flavour to it 25. The assistant city
engineer made several references to the political colour of the council, and to the
importance of its socialist principles in defending working conditions. The safety
officer said that this council had learned a lot from other local authorities ("not just
the likes of Liverpool"), in retaining local discretion without illegality or direct
confrontation. Similarly, the senior NUPE representative said despite the over-zealous
nature of some Labour councillors' receipt of CCT and other legislation, the Labour
majority on the council was vitally important in opposing the worst effects of
competitive procedures. These frank comments by senior managers closely involved
in the details of CCT, coupled with the success-rate of in-house tenders (particularly
in important core areas such as refuse collection, Street maintenance) would suggest
that CCT legislation has failed - but this is too simplistic an approach. We need to
examine whether this competition has changed practices and relations within direct
labour organisations (DLOs) where contracts have been retained.
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All of those interviewed pointed to a mixed degree of success for Conservative
legislation although for some, the future did not look so assured. The safety officer
said:-
Not wanting to be political or anything,. ..if they [the Conservatives]
win for the fourth time, then I think you will not have seen the start of
changes in the public sector.
Employment levels in Department B have remained unchanged in recent years, when
changes brought about by departmental and council restructuring are discounted. All
major contracts have been retained, and managers seem to use contract firms in much
the same way as managers in the other three case studies do, for large-scale projects
where in-house experience or resources are limited, or for marginal activities or
services where managers are keen to shed them anyway, and where clear savings can
be made without affecting sensitive issues such as core employment levels. One of the
key changes brought about by compliance with CCT legislation has been a re-shaping
of the relationship between managers and employees, almost in common opposition
to the legislation itself. Both managers and employee representatives said that there
was now a much closer relationship between themselves, as the new reality of having
to compete for jobs with the private sector came into play. This perception of
management and workers as having a joint set of interests in defending jobs in the
public sector is not a simple outcome of Conservative legislation. However, during
the research, it became apparent that representatives of both "sides" spoke in similar
terms of tightening up on costs, and that they considered this a relatively new
development. This common approach was seen with respect to safety regulation also.
For example, at a meeting of the joint safety committee, a senior manager from the
Personnel and Administration (P^A) department said:-
the new legislation [on health and safety from the EC], on supervision
ratios, is obviously good for us, as it means we can use it as a way of
keeping staffing levels up in some departments.(my emphasis).
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Furthermore, changes have occurred in the organisation of work, although the extent
of change is contested by those interviewed. If we go back to the quote some pages
ago, the assistant city engineer talks of a defence of working conditions. There is an
implied logic here that CCT potentially involves dilution of standards, speed-up of
work, corner-cutting in safety regulation etc. He agreed with the general logic of this
argument, but also pointed to the ways in which the nature of the work involved,
served to obstruct the full application of a pseudo-market logic in public sector
employment. These ranged from the highly specific content of certain jobs to the fact
that there was a statutory requirement to provide services that simply couldn't be
sacrificed if uneconomic.
Safety representatives were consistent in their claims that work had definitely got
appreciably harder in recent years, and that workers now had to deal with reduced job
security and the need to defend jobs through keeping costs down 26. Further, this
change was greeted positively by the safety representatives, who said that in the past,
workers didn't really have to work that hard at all. One of them said:-
My grandad and father worked here,. ..it was almost a job for life, and
when I started I thought my kids and grand-kids would be able to do
the same, but its all changed. Mind you, its not such a bad thing,. ..now,
you just have to do a full day's work. The full day's work is now more
the rule than the exception.
Having to tender for contracts has brought some attempts at increased workloads,
such as when managers increased the number of houses on each refuse collection
round some years before the research was carried out. However, there were further
obstacles to cost cutting on jobs carried out by Department B. One shop steward and
safety representative said:-
In this department, most jobs involve transport to and from sites all
over the city,. ..it is hard to speed those jobs up unless you ask a driver
to deliberately break the speed limit.
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Similarly,
two years ago they [management] decided to reduced the timing of the
bin rounds,...this led to rubbish strewn around the place, and they had
to send a back-up team to clear up the mess, so that it cost more in the
long-run.
It is not just aspects of the jobs themselves which seem to obstruct the injection of
competitive practices. This example of the poorly carried out bin round is not simply
a question of the task of refuse collection but of how workers respond to it. Workers
are pro-active in retaining discretion and autonomy in the carrying out of tasks,
(particularly when a contract has been won and is safe for the next year), and
increases in the level of refuse spilled or left is a possible indicator of this 27. Such
discretion is arguably less easily shaken in a public sector setting. The example above
is indicative of how a statutory requirement to ensure refuse collection, coupled with
an ability to fight off private sector competition in the tendering process, gives
workers a good deal of autonomy and "freedom" to dictate the pace of work.
However, it cannot be assumed that workers go on from this to take jobs easy and to
protect their own health.
A middle manager in Department B said that a COP had been approved stating that
workers must carry no more than two bin bags in front of them, wearing protective
gloves, so as to avoid the hazards of glass, metal, syringes etc., around the neck and
back area. He said that despite the fact that the workers were not on piece rates, and
despite this strict COP, some workers still handled six bags at a time, slung around
the back, in an attempt to finish the round and go home. This resulted in more
injuries, including a worker receiving a small amount of insulin and having to go to
hospital. This raises the interesting prospect that a high degree of job control and
autonomy, may give workers an ability to dictate (partially at least) the pace of work
with somewhat paradoxical results for accidents and safety. The real picture is, of
course, more involved than this, as the pressure to work hard (and dangerously) to
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finish a job may have many causes, not least the drudgery of collecting refuse. Of
course, this allows managers to point the finger of blame at individual ignorance and
the flouting of regulations as much in Department B as in the other case studies. One
middle manager claimed that "... 80-85% of accidents are down to individual
negligence.
Common to the other case studies was the experience of worker representatives also
blaming workers for accidents in Department B. Safety representatives saw a large
part of their job as involving the policing of individual workers, rather than positive
representation of workers against managers. Managers also saw this degree of job
control, coupled with the possession of skills in certain areas, as the main difficulty
confronted in the implementation of CoSHH. A section head in Department B said:-
.try telling a bloke who has been tarmacing for twenty years what the
CoSHH assessments are and that the way he does his job has to
change.
A safety representative said that he had had to undergo re-training on his job working
a crane. He said that this was unnecessary as he had been working on it for 8 years
without any certificate or formal qualification, and that he knew as much, if not more,
about how to use it than any potential trainer. The increasing regulation of safety
through CoSHH, and through the introduction of a permit to work system in some
areas of Department B, therefore confronts established practice and job control in a
complex way. In particular, at a "global" level within this case study, union and
managers hold the similar view that it is competitive tendering, with pressures on job
times, staffing levels etc., that represents the main problem for safety regulation.
In Department B, the safety representatives claimed that the savings necessary to
reduce costs and to ensure competitiveness against external tenders, had been made
through the taking up of slack in the working day, mentioned above, and through a
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certain amount of rationalisation, such as in the purchasing policy 28. In commonly
agreeing that work was now harder, the safety representatives were confirming that
CCT legislation, whilst failing to take important contracts into the private sector and
to the lowest bidder, has changed the atmosphere and pressure of work within the
council. This has occurred in a partial and uneven way, and it has had a differential
impact across the council. The senior NUPE representative said that there had been
considerable extra work pressure imposed on cleaners in the education department.
There, although the contract had been retained by the existing workforce, his
members were now:-
simply having to do more work, in the same or even less time than
before.
This has lead to an increase in the incidence of repetitive strain injury (RSI), as the
diameter of the polishers used on buffing machines had been increased from 9"-12 to
around 16"-18", making the machines heavier, involving much more vibration and
requiring greater strength. In addition, fewer cleaners meant that the buffing machines
had to be used for longer periods by each cleaner. This represents a clear link between
the need to reduce costs to compete with tenders from private sector firms on the one
hand, and an increase in accidents and ill-health on the other. Similarly, whilst
pointing to a generally positive trend in the reduction of accidents in Department B,
the assistant city engineer said that CCT had indirectly led to an increase in the
general pace of work, and to problems caused by stress and repetitive tasks, such as
backache etc. (see section on accident statistics above). A representative for the CSU
also suggested a link between the poorer safety figures for 1991, and the long-term
effects of CCT, during a meeting of the JSC.
Therefore, it would seem inappropriate to talk in simple terms of the impact of CCI'
on employee relations and on safety regulation in Department B and the council.
Perhaps most obviously, CCT represents a set of changes within an already complex
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framework of public sector employment. The safety officer said that the reasons for
this imperfect implementation of competitive processes lay in the nature of the public
sector itself:-
In my last job,...[safety officer in the car indusiry], people were very
much driven by the track; here, once a contract has been won, there is
still truth in the idea that work pressure is less.
One could always speculate as to how competitive mechanisms could be made to
work more effectively in local authorities. The sentiments of managers, however,
would appear to suggest that the lack of a genuinely external, and therefore
competitive, product market provides a resilient obstacle. This is not just an academic
matter; the way in which management choose to manage, and the pressure that
management decisions puts on workers, is of central importance to the whole study.
In Department B, workers are having to work harder, and in some cases this appears
to be reflected in increased rates for accidents and/or physical stress-related injury.
However, the reasons for this are not simple to define. A further factor mentioned by
some managers and a safety representative was the payment system. Agreement was
reached in national negotiations two years or so before the research, to remove the
ceiling on bonus payments, at the request of union representatives 29. A safety
representative said that this had led to workers working longer and faster in order to
take advantage of bonuses. In the past, reportedly, the end of the working day would
involve a natural slow-down as the bonus ceiling was reached. This is not to argue
that -choice of bonus system may not, in other circumstances, be a part of the whole
process of competition for contracts as local managers seek to link bonuses to
productivity, or to the retention of skilled workers etc. However, in this instance, it is
national bargaining which regulates bonus schemes, involving in this case the
apparent increase in the pace of work without necessarily the reduction of costs being
an intention, and with the trade union directly involved in pursuing the removal of
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bonus ceilings. This also further muddles the waters surrounding the supposed natural
role of unions in protecting working conditions, although a broader analysis of wage
trends in public sector manual work is needed before jumping to conclusions, so that
the background to this change in bonus payment policy at national level could be
better understood.
To sum up here, CC!' has been, at best, partially successfully in modelling public
sector employment on private sector price competition. Managers seem to have a
relatively wide berth in the tendering process, and in drawing up criteria which seem,
directly or indirectly, to advantage DLOs. Furthermore, the impact of CCT has been
uneven - with some groups of workers affected more than others, and with workers
retaining a high degree of autonomy and job control in Department B. Whilst the
bonus system is commonly blamed for the increase in the pace of work more than
CCT is, changes in the payment of bonuses whilst an employee is sick in Department
B are also argued to have reduced reported accidents in recent years. In an instance
from another department, the issue of contractors was raised in much the same way as
at Textchem. A contract firm was used for some building work in the education
department. For workers already employed there, the safety implications did not lie in
the threat that the use of contractors made to their own jobs (thereby, as the logic
implies, forcing them to work harder and less safely), but the fact that the contract
workers were endangering themselves by using ordinary drills in pouring rain. Again,
established COPs for council workers meant that the local supervisor should have sent
the contract firm home, insisting on them using the right equipment on their return to
the job. In practice, the pressure to finish the job meant that council employees made
their safer machinery available to the other workers. The world is more complex than
the simple price competition of CCT supposes. This section has looked in some detail
at the impact of CCI' on employee relations, on the hazard agenda that exists for
workers, and on more subtle aspects of organisational practice. The next section looks
to locate this amorphous set of relationships and changes within the council and
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Department B, and returns to safety regulation in the context of formal participation
mechanisms.
(iv) Statutory participation, safety regulation and the floor of rights
This section is about the formal mechanisms for the regulation of health and safety in
Department B and in the council as a whole. As mentioned earlier there are two
departmental safety committees (one joint and one management-only pre-meeting),
and a joint safety committee, where individual departmental managers are only co-
opted where necessary, and with a 17-strong standing union representation. In
addition, there are some 11-12 safety representatives in Department B, with rights to
time-off, inspections, training etc., as well as attendance at all USC meetings in the
department. The main argument in this section is that formal participation plays a
somewhat marginal role in the regulation of safety, apart from as a forum of
information exchange and as a general sounding board for the expression of formal
and informal opinions by representatives of both sides. An important background to
this is the fact that in recent years, employers and workers have come to emphasise
common interests in the defence of jobs (and whole departments), discussed in the
previous section. I am not arguing here that formal participation mechanisms such as
safety committees necessarily operate in a zero-sum way as a point of conflict
between managers and union representatives (with the implication that the "new
reality" of cooperation in opposition to some aspects of CCT renders them
unimportant). Rather, in this local authority, the expression and resolution of conflict
between managers and unions over safety and other matters (still an important aspect
of industrial relations) tends to by-pass institutions such as safety committees. I would
like to discuss four areas, given as reasons by those interviewed, for the weakness of
formal participation. The section ends with an evaluation of what this means for our
understanding of a floor of rights in safety regulation.
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Firstly, managers in most interviews were keen to stress the process of devolution of
decision-making that has taken place in the last few years. From what I have said in
the previous section, I would argue that this devolution has gone hand-in-hand with
the introduction of CCT, and of tighter financial control and more fragmented
budgeting to accompany it. The business plans mentioned in an earlier section are
prepared by middle managers in Department B , and a senior manager there said that
his veto, and those of executives above him, was in practice never used. Management
have gone further, however, in a more pro-active way, to mirror this devolution in
grievance resolution and safety participation. The main complaint of the senior NUPE
representative was that the JSC was almost a pointless exercise, in that not only was it
not a decision-making body, but that:-
...members of the P+A department are often to be seen whispering over
an issue - . ..They do this to find out what departmental management
have ruled on a certain issue. They will then very rarely go against this
atJSC.
Similarly, whilst the notion of a management pre-meeting is not unusual amongst the
case studies, the way in which it operates is, in that it is used as a screening device so
that a united front can be presented to joint safety committees, further down the line.
Towards the end of the research, a new procedure was devised for the JSC involving
an agenda meeting a week beforehand, designed to make the full JSC shorter and
more to the point. Also, pre-meetings exist for management (the P+A representatives)
and unions just prior to the JSC. I attended managerial pre-meetings at both
departmental and council level. On several issues, the pre-meeting involved
constructing a particular approach to take at JSC, on issues ranging from high
visibility clothing (see later) to disputes over British Standards application, and the
viability of health screening for hearing loss in new recruits. At the JSC pre-meeting,
the issue of devolution of grievance resolution was expressed forcibly. A group of
workers had gone to the HSE inspectors over noise regulation problems in a
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department (not Department B), without taking the issue up with management (or
their own safety representatives) first. In this respect the JSC is to be distinguished
from the TSC (technical safety committee) at Textchem, in that it is not a powerful
body from which worker representation is excluded, but more a procedural
arrangement for management consistency, mirrored in the union pre-meeting.
The fact that the safety committees operate in this way reinforces the culture of
managerial devolution in that pre-meetings of managers anticipate opposition, and
seek to shore up internal management divisions. Such internal divisions were
apparent at MSC level. Several managers put forward arguments against council
rulings on high visibility clothing and orange overalls, and the MSC was very similar
to the OSC in that managers were essentially trying to sell official council policy on
safety regulation, only this time to each other rather than to workers. As mentioned,
one such issue was audio-metric testing, a screening programme to identify hearing
problems in new workers, thereby reducing spurious claims for compensation once
workers had been in Department B for some time, making it popular with some
managers. The council had a policy opposing audio-metric testing, running against
departmental management's wishes, and the issue remained unresolved throughout the
research.
The pressure of devolution on the problem-solving capacity of safety committees
applied at departmental as well as council level. At an OSC meeting, a safety
representative complained about safety problems that had arisen with the use of a
particular kind of caravan at the main depot, his main complaint being that they
should never have been chosen in the first place. The chair of the meeting (a manager)
swiftly squashed the issue, and ensuing argument, by pointing to the previous minutes
which told the safety representative and the section head to discuss and resolve it,
which clearly hadn't happened.
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Whilst it is likely that this process of devolution reduces the power and influence that
can be wielded by both representatives of management and employees at council
level, this does not in itself explain why the process has not been accompanied by an
increase in importance for departmental level participation (i.e. the OSC) 30. The
logic of devolution, indeed, would point to a relative enhancement of departmental
control over safety regulation.
However, a second set of forces exist to restrict the scope and importance of formal
participation mechanisms - the highly integrated role of formal industrial relations
machinery in the council and, to a lesser extent, in Department B. The role of trade
unions is discussed in more detail in the next section. I introduce it here to illustrate
how the strong tradition of employer/union relations is the more commonly used
channel for the representation of employee interests in safety issues, somewhat
outside of the structure of representation gathered under the SRSC (1978) regulations
(safety committees etc.). Despite the written agreement signed by management and all
organising unions in 1978, the expression of health and safety grievances generally
follows the contours of the unwritten informal grievance resolution procedure
between shop stewards and managers. This is not surprising given that safety
representatives are also shop stewards (on the whole) and given the perceived
weaknesses in the OSC/JSC framework of involvement31 . Such weakness helps the
shop steward function to predominate over the safety representative one, in the eyes
of participants.
On several issues, including above all the one on orange overalls and high-visibility
clothing (discussed in the next section), I was told by managers that:-
..things have gone beyond consultation [i.e. beyond the formal
participation of safety committees which had been the place where the
problems had been originally aired.]...and into the JR arena.
231
Indeed, both OSC and JSC discussions of contentious issues were shortened by the
chair, on the pretext that it was not for the committee to discuss things that had gone
into the jurisdiction of formal industrial relations procedures. This provides us with
the opposite trend to that of managerial devolution; i.e. that the expression of
grievances and safety interests has, in the recent past, led to issues moving quickly out
of Department B and to council-level representation. Thus, whilst management are
seeking to take decisions at the lowest possible level (with the support of some safety
representatives), union influence remains concentrated at. higher levels in the
organisation32. This situation is likely to be challenged by the restructuring of
representation, filling the supposed gap between shop-floor grievances and the full-
time officiallbranch secretary/local representative etc. In simple terms, however, the
OSC and JSC are not just seen as ineffective channels for safety regulation by union
representatives, but as less effective than the union itself. This important distinction
has a bearing on our understanding of a floor of rights, to which I shall return.
The third factor in accounting for the weakness of formal participation is the diversity
of employment groups, the differences in approach between the trade unions 33, and
the general difficulty of trying to fit such diversity into a simple structure of
participation. At the JSC meeting I attended, representatives of OSCs in the education
department34, complained of two things. On the one hand, education-related safety
issues were not finding their way on to the agenda of the JSC, mainly because not all
unions were represented at the agenda meeting a week or so before each meeting, and
the unwillingness of management to discuss things outside of the formal agenda,
pursuing the policy of devolution of issues to section (i.e. school) level. On the other
hand, the lack of DARs in many schools (because of a lack of willingness for people
to take the job on) meant that the new system of representation by-passed many
sections of the workforce, with members of the union side at JSC claiming that details
of meetings had not been circulated to everyone involved etc. In both of these areas,
there was a feeling that safety participation was dominated by manual unions and
232
large, well-organised departments, thereby depriving the JSC of an embracing
legitimacy. This antipathy towards the manual unions was reciprocated in my
discussions with the NUPE representative, who said that:-
...in education, health and safety starts at 9am and stops at 3.3Opm. All
tiers of management were essentially teachers, or teacher-centred, and
neither they nor the school teachers often stop to think about the
cleaning of classrooms, the safety of buildings etc...
This may seem a fairly minor point, in that competition, conflict and differences of
strategy exist to some degree in virtually all multi-unionised workplaces. It is
important here as a further contributory factor in undermining the channel of formal
participation (under the guise of the 1978 written agreement) in safety regulation,
coupled with the highly diverse and varying nature of the jobs done by the 19000 or
so council employees. It also raises the question of the contribution that industrial
unionism in Germany makes to forms of interest representation in health and safety,
discussed in the next chapter.
Finally, another reason for the ambivalent nature of formal participation in safety at
departmental level is the role of safety representatives. Managers were on the whole
unhappy about many of the qualities of safety representatives in Department B, and of
the job that they do. This encompassed a range of issues. On the whole, managers
thought that there were too many safety representatives, that this took up too much
time as they all had to be invited to OSC meetings, and all (theoretically) had rights to
quarterly inspections and the other aspects of the 1978 agreement etc. This was
accompanied by a feeling that they lacked the degree of technical know-how to make
an effective contribution to safety regulation. On the other hand, managers also
berated representatives for not taking up those rights that existed, and complained that
so few attended OSC meetings or attended inspections etc. In addition, some
managers said that certain individual safety representatives were "bad pennies", and
that they abused their function in safety regulation to take up more general causes
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with management. In general, the opposition of managers to the safety representative
function as well as safety representatives can be grouped into two. Firstly, the
maintenance of such a large body of safety representatives in Department B, as well
as of a large union presence at JSC meetings, was a bureaucratic cost, irrespective of
whether the rights were taken up in a more dynamic manner. At an OSC meeting,
management were trying to emphasise the new policy on union representation
(CARs/DARs etc.). A safety representative complained that it was up to the union
how it elected stewards and safety representatives. A section head responded:-
• ..that's all well and good,...we can have as many safety reps as you
like, but I will see you in the dole queue.
Secondly, some managers said that shop stewards confused the role of safety
regulation, making life more difficult than easy for management in driving safety
issues home to workers. The assistant city engineer said:-
• ..I think safety reps could be more supportive of what management are
trying to do. Of course, it is up to the union to try and improve safety
and working conditions by challenging management, but you try
disciplining a union member over safety and you soon have the
steward in here complaining.
Many of these experiences are not unique to Department B or this authority. The
other case studies include similar difficulties experienced in the task of taking on
representative functions in health and safety. What is important though is the context
in which the perceived weakness of formal participation is situated, and the complex
relationship between the factors highlighted. For instance, whilst managers complain
that safety representatives confuse general bargaining and negotiation issues with the
distinct sphere of contributing to safe working conditions, they also stress that issues
cannot be settled in formal participation mechanisms when the formal industrial
relations machinery has been invoked. As a whole, safety representation as a distinct
sphere of influence outside of industrial relations (i.e. relations between unions and
234
management) is not easily identified in this case study. Whenever discussing safety
representatives at OSC and JSC meetings, managers unfailingly refer to them as
"...the union side..." with seemingly no prompting from the representatives
themselves.
In essence, there is a dual tradition of statutory safety participation in Britain. On the
one hand it has been to lever a space, insulated from the politics of industrial
relations, in which management and workers' representatives can consult about issues
which they have a mutual interest in resolving. On the other hand, rights to
inspection, training, representation etc. serve to guarantee a floor of rights which can
supposedly survive managerial conflict with unions over other issues, and union
weakness at the hands of managers in general 35. The situation in Department B, and
the council as a whole, is that the legislation has failed, to an extent, in its function of
making safety an issue outside of industrial relations. Important issues quickly go
beyond JSC jurisdiction, and managers complain about safety representatives
confusing their representative role, and individual workers of using safety as a lever
in other disputes. However, this does not mean that managerial prerogative is
unchallenged, just that formal participation, for several reasons, is not seen as a
genuinely viable channel for this challenge to be made. The issue for the researcher,
however, is to uncover a more illustrative understanding of the floor of rights. When
workplace representatives have established independent mechanisms and procedures
for the expression of interests in health and safety, then is the floor of rights
redundant, has it performed its essential function, or is it still vital if hidden as a tool
for the expression of such interests? In general these questions can only be answered
over time, as the ebb and flow of union influence contra management develops. In
Department B these questions cannot be answered without a direct analysis of the
position of trade unions themselves, rather than as adjuncts to formal participation,
and to the whole process of CCT implementation. Trade unions are the focus of the
next section.
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(v) Representation: the role of trade unions and the collectivisation of health and
safety.
I have suggested in previous sections that in a variety of ways, unions are fairly
influential in this local authority. They have the assistance of some managers in
seeking to advantage in-house labour whenever possible, even though this has led to
speed-up in some areas. The unions also have a vital input in the preparation of COPs
(important in themselves as a device for screening competition from private
contractors), through the automatic submission of proposals to safety representatives
on OSCs for consultation and approval. The unions make good use of both the 1978
agreement to time-off, inspection and participation at various levels of safety
committee, and of established but unwritten grievance resolution procedures from
supervisor level to independent arbitration on a regional basis 36. Crucial in this
maintenance of a high level of power and influence is the new identity of interests
between unions and management in the new atmosphere of competition, even though
sacrifices have had to be made in the speed of work. Yet, there is also conflict
between union and management, particularly at council level.
I have already mentioned that some managers are unhappy about the structure of
representation, and the relatively free role that unions have in organising safety
participation and representation. About two years ago, the council decided to reform
the system of representation in order to establish some control over union activities.
They decided to introduce full-time officials for each union (two each for the larger
unions), and a full-time representative for each department. Towards the end of the
research, the assistant city engineer said that the system was up and running, and had
been agreed by unions, apart from one or two maverick individuals who did not like
the new system.
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The senior NUPE representative (now CAR) said that the system had been introduced
with far more important motives in mind, and with more opposition than management
were prepared to concede. The reorganisation began with the process of financial
devolution, part of the more fragmented budgeting necessary with CCT. This led to
conflict in the education department because the ERA (Education Reform Act) of
1988 specified that sums of money must be made available for teachers to carry on
public functions (trade union duties). This meant that departments had to specify
sums of money to be used to subsidise time-off and training facilities for teachers.
This led him to ask what proportion of the £90000 in this authority would be made
available for support staff unions (his area of representation), and he was told that
none would be. This led to a good deal of internal conflict both between unions and
between management and union representatives, and forced management to specify
the time-off rights for all unions in the council 37. To him, the CAR/DAR system is
intended to control union activities, and he gave the example of a manager in his
department telling him to give over his diary every week so that the manager could
decide when and where the time-off could be granted. To the union representative,
this was a gross infringement on union freedom of organisation, and claimed that
conflict over the implementation of the new system is endemic rather than an
individual matter, as a manager had put it. All of the unions have refused to comply
with the rules of the CARJDAR system, apart from the TGWU, who (he claimed)
have a senior official who has simply bowed down to management over it38.
In a sense, this dispute over who controls the system of representation brings us back
to questions raised in section (iii), about the nature of management in the public
sector, and the particular relationships that are generated between public sector unions
and management. Clearly, conflict is a part of the daily contact between unions and
managers, particularly at council level, although the issue of time-off and formalised
representation is the most explicit expression of this conflict.
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A problem that appears to be particularly prominent in this case study is of
inconsistency and division between levels of management 39. It has been discussed in
the context of financial pressures in the implementation of CCT, in terms of the
different levels at which safety regulation takes place, and also with respect to the
persistent need for consistency and a unified approach in dealings with unions at
safety committees. When placed in the context of relatively strong union organisation,
high membership density in many areas, well-established grievance resolution
procedures, and a common desire to stave off the worst effects of CCT legislation, we
are left with a complex analytical minefield.
A year or so before the research, the council decided that the usual maroon overalls
would be replaced by orange overalls on the grounds of safety. This generated severe
opposition from workers in several departments who claimed, with support mainly
from the senior steward (DAR) in Department B, that not only were the new overalls
less safe (in that they got dirty and lost their reflective properties) but that it was less
convenient to wear the bright clothing to and from work. This view received some
support from (particularly middle) management. One section head said that he was
told to implement the new policy (i.e. to discipline workers for not wearing the new
overalls) but turned back on council management saying that he was not prepared to
put his foremen in the position of sacking workers when genuine grievances were at
stake. The issue moved very quickly beyond the formal safety committees, and at the
end of the research was still undecided, although a working solution was reached.
Management decided that workers could wear the old overalls but that from a certain
date only orange ones would be issued as replacements, leaving the old ones to "die
out" as they became worn out. Similarly, new workers had the obligation to wear the
new overalls written into their contracts, with threats of disciplinary action also
included. Managers in Department B have also made it clear to the HSE that any
accidents resulting from non-adherence to the new regulations are beyond their
responsibility.
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This example is a genuine case of union representatives taking safety issues to
management on a collective basis40. No manager claimed that the dispute was
masking other issues as a negotiating device, and everyone involved agreed in
interviews that the compulsory additional tabards (strap-on reflective bands) required
by law was adhered to by most workers, and that disciplinary action taken against
recalcitrant employees in this area was not opposed by union officials. The case also
shows the ability of the workplace union to impinge on managerial prerogative, as
two back-downs by council management over the compulsory wearing of the overalls
indicate.
Yet union representatives also found themselves in difficult positions with regard to
safety, similar to those in the other case studies. The senior NUPE representative in
the education department said that he had been alerted about an accident involving a
support staff member at a school. A drain in the school yard had had the grill
removed, and after a period of heavy rain, had overflowed so that the opening of the
drain could not be seen underneath the murky water. She had fallen into the drain,
broken her leg, had several weeks off work and submitted an accident report form,
leading to an investigation. He asked her who had been responsible for removing the
grill, and was told that she didn't know, as it had "...been like that for at least a couple
of years." He claimed that cases like these made the union's job very difficult, as it
only served to reinforce managerial perceptions that individuals were responsible for
accidents, through negligence or, in this case, short-sightedness and apathy towards
safe working practices.
Clearly, the same sorts of obstacles to the collectivisation of health and safety exist
here as in other case studies. In this local authority, however, unions have retained a
degree of influence which has made opposition to management on safety grounds
possible. This is not simply a question of what the union has done in isolation. Rather,
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the particular context of forces acting on representation and safety management is
responsible, from the political colour of the council, to common opposition to some
aspects of CCT legislation. The difference in degree and nature of this union
influence when compared with the other case studies is taken up again in the final
chapter.
(vi) Conclusions
The last decade has seen great changes in the management of local authorities, as the
government has attempted to introduce private-sector type competition. The relative
success or failure of this policy in achieving financial savings has been discussed by
other authors4 -. In Department B, the legislation concerning CCT has had an
important impact, in increasing awareness of competition for jobs, and seemingly in
increasing the amount of work that workers have to do. However, this has not been
achieved without an evolution of the relationship between managers and worker
representatives, as the interests of both groups come together in the survival of
departments and the winning of contracts. This process, as I have argued, highlights
the ability of managers to cipher the terms of competitive legislation, and,
importantly, to foster a new, co-operative relationship with workers, in utilising safety
standards to advantage in-house bids.
This does not mean that the ideological rationale behind CCT has failed, as the
increased workload for many workers in the council, (although less so in Department
B), illustrates. Some workers, and especially those in peripheral employment areas
such as cleaning, have clearly seen employment hazards increase with the pressures
of the working day. However, in Department B, the conversion of cost-cutting
initiatives into changes in working practices have come up against the twin obstacles
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of "the nature of the job" (or some of the jobs at least), and the pro-active ability of
workers to dictate a working pace beyond the direct control of managers.
The new spirit of co-operation between managers and workers on a daily basis, has
not, of course, eradicated the notion of conflict itself, and I have given several
examples of such conflict. Most importantly, management seem to be trying to re-
negotiate the entire system of representation itself, against the wishes of many union
representatives. Formal participation mechanisms are seen as relatively weak in the
resolution of safety problems, although their function as a medium for the exchange
of information, and for testing the waters on controversial issues cannot be
underestimated. The two other key reasons why formal participation is not used by
unions in an attempt to force the hand of management on safety are (i) the pursuit of a
policy of devolution by management throughout the council (itself closely related to
decentralised budgeting and financial control resulting from CCT etc.) and (ii) the
existence of an established industrial relations procedural agreement which ensures
that issues very often leave the consultation arena of the safety committees, and which
consolidates the power and influence of trade unions at an extra-departmental level in
the council.
241
Notes.
1. Even physically running away from my approaches to him after council safety
committee meetings.
2. In particular, some of the material on health and safety regulation and job control,
was generated from interviews with Department B managers and workers, whose
experience was mainly in refuse collection services, which by the time of the research
had been transferred to another council department. This does not reduce the validity
of the material however.
3. For a fuller account of broader government policy towards the public sector and
public corporations, see Ferner,1989.
4. I use CCT as a catch-all shorthand both for the wide variety of measures introduced
into local authority employment by the government since 1980, and in the narrow
sense of the specific services that local authorities have had to put out to tender, and
which DLOs (direct labour organisations) have had to compete for themselves.
5. The average is used for the purposes of accident frequency statistics, presented
later.
6. Requiring all jobs that cannot be filled by internal transfer to be advertised
externally.
7. This legislation is an extension to CCT legislation, in that it requires councils to
establish a different managerial structure for those awarding tenders, separate from
the departments who compete for them, presumably trying to stop local management
from preferring in-house tenders on criteria other than economic efficiency and cost.
8. The union representatives I spoke to saw the CAR and DAR system as involving an
attempt by management to control time-off rights for stewards etc. The union
translation for CAR is the "corporate-representative".
9. Like in the German local authority, CoSHH monitoring and implementation has
taken place at council level.
10. Previously, there was a lone safety officer, and a separate safety officer for
building services.
11. So virtually an identical structure of council-level safety regulation to that in the
other public sector case study.
12. See the next section for discussion of how COPs are used as a screening device in
the CCT procedure.
13. Most of them simple accept the format recommended by the CSU.
14. The safety committee convened in accordance with the SRSC regulations of 1978.
15. Other departments have different lengths of time between safety committee
meetings, depending "..on the nature of the hazards.." according to the safety officer
for the council. Most departments operate a dual MSC/OSC system, however.
16. At the meeting I attended, there were roughly ten union representatives, two
councillors, a member of the CSU, and two members of the P^A committee. There
would be around 17 or 18 employee representatives at each committee meeting if
every union and each OSC sent representatives.
17. With a heavily union-dominated JSC, it would be surprising if this committee was
given a driving role in determining management and council policy in safety and
"overspill" areas.
18. Safety representative positions in the white-collar sections often remained
unfilled. In the administration block in the centre of town, no-one was willing to take
on the job, leaving a manager in the uncomfortable position of discharging the
functions.
19. The high-point for this particular rate was 3.86, reportedly from some years ago.
20. Apparently, these figures for Department B form part of a trend covering a
number of years. My main source of accident statistics was my contact in the CSTJ, so
more longitudinal figures are only really available for the council and not Department
B. In any case, the many organisational changes and restructuring that has taken
place, including critically the loss of refuse collection to the building services
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department, makes year-on year comparison of accident rates solely within
Department B somewhat redundant.
21. It must not be assumed that other accidents are, in fact down. The increase in
major accidents from 21 to 25 in the year 1991 is more likely to be "above" the
vagaries of the bonus payment system and the inaccuracies of reporting procedures.
22. Framing the question concerning the impact of CCT in this way allows us to
compare not only the public and private sectors in Britain, but the public sectors in the
two countries.
23. This involves two highly stereotyped models. On the one hand, the private sector
is seen as a sphere of "perfect competition", with concrete financial pressure on
labour costs. On the other hand, the injection of competition is made in what is seen
as a "moribund" public sector, rife with restrictive practices, over-staffing, a
monopolistic attitude to service delivery etc., which force up costs to the local "tax"
payer.
24. This strong response came after I suggested that opposition to the spirit of CCT
was an unspoken managerial strategy in both the council and Department B. After
April 1993, new legislation will attempt to break this power of departmental
management to deviate from the spirit of CCT-related legislation.
25. Partly owing to the sensitivity of their position as senior managers, and partly,
perhaps, owing to my position as the researcher, many such comments were put very
circumspectly on occasion, with disclaimers and requests that this was "...off the
record..." or "...between you and me..." etc.
26. This experience could not be further from that at the German public sector
workplace; see next chapter.
27. Although the reasons given at the time, that too many houses were involved, may
well also be true.
28. Including a more careful purchasing system, reducing stockpiles of equipment,
buying in bulk when prices were right, shopping around for cheaper materials (whilst
still abiding by British Standards and other specifications).
29. According to a senior manager in Department B, but not verified from union
sources.
30. Remember that the relative lack of influence of the four business safety
committees at Textchem did not stop managers, union officials and safety
representatives from seeing them as nevertheless very important and part of the new
high-profile role for safety in broad terms.
31. In response to interview questions about the reasons for the "improvement" in
accident frequency rates, formal involvement was accorded low priority by both
workers' representatives and managers. A new permit to work system in Department
B was given as a reason. A section head said "...now, part of the permit to work
system is that a worker must consult with the utilities [electricity, gas, water
companies etc.] over plans and drawings before sinking a trench or digging into the
ground. In the past, we had blokes blowing themselves up (sic) by going straight
through electricity cables by the roadside." For this manager participation was a
minor element in safety regulation. He complained that there were too many people
having time off to attend safety meetings, but that:- "...you have to do it that way, to
give them a feeling of being involved."
32. This distinction is, I would argue, replicated in the discussion over CCT and work
pressure. Whilst senior managers have been able to implement CCT in a "union-
friendly" way, pressure has still increased on the shop floor.
33. The main difference at council level is the degree to which the different unions
oppose the introduction of the CAR/DAR system, discussed in the next section.
34. The structure of safety committee in education had changed prior to the research,
leaving a three-tiered structure of departmental participation, each sending delegates
to the JSC.
35. The irony being that it is only really a floor of rights for unionised workers; see
chapter 2.
36. Disputes that cannot be settled at departmental level (nor through the OSC and
JSC if the issues are safety-related) go to an independent group of councillors, with
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no investment and prior interests in that department, for non-binding arbitration. At
this stage recommendations for arbitrators are drawn up by management, and unions
can oppose these, as they have done in recent years, on the basis of repetitive
decisions going against the union side. With no agreement reached at this level, the
dispute goes to a "provisional council", which is made up of regional union officials
and councillors from other local authorities. This is the highest level that is
prescribed, and in practice, disputes are usually solved much before the provisional
council stage.
37. NUPE, NALGO, and the TGWU each have two CARs, with one each for the
EETPU and the GMWU.
38. Lending credibility to the view of the senior manager in Department B that
opposition to the new system has been slight, given that only the TGWU organise
manual workers in that department. The non-participation of the senior steward in
Department B made it impossible for me to pursue opposition to the renegotiation of
union rights at Departmental level, although I was told that the senior steward
opposed the conciliatory approach of the CAR for the TGWU..
39. Although conflict over the Business and Plan and the vertical restructuring at
Textchem involved similar conflict between management.
40. Of course, it is not simply a case of management cutting corners on safety, but of
implementing a new safety regulation in the genuine belief that it was for the best,
and coming into conflict with workers over this.
41. See, for example, Hartley (1990).
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Chapter 7
Department G; a German local authority.
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(i) Introduction.
Department G is a direct labour organisation, with a permanent workforce of just over
a thousand people, and is a part of the city council of a large German city. It
corresponds roughly to the city engineer's department seen in many British local
authorities 1 , and the tasks it performs on behalf of the council are extremely diverse
and heterogeneous. This chapter focuses on the regulation and management of health
and safety within Department G, on the way in which Mitbestimmung co-exists with
the structures of industrial unionism and the specificities of public sectOr
employment, and on the complex relationships that exist between the Personairat
(staff/works' council), Dienstellenleitung (management), union representatives, and
Fachkrafte (safety specialists) in the execution of safety functions and
responsibilities.
As with the other case studies, an initial task has been to decide on the unit of study
for the purposes of writing up the research. Given the position of Department G
within a large city council, and given other limitations, for example to access, and the
fragmented nature of employment within the Department, it is necessary that we look
also at the statutory framework governing participation in health and safety at a
council-wide level. This involves looking at the broader structure of decision-making
within the council, as well as the interface that exists between involvement in the
management of health and safety at departmental and council levels, and at the
importance of these decision-making structures at the broader level for our
understanding of participation more generally within Department G. It is impossible
to consider Department G as a unitary workplace, given the degree of practical and
geographical separation between different tasks, units etc. Rather, the department
consists of a number of isolated centres, where general safety issues (protective
clothing, the pace of work etc.) mix with highly workplace-specific working
conditions and hazard agendas, within a system where worker participation (via
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elected representatives and trade unions) in safety regulation is highly centralised and
insensitive to such diversity.
The next section therefore looks briefly at the structures and practices of participation,
employment, representation and health and safety regulation at the level of the
council as a whole. Following from this, the section introduces similar themes with
respect to Department G, and looks more closely at participation in health and safety
at this lower level. Included here is a brief look at the accident statistics of recent
years, the nature of the hazards involved in much of the work, and the various
structural, institutional arrangements that exist for the management of health and
safety in Department G and in the council. As a result, there will be a degree of
overlap with material produced in other chapters, as this chapter seeks to apply the
analysis of formal institutions of participation and safety regulation, more directly and
relevantly to the context of this workp1ace.
The sections thereafter attempt to deal with the issues raised at the end of chapter 1;
i.e. the groups of research questions and issues drawn out of the literature review and
theoretical considerations of that chapter. A central argument of previous chapters has
been that the regulation of health and safety issues is inherently a question of the
management of resources, people, working practices, technology etc. Section (iii)
looks at the extent to which our understanding of participation within Department G
is affected by the perceived nature of both public sector employment and managerial
strategy in Germany2. In this context, the research shows an important factor
influencing not only perceptions of health and safety regulation, but also attitudes to
employment conditions more generally, to be that of relatively modest Leistungsdruck
(performance/work pressure). This emerged constantly as a theme underpinning
attitudes and perceptions of workers and managers alike to public, as opposed to
private, sector employment - and forms a central pillar of this chapter, in much the
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same way as the business plan did at Textchem, as staffing reductions did at Prochem
and, importantly, the introduction of CCT did in the UK public sector study.
In the case of Department G, the close relationship between participation and
involvement in general employment issues via the Personairat on the one hand, and
the framework for participation in health and safety itself on the other, is such that
questions dealing with the impact of legislation on health and safety, and the
importance of statutory mechanisms for participation can be dealt with as two sides of
the same coin, in section (iv). This section also re-examines the idea of a floor of
rights in the context of highly regulated workplace employment relations, and the
strong statutory grounding for forms of worker participation.
Section (v) goes on to look at the issue of the collective expression of safety issues
through worker representatives, and at the impact that the structure of management
has in this respect. In the German context, of course, this involves looking at a key
issue of the thesis; the dichotomy between interest representation via the Personairat
on the one hand, and workplace trade unionism on the other, particularly with respect
to safety issues. Part of the same discussion is also a consideration of the key position
of certain individuals in the representative matrix within Department G; in particular,
attention is given to the structure of trade union membership and representation at
departmental level, and at the way in which it acts vertically rather than horizontally
in the expression of interests, in contrast to the multi-unionism and fragmented
interest representation in the British local authority study. The chapter ends with a
small concluding section, drawing together some of the themes emerging in the
general discussion.
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(ii) Background information
The city council employs a total of around 16000 people. As one would expect, the
areas of employment are extremely diverse. Six thousand of the council's employees
work in various hospitals, making this clearly the largest single group of workers3. Of
the 16000 employees, roughly 4000 are Arbeiter, 7000 are Angestelite and 5000 are
Beamte, making manual workers the smallest single occupational category within the
direct labour force of the council4. The council has an elected leader, in this case
from the conservative CDU party, who co-ordinates the work of the different
departments (Amte), each controlled by a deputy mayor. In this council, there are 40
or so such departments, with the majority involving small departments of around 50-
100 employees. Aside from the hospitals, the largest two departments are those in
charge of Street cleaning and refuse disposal and Department G
There exist well established mechanisms for the participation of employee
representatives at the level of the council as a whole. The main participative organ is
the Gesamtpersonalrat (joint works council) or GPR, established in accordance with
the Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz of 1974 (BPersVG) 5. This body is equivalent to
the Gesamtbetriebsrat found in private sector concerns, except that rights to
information and consultation are slightly weaker in certain areas 6. This GPR is made
up of employee representatives only (who are also Personairat members in their
respective Amte), and they are elected indirectly from the works councils of the
different departments, although members of management are often invited to sittings
of the GPR, to exchange information or to take part in discussions7. The GPR
discusses issues of concern at the level of the council, and involving the whole
workforce, particularly in the area of personnel policy, and the implementation of
Vereinbarungen (collective agreements). It does not act as a higher body for the
resolution of disputes and intractable problems at lower, departmental, levels 8. There
is therefore a potentially important separation of functions between participative
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mechanisms at different levels, an issue that will be discussed later. The GPR has
three full-time members, in accordance with the regulations specified in the BPersVG.
Health and safety regulation at the level of the council has three main components.
Firstly,	 all	 Arbeiter	 and Angestelite	 are	 insured	 through	 the
Reichsversicherungsordnung (Amendment) (RVO) of 1963, which ensures
compulsory membership of an appropriate insurance and safety enforcement agency9.
In the public sector, these bodies are organised on a regional basis, and are run by
equal numbers of employer and trade union representatives, with the power to pass
new safety regulations and to police member organisations, in much the same way as
the HSE does in the UK.
Secondly, there is an ArbeitsschutzausschuJi (ASA), or safety committee, at the level
of the council, made up of representatives of management, employees (i.e.
Personairat members), as well as technical experts and safety representatives o . In
this council, there are three places on the ASA for workers' representatives; in the past
there were two, but they argued successfully that each of the three employment
categories (Arbeiter, Angesteilte and Beamte) should have their own representative on
the committee. It is important to note here that the ASA is explicitly not a decision-
making body; the law has a complex system of laying down specific legal
responsibility for safe working conditions, involving line management and
Vorgesetzter (superiors 11), and the advisory nature of the ASA seeks to ensure that
this legal responsibility is not compromised. The system of allocating managerial
responsibility for safety is highly formalised both within Department G and the
council as a whole, with specific procedures for separating the levels at which
different managers take on very specific functions; this system is governed by federal
legislation, and is particularly important when investigations take place, and when the
relevant insurance agency seeks to locate blame for accidents within the decision-
making structure. The ASA does, however, have a strong role In carrying out
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investigations in specific safety matters, and in putting pressure on management to
take action. An important outcome of my discussions with employee representatives
was the complaint that such a channel did not exist at departmental level, an issue
discussed later in this chapter.
Finally, the council has a centralised safety section, which monitors safety at a
general level, looks at the safety implications of new technology, investment etc. The
law lays down the number of hours that should be worked by safety specialists
(Fachkrafte), depending on numbers employed and the hazards involved. This council
should employ the equivalent of 12 and a half full-time Fachkrafte, but at the time of
research only had 8 in office, reflecting a general difficulty of recruitment in the
public sector. Each Fachkraft takes responsibility for a specific technical area, and in
addition, the 8 are grouped under three umbrella technical areas 12. The central safety
unit had had particular problems in employing a Fachkraft to deal with chemicals
substances, principally to comply with the Gefahrstoffverordnung (GeJStofJV), or
Hazardous Substances regulations, of 1986, although someone was employed during
the course of the research. This office carries out all of the assessments of hazardous
substances required under the new law, with very little monitoring input from
departmental level. Despite this, the leading Fachkraft claimed that a close working
relationship existed between his office and the GPR.
Department G, as I have said, is very similar to a city engineers department within
UK local authorities. It has a full-time direct workforce of 500 Arbeiter (of which 15
are women) 13, 360 Angestellte (of which 80 are women), and 140 Beamte (also 15
women), plus about 50 apprentices and trainees; around 150 of the thousand or so
employees are foreign workers. The department carries out an extremely wide variety
of tasks, and is subdivided into around 20 or so units, each dealing with specific
operations which are geographically separated from each other, and spread around the
city.
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The title of the department translates as deep/underground construction office, and
indeed a typical unit takes on a specific task with relation to the road tunnels, rail
tunnels, street trams, public escalators etc. that cover the city, and this is reflected in
the kinds of injuries encountered (see accident distribution statistics later). Many of
these smaller units employ as few as 10 or 20 people, working on highly specialised
maintenance and engineering functions. However, the three large units employing in
total the majority of Department G's workforce are a) general construction work
(including tunnels and rail tracks), b) the construction, as well as maintenance and
repair, of the system of sewers in the city, and c) the running of four water treatment
centres on the outskirts of the city. This represents a slightly different workplace
structure than in the UK counterpart, where there was two depots from which workers
then travelled to different sites around the city, with no equivalent to the fixed
employment sites of the water treatment centres.
In both the sewer repair unit, and the water treatment centres, the main dangers
associated with normal working conditions were identified as the build-up of gas
vapour and gas concentrations, explosions as well as increased fears about discarded
needles and the risk of HIV contamination. One of the key health and safety reference
points for most people I spoke to was an explosion which took place in 1979, and
which killed four people, two contractors and two permanent Arbeiter from
Department G. This accident is seen by the majority of people I interviewed in
Department G as the point at which health and safety started to improve, at which
safety issues began to be taken more seriously, and as an impulse for new investment
designed at improving working practices, particularly during routine sewer
inspections. Indeed, the responses to my questionnaire indicated a general feeling that
health and safety has improved somewhat in recent years.
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How has safety changed in recent years?14
Response	 No.	 %	 cum.%
Much better	 17	 16.0	 16.0
Better	 42	 39.6	 55.6
The same	 27	 25.5	 81.1
Worse	 2	 1.9	 83.0
Much worse	 2	 1.9	 84.9
No idea	 16	 15.1	 100.0
Total	 106	 100.0	 100.0
This shows that only four Out of 103 respondents feel that safety has to some extent
got worse in recent years, with over half claiming at least some improvement. The
most serious accident in recent years involved a bad leg injury to a worker in the
construction of a crane which led to an investigation and to new internal regulations.
The importance of the 1979 accident represents a key problem for those attempting to
manage health and safety in the workplace, the fact that accidents rarely form part of
the daily agenda of issues to be resolved, and that it is only accidents themselves
which make concrete the theory and practice of safety management. They are
"invisibl&' until they happen (even in workplaces where dangers are known), often
involving a renewed attempt to tighten up on safety and to introduce new internal
regulations. This is an issue returned to in the final chapter. As can be imagined, the
geographical and institutional separation of workers and workplaces within
Department G is important in considering the ways in which safety is managed. Such
a diversity of tasks, and therefore of perceived hazards, raises the question of the
effectiveness of structures for participation in, and regulation of, health and safety,
which are highly centralised both at departmental and council levels. This will also be
discussed later.
Employment levels in Department G have remained broadly stable over the last
decade. There have also been no radical changes to the organisation of work, or to
working methods over this period, according to both managerial and union
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representatives. This situation may well change over the next few years, according to
my key informant, as the federal government plans an increased role for the private
sector in local government employment, moves towards which are already under way
in other Liinder15 . Employment levels in department G are determined at the political
level (i.e. through a sub-committee of elected members of the council), through
annual applications from the departmental personnel office via the council personnel
office 16. A recent council ruling means that departments with more than 5% of
positions remaining unfilled are not awarded extra money for new recruitment
purposes. At the time of the research, Department G had less than 50 places unfilled,
although the justification for the ruling, that departments should place a high priority
on filling vacancies before requiring extra funding, highlights a further problem
relating to public sector employment in Germany - the failure of public service pay to
compete with that of those employed in the private sector 17. Department G employs
contract workers, usually on specialist construction work, although there has been no
real increase in the amount of work put out to contractors in recent years.
Technical change has taken place at a steady rate, and the driving force behind the
changes that have taken place has been the need for the Department to comply with
new legislation controlling emissions, particularly from the water treatment and
incineration centres, as well as the requirements of the GeJStofJV (see chapter 2).
These laws were partially responsible for the purchasing of new camera systems for
the remote examination of sewers and pipes.
The structures of participation in health and safety, and other issues more generally,
in Department G dovetail closely with those existing at the level of the city council.
The Personairat consists of thirteen worker representatives, made up of 7 Angestellte,
4 Arbeiter and 2 Beamte. One of the thirteen is a woman, none are foreign workers,
and there are two full-time members of the Personairat. The rights to consultation,
information and co-determination (whether Mitbestimmung or Mitwirkung) are laid
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down by law, and include personnel matters, recruitment, manning levels, overtime,
etc.1 8 There is also an Einigungsstelle (grievance procedure) which governs
disagreements between management and worker representatives.
The section of the BPersVG dealing with health and safety issues requires the
employer to "...work with the Personairat, and to make changes to work organisation
known to worker representatives...", in order for potential safety issues to be
discussed in advance. This ambiguity has led to several inconclusive legal battles
as to the precise rights of a Personairat in safety matters, although there is definitely
no right of employee representatives to stop production or work in response to a
perceived hazard. In addition, independent pieces of legislation over safety issues,
such as the GeJStofJV, also contain clauses which reinforce the participation of works
councils in both the public and private sectors. In the public sector in Germany, there
is no equivalent to the supervisory board level participation that exists in large private
concerns.
There are also around twenty-five Sicherheitsbeauftragte (SBA), or safety
representatives, chosen by management from amongst all full-time workers, to help
police safety regulations, monitor the use of protective equipment, alert management
to safety problems etc.20, plus a leitende Sicherheitsbeauftragte who co-ordinates
their work21 . Most of these SBAs, according to a manager, are also Vorgesetzter (i.e.
people with responsibility for some specifically defined areas of safety within line
management)22. The SBAs have a regular forum for the discussion of problems
relating to their work. I think it valid to consider the SBAs as representatives of
employees with regard to health and safety, even though they are chosen by
management, and have no mandate for the representation of specifically workers'
interests in dealings with managers. Many people I spoke to, especially at the large
water treatment centre, claimed that SBAs were an important vehicle for the
expression of grievances over safety, even if this causes problems in the co-ordination
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of representation by the Personairat. The general position of SBAs and
Verirauensleute in Department G is discussed further in section (v). SBAs are also
involved in any inspections affecting local sites or workplaces.
Additionally, Department G carries out comprehensive safety inspections at least
annually, and often more regularly. As mentioned above, there is no ASA at
departmental level within the council. This means that virtually all formal
participation in, and consultation over, health and safety issues takes place between
the Personairat and Dienstellenleitung. The law does not attempt to regulate either
the contact between Personairat and management or the content of their
deliberations, presuming that this will be issue-driven, and that the will to engage
with each other is there; the Einigungsstelle exists to prevent (essentially managerial)
obstructions to effective consultation. In fact, relations between the Personairat and
management within Department G seem to be governed less by the letter of
participation law, than by the close proximity of the offices of each body in the same
building, and the close relationships that exist between the full-time members of the
Personairat, and individual members of management, many of whom also used to
serve on the Personairat prior to taking on managerial positions. This is discussed in
section (iv). Indeed, the full-time members of the Personairat appear to take on very
similar functions (in terms of the general regulation of employment issues and of a
routine day-to-day contact point between the workers and management), and occupy a
similar role, to full-time senior stewards in large workplaces in the UK, although the
comparison should not be stretched.
The main union for all workers in the council is the OTV, although a small number of
employees are members of DAG and DBB, alternative union federations that organise
only white-collar employees and Beamte respectively. Collective bargaining takes
place at national and regional levels23, leaving little autonomy for employers in wage
determination, hours of work etc., at council and departmental level 24. Management
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within Department G, and the council, are members of the appropriate regional
bargaining commission on the employers' side, but can only influence bargaining
strategy, and are bound to the resultant deal agreed with OTV25. This restriction on
the scope that local managers have in negotiating remuneration is raised in the next
section as a contributory factor in the perceived differences in private and public
sector employment of those interviewed. The last few years have seen more
protracted periods of wage bargaining between unions and employers in the public
sector, and at the end of my research, warning strikes were taking place selectively in
public services, not affecting Department G26.
The high degree of centralism in collective bargaining over pay was mentioned
several times during the research as being critical in reducing internal divisions and
sectionalism amongst union members. Overall union density in Department G is 50%,
a figure lower than the average for public sector employment in Germany 27
 , but
partly explained by the higher proportion of Angestelite, traditionally a less organised
section of the workforce. According to union officials in the department, density
amongst Arbeiter is around 65%, and this corresponds almost exactly to the
proportion of questionnaire respondents who were also union members.
Union member?
Number	 %
Yes	 70	 64.8
No	 36	 33.3
No response	 2	 1.9
Density for members of Persona/rate across the council stands at about 90%.
Formally, the union is excluded from workplace health and safety regulation, which is
left to the Personairat. However, this is not the end of the matter; earlier chapters
have argued that unions are inherently involved in health and safety given the
importance of job control and production-led decisions in determining the nature of
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the safety agenda and the generation and prevention of hazards. The problems
associated with this exclusion of unions are discussed in section (v).
There are about 30 Vertrauensleute (shop stewards28) in Department G, whose
functions are mainly limited to the implementation of union collective agreements,
and who act as a grievance channel for wage-related issues. There is no law
governing the rights and obligations of Vertrauensleute, and they are therefore
external to the structure of participation in health and safety, in a formal sense at least.
They have a twice yearly meeting which is well-attended, and, according to a
respondent, safety issues do crop up as part of these meetings. In practice, the
separation of functions between Vertrauensleute and SBAs means that the work of
shop stewards is more isolated from health and safety issues than appears the case in
Britain. An indication of the different role of stewards and safety representatives at
the two workplaces where questionnaires were circulated is given in the table below.
First contact for safety problem?29
	
Dept G	 T' chem
response:	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Foreman	 56
Safety rep. 17
Steward	 11
Workers	 6
Nobody	 4
Head SBA	 3
Other	 3
Safety off. 2
Managers 2
No response 2
Personalra 1
GUW	 1
108
51.9
15 . 8
10.2
5.6
3.7
2.8
2.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
0.9
0.9
100 .0
20 31.7
8 12.7
12 19.0
1	 1.6
1	 1.6
n/a
0	 0.0
1	 1.6
19 30.2
1	 1.6
n/a
n/a
63 100.0
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Obviously, it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions from samples of this size.
However, the table does show three things. Firstly, most complaints about safety go to
foremen (especially, but not exclusively in the German workplace)30. Secondly,
stewards seem to be around half as likely to be approached about safety problems in
Department G as in Textchem. This latter point was reinforced in the comments of
those interviewed, and will be returned to as an important issue in section (v).
Thirdly, the Personairat is not a vehicle for grievance expression in health and safety,
perhaps partly because it is so centralised and above the level of workplace problems.
Finally, there is also a Personalversammiung (staff assembly), which meets once a
year, and allows the Personairat to give information to employees, and for a union
representative to give collective bargaining information. It is usual also for a member
of management to address the assembly as well.
Statistics on accidents and injuries within Department G are recorded on behalf of the
Personairat by my key informant, jointly with the Amtsleiter (senior manager) of
Department G. Reportable accidents (those involving at least three days off work) fell
from 52 in 1984 to 36 in 1990, fluctuating slightly in between31 . Of the accidents in
1990, 27 were minor injuries to arms, hands, feet and legs, and the distribution of
injuries across the different workplaces within Department G showed that somewhat
more accidents take place at the largest of the water treatment centres (ten), and in
sewer maintenance (nine), with others evenly spread across the many other units.
This distribution may hide a higher proportion of injuries and accidents in the street
working units, where work sites are portable and where reporting is more likely to
underestimate real incidents. The questionnaire responses indicated that dangers
associated with traffic and road-work were considered at least as common throughout
the department as slips and trips at the water treatment centres. Thirty-three of the
thirty-six reported accidents caused injury to Arbeiter. No serious accidents took
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place in 1989 and 1990, and the works councillor responsible for the report claims
that an extensive inspection of the workplace in 1989 had found '...no serious
faults...", and claims also that improved instruction procedures, as well as on-the-job
training, are the reasons behind these improvements.
This section has attempted to describe the institutional framework of participation
within Department G, and the structures and practices of safety management. The
subsequent sections each deal with a group of issues articulated at the end of chapter
1. The first of these looks more closely at the perceived nature of employment in the
public sector via the experience of those working in Department G, and at the
influence that styles of management can have on the control of work and the
prevention of hazards.
(iii) Management, pressure and the control of work
The most common theme that emerged in the course of interviews with workers and
managers alike in Department 0, was the issue of Leistungsdruck, or "performance
pressure". It is very much a "framework" issue in that it describes not only the nature
of the employment relation, but also the impact on hazards, safety regulation and job
control generally, in much the same way as the business plan at Textchem, and
competitive tendering in the UK public sector case study (see chapter 7) do. Put
simply, it is widely held that working in the public sector, whether as Arbeiter,
Angestelite or managers, brings with it a set of accepted norms which qualitatively
distinguish such work from similar occupations in the gewerblichem Bereich (private
sector). Questionnaire responses show how such perceptions extend to Arbeiter in
Department G.
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Is pressure greater, the same or less than in the private sector?
Greater	 ''''' 8 (7.4%)
The same	 48 (44 4%)
Less	 37 (343%)
No response	 ''''''s'' 15(13.9%)
In interviews this feeling was expressed both by those who had worked in private
firms in the past, and by those who had just been employed in the public sector. The
simplest expression of this is that you "...simply don't have to work as hard...", in that
management themselves are not under the same fmancial pressures and constraints as
their private sector counterparts. The deputy manager of the largest water treatment
centre also saw this absence of pressure as a key feature of work in the Department,
and in the public sector as a whole. Further, such perceptions stretched from shop
stewards and individual workers, through to the senior Fachkraft who said that:
there is barely any financial pressure on the organisation of work in
the public sector.
However, it goes beyond a question of how hard you have to work: this forms part of
a more encompassing perception of the difference in the nature of the employment
relation. A member of the Personairat in Department G put it succinctly:
wages are lower but job security is better,.., it is as simple as that,..
Very similar sentiments were expressed in the vast majority of cases, although some
Vertrauensleute were keen to point out that job security could hardly be higher than in
the -numerous world-famous manufacturing companies located in the city.
However, this perception of low-wage/high security employment feeds in to, and
reflects upon, other aspects of work. In particular, respondents saw reduced
Leistungsdruck as partially responsible for both the difficulty in recruiting younger
workers, and in holding on to those that are employed (cf. earlier comments on
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recently introduced strategies to improve labour retention through incremental loyalty
bonuses in the face of competition from the private sector 32). Similarly, it could be
suggested that low levels of Leistungsdruck are generated and sustained by a lack of
strict financial control, and market-led managerial strategies, in the public sector. If
this is the case, then a key factor could well be the low level of discretion and
autonomy that management in the public sector have in determining broad wages and
conditions of workers33. in particular, the fact that negotiated pay spines for
Angesteilte often include clauses which guarantee promotion on the basis of
additional educational qualifications, thereby denies management the range of further
options in the flexibilisation of remuneration that private sector managers might
expect. My key informant went into the intricacies and structures of the payment
system and pointed to some severe problems that it caused for management and
employees alike, for instance given bottle-necks that often appear in the pay spine of
Beamte which often leaves them stranded on lower wages than some Arbefter given
long-term incumbents higher up their own ladder. If management were to seek to
apply more competitive staffing strategies generally, then such structural and
organisation centralisation would be a major obstacle to overcome34.
It is of course beyond the scope of this research to engage with an Anglo-German
comparison with regard to changes in public sector employment policy and industrial
relations in the last decade35, although I indicated in a previous section that in the
opinion of my key informant, financial pressures, budget controls, and competition in
the public sector hadn't changed noticeably in the last few years. He did say, however,
that in his position as a technical manager in the Elektro-Technik unit of Department
G, he was in charge of allocating jobs and of staffing levels, and that this function was
task-based, explaining that he never tried to reduce the staffing levels in order to cut
costs or meet financial targets and controls. Again, it is difficult to draw out the
implications of this statement, and to verify it as representative of management in the
German public sector per Se. What is important here, is that this belief in the
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qualitative difference in the nature of management in Department G, widely held as it
proved to be, structures the approach of key individuals to the broader problems lying
behind the management of health and safety. I have argued that safety regulation is
inherently a matter of the exercising of managerial power and authority, and of job
control; therefore, it is important to test the degree to which such a perception of work
pressure helps us to understand how safety management takes place, and how
representatives of employees see safety matters within a broader set of relationships
to management, and in relation to a particular style of management.
In this context, it is necessary to enquire as to the real and imagined effects that this
perception of Leistungsdruck has on both the existence of hazards, and on the
regulation and management of safety per Se. Of course, in the absence of hard data on
work pressure between sectors in Germany, I have relied on the comments of those
interviewed, and on the questionnaire returns. These comments make for an
incomplete assessment of the effect of Leistungsdruck on hazards. On the one hand,
an overwhelming feeling amongst respondents was that reduced pressure makes for
safer working conditions, confirming questionnaire responses both to the issue of
Leistungsdruck and to the improvements in safety made in recent years. On the other,
reference was occasionally maâe to the generaX 'easesa o ctict 'cx
provision in the public sector (no board level co-determination, no AJ1 at
departmental level, no system of GUVV rebates as is the case in parts of the private
sector36, weaker Mitbestimmung rights, lower inspection rates for GUVVs than for
BGs in private industry), as well as the perceived weakness of public sector
workplace trade unionism as against the powerful shopfloor organisation of,
especially, IG Metal! and IG Chemie. A typical response to the question of
Leistungsdruck influence on hazards would be that less formal protection is
compensated for by a management that is not interested in squeezing unit labour
costs, and who have the resources to provide the necessary equipment for personal
protection and the will to do so following the fatal accident 12 years before. The
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perceived weakness of participation machinery (see next section), in health and safety
as well as generally, is not given a high priority by those interviewed. One could
conclude therefore, that the issue of reduced work pressure has a major role in
generating this lack of a focus on the formal mechanisms of participation in
managerial decision-making. In other words, when managers and the function of
management are perceived in a positive light by worker representatives, and when
workers do not feel under so much pressure to perform, then the importance of zero-
sum aspects of Mitbestimmung may diminish. This argument resurfaces in the next
section, when formal participation is examined.
Furthermore, if there is a concrete relationship between the nature of managerial
policy formulation and decision-making, and the generation of hazards, then it is
important to consider Leistungsdruck as also an issue in job autonomy and job
control. If it is true that the different managerial strategies operating in Department G
result in a perceived reduction in pressure, then this could be said to translate as an
effective increase in job control on the part of workers, as management are less
interested in developing forms of control over individual jobs and workers. In other
words, we need to look at whether reduced Leistungsdruck is partially a function of
the ability of employee representatives to make a genuine input into personnel policy,
as well as its partial cause; i.e. as the formal provisions for worker participation get
left behind, and begin to affect the nature of employee relations in an organic and
dynamic way. Again, a comprehensive answer to such a contention is beyond the
scope of this thesis, requiring as it does a different methodology and research design.
What is instructive however, is the extent to which the institutions of co-
determination (primarily the Personairat) can influence the degree to which the
workforce can retain influence and control over working methods, and the extent to
which entrenched consultation procedures can be used to prevent those managerial
initiatives which do seek to increase work pressure. This is the question of the transfer
of rights from formal legislation to everyday practice, and is the central appeal of
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statutory participation at a time when unions are generally on the defensive. In other
words, we need to look not only at the "first-order" indications of the utility of
Mitbestimmung (compulsory arbitration, use of labour courts etc.), but at the impact
of participation in increasing influence over labour regulation, expressed through
increased job control.
In this respect, a case from another department of the council is enlightening.
Management in the refuse collection department attempted to increase the volume of
refuse collected each week, through keeping staffing levels constant and increasing
the size of each container collected. This move was opposed by worker
representatives in that department, but the new system was introduced in any case.
Subsequently, problems occurred with the tipping of the new bins into the back of
refuse trucks on the many steep residential hills which make up the suburbs of the city
- the weight of the bigger bins meant that the hydraulic system could not tip them
beyond 9O. This then led to workers having to climb into the back of the trucks to
manually remove the rubbish from the bins with shovels, in contravention of several
UVVs and internal safety regulations. In this particular case, the Personairat from that
department was able successfully to campaign for the re-introduction of the older bins
(and staffing levels) on the basis of the safety dangers that the new procedures had
generated.
In cases such as this one, there are many factors at work in workforce representatives
retaining a degree of influence over decisions of management relating to safety issues.
In the complexity of everyday relations, the issue of whether the qualitative nature of
management in the German public sector, leading to reduced work pressure leading to
increased job control, is the prime mover is difficult to say exactly. For the researcher,
it Is difficult to separate the rhetorical and real importance of received notions of
Leistungsdruck expressed by workers in Department 0. What is clear however, is that
it is not just a question of not having to work as hard; rather, of the degree to which
265
task-led managerial staffing policy, reinforced (as mentioned earlier) by a system of
departmental funding for additional staff which is centralised at council level and
which (so long as vacancies do not rise above 5%) does not pressurise departmental
management from above, allows workforce representatives to at least partially dictate
the safety agenda, at least at the level of job content and job autonomy.
Statutory forms of participation and involvement are important, as the case above
highlights, in facilitating this retention of control over working methods and the pace
of work. In this case study at least, it appears that this ability on the part of workforce
representative bodies to have some genuine influence over control of the labour
process itself is more important in the overall management of health and safety than
the formal connections that exist between employee representatives and safety issues
themselves via the AsiG and the BetrVG. This parallels the experience in the previous
chapter where formal participation mechanisms were marginalised as a forum for the
involvement of worker representatives in issues of job control and the regulation of
work. It may well be difficult for the researcher to distinguish the rhetoric from the
reality of Leistungsdruck, and even harder to determine the validity of assertions that
less work pressure means a safer working environment (although common sense
would suggest so). However, the critical importance of this notion of reduced work
pressure lies in the way that it interacts with the opportunities for input into decision-
making regarding fundamental issues of control of the labour process. This is
reinforced by the seemingly non-competitive nature of management in the public
sector, at least for the vast majority of those I spoke to, which in a sense, allows the
Personairat to dominate, or at least to lead, the personnel agenda.
Leistungsdruck, however, is not simply a matter of the nature of the decisions that are
made being different in the public sector. It is also an issue of the structure of
management, and the forms of "internal stratification", and "integration" which
govern employment relations in Department G. These issues are discussed in section
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(v). The next section goes on to look more closely at the role of formal participation
mechanisms in the regulation of safety and other employment matters in Department
G and the council.
(iv) Statutory participation, safety regulation and the floor of rights
Any study of worker participation must address the way in which statutory rights are
used in practice by those institutions representing workers' interests. In other words,
how does participation as a set of formal rights transfer to the day-to-day involvement
and influence of employee representatives? We have already seen in the last section,
how perceptions of Leistungsdruck are important in structuring the attitudes of worker
representatives. The Personairat did exert influence in Department 0, and in other
departments as the refuse example shows, although I also argued in the last section
that co-operative managers, and a style of management which allows worker
representatives to dictate some aspects of the safety agenda, were centrally important
in this. This section looks more closely at the use of formal consultation and
participation rights, and at how it affects our understanding of the floor of rights 37. In
the course of the research, these issues were raised frequently, both in response to my
questions, and spontaneously by those interviewed.
Many of the people interviewed claimed that Mitbestimmung was not important for
the day-to-day conduct of industrial relations in Department G. The principal reason
for-this is the very good relations that exist between the Personairat and management.
One senior manager said:-
In this department, we don't do things so much by the book.
Everything is more informal and relations are good.
267
This view was also held by the two full-time members of the Personairat, who made
the important claim that this close working relationship between them and
management was more significant than the set of formal rights that existed for them
as works councillors. This does not necessarily mean that we can conclude that
Mitbestimmung is unimportant; rather, that it is viewed in a particular way by worker
representatives, as a kind of "shadow" behind the concrete daily reality.
This is reflected in the fact that the two key rights granted to the Personairat by law -
the Initiativerecht demanding formal responses by management to particular
initiatives, questions etc. put by the Personairat, and the Einigungsstelle governing
compulsory independent grievance resolution - have never been used within
Department G (although the latter was recently threatened at council level by the
Gesamtpersonalrat over the protracted delay in the employment of extra Fachkrqfte
needed to meet statutory requirements).
This led many respondents to claim that the existence of Mitbestimmung rights was
good and important in itself, but that they did not form the central pillar of the way
that the Personairat dealt with management and vice versa. In a similar vein, many of
the Personairat members I spoke to had an excellent knowledge of the legislation
governing Mitbestimmung, and of the rights granted to them as works council
members, whilst simultaneously playing down the importance of the hard elements of
such a system (those which enable a Personairat to put pressure on a recalcitrant or
obstructive management) in informing everyday involvement. This set of arguments
seemed important in structuring the response of key Personairat members to my
questions about Mitbestimmung. In general, all of them found it very difficult to pin-
point improvements that could be made in the law in this area. This was accompanied
by a general feeling that it was more important for Personairat members to improve
the use that is made of rights to involvement etc. than to pursue extensions to the legal
framework. In other words, the law is fine, but Personairat members do not use it
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effectively enough 38. These general sentiments about the nature of participation are
equally valid when we look at the regulation of health and safety within Department
G. They are reflected in a general lack of a desire for stronger intervention rights by
the Personairat in health and safety issues; in response to questions concerning
problems with the current operation of participation rights, it was usually the
difficulties of motivating the workforce to participate themselves and to engage in
health and safety regulation, and of making use of existing legislation which were
raised, and not specific calls for, say, a right to stop dangerous work by employee
representatives.
Two currents of opinion ran through the comments of those interviewed. On the one
hand, there was a feeling that the system of Mitbestiminung either operates, or should
operate, slightly differently with respect to health and safety issues, than is the case
more generally. In particular, there was a definite sense that the Personairat should
not have to take the initiative in health and safety matters, given the ovethding
responsibility on the part of management to ensure safe working conditions. One
Personairat member claimed that:
• ..the health and safety system would not be working if it was left to
the Personairat to make initiatives in this way.
In this sense, participation is viewed by many employee representatives in
Department G, in a systemic fashion; that is, that their role as representatives is to
help to maintain an effective health and safety system (Arbeitsschutzsystem), rather
than to represent purely the interests of workers against management in a zero-sum
sense, and to be pro-active in safety regulation39. This represents a stark contrast to
Prochem. There, the procedural rules governing participation itself were the subject of
on-going conflict; at Department G, participation procedures are an established part of
the labour regulation system, with some claiming that that is how things should stay.
The function of the works council, according to one Personairat member I spoke to,
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is to enable information to be passed both ways between individual workers and
managers, rather than to express the collective interests of workers as such. Such a
position is reinforced by a perception, held by a number of works council members I
spoke to, that in terms of the representation of workers interests generally as well as
in health and safety, the Personairat was a half-way point between management and
employees. Moreover, questionnaire responses seem to indicate that whilst formally
speaking (i.e. legally and institutionally) the Personairat is the representative body
for the expression of workers' interests at shopfloor level, this is not necessarily
translated into a strong identification of interests between individual workers and the
works council.
Which body is most important for your interests generally?
PR
Union
Management
None
Other
S*S*SS*S% 18
SSSS%**S* 25
48ssss	 8
'' 1
This key distinction between the Persona/rat as a vehicle for the formal expression of
employees' grievances and interests, and as a contact point between employees and
employers is critical in our understanding of the nature of participation, as it informs
the tensions that exist within this system of participation.
On the other hand, there was a strong feeling that formal Mitbestimmung rights would
remain partially effective (and changes to the law would remain unnecessary and
irrelevant) until those in various representative positions (Vertrauensleute, SBAs,
Persona/rat members etc.) developed strategies for making more dynamic use of the
existing framework of participation40. The respondents who held this view claimed
that there was a lack of awareness of the role of the Persona/rat in taking up
individual grievances, thus creating a gap between it and those it represented (see
table above). Similarly, a lack of co-ordination between the work of the union and the
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Personairat led to the feeling amongst some that Mitbestimmung practices were in
some way isolated as a set of formal rights, and that there was scope for more
extensive and imaginative use to be made of these provisions, particularly involving
health and safety issues. Examples given included the lack of input by worker
representatives into the pre-entry training of Fachkräfte, who often arrived with only
the minimum awareness of the complex system of UVVs following their University
education.
In addition to this perception of Mitbestimmung as at the same time both important in
itself but redundant in governing day-to-day relations between the key institutions of
interest representation inside the department, an important finding of the research was
the degree of separation of functions between competent bodies, particularly with
regard to health and safety management. I found the adherence to separation of
functions laid down in legislation (often merely as guidelines or codes of practice) to
be stronger in practice than I would have imagined to have been the case, given the
comprehensive nature of the Mitbestimmung and Mitwirkung system, and to be
unsupportive of the kinds of claims made by the theory of cumulation. Participation is
not a homogenous activity in this workplace. As mentioned earlier, the GPR and the
Personairat observe a strict separation of issues. Those discussed at the highest level
are rigidly limited to those which are seen to have an impact in every department.
Issues important to each department generally get left at the lower of the two levels,
with the individual Personairat, and of course with no departmental ASA to take
safety issues to. Participation should be seen as a multiplicity of practices and
relationships which are traceable to different statutory and non-statutory origins, and
which surface in different problem-areas without necessarily possessing a coherence
and overview that cumulation-type arguments assume.
This separation also reappears in a later section looking at the issue of dual channel
representation, whilst here it is most relevant with respect to the division of labour in
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the management of health and safety. The distinction between safety issues which
affected workers across the whole council (medical examinations, training of
Fachkrafte, safety training provisions, constitution of the ASA and other bodies etc.),
and those which were specific to single departments or a small number of
departments, was important in determining the level at which consultation and co-
determination over such issues would take place. This sounds straightforward enough,
in that problems inevitably have a certain appropriate resolution-level dictated by
the geography and severity of the hazard involved. However, this is not
unproblematical; previous chapters have argued that hazards cannot be effectively
compartmentalised in this piecemeal manner, and that more fundamental
considerations (production priorities, management decision-making structures etc.)
are necessary if a genuine assault on the problems is to take place 41. In Department
G, it seems that a central factor restricting a more dynamic use of involvement
provisions in health and safety, is the over-bureaucratised and segmented treatment of
issues on formal agendas and through formal channels. The Personairat member in
charge of safety issues said that safety was kept as a separate agenda item at full
meetings of the council, and that attempts to consider safety within discussion of
other issues on the agenda have been very limited. A more fundamental approach to
health and safety management necessarily has implications for the quality of the
participation that employee representatives engage in, in that an effective challenge to
managerial hegemony in determining the safety agenda is made more difficult if
dangers in the workplace are "boxed" and made to dovetail with the different tiers of
management in this way.
Mitbestimmung cannot be reduced to a set of paragraphs in the BPersVG or AsiG. Its
supporters (eg. Streeck, 1984) make claims about the cumulative effects that statutory
involvement has on workplace representation, and about the transfer of influence
between levels (for example, between national/regional bargaining and workplace
information rights of works councils) and between representative bodies (works
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council and union) that the institutionalisation of participation and rights to
information generate. Employers, also, have at times used such arguments about the
effects of cumulation in legal battles to limit the scope of Mitbestimmung
legislation42. With respect to Department G, the more widespread separation of
functions, representative institutions and levels at which safety and other problems are
sought to be resolved, means that the regulation of safety grievances operates within a
system which limits their expression to fairly rigidly demarcated channels. This is the
essence of German union criticisms of participation and the main stimulus towards
the attempted nurture of a shop stewards system in most unions. It also further
strengthens the complaints of those interviewed about the lack of an ASA at
departmental level within the council, meaning that safety issues are limited to a
portion of the work of the Personairat, making the transfer of influence (an aspect of
cumulation discussed in previous chapters) between levels of representation very
difficult.
The forces driving safety management into this apparent straight-jacket are not
merely external to the Personairat (i.e. resulting from the legislation itself). The
Personairat chooses to separate the function of health and safety regulation as one
amongst its many tasks, leaving it largely to my key informant to prepare reports,
make recommendation to the Personairat, collect information and statistics on
accidents and so on. His chief complaint in this respect was that:
other members of the Personairat see safety as less of a priority, given
their central concern with other personnel issues such as wages,
- overtime etc.
The comparisons with managerial de-prioritisation of safety as against more
mainstream management concerns are obvious. As we have seen, there is no attempt
at an integration of safety issues within the general work of the Personairat, and it is
kept as a separate agenda item when the Personairat sits. Such an isolation of health
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and safety matters within the key institution of workplace employee representation
cannot be over-emphasized, and it is instructive to compare such a process with the
similar way in which management at Textchem choose to isolate participation in
health and safety from other core decision-making structures (the TSC). The
complaints of the Personairat member in charge of safety issues mentioned above are
mirrored by the problems that other members had in answering questions about health
and safety at all. Both the president and vice-president had never heard of the
GefStoffV, and Vertrauensleute generally found it impossible to articulate any kind f
argument regarding their role as workplace representatives on the one hand, and
issues of safety on the other. The separation of the union from safety seems to have
been reproduced within the workplace.
I would argue that it is wrong to blame the structure of participation mechanisms for
this rigid separation of functions; rather, they are indicative of more fundamental
problems in safety regulation compared to other employment issues, discussed in the
final chapter. The evidence here would suggest that highly regulated, statutory
participation does not provide an easy cumulative answer to the problem of the
bureaucratisation and de-politicisation of safety regulation.
On the whole, I found institutions and practices of worker participation, particularly
with regard to safety issues, to be relatively distinct from one another, both in terms
of content (isolation of health and safety matters from personnel issues generally by
the Personairat), and in terms of level of interest articulation. These two forms of
separation, between the levels at which Mitbestimmung allows employee
representatives to engage with the specific content of safety management, and the
sub-delegation of safety matters within the Personairat, help to explain the sense of
dissatisfaction that the system of Mitbestimmung within Department G does not
operate with more vigour and dynamism. Further, it raises the question of whether the
statutory provision of consultation and rights to information, backed up by the
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Einigungsstelle and recourse to the (often sympathetic) labour courts, the so-called
floor of rights, would be much use at all if everyday relations between management
and the Personairat were not so good?
My conclusion is that Mitbestimmung is viewed, in this case study, in a variety of
non-coherent ways by those worker representatives involved. It is rarely seen in a
zero-sum way, as a set of powers to be used to force the hand of management in
negotiations or to glean more and better information about proposed decisions etc. It
is seen on the one hand as partially irrelevant to Department G given the good
industrial relations that exist, and on the other as a system which works precisely
because the Persona/rat leaves management to do its job. Yet statutory involvement
is still seen as a positive thing, even by management respondents who did point to the
power and influence it gave to the Persona/rat, even if a common response cited also
the somewhat weaker provisions for participation in the public sector as a fault. Is it
possible to discern a meaningful pattern to these responses from participants in the
research? In a sense, an answer to this can only come in comparison with the other
three case studies and an understanding of the highly specific context in which this
one is set. In particular, the relative failure of the formal channels of participation to
provide a coherent strategy of proactive safety mobilisation puts the workplace trade
union in the spotlight. The next section goes on to look at the union, within a further
set of factors that influence the nature of participation in Department G as well as the
council as a whole, looking at the structures both of employee representation, and of
management itself, which crisscross the organisational hierarchy.
(v) Representation; the role of trade unions and the collectivisation of health and
safety
This section seeks to expand on the discussions of the previous two. I argue that an
important catalyst for understanding participation in Department G, in health and
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safety regulation and more generally, is the way in which representation operates.
This section is about how the way in which representation is structured acts both to
limit the effective participation of employee representatives, and to reinforce the
separation of functions between Personairat and union mentioned in an earlier
section. The previous sections have pointed to the particular context in which
participation in health and safety takes place. Correspondingly, the inability or
unwillingness of the works council to establish a coherent strategy on safety raises the
question of the union and its particular place in the representative matrix. Yet in this
case study, management are also the subject of some discussion. Two things are at
issue here; the role the union plays, in conjunction with the Personairat primarily, in
influencing the management of health and safety issues on the one hand, and the
importance of a vertically organised managerial structure which mitigates against the
expression of clear communities of interest between employees and employers on the
other.
The formal role of German trade unions in health and safety matters is very limited.
At supra-workplace level it is mainly restricted to parity involvement in the
management of accident insurance bodies (BGs in the private sector and GUVVs in
the public sector), where the main influence is in the drafting of new UVVs or
accident prevention regulations that have the status of law. At workplace level, this
role is one mainly of running education and training courses for members of
Personalräte, as well as union members more generally. The key omission here is of
any connection between the selection and training of SBAs and the work of the trade
union, a connection enshrined in the SRSC Regulations of 1977 covering British
workplaces. It is only to be expected that if the union plays no role in selecting or co-
ordinating the work of these safety representatives, then it will play equally minimal a
role in the training and utilisation of this form of representation. In other words, if the
mandate for the job of safety representative is provided through management
276
selection, then there is little scope for unions to use this channel of representation as a
way of seeking influence in safety matters at workplace level.
The isolation of the union from workplace safety issues, i.e. safety was never taken
through union channels via the shop steward etc., was mentioned by most
respondents. Furthermore, many people interviewed, including the vice-president of
the Personairat, claimed that such a modest direct role for the union in workplace
health and safety was a good thing, and that union influence did not require
strengthening43. This reflects the different jobs that SBAs and Vertrauensleute do on
a day-to-day basis. Even interviewees who were both shop stewards and SBAs were
keen to stress that the two aspects of their jobs did not interact in any wayk The
essential role of the Vertrauensleute, reported by those interviewed, was the
supervision of Tarfvertrage (collective agreements), and issues like Eingruppierung
(p ay determination), overtime and the allocation of work, often in conjunction with
the Personairat who, as mentioned before, have Mitwirkung and Mitbestimmung
rights in these areas. Only one Vertrauensinann said that his job as a shop steward
should involve a greater involvement in safety issues. The issue here then, is that even
if the details of participative legislation seem to lead to a compartmentalisation of
health and safety management away from general employee relations", workplace
trade union representatives also seem to play a part in maintaining such a separation.
This all suggests that it is the strict separation of functions in the management of
safety issues which is most characteristic of the working of the Mitbestimmung
system, rather than an embracing overlap between the rights of works councillors, the
collective bargaining recognition that trade unions have, and statutory regulation of
safety management itself. In particular, the representation of workers in safety
matters, as mentioned earlier, is highly centralised with no ASA or Fachkrafte at
departmental level, and workplace safety representatives (SBAs) being selected and
trained by management and external agencies45. Such a structure of representation
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furthers the problems that unions have in establishing a representative function in
safety matters at shopfloor level, and certainly deepens the dependence that unions
have on works councils for their influence at workplace level. Discussions with SBAs
and a Personairat member employed at the largest water treatment centre supported
the argument that formal participation via the Personairat did not translate into an
effective grievance expression from individual workers. They said that employees
often saw the management-selected safety representatives as a part of management,
and took complaints to them that were better suited to the official channel of
representation (the Personairat).
To pause for a moment; the key issue here is the processes by which safety is or is not
collectivised in the articulation of interest representation. I have argued that the union
must always come under the microscope in this respect, given the inherent link
between job control, managerial policies and the prevention of accidents and the
control of hazards. In the context of the German system of Mitbestimmung, the works
council must also form part of this analysis, although the evidence here suggests that
the impact of legislation which clearly prescribes a separation of functions between
the dual channels of representation is to keep the union out of workplace affairs, and
to limit the scope for an expansion in the way in which worker representation via the
Personairat can be used as a vehicle for the expression of a coherent critique of
management policy on safety. This is true in both of the sectors studies, although the
broader framework of managerial control and socio-economic pressure appears to
play a vital role in how the safety interests of workers are articulated and represented.
In Department G, this is reinforced by a general perception of union weakness; many
shop stewards claimed that most union members were fairly uninterested, and that
interest in union matters (represented in a low uptake of shop stewards positions) was
poor, despite a higher than average union density amongst Arbeiter.
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One union representative said:-
..it is a constant struggle to show Arbeiter that the union means
anything; wage increases seem automatic and not to depend on being a
union member..,
and shop stewards complained generally about the fact that many workers were free-
riding, in taking the benefits of union membership without paying dues and getting
involved. This is not unique to German trade unions, as examples of frustration
directed by worker representatives against workers as individuals crop up in each case
study; however, it does force us to re-examine the representative relationships that
exist between the works council and the union.
What is at issue here? I have argued in previous chapters that the expression of safety
interests on the part of workers is potentially always a collective issue, and that as
representative bodies, trade unions must form part of this equation. In other v'ords, if
unions do not express collective safety concerns, then why not? What is stopping
them, if anything? In Department G, the conditions for such an expression of
collective safety interests are good, given co-operative management and given the
framework of participative legislation. What obstructs this however, is the separation
between the safety functions of the Personairat at departmental level, and the ASA
and Fachkrafte at council level on the one hand, and the demarcation between
Personairat and union as first order representative institutions in the workplace.
In the case of Department G, it is also an ambiguous relationship with the Personairat
that seems to obstruct a more campaigning role for the union. The union appears to
fmd itself in the position of dependency on the resources and institutional advantages
of the works council, and cannot lever a specific trade union approach to workplace
health and safety matters (as opposed to national-level parity involvement) without
strengthening this dependency. The lack of a clear notion of interest representation is
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reflected in questionnaire responses to the question "who best represents you interests
in safety?". This table can be compared to the one earlier in this chapter in response to
a more general question concerning representation; it is clear that safety is not
perceived by workers as an issue which either their elected workplace representatives,
or their trade union, can/should mobilise around. Furthermore, there is no significant
variation in responses to this question when union membership is controlled for, with
union members, if anything, more likely to cite management as more representative of
their interests in safety. 	 -
Which body is most important for your interests in health and safety?
PR' * * *	
' 18
Union ''"'''' 14
N 'ment	 '. S S S S S * S S S S * * * * S S S S S S S S S S S S S 55555*55
None	 '''s
Other ' 2
The role of the general nature of trade unionism in Germany is important here. In
general terms, trade unions have been weaker at plant level than in centralised
bargaining situations. This has, in turn, helped to develop strategies of interest
representation which themselves are more centralised, articulated at regional and
national levels, and engender a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the workplace
and with representative functions at that level46.
The issue here, as mentioned above, is the confused role for the Personairat as on the
one hand a mid-way between employees and management (in terms of day-to-day
contact, and in terms of the information-flow function it performs) operating, on the
other hand, within a system of Mitbestimmung which sees it, in a legal sense at least,
as the representative of workers in dealings with management. Similarly, the
relationship between the Personairat and the union is somewhat difficult to simplify;
obligations to industrial peace, and the secrecy of some information, mean that the
Personairat cannot simply act as a workplace trade union, and is restricted in the use
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it can make of privileged access to consultation and involvement. In this sense, the
apparatus of Mitbestimmung appears as much an obstacle to the expression of clear
communities of interest, particularly in health and safety matters, as a set of
opportunities. Furthermore, we need not assume that unions are always the natural
constituency for the expression of safety grievances. I showed in section (iii) that
there is a distinct perception of public sector management as being different to that in
private industry. In this context, perhaps the union cannot expect to be the place that
workers take safety matters to, when a strong and seemingly sympathetic
management are first in line.
Also important in drawing out the specificity of the representation matrix is the
particular structure of management itself within Department G and the council. In a
sense, management in Department G are able to "invade" the sphere of employee
representation, through the joint operation of two factors. One is highly centralised
industrial unionism, which makes it commonplace for senior members of
management to be trade union members. In this city council, such a membership
ladder stretches as far as the conservative Bürgermeister himself. Several of the
Fachkr4fte were also members of OTV. In Britain, union membership also nominally
extends to middle levels of management47, although it would be highly unusual for
management to be members of the TGWU or GMB, for example. The other reason
may be more specific to this workplace, and concerns the location of several major
representative and safety functions in one man (my key informant). Again, it would
be unlikely that in the UK a manager would be at the same time an activist in the
union which organises manual workers, and an elected workers representative in a
consultation committee - as well as being a safety representative. This is what the
structural parameters of Mitbestimmung and industrial unionism appear jointly to
allow, although as we have seen, this does not automatically mean that the safety
interests of workers are put at the centre of the works council agenda.
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He spoke of the problems that such a situation caused, mainly in establishing
priorities on the way he spent his time. However, being at the centre of the
representative matrix also allowed him to do his job more effectively, and to be able
to keep regular contact with so many other parts of the organisation. Leistungsdruck
may also be a key factor at play here. The common perception that the function of
management in the public sector involves less of a desire to cut labour costs and
improve productivity, appears to generate legitimacy for his position at least, and
possibly of management vis a vis health and safety generally48.
It is also the case that this verticalism in interest representation (the ladder of union
membership as well as the overlap between employers and workers, for example in
the fact that virtually everyone is eligible for election to the Personairat) helps to
generate the crisis of (union) representation that some Vertrauensleute spoke of. It
generates an ideology of involvement which certainly does not rest easily with a
conflict model of industrial relations, but which instead enmeshes the institutions of
participation at workplace level with the function of management itself 49, and makes
it even more difficult for the union to convince the unconvinced that union
membership would be productive and rewarding. This is summed up by the deputy
manager of the largest water treatment centre 50:-
...if we ask the opinions of the leitende Sicherheitsbeauftragte about,
say, the safety implications of some construction work, then how does
he speak to us? As a union member? As a Personairat member? As a
safety specialist?...
In conclusion, the structure of representation in Department G, and beyond, has an
enabling effect on the way in which participation operates, and the patterns that
develop in the management of health and safety. In particular, the vertical structure of
union membership, coupled with an expansive notion of eligibility to stand as a
Personairat member, helps to stimulate a perception of management as being
something very much short of "the enemy". Developments at national political level
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may help to explain why workers and management in the public sector in Germany
have been able to maintain these relatively cordial relations in a difficult era for the
public services. What this shows us however, is that Mitbestimmung has a lot more to
it than the letter of the law. Participation takes place within a network of existing
(representative) relationships, and modus operandi, which give it a reality beyond the
formalism of legislation. Such a situation offers limits and opportunities, as we have
seen. In practical terms, the infuriatingly bureaucratic nature of the Personairat
appears to make effective campaigning over the safety interests of workers more
difficult, through isolating safety within its own work in much the same way as
management have sought to do at other workplaces. What is clear, however, is that,
the strategic strength (relatively speaking) of trade unions at a societal level in
Germany, does not translate into a necessarily spontaneous and cumulative
relationship with the works council.
(vii) Conclusions
Participation in health and safety in Department G is illustrative of a range of
complex issues regarding safety and working conditions, the nature of management
and the dual channel representation of workers. Wider conclusions about the nature of
participation in health and safety in a comparative setting are left to a final chapter. In
this concluding section, I will attempt to draw together the various strands of
argument outlined above.
An overriding necessity is to appreciate the specificity of participation and health and
safety management in Department G (as elsewhere). In this department, a wholistic
approach is necessary to understand the complex relationships that exist between
participation, hazards, representation and employment in the public sector. Formal
participation of worker representatives in the management of health and safety and
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other issues takes place within good general relations with management. The cordial
way in which the Personairat, management, union, and worker representatives in
general were spoken of by others indicates the importance of the informal over the
formal, at first glance at least. The two key factors sustaining such a condition are a)
the perception that management and employees alike are more active in pursuing
safety issues since the fatal accident of 1979, and b) the agreed notion that the public
sector involves a qualitatively better set of working relations between management
and workers (and their representatives), resulting in a greater input of the Personairat
into control of the pace of work, and a management seemingly uninterested in
challenging this input. This latter point appears to be particularly true when safety
reasons govern Persona/rat input.
Such a stable relationship between the institutions of representation lead most people
to downplay the aspects of Mitbestimmung law, and health and safety law, which
enable works councils to force the hand of management. This is not the same as
saying that statutory participation generates industrial peace in a simple sense. As the
next chapter shows, the absence of goodwill between management and workplace
representatives can threaten the systemic and integrative effects that participation is
claimed to have. This apparent "backseat" role for Mitbestimmung leads us to
question the effects that it can be said to have, in conjunction with our other
observations concerning representation and the structural role of trade unions, on
employee relations, and on the management of health and safety. It would appear to
pull in (at least) two directions. On the one hand, it gives the Persona/rat a genuine
opportunity to contribute to the generation of managerial policy in personnel matters.
I have argued that this ability to lead the personnel agenda, coupled with the role that
the law ambiguously gives the Personairat in safety issues, makes for a similarly
genuine influence on the safety milieu, and a significantly greater contribution to the
management of safety on employees' terms, than do the hard provisions of the
Einigungsstelle, the labour courts and the Initiativerecht.
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On the other hand, there is little coherence and unity in the representation of workers'
interests. The union, even in the relatively hospitable environment of the public
sector, is still external to most considerations, and the separation between the
representation of workers in wages, and in conditions (including workplace safety), is
the most obvious expression of this. It is true that the union sees the Personairat as
the gateway to such representation, but such a situation is contingent. It serves to
deepen the dependence of the union on the works' council, and does not give the
union what might be called an "organic" voice in the workplace. A strong
identification of the union with the works' council can also mean a confused role for
the union at the mid-way point between workers and managers. This is made even
more problematic in a situation where some of the rubric of Mitbestimmung makes it
difficult to draw a clear line between employers and employees 51, and where
industrial trade unionism, with an extended ladder of membership, mitigates against
horizontal integration 52. Yet we must not be too pessimistic with regard to these
difficulties of interest representation. The geographical separation of workers does
serve to make effective safety representation difficult for centralised bodies such as
the Personairat. However, the positive attitude of management to staffing levels (i.e.
the absence of attempts to increase work intensity), and the structure of industrial
unionism, both act as catalysts in preserving a degree of homogeneity and coherence
in safety representation higher than in the other case studies.
The contextual environment in which participation takes place is vitally important,
and the perception of management as being qualitatively different in the public sector
seems to underpin much of Department G experience. The structure of the
organisation may also play a role in drawing the parameters of the discussion above.
Representative and participative mechanisms which are centralised in a large
department, in which employees work largely in groups of less than ten and where
empathy with safety problems in the sewers, incineration buildings etc. is at a
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premium, are bound to exhibit a degree of difficulty in forging a coherent safety
strategy. The degree to which we can generalise from this case study, whether to talk
about participation in the public sector, or about German as against British forms of
participation and safety management is taken up in the next chapter.
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Notes.
1. And the department studied in the previous chapter.
2. There is insufficient room to comprehensively discuss changes in public sector
employment in Germany over the last decade, particularly in comparison with the
well-documented experience in the UK. For this case study, it is the perceptions of
public sector employment by those involved which are critical.
3. Schools, colleges and universities come under the auspices of the Minisrerium für
Kunst und Wissenschaft (Department of Art and Science).
4. These categories roughly correspond to blue-collar workers, white-collar workers
and public officials.
5. Implemented through the Landespersonalvertretungsgesetz (LPersVG) for this
region of Germany.
6. Again, see chapter 2 for more details.
7. The BPersVG @aras 13-15 inclusive) specifies who can stand for election to a
Personairat, and who cannot. In general, those who have control over personnel
matters as a central part of their job are excluded from standing for election. Where
such control is of a technical, or production-led nature, supervisors (Meister,
Techniker etc.) are allowed to stand for election, as in the case of my key informant.
8. In contrast to the "vertical" functioning of the disputes settlement procedure in the
British public sector workplace: see chapter 6.
9. Beamte are insured individually, and through separate sets of employment
legislation.
10. The work of the ASA is not governed by law, and indeed such a committee is not
compulsory as such in the public sector. The private sector legislation covering safety
committees merely states that public sector employers should make at least the same
provisions as exist in the private sector. In practice, the Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz
(AsiG), or Health and Safety at Work Act, is applied to the public sector as well.
11. Superior is a somewhat formal translation, arising from the origin of the word in
civil and public service occupations (for example, see Weiss, M., 1992:339). In
practice, foreman" or "supervisor" can also be used as valid translations.
12. These groupings are Bau (building and construction), Elektro (electricity) and
Maschine (engineering and maintenance), these corresponding to subject divisions in
German universities and polytechnics.
13. In common with the other fieldwork chapters, the issues surrounding women's
employment, representation of interests and health and safety are not treated in a
direct and systematic manner. I break down employment by gender here to give a
more complete picture of Department G and the people working in it.
14. Percentages here are hlvalidu in that they are given as a proportion of responses,
excluding missing values.
15. Those attempts to introduce private sector labour market disciplines to the public.
sector in Germany that have taken place have not formed part of a political crusade by
the government in the same was as in Britain. Indeed, SPD governed Nordrhein-
Wesifalen has been at the head of these developments.
-16. The decision at council level is discretionary, and may result in a particular
decision (i.e. "you can have x number of workers for such and such a department") or
can involve general assent to departmental demands.
17. At the time of the research, roughly 700 positions, or 4.5% of the workforce,
remain unfilled throughout the council.
18. The way in which Mi/wi rkung and Mitbestimmung are distinguished is discussed
in chapter 2. It is important also to note the role of the labour courts in establishing
precedents in cases where the procedures of participation are disputed by the parties
involved. See, for example, Weiss, M, and Krieger, H. (1991:12).
19. A court decision was reached in the course of the research which emphasised that
the Personairat had Mitbestimmung (rather than the weaker Mitwirkung) rights in
health and safety, although the contention fo such details through the courts on a
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variety of issues is commonplace. For a fuller account see Der Personalrat, 3/8 9,
pp65-67.
20. The differences and similarities in the roles of Sicherheitsbeauftragte and their
counterparts in the UK are discussed in chapter 2. The main difference is that in
Germany these representatives are selected by management only, with no union input,
as is normally the case in the UK.
21. My key informant was the leitende SBA, union activist, Personairat member and
ASA member wrapped into one.
22. This corresponds to existing research which has pointed to a higher incidence of
SBAs also being Vorgesetzter in public and quasi-public sector bodies
(Diekershoff, 1979:19).
23. There are three pay spines, one each for the three employment categories. For
Arbeiter, there is an 8 point scale (recently negotiated up from 7), with additional
increments for service, qualifications and the job involved. The council has recently
introduced higher service bonus rates, in an attempt to lose fewer workers to the
private sector between the ages of 30-45. There is some shift work in the Department,
necessary given the difficulties of maintaining rail tracks in the daytime. The majority
of workers work a 38.5 hour week, and flexi-time operates for Angestelite but not
Arbeiter.
24. OTV organises also in the private sector, with a growing proportion of members
coming from the private transport sector, and from Versorgerung companies, the
pseudo-privatised utility companies. This means that a vast number of individual
collective agreements are signed between OW and employers, covering the different
areas of union organisation, different employment categories and regional variations.
25. Although as one of the largest departments in the largest council in the Land, then
managers here would have more say than most in negotiations with OTV.
26. This process has strengthened since the research was carried out, and OTV
members were involved in extensive strikes, lasting two weeks, in the spring of 1991.
For details, see the Financial Times 27/4/92 — 7/5/92 (inclusive).
27. See, for example, Jacobi and Müller-Jentsch,1990.
28. I use "shop steward" as a convenient, and by now traditional, translation for
Vertrauensleute, although the two functions do not tally precisely. See Weiss, M. et
a!., (1992:336).
29. I emphasise that Textchem and Department G are such different workplaces, in
different sectors of the economy, of different countries etc., that genuine statistical
comparison is impossible. In particular, it is more likely that stewards are also safety
representatives at Textchem, raising the problem that respondents had to choose
between two labels for the same person.
30. It is reasonable to put "foreman" and "managers" together in this analysis, as the
combined total is over half for each workplace, and the difference is probably one of
definition in each workplace.
31. Of these, around 2-4 per year are Wegeunfalle, or injuries occurring in transit to
work.
32. Age profiles for the two sets of questionnaire responses suggest that Textchem has
a generally younger workforce than Department G, although distributions by length of
service are similar at the two workplaces.
Age of respondents:
Textchem:
16-23 S%SSSSS%SS.SS% 7
24-31 S %%S%SSSSSS%%S%s%s%%%s %%s% 15
32-39	 SSSS%% S%SS%%%%SS
40-47 %%SSS*%*%SSS%%%%%._%S%%. 	 13
48-55 SSSS"SS%%%%%%S.ss. 10
56-	 7
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Department G:
16 23
	
S*.SS%%SS%S 14
24-31 S%SS%%%%%%%SS%%*%	 17
32-39	 %SS*%S%.*%S 18
40 47
	
17
48-55 SSSS SS	 22
56	 SSS%S 20
33. See discussion of collective bargaining arrangements in the public sector in
Germany in an earlier section.
34. Compare here the arguments of Streeck (1984:408-411) and (Hoff: 1984) on how
one of the key results of workplace Mitbestimmung and consultation has been the
generation of internal labour markets, and the prioritisation of personnel issues and
long-term staffing policy given the prohibitive costs associated with following
alternative personnel strategies..
35. See Bailey,1989; Brown and Rowthorn,1990; Femer,1989; Winchester,1989.
36. See chapter 2 for details of Bonus und Malus system of accident insurance.
37. Questions directly addressing the issue of Mitbestimmung and the possible need
for changes to the participation legislation were omitted from the questionnaire,
partially because of competition for space, but also because the functioning of
Mitbestimmung is mainly an issue for representatives of managers and workers, who
were the subject of interviews.
38. Notwithstanding the general belief that the protection of safety legislation in the
public sector is weaker.
39. An important factor here may be the strict (in terms of legal and insurance
legislation) system of line management responsibility for safety, which could be
compromised by a more pro-active role for the Personairat in safety matters.
40. I appreciate that because SBAs are selected by management with no input from the
Personairat, they cannot strictly be defined as worker representatives. However, in
interviews, respondents mentioned them as a part of the solution to problem of
ineffective use of Mitbestimmung rights.
41. See, Moore,1991.
42. For example, during the controversial drafting of the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of
1976, where German employers made a concerted effort to challenge the legality of
parity co-determination in the Labour Courts, largely without success. See
Streeck,1984.
43. It is important to mention the nature of the training courses organised at regional
and national centres by the trade union education department of 01W, one of which I
attended for a week. Very few of the participants were SBAs, with the majority being
members of the Personairat of different public sector workplaces. The content of the
courses appeared to be targeted at the powers of the Personairat, rather than in
addressing particular health problems or particular groups of workers. This would
seem to support the argument that the Personairat has become the workplace "arm"
of the trade union, in safety matters at least, although the different bases of legitimacy
for the two bodies still makes us question the benefit that the term cumulation
provides.
44. This is symptomatic of a broader problem of workplace representation for
German trade unions. A main campaigning strategy for many unions in the 60s and
70s was to encourage the growth of shop stewards movements (often premised on the
image of strong British workplace influence achieved through shop steward
representation) in order to counter the increasing centralisation of union/employer
relations (eg.Markovits: 1986, Koch: 1978).
45. The other centralising force in worker representation being industrial unionism.
46. British unions similarly have to tread a path between global and plant level
strategies of representation, and in the area of health and safety different unions have
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had different approaches to, say, the issue of whether shop stewards should be safety
representatives as well.
47. See chapter 6 focusing on the British public sector department.
48. For a fuller account of the importance of key individuals in the management of
safety within organisations, see Dawson et al,1988.
49. The importance of vertical segmentation in characterising, in general and
historical terms, the structure of the German labour market is discussed by Fox,1978.
The final chapter of this thesis addresses the problems that this dual nature of
participation poses for works councils and unions.
50. Not a union member, but only because he hasn't yet had the time to join!
51. See, for example, Bulmer and Paterson, 1986.
52.SeeFox, 1978.
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Chapter 8.
Summary and Conclusions.
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(i) Axes of differentiation
This thesis has been centrally concerned with the participation of workers
representatives in the regulation of safety at four workplaces. Above all, it has been a
comparative study, with a research design that has allowed both cross-national and
cross-sectoral comparisons to be made in an effective manner, and which has allowed
me to weigh the different national, sectoral and institutional frameworks against what
I consider to be fundamental tensions in the organisation of production and in the
prevention of accidents. In the course of the research, I have addressed a wide and
divergent range of issues concerning the generation and prevention of workplace
hazards, the politics of participation, issues of difference in the nature of management
in the public and private sectors, problems and ambiguities in the representation of
workers' safety interests - within a cross-national comparative framework where
similar formal arrangements for the regulation of safety combine with radically
different forms of representation and participation at workplace level. There are two
main tasks to this chapter. The first is to re-cap the main points which have emerged
in the course of the four case studies, and for reasons of presentation, I have organised
this under the same three sub-headings used in the fieldwork chapters. This allows the
reader to review the broad research outcomes in a more systematic and comparative
manner.
The second objective is to bring these disparate issues and arguments together, and to
systematise the various conclusions reached in the course of the fieldwork chapters.
This raises problems of presentation, given the complex lines of comparative analysis
running through the thesis. Some conclusions are universal in that they are valid in
each of the workplaces, albeit in different ways. Some conclusions are drawn from
particular comparison between two workplaces; in particular, public sector experience
in the two countries. These will be integrated into the discussion as and when
necessary, as they do not represent the key comparative issues raised by the thesis,
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and which structured the fieldwork chapters. However, the structure of the research
does lead towards the presentation of these conclusions in a particular way. Issues
surrounding the nature of managerial control, the particular pressures that workers
face, and the ability of workers to control the pace and nature of work and thereby
regulate hazards, are most profitably dealt with in a discussion of the differences
between the private and public sectors, and this is the subject of section (iii). On the
other hand, the discussion of statutory participation, formal involvement and the role
of the floor of rights in the management of health and safety, are treated, as
essentially cross-national issues, and are discussed in section (iv). The chapter ends
with a section that discusses some of the key themes of chapter 1 in the light of the
case studies and the other research conclusions. In particular, I return to the key issues
of interest representation, cumulation, and the nature of the ambiguities and
difficulties that representative bodies face in attempts to maintain a collective
regulation of health and safety.
(ii) Summaries
a) Work pressure.
The business plan is the major source of change and restructuring of work relations at
Textchem. The shift in organisational emphasis, from horizontal plant-wide business
relationships to the creation of independent vertical businesses, has generated a
process of de-collectivisation of work regulation, despite the fact that health and
safety management functions remain organised on a site-wide basis. The impact of
the business plan in further separating workers from one another on a daily basis, in
fragmenting safety regulation and complaints procedures and in introducing unfair
bonus systems are key issues at Textchem. This process of business devolution has
not, however, been accompanied by explicit attempts to increase productivity, reduce
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staffing levels etc., and the company was seen by most of the people I interviewed to
be in relatively good economic health, despite long-term fears over the future of the
flake business. The resurrection of safety committees, the high profile given to the
new safety manager, and the perception that more money, time and effort is put into
safety by management that in the past, all contribute to a degree of apparent
consensus over the need for new investment in machinery, particularly involving
corrosive processes. Indeed, both private sector case studies were characterised by the
problems associated with investment and its bearing on working conditions and health
and safety regulation, even though Textchem was doing much better financially than
Prochem.
At Prochem, reductions in staffing levels have led to increases in work pressure, as
both productivity and output have improved in recent years. This has had a negative
impact on the frequency of accidents, particularly in production areas, as the
examples from the case study show. In addition, the conflict over staffing levels has
changed the tone of the relationship between the Betriebsrat and management. The
safety of working conditions and the policies of management stand in greater contrast
than in any of the other workplaces. However, management at Prochem have not
attempted a radical re-structuring of the work relationship itself, when compared to
the experience of Textchem. The nature of the work involved in filling and mixing
compounds from set recipes still allows worker a relatively high degree of discretion
and autonomy.
The case of Leist ungsdruck in chapter 7 was the most clearly stated expression of the
range of differences that are said to exist between private and public sector
employment. In the eyes of virtually everyone interviewed in Department G, and
large numbers of those returning questionnaires, work was less hard in the public
sector. Furthermore, the nature of the employment relationship was seen as
qualitatively different from that in private firms, with the absence of external markets
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and the lack of a political will to introduce market mechanisms into the public sector
given as key reasons for this.
In Department B, the feeling that work pressure was less than in the private sector
was evident, but more muted and cautious than in Department B. In this workplace,
the introduction of competitive tendering can be seen as the dominant issue for safety
and work pressure issues. The importance of a lack of a genuine market environment
was expressed in a similar manner when both workers and managers talked of the
impact of Conservative legislation. CCT was said to have had uneven effects in
relation to everyday work pressure (affecting different work groups and occupations
differently) and job insecurity for workers, although the last decade had certainly seen
large-scale changes in perceptions of this difference between public and private sector
employment.
b) Participation.
The role of formal participative machinery at the four workplaces can be
characterised differently. At Textchem, a process of de-collectivisation of labour and
safety regulation is underway, driven by the business plan and its broader effects.
Whilst safety committees have been given new life in recent years, this has been done
under the auspices of the new vertical restructuring process, leaving the former site-
wide mechanisms of safety participation redundant, despite safety officially being
retained as a non-devolved management area. There are no other participation
mechanisms in operation at Textchem.
At Prochem, formal participation is a matter of conflict between the works council
and management. This is the case both when fundamental issues of cost and safety are
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concerned, such as the problem of staffing levels, for example, and when no apparent
reason for conflict exists, such as in the case of the construction of new buildings.
In Department B, formal statutory participation machinery, such as the safety
committees, is marginalised. This has not occurred through a direct attack on, or
obstruction of, these institutions, such as at Prochem, nor through organisational
restructuring that have left them without a clearly defined role, as at Textchem.
Indeed, the system of safety committee participation - has been progressively
strengthened over the last 15 years or so, with new layers of bureaucracy added
recently (pre-meetings etc.). Rather, the reason for this marginalisation is the fact that
formal institutions of participation operate within a well-established grievance
resolution procedure, and broader regulatory system for the involvement of trade
union representatives. In other words, participation forums such as safety committees
lack importance because when serious disputes over safety crop up, they usually get
taken away from committee jurisdiction and into the broader grievance resolution
procedure.
In Department G, Mitbestimmung is seen by worker representatives almost as a
shadow - i.e. it is important, but in the background, and everyday relations have
superseded the immediate necessity for statutory protection. In a sense, this
represents an ideal-type operation of a floor of rights, in that basic statutory
provisions are often not seen to be relevant given the progressive extension and
sophistication of forms of influence and involvement, as if they had been "left
behind". However, I have also argued that the context of public sector employment
may be critical in making sure that basic rights to participation are not the subject of
conflict in the same way as they are at Prochem. This background role for formal
participative machinery is similar to that in the other public sector study, the
difference being the highly integrated role of union representation in the regulation of
safety in the British local authority.
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c) Representation.
The critical problem for worker representation, in health and safety as well as other
areas, is the heterogeneity of interests that workers have and express. Each of the case
studies involve examples of this, and the difficulties it presents, particularly to shop
stewards and works council members, in seeking to establish a collective approach to
safety regulation and involvement, and in seeking to represent workers in a situation
when the defence of jobs, and the pursuit of better working conditions in dealings
with management, involves a delicate balancing act.
The problems for union representation at Textchem spring from the structural
reorganisation of the business plan, and the trend towards more direct forms of
communication between managers and workers. More long-term objectives are likely
to accentuate this trend, leaving the union in the middle of changes it appears to have
little control over. This state of affairs is illustrated by the area of safety regulation
where the new high profile approach of management is contrasted to the minimal role
that the union plays in campaigning on safety issues, although this is probably a
function of the general weakness of union organisation at Textchem, rather than a
particular problem in the area of safety that does not occur in general collective -
bargaining.
Prochem is characterised by a virtually non-existent role for IG Chemie in workplace
safety issues, and a growing recognition that the Betriebsrat can play a vital role in
challenging managerial policy through utilisation of safety legislation and the specific
provisions for involvement and participation. The evidence from Prochem is also that
the works council is a positive force for the promotion of union goals (particularly in
terms of the recruitment of members, and in the dissemination of union-related
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information), but that this falls far short of the mutually reciprocal and supportive
relationship envisaged by proponents of cumulation. The separation of functions -
with unions responsible for wage bargaining and the monitoring of wage agreements
through the system of Vertrauensleute, and the Betriebsrat responsible for workplace
issues such as staffing levels, overtime and health and safety regulation - is very
strong at Prochem.
Unions are most influential at Department B, and particularly in the local authority of
which the department is a part. Long-established grievance resolution and union
recognition agreements have ensured a respected system of representation, which
tends to get used for a wide variety of problems, including those essentially involving
health and safety, and which has led to managerial attempts at renegotiation of the
system of multi-union representation in the authority. The relationship between
managers and unions at the 1eve1 of the authocit'j 'en 	 t'ie'j	 ci I
argued that part of the reason for this are the radical re-orientation that has taken place
in response to the introduction of CCT, with the development of something of
consensus between unions and managers (and councillors) that the defence of jobs,
and the use of safety legislation as well, is of the highest priority.
In Department G, the main union, again, played virtually no role in workplace safety
issues, with training courses for works council members being the main vehicle
whereby they sought to contribute to safety regulation. The separation of functions
between Personairat and union in Department G was of a similar nature to that at
Prochem. Questionnaire responses tended to see the union as less representative of
workers' interests in safety than both management and the Personairat. The works
council appears to be on very co-operative terms with management, and I have argued
that the vertical structure of management itself contributes to this lack of conflict,
alongside other factors such as a government less concerned to revolutionise public
sector employment. This does not mean that mobilisation and campaigning around
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safety are necessarily more effective than at other workplaces, and the delegation of
safety items within the work of the Personairat to one individual, and the lack of
imagination and integration of safety into other issues being reminiscent of strategies
of de-collectivisation on the part of management at Textchem.
(iii) The parameters of managerial strategy and the generation of hazards; sectoral
divergence
Work pressure has been a consistent theme is this thesis, representing, as it does, a
key set of problems in the involvement of worker representatives in safety regulation.
It reflects on the nature of management and managerial strategy, on the way in which
the fmancial environment surrounding the workplace impacts on production and
working methods, on the scope of discretion for workers in the control of their jobs,
and on the different political pressures that exist in public sectors characterised by
very different governmental approaches over the last 15 years or so. It does not only
tell us something about the differences between private and public sectors (although
this is its main contribution to this thesis), but also of the relationship between forms
of involvement and participation on the one hand, and the regulation of safety and
hazards on the other.
An expression of the difference between the sectors is the degree to which safe
working conditions were perceived to be in conflict with managerial goals, policies
and strategies. The clearest example of this was the problem of under-staffing at
Prochem, with worker representatives pointing to a definite link between this and a
deterioration of working conditions. However, it would be too simple to say that the
conflict between the pursuit of safety as against production goals is a part of private
sector employment only. At Department B and the UK local authority, the new annual
business plans have to contain an element of profit, although this does not appear to
translate into a fundamental renegotiation of the use of labour, flexibilisation etc.,
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other than in peripheral employment areas such as cleaning, where the political risks
are perceived as less, and where union representation is less effective. Similarly, in
the German public sector study, managers made specific reference to the fact that
cost-benefit approaches played only a minor part in the way that they sought to utilise
labour, devise staffing policies, distribute tasks etc. The reasons for this are complex,
and range from the lack of a systematic attempt by the Federal government to
restructure public sector employment, to a situation characterised by recruitment
problems in the German public sector as a whole.
However, whilst the safety/profit theme was more apparent in the private than public
sector studies, this hides important differences in the manifestation and expression of
the problem. Safe working conditions are in conflict with the pursuit of profit in a
complex way. The reason for this is that the pursuit of profit does not necessarily
involve a one-dimensional strategy on the part of capital. Rather, the realisation of
surplus value depends on the utilisation of the physical means of production, the use
of labour power in maximising the return on capital investments as well as a range of
other economic factors such as the extent of competition in product markets.
Therefore, managers may choose a range of options in the pursuit of production-led
goals, which can, in turn, have a variety of effects on hazards, work pressure and
health and safety in general. Investment which seeks to speed production, and
increase productivity, without increasing the amount of labour hired, is likely to have
a negative impact on workers' health, through increasing the pressure that individual
workers work under. On the other hand, investment which seeks to improve product
quality, reliability etc. (eg. automated process machinery in the chemical industry),
may result in the improvement of working conditions through removal of workers
from materials and machinery 1 , and may involve an increase in the discretion and job
control that workers have, which, as I have argued, has an important bearing on the
prevention of accidents. It does not necessarily involve an attempt to increase labour
utilisation, or the intensification of work.
300
Whilst my conviction that, broadly speaking, safety and profit are conflicting
organisational goals remains fundamentally intact, I would argue that the exclusivity
involved can be highly variable, particularly when the issue is viewed subjectively by
workers and their representatives. With the limited insight that only two private sector
case studies can offer, my research would suggest that in workplaces where
automation and capital investment is low, and where wage costs form a relatively
high proportion of total costs, then safe working conditions and the goals, of
management are more likely to be seen to collide. The reason for this is that financial
pressure on the firm is most likely to be expressed in a reduction of staffing levels,
and the burden more likely to fall onto workers through increased pressure. This does
not mean that capital intensive workplaces are safer, or that the conflict between
safety and profit is not also fundamental to the work relation in those contexts. The
perceived common interest of labour and capital, at workplace level at least, in forms
of investment that will both enhance productivity and therefore job security, and
improve working conditions, is a general feature of industrial organisations. It appears
to be the case, though, that the conflict between safety and profit is more explicit
when conflict focuses on labour costs and labour utilisation. The safety implications
of investment are highly context-specific. At Prochem, investment directed at
speeding up the process of packaging and canning has led to increased dangers to
workers fingers and hands. At Textchem, recent investments in production lines for
the flake department have greatly reduced exposure levels in that department.
The impact of managerial strategy is not only a question of work pressure, but also
one of the degree to which the defence of prerogative, of the right to manage, is seen
as being in conflict with forms and practices of participation. This is largely an issue
of the forms of legislative protection that worker representatives have, and the impact
that involvement has on the freedom of management to manage, discussed in the
context of Anglo-German comparison in the next section. It is also a question of the
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relations of dominance which safety regulation takes place within, and is therefore of
importance to our discussion here of the nature of management and the procedures of
safety regulation. The ability of managers to dictate the safety agenda was apparent,
although to differing extents, in each of the four workplaces, with private sector
managers, on the whole, having a greater degree of freedom than their public sector
counterparts. This confirms Lane's argument that:-
a successful implementation of the legal norms depends decisively on
whether management is ready to permit worker influence on decision-
making.(Lane, 1989:233)
In particular, managers in the private sector seemed to have a greater degree of
freedom in defining the generic approach to workplace safety regulation, as the
widespread secondary effects of the business plan at Textchem, and the pursuit of
cost cutting strategies at Prochem illustrate. In both of the private sector case studies,
management were also very much in the driving seat in terms of the direction in
which forms of safety regulation were heading, with worker representatives, on the
whole, struggling to find coherent alternatives or challenges. This does not mean that
private sector management is homogeneous in the way it seeks to regulate safety. The
case studies show examples where management were internally divided with respect
to safety policy (the different impact that the orange overalls policy had on different
levels of management in Department B, for example). At Textchem, managers were
seen as largely responsible for propping up an ailing workplace trade union structure,
whereas managers at Prochem seem to have chosen a path of direct confrontation
with the Works council. A key problem lies in understanding the degree to which a
common aim underlies these different strategies on the part of management. As
mentioned before, the business plan changes at Textchem were centrally concerned
with refining management decision-making and not with a confrontation with trade
unions. At Prochem, management appeared to have dug themselves into the hole of
continuous and inflexible opposition to the rights of the Betriebsrat to information
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and consultation. In both cases, management have pursued policies which, in their
opinion, most enables them to retain prerogative over decision-making. The structural
position of management in organisations which operate in a genuinely competitive
market is one which seems to provide a greater degree of managerial dominance in
dictating the way in which worker representatives participate, and a desire to pursue
policies which defend prerogative that does not feature strongly in the two public
sector studies. Obstacles to the freedom of management to pursue goals that may be
in conflict with the safety of workers seemed to arise out of the nature of public sector
employment rather more than through the opportunities that legislation in safety
participation gives to worker representatives.
To sum up then; work pressure is strongly related to accidents and poor safety. Such
pressure, perhaps logically, is a function of managerial strategy and the economic
context that the organisation finds itself in. Therefore, whilst cleaners in the UK local
authority experienced a similar degree of work intensification to workers at Prochem,
on the whole work pressure remained an issue which separated workers' and
managers' perceptions of public from private sector employment, and the generation
of hazards. Opposition to the intensification of work involves job control, and the
extent to which workers or their representatives can have genuine influence over the
organisation of work. My evidence suggests that sectoral issues are likely to play at
least as big a part in informing this conflict over the control of work as the formal
structure of participation and safety regulation in each country.
(iv) The marginalisation of formal participation
Statutory protection in the regulation of safety, and in participation generally, is a
complex field. In the German context, there is the peace obligation in works
constitution law on the one hand, involving restrictions on the use of information for
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collective bargaining purposes by works councils, and the Thard" elements of
Mitbestimmung on the other (the Einigungsstelle, in particular). Both German case
studies show both the ambiguities and the importance of this dualism in participation
law, with Prochem providing a test case for the efficacy of harder protective
legislation, and Department G allowing an examination of the function of the
integrative nature of the law alongside industrial unionism and public sector
management structures and practices. In the UK, the double-edged impact of the
introduction of CoSHH to Textchem is also an example -of this complexity when
analysing the impact of protective legislation on the regulation of health and safety,
although worker representatives in each case study were keen to stress the vital
importance of legislative protection in these matters. Once again, the key lies in the
fact that legislative provisions, although compulsory in a general sense, still have to
work on a day-to-day basis inside established systems of participation (or non-
participation), representation etc., which vary between workplaces and across time.
This is why cumulation, although originating in an interest in the specific nature of
dual channel representation in Germany, is important in our considerations of the
relationship between safety participation and single channel representation in the
British context.
The four representations of the function of participation discussed in section (ii) of
this chapter illustrate the complexities involved in analysing consultation and safety
regulation in a cross-sectoral and cross-national perspective. In particular, it requires
us to re-examine how the floor of rights operates in practice. The German case studies
both highlight the reluctance of worker representatives to utilise the hard elements of
Mitbestimmung law, the Eingigungsstelle in particular. I have already mentioned that
co-determination law in Germany is built on the twin pillars of legal redress against
employers, and obligations to workplace "peace". However, the case of Prochem
shows how, even where management are obstructive of even the most basic of co-
determination rights, legal redress through the letter of the law is not a common
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outcome of disputes. This allows us to return to some of the themes of the opening
chapter, and in particular, the peculiar nature of the space (see chapter 1) in which
consultation and involvement operate is particularly relevant here 2. Experience of
each workplace shows that there is an irresistible desire, on the part of worker
representatives in particular, to maintain acceptable relations with managers. The
term antagonistic cooperation (Maclnnes,1985: 138) also seems highly appropriate
to describe the relationship between the works council and management at Prochem.
In other words, works councillors and managers strive to maintain a workable
relations, in the midst of a general discourse of conflict and opposition. The need to
achieve acceptable relations also seems to have primacy in instances where it seems
that recourse to the law in a direct confrontation with management is the most likely
outcome. It is too easy to overestimate the ease with which formal rights to legal
redress are taken up by worker representatives. In my case studies the significance of
the system of legal redress against recalcitrant management was expressed in terms of
the rhetorical and knock-on effects that major Bundes- and Lander-level court
decisions had for workplace politics. I am not arguing that this is ineffective: rather,
the particular legislative framework in which industrial relations and safety regulation
takes place is not a static, immovable force in determining the outcomes of various
forms of conflict. Formal statutory mechanisms for participation extend the options
that worker representatives have in challenges to management, but can count for little
if, for a variety of other reasons, organised labour is weak at workplace level, as the
Prochem study clearly shows. In this respect, the institutional framework inside which
workplace industrial relations take place, and particularly structures of union
representation and sectoral issues, play a key role in determining the nature and
impact of the floor of rights.
However, this does not mean that the law fails in providing a floor of protection in
safety regulation. Clearly, in each of the case studies formal participation and
protection forms at least part of the overall strategy of worker representatives in
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dealings with management. The case of the climb-down by management in the
German local authority over refuse collection, and the ability of the Betriebsrat at
Prochem to have a building partially demolished because of a combination of
regulations governing sunlight, and the decision of management not to consult over
design, are clear examples of this. But does this then enable us to talk of a
qualitatively different impact on the part of statutory participation in Germany?
Importantly, extensions to the floor of rights (i.e. the broader and dynamic utiuisation
of basic legislative protection) seem to be subject to factors other than the nature of
the legislation itself, as the discussion of sectoral issues in the previous section
indicates. This is equally true in both countries, despite the more integrated system of
participation in Germany. Thus, whilst at Prochem, Mitbestimmung offered little
genuine protection in terms of qualitative changes in the dominant managerial
strategy of cost-cutting, in Department 0 the combination of workplace co-
determination with a management allowed to manage without free market, or
politically imposed, constraints appeared to involve the evaporation of the floor of
rights in everyday perceptions. Indeed, the workplace where basic rights to
participation and involvement seemed to generate a more comprehensive (though still
limited) and coherent challenge to management on safety issues was Department B, in
the case of industrial conflict over the unpopular (and arguably less safe) introduction
of orange overalls.
At Textchem, safety regulation is essentially a management-driven phenomenon,
despite the existence of business safety committees. Part of this is a result of the
business plan which has decentralised and fragmented existing collective regulation,
and part is the result of the conscious retention of control by management over
technical and investment-centred safety decisions, through the TSC and the lack of
genuine consultation over the implementation of CoSHH regulations. Yet this has
coincided with a period of renewed interest in safety provision as a whole, and
positive appraisal, from worker representatives, for management's commitment to
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safety. Indeed, this apparent managerial commitment to safety at Textchem can be
contrasted with the difficulty that the works council at Prochem has had,
Mit be stimmung or no Mitbestimmung, in obstructing changes which have had a
definite negative impact on workers' safety. Similar, though less extensive, patterns of
de-collectivisation and decentralisation are evident at Department B, although
industrial conflict has been mediated by political and economic necessities, and an
alliance between managers and workers in the defence of jobs and departments. What
appears to distinguish the two public sector studies is on the one hand the impact of
CCT on perceptions of work pressure, and on the other, the visible role that the union
plays in safety regulation. In Department B, the floor of rights is coupled with
traditional and so far largely unchallenged patterns of union involvement; in
Department 0, the floor of rights is somewhat invisible owing to its success in
establishing basic workplace consultation rights for the Personairat, making the
involvement that takes place more routine and bureaucratised as the basic building
blocks of participation are not contested.
Herding (1972) argued that statutory participation in (West) Germany was weak, in
comparison to the system of collective bargaining in the United States, in the
retention of shopfloor control by workers, and in protecting the standard of working
conditions (particularly regarding physical effort). My research is inconclusive in this
respect, although no comparison with the USA has been made. At Prochem, statutory
participation did not really enable worker representatives to obstruct managerial
drives for cost cutting, efficiency etc., leading to increases in work pressure and
accidents. In Department G, the Personairat was more able to do so, although as I
have indicated, the specific nature of public sector employment and other factors are
of central importance in this. The failure of formal participation in safety regulation to
insulate workers from the immediate conflict between good working conditions and
profit is most apparent at Prochem. I have argued that in the private sector, the
translation of this inherent conflict into concrete pressure on workers seems partially
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dependent on the degree of labour intensiveness, and on the financial situation of the
firm, although work pressure still exists as part of drudgery of everyday working life
in the public as well as private sectors. The experience at Prochem is no doubt similar
to that for workers in labour intensive public sector corporations, particularly where
competition exists in the form of alternative products (the railways, for example),
with increases in work pressure, overtime etc., having potentially tragic
consequences. The diversity of organisation found in the public sector is important
here, however, and in my public sector case studies the lack of an external market has
reinforced perceptions of low Leistungsdruck in Germany, and helped limit the
impact of competition legislation in the UK.
So how are we to judge the impact of formal safety participation, and statutory
protection, when workplace- and sector-specific factors govern the parameters of
safety regulation in this way? I would argue, as above, that the impact of statutory
protection lies in the options that it can give to worker representatives when
economic or political conditions change 3, and in the degree to which formal
participation can enhance the ability of workers and their representatives to retain job
control. I have argued that the control, by workers (either individually or through
representative mechanisms) over the pace and nature of work is a central element in
the prevention of accidents and the continual suppression of hazards4. In each of the
case studies, the control of work and working methods has acted as a catalyst in the -
interplay between the generation and prevention of hazards on the one hand, and
forms and practices of participation on the other. The success of the works council in
the German public sector case study5 in utilising accident prevention regulations to
reverse managerial decisions about working methods is the clearest example of this.
The Personairat in this case was aided by a broader framework of managerial control
less tight than at Prochem, qualitatively affecting the impact of formal participation
and legal protection. The "success" of participation, if success is defined as the
translation into reality of rights that exist only in a formal, statutory sense, is
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contingent on the nature of the employment relationship, and on the effects of public
as against private ownership on the thrust of managerial policy and strategy. This is
not to argue that job control is an unproblematic term depicting objective features of
particular occupations. Rather, the key to unlocking the relationship between safety
regulation and the provisions and protections of a floor of rights, lies in understanding
the effect that such participation has in facilitating the control of work by workers
and, vice versa, in understanding the catalytic role that different manifestations of job
control play in offering limits and opportunities in participation (eg. the importance of
transport in obstructing the speed-up of jobs in Department B).
(v) The visibility of safety; fragmented communities.
The research has pointed to the many ways in which the construction of clear
communities regarding safety regulation is obstructed and mediated, and the
particular problems that unions and works councils have in pursuing these interests.
At both Textchem and Prochem, environmental legislation has begun to play an
increasingly important role in underpinning the direction of safety policy within the
workplace, with direct implications for workers' health and safety6. The economic
cost of such protection is not lost on workers representatives 7. The cautious way in
which safety provisions of this kind (i.e. involving a potential challenge to the
competitive position of the company) have been received represents an extension of
everyday problems in safety provision for individual workers. In other words, the
potential conflict in the role of environmental protection for workers is reproduced in
economic terms, with pressures on workers to balance safe working practices against
the defence of jobs, a problem more apparent in the private sector where the free
market acts as an external source of internal pressure.
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Throughout the fieldwork, the heterogeneity of both management and workforce
played a key role in this disaggregation of safety regulation. In Department B,
section heads in charge of the daily implementation of contracts and business plans
exhibited a much closer working relationship with worker representatives, than did
senior managers more involved in the implementation of CCT and other policies at a
higher level. Similarly, at Textchem, senior stewards claimed that the safety officer,
and individual managers charged with essentially safety-related tasks, were different
from other managers (i.e. those more concerned with financial and production
matters) in that they formed part of a safety community distinct from others, whether
workers or managers, and almost above the broad opposition between unions and
management reflected in collective bargaining structures. The ability of formal
channels of representation and involvement to allow diverse occupational experiences
to be integrated with organisational safety policy forms an obvious counterpoint to
this set of problems which serve to disaggregate joint/collective safety regulation.
However, problems of interest heterogeneity and disaggregation in the regulation of
safety do not only involve relations between groups of managers or workers. At both
private sector studies, individual workers, or groups of workers, were blamed for
accidents or potential safety problems, when a closer look at the problem revealed an
omnipresent compulsion on the workers involved to overcome problems in
production by side-stepping formally agreed safety checks, or payment systems which
encouraged greater work speeds. This not only illustrates the scepticism with which
this individualisation of blame should be treated, blame emanating from workers'
representatives as well as from managers. This also points to a problem for formal
(statutory and non-statutory) channels of participation, in that they can also be
perceived as being removed from everyday workplace experience, as union
involvement in the production of COPs in Department B illustrates.
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Furthermore, this is an issue for cross-national comparison. In both countries, forums
and mechanisms for the involvement of worker representatives in safety regulation
were cited as inappropriate for the expression of individual grievances about health
and safety, as the small number of workers reporting, in the questionnaires, that they
went to the union or the works council about safety problems, indicates. In the UK
case studies, this problem manifested itself in the difficult relationships between
permanent workers and contract workers, and in the local authority, in the differential
efficacy with which the union and safety representatives have protected workers
against the negative health impact of tendering. Multi-unionism also helps to
differentiate between the experience of groups of workers. In Germany, the works
constitution and industrial unionism reinforce a system of collective interest
representation with less internal division and fragmentation. This does not necessarily
make for a more effective system for the representation of individuals in safety.
Works councils in the two German case studies still had problems in this, as the
questionnaire responses from Department 0 show 8. Rather, the relationship between
individual and collective representation is different within structures of union
organisation and workplace involvement and democracy which emphasise the
common interests of employees at a relatively insular enterprise level (Germany),
when compared with multi-unionism and a lack of a second channel of workplace
representation (Britain). The fundamental tensions in the problem of management
remain (see chapter 1), and the German case studies show how the integrative logic of
Mitbestimmung is incompatible with the poor industrial relations atmosphere at
Prochem, whilst the confrontational aspects of Mitbe stimmung seem to be
undermined by the vertical structure of management and representation in Department
0. Formal involvement does not solve the inherent instability of the central
management task; the negotiation and maintenance of consent from workers and the
necessity to muddle through.
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Following on from this, another important finding concerns the legitimacy that is
attached to forms of worker participation. I argued in chapter 1 that participation, and
particularly those forms which ase management-initiated 9, inherently involve
attempts to generate and maintain legitimacy for management's rights to manage
(Ramsay,1985:58-60). My research has shown that forms and practices of
participation can also have important consequences for the legitimacy of trade union
representation in of the workplace, in the struggle to maximise perceptions of the
union as being effective and worth getting involved in. At Textchem, those forms of
joint participation in health and safety which remain after the changes of the business
plan are as important in the efforts of safety representatives and shop stewards to get
workers actively involved in their own safety, as they are to managers in fostering
legitimacy for managerial prerogative. Similarly, union activists at Prochem depended
on the legitimacy that an elected workplace body possesses, to make use of the office
resources of the works council, to distribute literature, make attempts at recruitment,
give information about wage rounds etc. In the German context, one could argue that
this is the only viable strategy given the formal exclusion of the union from
workplace negotiations, activities (in the British sense, at least) etc., although I have
indicated in the case studies that the legitimacy and status that unions seek through
domination (in terms of numbers) of workplace channels of representation is a useful
characterisation of the works council/union relationship. In terms of our discussions
in chapter 1, it is indicative of Vershrânkung rather than Verschmelzung (Schmidt and
Trinczek,1991: 182-188)..
Whilst this is a comparative thesis, participation in health and safety has been used as
a test case for the theory that both the union and the works council form part of an
extensive, mutually reinforcing system of representation, a theory specifically relating
to dual channel representation in the Federal Republic. Importantly, the various
arguments which I brought together under the term cumulation in chapter 1, have
been shown to be at best simplistic by my research in the two German studies'°.
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Bean (1985:173) claims that the works council is partially dependent on the existence
of trade union influence in the workplace, as a protection against the victiniisatiott of
works council members. This representation of the relationship between the union and
the works council, and of the kinds of influence they can exert is rejected by the
research I have carried out.
..the distinction between voluntary representation through trade unions
and legally regulated representation through co-determination has
become increasingly blurred since the 1950s. (Streeck,1984:405-406)
Streeck does offer disclaimers that these trends are most developed in the largest
companies, and an examination of another aspect of cumulation - the relationship
between workplace-level and enterprise-level participation - has not been addressed in
this thesis. However, the above statement has some truth in my case studies, if one
looks only at the fact that works council members are generally trade unionists, and
that the union takes advantage of the priveleges that the works council has in pursuing
its activities. However, this is different from an extension of influence through the
mutually supportive relationship between the two channels. Particularly regarding
health and safety regulation, the separation of functions between the union and the
works council was fairly rigidly observed, with no attempt to utilise Mitbe stimmung
rights to launch a more comprehensive challenge to management over safety
provisions in the workplace. It is interesting to note that the nearest example of
cumulation noted in the case studies, was the way in which shopfloor-level safety
problems and disputes in Department B, and the British local authority as a whole,
very quickly involved industrial relations machinery at much higher levels in the
council. This is to be contrasted strongly with the zealous way in which the
demarcation between plant-level and supra-plant level safety regulation was regarded
in both German case studies. Cumulation is therefore also relevant in highlighting
how the structure of representation and the floor of rights interact in the British
context.
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Finally, the case study chapters have said relatively little about the consultation
versus bargaining debate discussed in chapter 1. In each workplace, bargaining over
health and safety seems to be very much the exception rather than the rule, although
anecdotal examples pointed to instances where this might go on at an informal and
implicit level, such as in the case of the gatemen at Textchem. In Department 0, no
mention of bargaining was made by respondents. At Prochem, bargaining can hardly
be the best way to describe the process of conflict over the implementation of basic
rights to information and consultation on the part of the works council. Again it was
only in Department B, with the existence of an established, union-based, grievance
resolution procedure, that there was a clear example of safety problems being taken
directly into formal industrial relations negotiating machinery, particularly regarding
the case of the orange overalls. What this tells us however, is not that consultation is a
better way of regulating safety, but that "consultation or negotiation" is a redundant
paradigm in analysing the regulation of safety. It pre-supposes that both options are
available to the parties involved, and that negotiation is a stronger approach, with
consultation necessary only when management refuse to negotiate1 1•
A central argument of this thesis is that safety is inherently a collective issue, in its
relations to fundamental decisions about the organisation of production and work. By
implication, safety management is an issue for bodies which seek to represent
workers' interests, and the struggles of unions and works councils to pursue safety
issues have formed a key part of the case studies. I am aware that the emphasis in this
thesis has been on the blocks that exist to the collectivisation of safety and health. The
reason for this is that a vision which takes up the prospects for the re-collectivisation
of safety is bound to remain somewhat speculative. A question mark remains over the
ability of unions and works councils to campaign and mobilise collective interests
around safety issues, although specific examples from the case studies should provide
some optimism. In this respect, the discussion of the collectivisation of safety should
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form part of a wider debate about the visibility of accidents (and poor health
generally). At various points in the case studies, it was suggested that an inherent
problem in attempts by worker representatives to challenge managerial hegemony in
the regulation of safety, is the fact that critical aspects of safety control only manifest
themselves after the event. In other words, safety can be an invisible agenda item,
helping to explain why institutions of participation and representation found it
difficult to integrate safety considerations with visible (or more traditionally
mainstream) agenda items such as pay, bonuses, promotion, overtime etc. In many
instances, this may be the result of a dereliction of duty on the part of management in
failing to control known hazards, and the case studies have given examples of this.
However, what pass for genuinely unforeseen accidents in the workplace, accidents
which tend to then get blamed on individuals and individual neglect of safety systems,
can also be seen as breakdowns in the received wisdom about particular jobs and
hazards.
This can involve something of a lateral shift in the working environment (such as
large quantities of rain in a school-yard) which challenge normal perceptions of the
hazards presented (in this case by a hole in the ground). In these instances, such as the
explosion from 1979 in Department G, an internal critique of safety regulation can
ensue, which can reveal flaws in the ways in which knowledge of the job is translated
into a more embracing and wholistic appreciation of the hazards that workers face in
abnormal instances. Speculatively again, this might reveal a key role for unions and
works councils in acting as the fulcrum for re-evaluations of safety management in
the wake of particular incidents which temporarily place health and safety matters
alongside the visible agenda. Unless such a role can be developed and extended,
accidents and the like are likely to remain occurrences which reinforce a notion of
individual responsibility for accidents, and help to place worker representatives in the
position of policers/enforcers, as examples from the case studies show. I have found
worker representatives to be keenly aware of the problems that various managerial
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strategies have caused for some aspects of hazard prevention (the division of workers
in the business plan at Textchem, the "speed-up" rationale behind investment at
Prochem, etc.). However, the monitoring of invisible safety problems is an inherent
problem in safety regulation, as the raison d'être for work is not to stay safe but to
produce, earn etc., guiding principles which may be less crude in the public sector,
but which still govern the working day for employees there. Moreover, it is a problem
that cannot be solved by intricate safety systems which ignore the fact that hazards are
the result of technological properties, business decision-making, the politics of the
workplace and the responses of workers (collectively or otherwise) to all three.
It is a problem which raises again the question of whether viable and coherent
alternative strategies and ideologies can be constructed by workers and their
representatives, which go beyond the formalities of participation in safety, and
challenge the authority and hegemony of managers to set the parameters for safety
control as a reaction to the problems caused by work. My research has shown
something of the nature of the forces which act to de-collectivise this response to
hazards on the part of worker representatives are many and various; resulting directly
and indirectly from managerial strategies and from the multiplicity of forces and
divisions (geographical, organisational, core/periphery etc.) isolating workers from
each other. The re-collectivisation of safety regulation is a contingent problem, and
the role that formal participation machinery plays in opening possibilities in this arena
is strongly dependent on contextual factors, and in particular on the constraints on
managers in disparate market situations.
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Notes.
1. Of course, it may involve the production of a new set of hazards and a different
accident prevention agenda.
2. Maclnnes (1985:106).
3. The impact of co-determination law on the ability of unions to retain influence at
nation and regional levels is possibly very important here, as my thesis has not
focused on the relationships between capital and labour at this level.
4. For a more detailed discussion see Kinnersley,1973:22-28.
5. Not the works council of Department G, but of the refuse department.
6. A recent example of the growing role of environmental control for occupational
health and safety is the deployment of 30 environmental advisers, by 5 DGB affiliated
unions, to co-ordinate the carrying out of environmental assessments with works
councillors, to strengthen the function of union education about environmental
control, and to support individual collective agreements between works councils and
management. For details, see EIRR,220,May l992,p6.
7. The impetus behind European-wide safety legislation is, of course, aimed at
harmonising the impact of these costs, whilst opponents of such regulation point to
the competitive edge that avoidance of such costs can bring.
8. Works councillors attending education courses at German union centres said that
those paragraphs of the BetrVG of BPersVG dealing with individual grievances were
the most under-used of the provisions of the works constitution law.
9. Corresponding, of course, more to the UK than the German system of industrial
relations, although non-statutory forms of participation introduced in this way in
German workplaces still present a valid case.
10. The German case studies support the thesis that the translation of formal rights
into effective rights at workplace level is very uneven in German companies. For an
excellent discussion of the literature on the patchy way in which Mitbestimmung is
put into practice, see Lane (1989:232-239).
11. For a discussion of the flaws of these assumptions, see Beaumont,1980: 19;
Beaumont found that worker representatives were more likely to describe their
relationship with management as involving consultation when management were less
strong on defending their right to manage, prerogative etc.
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1. What is your job?
2. Which business do you work in? (please tick one)
Flake 0	 Plastics 0
Tow - 0	 Yarns 0
3. What is your age? (please tick one)
16-23 yrs
24-31 yrsO
32-39 yrs
40-47 yrsO
48-55 yrsO
56- yrs
4. How long have you been at Little Heath? (please tick one)
0-2 yrs
	
3-5 yrs 0
6-8 yrs
	 Q	 9-11 yrs
Over 11 yrsQ
5. Are you MALE/FEMALE	 (please underline)
6. Are you a union member? YES/NO
7. Are you a shop steward? YES/NO If ' no' , have you ever been? YES/NO
8. Are you a safety rep.? YES/NO If 'no', have you ever been? YES/NO
9. Is there a safety committee for your business? YES/NO
10. If so, how often does it meet? (please tick one)
Once a week	 0	 Once every three months fl
Once every two weeks	 Don' t Know
Once a month	 0	 Other (please specify)
11. What do you consider to be the main health and safety dangers of
the work that you do? (please tick as many as you like)
Explosion 0
Electricity 0
Noise	 [J
Dust
Exposure to Chemicals
Fire	 0
Falling or Slipping Q
Asbestos 0
Other (please peciiy>
Page 2 of 6
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12. How effective would you say the Business Safety Committees are in
solving the following problems:
(a) Safety problems caused either by the company or individual
employees? (please tick one)
Very Good D
Good
Bad
Very Bad
Don' t Know Q
(b) Safety problems which require a change to the layout of the
factory, or to working practices, at little or no cost to the
company? (please tick one)
Very Good 0
Good	 0
Bad 0
Very Bad 0
Don' t Know
(C) Safety problems which require a good deal of money to put right?
Very Good Q
Good	 0
Bad 0
Very Bad 0
Don't Know Q
13. Who would you normally go to, if you had a problem, or a grievance
about a health and safety matter? (please tick one)
Your shop steward 1J	 Your department managerfl
The safety advisor 0	 Your convenor	 El
Your workmates	 0	 Your supervisor	 0
Your safety rep. fl	 The personnel manager o
The nurse	 fl	 No one	 0
Other (please specify)
Page 3 of 6
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14. What kind of changes would you like to see in the area of health
and safety at Little Heath?
15. To what extent do health and safety issues get wrapped up in other
issues such as pay and conditions? (please tick one)
Very Much
	 D
To Some Extent 0
Rarely	 0
Never	 0
Don't Know
	 0
16. How seriously do you think the company takes health and safety
issues? (please tick one)
Extremely Seriously 0
Very Seriously	 0
Quite Seriously Q
Not Very Seriously 0
Not At All Seriously 0
Don' t Know	 0
17. How do you feel about changes to health and safety since you have
been at Little Heath? (please tick one)
Health and Safety has very much improved 0
Health and Safety has improved 0
Health and Safety is just about the same 9
Health and Safety has got worse
	 0
Health and Safety has got very much worse 9
Don't Know
	 0
Page 4. of 6
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18. Which of the following would best improve health and safety?
(please tick one)
More and better laws
Higher quality management	
.	 0
Stronger unions
Better safety training f or workers 	 Q
More frequent inspections Q
The company spending more money on safety Q
Other (please specify below)
19. Have you attended any safety courses run by the union?	 YES/NO
20. Have you attended any safety courses run by the company?	 '(ES/NO
21. Have you gone to any talks about CoSHH in your department? YES/NO
22. How are you usually informed about health and safety matters?
(please tick as many as you like)
By your departmental management through briefings, talks etc.fl
By the training department, through the courses they run 0
By the union, through the courses they run I]
By your shop stewards
By your safety reps. 0
By newsletters and noticeboards 0
By your supervisor 0
By your workmates 0
By the safety advisor U
By the nurse/surgery 0
By other managers 0
By no-one 0
By someone else (please specify)
Page 5 of 6
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23. Generally, how healthy a place to work in is Little Heath? (please
tick one)
Very Healthy 0
Fairly Healthy Q
Fairly Unhealthy 0
Very Unhealthy
Don' t Know
24. Some people blame the company for accidents, some blame the union,
some blame individuals. In your opinion, who is more often to
blame? (please tick one)
Usually the worker himself/herself 	 0
Usually the company/management
Usually contractors/contract workers
Usually no one is to blame, they are just accidents 0
No one Is usually more to blame than anyone else
Don't Know
	 0
Someone/something else is to blame (please specify)
25. Do you want to say anything else about nealtn and safety at Little
Heath? Do you want to make any comments about this questionnaire?
Please continue on a separate page if necessary; please remem.Der that
the questionnaire is comletely anonymous.
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Fragebogen zurn Arbeitsschutz beini Tiefbauamt der Stadt
(Bitte keine Nauien angeben. Der Fragebogen wird vom Tiefbauaint nicht
ausgewertet..)
1. Was sind Sie von Beruf, bzw, weichen Beruf Uben Sie ,aus 	 ________________
2. In weicher Abteilung arbeiten Sie? _______________________________________
3. Wie alt sind Sie?
	
16-23 0	 40-47 9
	24-31 13	 48-55 Q
	32-39 9	 56- fl
4. Wie lange sind Sie beim Tiefbauanit beschäftigt?
0-2 Jahre	 9	 3-5 Iahre 13
6-8 Jahre	 13	 9-il Ianrejj
mehr als 11 JahrejJ
5. Sind Sie MANN/FRAU? (bitte unterstreichen)
6. Sind Sie Gewerkschaftsmitglied?	 JA/4E'	 (bitte unterstreichen)
7. Sind Sie Vertrauensznann/frau? 	 JA-/NEIN	 (bitte uriterstreichen)
8. Sind Sie Sicherheitsbeauftragte(r)?	 J-AINEIN	 (bitte unterstreichen)
9. Weiches sind die hauptsächlichen Arbeitsschutzgefanren bei Ihrer
Tat igkeit?
10. Wenn Sie em Problem bezüglich Arbeitsschutz haben, mit wem sprechen
Sie zuerst? (bitte nur eine Wahi)
Vert rauensmann/ frau	 0
Vorgesetzter 0
Fachkx-aft für Arbeitssicherheit 0
leitend. Sicherheitsbeauftragten 0
Nieinand	 0
Anciere (bitte genau angeben)	 0
Sicherheit sbeauft ragten 0
Dienstellenleitung	 9
Personairat	 0
Ihren Mitarbeitern	 0
Berufsgenossenschaft	 0
1
00
0
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11. Wie werden Sie normalerweise über Arbeitsschutzangelegenheiten
inforiniert? (nur eine Wahi)
von Sicherheitsbeauftragten 0
• von Vorgesetzten 	 0
von Nieivandem	 Q
von der Gewerkschaft	 0
von anderen Mitarbeitern 0
vom Personalrat	 0
von der Fachkraft für Arbeitssicherheit 0
von Vertrauensleuten	 Q
von den Berufsgenossenschaften 	 Q
durch Rundschreiben/Schwarzes Brett 	 0
von der Dienstellenleitung durch
Anweisungen, Unterweisungen usw.	 0
von Anderen (bitte genau angeben) 	 0
12. Weiche Einrichtung/Ste].ie ist am wichtigsten für Ihre Interessen:-
(a) im Bereich Arbeitsschutz?
Personairat 0
Gewerkschaft 0
Dienstelle
keine	 0
andere (bitte genau angeben)
(b) im Bereich Arbeitsiöhne?
Personairat 0
Gewerkschaft Q
Dienstelie 0
keine	 0
andere (bitte genau angeben)
Cc) insgesamt?
Personairat 0
Gewerkschaft 0
Diensteile 0
keine	 0
andere (bitte genau angeben)
2
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13. Wie wirksam 1st der Personairat im Bereich Arbeitsschutz beini
Tiefbauamt? (nur eine Wahi)
Sehr wirksam 0
wenig wlrksam
kauin wirksain
unwirksam	 0
kelne Ahnung 0
14. Wie beurteilen Sie die Unterschiede hirisichtlich Beschaftigung und
Leistungsdruck zwischen gewerblicher Wlrtschaft und öffentlichem
Dienst? (nur eine Wahi)
sehr unterschiedlich 0
unterschiedlich	 0
kein Unterschied	 0
keine Ahnung
andere (bitte genau angeben)O
15. "Leistungsdruck mm Offentlicnen Dienst 1st
GROSSER, VERGLEICHBAR, WEIGER
als mm gewerbiichen Wirtschaft? (nur elne Wahi; bitte unterstreichen)
16. Weiche Veránderurigen würden Sie für den Bereich Arbeitsschutz beim
Tiefbauamt empfehlen?
17. Wje hat sich dei- Arbeitsschutz beim Tiefbauamt in den ietzten Iahren
verändert? (nur eine Wahi)
Arbeitsschutz 1st jetzt viel besser	 0
Arbeitsschutz ist jetzt besser
	 0
Kein Veränderung	 0
Arbeitsschutz let jetzt schlechter 0
Arbeitsschutz 1st jetzt viel schlechter 0
keine Ahnung 0
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18. Weitere persönhiche Aussagen/Meinungen zuni Arbeitsschutz beim
Tiefbauaint:
Nach dent Ausfülien bitte ungahend an den Personairat beint Tiefbauamt
zurUcksenden.
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mitarbeit
Richard Olsen
Universität Warwick
Coventry
England
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